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Abstract 
Turkey’s modernization process has been heavily influenced by the strong will and idealistic 
ambition of the Turkish state to ensure progress and development since the inception of the 
country in 1923, or even earlier, since the first modernization attempts of the Ottoman 
Empire in the 19th century. Elevating the whole nation to the level of “contemporary 
civilizations,” which was perceived as the level and standards of the West, and ensuring 
integration and homogenization in political, economic, social, and cultural spheres at the 
national level have been indispensable principles of this process. For this reason, dispersing 
the population and services throughout the country and reducing the long-standing disparities 
between inner and coastal as well as eastern and western regions have also been crucial for 
the state to fulfill its regional policy and modernization goals and objectives.  
Even though a wide range of modernizing reforms and development policies were 
implemented and many development plans, programs, and projects were formulated to this 
end since the 1920s, arguably Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, 
GAP) has been the most ambitious and sensational project in this regard. GAP was initiated 
in long “underdeveloped” Southeastern Anatolia Region–or GAP region–in the 1970s as a 
technical project primarily to produce energy and irrigate lands through constructing plenty 
of dams and hydroelectric power plants on Euphrates and Tigris. In time, however, the focus, 
scope, and character of GAP have undergone significant changes and the project has evolved 
into a bolder scheme to reorder and transform the political, social, economic, and cultural 
landscape of GAP region and reshape the mindset and behaviors of its local population.  
Even though the advancement of GAP increased the influence of the project on GAP region 
and led to positive development outcomes such as increase in agricultural production and per 
capita income over time, it also led to controversy, unintended consequences, and 
contestation on different fronts. The mismatch of visions, aspirations, and expectations 
between the architects of GAP and the local population never ceased to exist. The negative 
environmental and social impacts and drawbacks of the project were also subjected to wide 
criticism. Despite these, the project was not only constantly redefined, repackaged, and 
reintroduced as a solution to socio-economic and socio-political problems of GAP region, but 
also given a “special” or “untouchable” status that prevented the questioning of its rationale, 
raison d’etre, modus operandi, and similar deeper and often overlooked aspects. Also, GAP 
was rarely examined in the light of critical development approaches and especially the 
concept of depoliticization, both of which question the “neutral” and “non-political” nature of 
development and concentrate on contestation and power relations created or altered by 
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development. Discursive constructions and perceptions of the architects of GAP and their 
implications were also largely overlooked. The project remained mostly unpacked and many 
questions as to what it used to be in the past, has recently become, and would look like in the 
future; why it was initiated; and how it was initiated remained uncontested in the literature. 
This study fills this important research gap and examines through what kind of discursive and 
material practices politicians, bureaucrats, experts, intellectuals, and other elite groups of the 
Turkish state have shaped the design and implementation of GAP. Based on written and 
spoken texts on GAP such as parliamentary proceedings between 1975 and 2014, archival 
resources of GAP Regional Development Administration, and 64 semi-structured interviews 
with the representatives of various governmental and non-governmental institutions, the 
study examines GAP’s rationale, vocabulary, assumptions, constructions, and mechanisms. 
In the theoretical guidance of critical development approaches and depoliticization and 
methodological guidance of post-positivist discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis 
methods, the study demystifies the project and demonstrates how it could remain rarely 
problematized and retain its “sanctified” position, which was supposedly “above” and 
“beyond” politics. Finally, based on the empirical findings, the study introduces and 
discusses a number of illuminating inferences on the concept of development in general and 
GAP in particular. 
The study comprises eight chapters that are subdivided into four parts. The first part, 
“Introduction,” comprises the introduction chapter followed by the theoretical framework and 
methodology of the study (Chapter 1, 2, & 3). The second part, “Background and Literature 
Review,” comprises one chapter (Chapter 4) and provides the history of modernization and 
development efforts of the Turkish state since the Ottoman period in the 19th century, distinct 
characteristics of Southeastern Anatolia Region, and a comprehensive and systematic 
literature review on GAP. The third part, “Empirical Analysis,” comprises three chapters that 
examine the historical trajectory of GAP and oscillations in its governance since its inception 
(Chapter 5); what kind of sources gave impetus to the initiation of GAP and how it has been 
rationalized in more than four decades (Chapter 6); and the sources and forms of 
depoliticization in the overall GAP framework and how GAP and depoliticization have 
related to each other (Chapter 7). The fourth part, “Conclusion,” comprises one concluding 
chapter (Chapter 8) that summarizes the study, identifies the major inferences drawn from the 
study about development and GAP, explains the implications of the study on GAP and 
development practice, and points to future research directions that can complement the study 
and initiate new research avenues in the relevant literature. 
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Kurzfassung 
Seit der Gründung der Türkei, wenn nicht sogar seit den ersten Modernisierungsbestrebungen 
des Osmanischen Reiches im 19. Jahrhundert, ist der Modernisierungsprozess des Landes 
stark von dem unbedingten Willen und der idealistischen Ambition des türkischen Staates 
beeinflusst Fortschritt und Entwicklung zu gewährleisten. Die ganze Nation auf die Stufe der 
"zeitgenössischen Zivilisationen" zu heben, auf die Standards des Westens, und Integration 
und Homogenisierung auf der nationalen Ebene in politischen, sozialen und kulturellen 
Bereichen waren unabdingbare Bestandteile dieses Prozesses. Aus diesem Grund waren die 
Verteilung von Bevölkerung und Leistungen im ganzen Land und die Reduzierung der 
langjährigen Disparitäten zwischen inneren und küstennahen, sowie östlichen und westlichen 
Regionen ausschlaggebend für den Staat um seine modernisierungs- und regionalpolitischen 
Ziele erfüllen zu können. 
Obwohl ein großes Spektrum modernisierender Reformen und Entwicklungsstrategien 
umgesetzt wurde und ein großer Anteil der Entwicklungspläne, -programme und Projekte seit 
den 1920er Jahren zu diesem Zweck formuliert wurde, ist das Südostanatolien-Projekt (türk. 
Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) wohl das ambitionierteste und aufsehenerregendste 
Projekt in diesem Zusammenhang. GAP  wurde in der seit langem "unterentwickelten" und 
konfliktgeschüttelten Südostanatolien Region, der GAP Region, in den 1970er Jahren als 
technisches Projekt initiiert. Das vorrangige Ziel war es, Energie zu erzeugen und trockene 
Böden durch die Konstruktion einer Vielzahl von Staudämmen und Wasserkraftwerke 
verschiedener Größe an Euphrat und Tigris zu bewässern. Im Verlauf der Jahre hat sich der 
Fokus, Umfang und Charakter des GAP erheblich verändert. Das Projekt ist zu einem 
gewagteren Vorhaben geworden, mit dem Ziel, die politische, soziale, ökonomische und 
kulturelle Landschaft der GAP Region zu verändern und die Mentalitäten und 
Verhaltensweisen der lokalen Bevölkerung umzuformen.  
Obwohl das Fortschreiten von GAP den Einfluss des Projektes auf die GAP Region und seine 
lokale Bevölkerung durch bestimmte Entwicklungsdiskurse und -praktiken erhöhte und zu 
positiven Ergebnisse führte, führte es auch zu Kontroversen, unbeabsichtigten Konsequenzen 
und Anfechtungen an verschiedenen Fronten. Die Diskrepanzen zwischen Visionen, 
Aspirationen und Erwartungen zwischen den Architekten des GAP und der lokalen 
Bevölkerung bestanden dauerhaft. In der Tat waren GAP und seine zahlreichen positiven und 
negativen Aspekte in der Vergangenheit bereits Untersuchungsobjekte verschiedenster 
Disziplinen. Allerdings wurde das Projekt nicht nur immer wieder neu definiert und 
wiederholt als die Lösung der vielen sozio-ökonomischen und sozio-politischen Probleme der 
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GAP Region vor- und dargestellt, ihm wurde auch ein "spezieller" oder "unantastbarer" 
Status verliehen, der es verhinderte, dass seine Gründe, raison d’etre, modus operandi oder 
ähnliche tieferliegende Aspekte in Frage gestellt wurden. Auch in der Literatur wurde das 
GAP selten im Lichte kritischer Entwicklungsansätze betrachtet und mit dem Konzept der 
Entpolitisierung betrachtet. Beide Ansätze stellen die angenommene neutrale und 
unpolitische Natur von Entwicklung in Frage und konzentrieren sich auf Konflikte und 
Machtbeziehungen, die von Idee und Praxis von Entwicklung geschaffen oder verändert 
werden. Sowohl diskursive Konstruktionen und Wahrnehmungen der Architekten des GAP, 
als auch die Vielzahl der Implikationen auf verschiedenen Ebenen wurden weitgehend 
übersehen. GAP wurde "glorifiziert" und in politischen Kreisen und der Literatur selten 
problematisiert. Viele Fragen im Hinblick auf Was das Projekt in der Vergangenheit war, im 
Verlauf wurde und in der Zukunft sein wird, aber auch Warum es initiiert und Wie es gestaltet 
und implementiert wurde, bleiben nach, wie, vor unangefochten.  
Die vorliegende Studie füllt diese wichtige Forschungslücke und untersucht durch welche Art 
diskursiver und materieller Praktiken PolitikerInnen, BürokratInnen, ExpertInnen, 
Intellektuelle und andere Gruppen der Elite des türkischen Staates die Form und 
Implementierung des GAP gestaltet haben. Die Studie orientiert sich theoretisch an kritischen 
Entwicklungsansätzen und Entpolitisierungstheorien und methodisch an post-positivistischer 
Diskursanalyse und Methoden qualitativer Inhaltsanalyse. Auf Grundlage geschriebener und 
gesprochener Texte wie parlamentarischer Sitzungsberichte zwischen 1975 und 2014, den 
archivierten Ressourcen der regionalen GAP Entwicklungsadministration und 64 semi-
strukturierten Interviews mit RepräsentantInnen verschiedener Regierungs- und Nicht-
Regierungsorganisationen entmystifiziert die Studie GAP. Sie untersucht Argumentationen, 
Vokabular, Annahmen, Konstruktionen und Mechanismen und bietet so sowohl eine neue, 
innovative und alternative Perspektive auf GAP, als auch auf das Konzept der Entwicklung 
und die Entwicklungsvisionen und Praktiken des türkischen Staates.  
Die Studie besteht aus acht Kapiteln, die sich in vier Teile aufteilen. Der erste Teil, 
"Einleitung" umfasst das Einführungskapitel, gefolgt von dem theoretischen Rahmen und der 
Methodologie (Kapitel 1, 2, 3). Der zweite Teil, "Hintergrund und Forschungsstand", besteht 
aus einem Kapitel (Kapitel 4) und rekapituliert die Modernisierungsgeschichte und die 
Entwicklungsbemühen des türkischen Staates seit dem Osmanischen Reich im 19. 
Jahrhundert. Außerdem beinhaltet es eine Darstellung der Besonderheiten von 
Südostanatolien und eine umfassende und systematische Literaturauswertung über das GAP 
Projekt. Der dritte Teil "Empirische Analyse", besteht aus drei Kapiteln. Kapitel 5 untersucht 
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den geschichtlichen Ablauf des GAP und die Unstetigkeit in seiner Steuerung seit Beginn. 
Kapitel 6 geht der Frage nach, welcher Anlass den Anstoß zur Initiierung des GAP gab und 
wie es über mehr als vier Jahrzehnte legitimiert wurde. Die Gründe und Formen von 
Entpolitisierung im Rahmen des GAP und wie Entpolitisierung und GAP miteinander in 
Bezug stehen, wird in Kapitel 7 untersucht. Der vierte Teil "Zusammenfassung" besteht aus 
einem abschließenden Kapitel (Kapitel 8), welches die Studie, sowie die grundlegenden 
Erkenntnisse der Forschung über Entwicklung und GAP zusammenfasst. Das Kapitel erklärt 
die Implikationen der Forschungsergebnisse für die Entwicklungspraxis im Kontext von GAP 
und verweist auf zukünftigen weiterführenden Forschungsbedarf.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We all have childhood memories. Some we repress so deeply that we hardly remember them, 
some we remember so clearly, as if they happened yesterday. I consider myself fortunate to 
have a great number of memories that fall into the latter category. For instance, I clearly 
remember how cold and snowy my place of birth was, how stressed I was on the first day of 
school, how proud I was when I first learned to read and write, or how happy I felt when my 
parents bought me a football for the first time. I have dozens, maybe hundreds of such 
moments I remember with mixed feelings. Among these, there is one special memory that 
stands out for the strong impression it left on me: I clearly remember seeing a gigantic 
concrete wall, a deep blue lake behind this wall, vast green fields, huge yellow machines 
operating on these fields, water coming out of pipes and sprinklers, factories with smoke 
coming out of their chimneys, shiny roads, complex intersections and viaducts, and similar 
images on television, possibly in the late 1980s or early 1990s. I am sure a considerable 
number of people who were born and raised in Turkey in the 1980s also remember at least 
one of these images. As a kid then, of course I did not have the slightest idea what these 
scenes were all about, but I remember feeling mesmerized by what I saw on the television 
screen on that specific day.  
Years later, in the 1990s, I came to know that the scenes I saw then were actually part 
of a short video clip about Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, 
GAP). I came to know that the project was one of the largest, the most ambitious, and the 
most controversial development projects in the history of modern Turkey, initiated in the 
1970s in Southeastern Anatolia Region–or GAP region–to produce energy and irrigate vast 
arid lands through constructing 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) in various 
sizes on Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Over time, I became familiar with GAP and the concept 
of development not because I had a special interest in them as a boy then, but because they 
were simply everywhere. “Development,” “development move,” “rapid development,” 
“Turkey is developing,” “Turkey will develop,” “Turkey is growing fast,” “GAP,” “GAP will 
develop Turkey,” “GAP will bring abundance to Southeastern Anatolia,” “GAP will change 
Turkey’s destiny,” “GAP will change ‘the ill-fate’ of GAP region,” and similar words, 
slogans, and statements could be easily heard at schools, on the streets, on television and read 
in books, textbooks, magazines, and newspapers. There was even a special television channel 
entitled “TRT GAP,” launched in 1989 by the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation 
(Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu, TRT) to present and publicize the project and its 
multiple impacts on southeastern Turkey. In time, I learned that the project was also designed 
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and implemented to radically transform the political, social, economic, and cultural landscape 
of GAP region–which corresponds to approximately 10% of Turkey’s surface area–and 
reshape the mindset and behaviors of the local population in GAP region–which corresponds 
to approximately 10% of Turkey’s population. Given the attention GAP received and the 
optimism it spread, I had no single doubt that development was a noble and virtuous cause 
and GAP was a flawless design that would eventually bring about a better future in which 
development, progress, order, peace, happiness, welfare would prevail.  
Towards the late 1990s, however, it became clear–at least to me as a teenager then–
that even a noble cause such as development could have detrimental consequences and even a 
benevolent project such as GAP could have imperfections and controversies. In addition to 
the regional and international controversy GAP created over the utilization of Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers among Turkey as the upstream state and Syria and Iraq as downstream states, 
more and more news footages, news articles, columns, and scholarly works drew attention to 
GAP-induced domestic controversies such as grave environmental and social problems 
including, but not limited to, soil salinization, soil erosion, waterlogging, climactic changes, 
flooding of historical sites, and forced displacement and resettlement. There was also another 
rising controversy with national, regional, and international dimensions over the alleged role 
of GAP in terms of its contribution to the Turkish state’s efforts to solve the long-standing 
and ongoing Kurdish question.1 Then, it occurred to me for the first time that there might also 
be a “dark side” of development and an untold story of huge dams, vast green fields, orderly 
images, and promises of a better future. Still, despite the increased exposure of such 
unforeseen and/or unintended consequences of development-cum-GAP, neither development 
nor GAP suffered a serious popularity loss. Both were still associated with “the good” and 
perceived as panaceas. From prime ministers to members of parliament (MPs), from 
governors to local politicians, from bureaucrats to experts, almost all elite groups within the 
state structure unanimously continued to agree that development was a benevolent enterprise 
and a positive process and GAP would bring about positive change and transform GAP 
region and its local population in a good way. In other words, there was hardly a change in 
how development and GAP were perceived, interpreted, and narrated. Apparently, 
controversies and dramatic consequences of development-cum-GAP were not that critical 
and worrisome in the eyes of the designers and implementers of GAP.  
                                                
1 Alternative labels include, but not limited to, the Eastern problem, Southeastern problem, Kurdish problem, 
Kurdish conflict, Turkish-Kurdish conflict, terrorism problem. 
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In the first half of the 2000s, GAP was not as sensational as it once was. Despite this, 
the project was still mostly associated with betterment, prosperity, happiness, and wealth. 
Also, according to the original plan and schedule, the project was supposed to be completed 
in this period until 2005. However, it appeared that it was an optimistic estimation and the 
project needed at least another decade or so to become fully operational. From my 
perspective then–this time as an adult–what was remarkable was not the delay in the schedule 
but, generally speaking, how little it mattered to people whether GAP was on time or 
delayed, complete or incomplete, or successful or disastrous. Seemingly, there was a lack of 
excitement about and apathy towards GAP. The reasons might indeed vary, but then I 
thought it was because people somehow internalized the project over decades and perceived 
it as a timeless and spaceless entity, a part of their lives even if they were not located in GAP 
region. I realized that GAP was perceived almost like a constant that existed and would exist 
eternally. It did not matter whether coalition and single-party governments came and went, 
political and economic crises arose and faded away, ethno-political conflicts escalated and 
deescalated, and similar noteworthy developments took place in Turkey; GAP was always 
treated as a “national” project which was supposed to be “above” politics and insulated from 
the endless and vicious political debates and contestations. Given the strong will and 
idealistic ambition of the state to ensure development and “fetishization” of GAP to this end, 
I began to wonder how and why the project had a “special” and “untouchable” status and 
whether the project would end at some point or evolve into something else in the future.   
 From the second half of the 2000s onwards, the visibility and momentum of GAP 
significantly increased once again. New action plans, reports, and studies were prepared and 
new subprojects and activities were carried out to revitalize the project and complete it as 
soon as possible. Once again, a tremendous amount of resources were allocated to GAP in 
addition to billions of dollars already spent on it. Once again, narratives that emphasized how 
GAP would bring about the promised development to GAP region and its local population 
and “save” both from the so-called backwardness, underdevelopment, ignorance, poverty, 
and powerlessness gained currency. Once again, controversies and discontents regarding the 
construction of certain dams (e.g., Ilısu Dam), salinization of certain plains (e.g., Harran 
Plain), submerging of certain ancient sites (e.g., the Tomb of Zeynel Bey),2 and resettlement 
of the residents of certain towns and villages (e.g., Hasankeyf) resurfaced. Once again, 
                                                
2 In order to prevent the flooding of the Tomb of Zeynel Bey, the 1,100 tonne tomb was lifted as a whole and 
transported on a wheeled platform to be installed in a new location on May 12, 2017 (Brown, 2017). 
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controversies over the role of GAP in the context of the Kurdish question reemerged. It was 
like a déjà vu moment; almost the same narratives on development, GAP, GAP region, and 
its local population were repeated and almost the same efforts were made to accomplish 
almost the same development goals and objectives. Given the magnitude of the profound and 
rapid change society and institutions in Turkey as well as GAP region have undergone since 
the initiation of GAP, this situation was somehow unexpected and counterintuitive.  
Rist (2008, p. 23) observed that normally “if a politician makes too many demagogic 
promises, he ends up a failure in the eyes of his electorate. And if a researcher persists too 
long with experiments that show no result, he is eventually dismissed by his employer.” 
However, he continued, “nothing of the kind happens in the field of ‘development’: promises 
are tirelessly repeated and experiments constantly reproduced” (p. 23). In line with this 
observation, it was interesting to see that again and again different projects under the 
umbrella of GAP were found inadequate and inappropriate to meet the needs and demands of 
the local population; there was almost always a debate on a mismatch of visions, aspirations, 
and expectations between the architects and target groups of the project. For instance, 
projects were widely conceived as completely detached from the realities of the local 
population and state-centric rather than citizen-centric with their exclusive focus on energy 
production and weak focus on irrigation projects that would have a direct impact on people. 
In simpler terms, it was generally believed that the project benefits were not trickling down. 
Also, negative ecological, social, and humanitarian impacts of the project became too visible 
to ignore over time. Still, such criticisms and drawbacks did not prevent GAP from being 
constantly redefined, repackaged, and reintroduced as a solution to various socio-economic 
and socio-political problems of GAP region in particular and Turkey in general. The 
approach to the concept of development was no less different. Even though development 
vision, policies, and practices of the Turkish state were subjected to intense criticism for 
causing disappointments, unintended consequences, and negative impacts on many fronts, 
more and more development plans and projects were implemented nationwide over the years.  
This situation was puzzling for several reasons. It was unclear why both GAP and 
development had “special,” “untouchable,” and almost “sanctified” statuses that limited 
debate and deliberation on their utility and consequences and prevented challenges to their 
foundations. In other words, it was unclear why GAP was being presented as the only 
possible alternative–“the only game in town”–that would “save” GAP region from its 
“underdeveloped” and conflict-ridden past. It was also unclear how almost every GAP- and 
development-induced negative impact and drawback could be justified somehow for years 
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and the project could proceed incessantly as if its unforeseen outcomes that concerned 
environmental degradation or social degeneration were petty and negligible issues. In relation 
to these, it was unclear why both GAP and development were conceived and treated as 
objective and neutral schemes while it was clear that their practice on the ground were 
creating winners and losers, altering power dynamics, and leading to political implications 
and consequences. Furthermore, it was unclear why the problems and imperfections 
associated with GAP and development were always attributed to some external factors or 
phenomena beyond human agency, but never to GAP itself and/or the concept of 
development itself. Combined together, it was unclear how GAP could remain rarely 
problematized both within policy-making circles and in the literature and proceed without its 
politics, rationale, raison d’etre, modus operandi, and similar deeper and often overlooked 
aspects being adequately questioned and challenged. 
In order to demystify and untangle this “mystique” around GAP and development, in 
this study I focus primarily on the texts and words of GAP and development and how both 
were written and narrated in legislative documents, policy papers, action plans, reports, 
surveys, etudes, formal and informal discussions, parliamentary debates, speeches, and 
similar written and spoken sources that were produced by various elite groups in politics, 
bureaucracy, development sector, non-governmental sector, and academia. My intention is 
not to measure and evaluate the effects of GAP or provide a simple and static description of 
the project. Neither is it to condemn GAP and development and claim they are 
unquestionably and essentially “bad” or “evil.” Rather, my aim is to introduce a fresh, 
original, and alternative perspective on GAP and examine its rationale, vocabulary, 
assumptions, constructions, and mechanisms. In this light, I formulated the following main 
research question and asked: Through what kind of discursive and material practices have the 
political, bureaucratic, expert, and intellectual elite actors of the Turkish state shaped the 
design and implementation of GAP? Furthermore, in the guidance of critical approaches to 
development and specifically the concept of depoliticization, I asked: How have state 
practices contributed to depoliticization of issues, institutions, and processes in the overall 
GAP framework? In relation to these broad questions, more specifically I asked: How was 
Southeastern Anatolia Region represented in legislative and elite discourses? How was GAP 
perceived and interpreted by different actors? How did these discourses change over time? 
How did these representations and conceptions contribute to (re-)configuration of power 
relations and influence policies? How was GAP positioned within Turkey’s modernization 
ideals and process? How was the design and implementation of GAP rationalized and 
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motivated? In addition to the theoretical guidance of critical development approaches and 
depoliticization, I drew on the methodological guidance of qualitative content analysis and 
discourse analysis methods to answer these questions. In this process, asking the how 
questions was hardly sufficient for a rigorous examination and had to be complemented by 
what and why questions in order not to miss out any crucial points, especially in accordance 
with an “interstitial” focus. Also, the final reordering of the findings could well reflect the 
what, why, and how of GAP and the operation of development–or the development 
apparatus–in Turkey. For this reason, I also presented them in the same order and discussed 
what GAP used to be in the past, has recently become, and would look like in the future; why 
GAP was initiated; and how GAP was designed and implemented in a detailed manner.  
As a scholarly work, this study is unique in certain respects. A careful examination of 
GAP-related literature indicates that the project and its various aspects were interpreted, 
evaluated, analyzed, and examined from the perspectives of various disciplines over decades. 
Still, unlike the majority of these mostly quantitative works on GAP and its various aspects, 
this qualitative study employs a post-positivist approach that challenges the positivist 
principles of hypotheses testing, objectivism, empiricism, and naturalism. In line with this, 
the study is one of the rare academic studies that focuses primarily on the discursive 
constructions and perceptions regarding GAP rather than numbers, official statistics, graphs, 
figures, and similar quantitative data, without claiming that “language is all there is” and the 
world can be reduced solely to the words of development (Crush, 1995, p. 5). Also, unlike the 
majority of the studies that had mainstream development approaches as their anchors and 
considered development as a neutral, technical, and power-free enterprise and process in 
examining GAP, this study examines the project and its implications through critical 
development approaches and especially the concept of depoliticization, both of which allow 
the consideration of power dynamics and contestation embedded in the idea, discourse, 
policy, and practice of development. In this regard, it would not be far-fetched to argue that 
the study is the most comprehensive and detailed study so far that focuses on and discusses 
the depoliticizing implications of the project. The study is also one of the few works that 
focuses not on the target groups of GAP–local communities, farmers, villagers, and similar 
laypersons–but on the designers and implementers or architects of the project–politicians, 
bureaucrats, experts, intellectuals, and similar elite groups within the Turkish state 
mechanism. In other words, the focus is on how elite groups who vary in type and possess 
different amounts of power have perceived, narrated, adjusted, and negotiated the project for 
more than four decades in order to understand and examine the operation of the complex 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 8 
organization or apparatus that formulated development policies and practiced development in 
the overall GAP framework.  
Given its uniqueness and contribution to the relevant literature, the study is appealing 
not only to research community in the fields of development studies and political science, but 
also to practitioners and policy-making community with similar backgrounds. For instance, a 
researcher who adhered to mainstream development approaches can grasp a different and 
alternative perspective on how development projects are negotiated and operationalized on 
the ground and what kind of overlooked implications they might lead to. Another researcher 
who adhered to more critical and “post-” approaches can enrich his/her knowledge by 
comparing and contrasting the study with other similar analyses that were conducted through 
a critical lens and based on primary and qualitative data. Researchers who have a regional 
focus on the Middle East in general, Turkey in particular, and Southeastern Anatolia Region 
more specifically can also acquire valuable information regarding how the politics and non-
politics of GAP have played out, how development and modernization vision and practices of 
the Turkish state have evolved, and how these two can be related to more recent 
developments as well as fluctuations in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres in 
Turkey. Also, practitioners and policy-makers can get a better idea of how complex and 
unpredictable development can become on the ground when development discourses are 
translated into action and plans are translated into policies. They can also gain insights on 
how to formulate policies that actually “work” and do not lead to unwanted and detrimental 
development-induced consequences. In that sense, the study is a comprehensive and multi-
dimensional examination of the “problematique” of GAP and development rather than a 
prescriptive and one-dimensional analysis of the issue at hand.  
The study is subdivided into four broad and interrelated parts. The first part, entitled 
“Introduction,” comprises the current introductory chapter (Chapter 1) followed by the 
theoretical framework (Chapter 2) and methodology of the study (Chapter 3). The second 
part, entitled “Background and Literature Review,” comprises one long chapter and not only 
provides detailed explanation about the history and background of the research topic, but also 
presents a comprehensive review of the relevant literature (Chapter 4). The third part, entitled 
“Empirical Analysis,” comprises three chapters which document and examine the historical 
trajectory of GAP and oscillations in its governance since its inception until 2015 (Chapter 
5); examine the primary reasons or sources that rationalized the design and implementation of 
the project as well as their multiple implications on various fronts (Chapter 6); and identify 
and discuss the sources and forms of depoliticization in the overall project framework 
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(Chapter 7). The fourth and final part, entitled “Conclusion,” synthesizes what has been 
discussed in seven chapters and makes the concluding remarks of the study (Chapter 8).3  
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework of the study and illustrates the guiding 
premises to be followed and applied in the empirical analysis. In order to discuss how the 
concepts of development and depoliticization relate to each other, I first present a brief 
history of development from the 18th century onwards and discuss the roots of the concept, its 
historical trajectory in the light of major development theories, and criticisms made against 
its main assumptions and practice in different time periods. Second, I clarify how the 
concepts of the political, politics, and depoliticization are understood in this study through 
making references specifically to prominent thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, Chantal Mouffe, 
and Jacques Rancière as well as more recent approaches in the relevant literature, without the 
intention to construct an all-encompassing, overarching, and “flawless” theory based on these 
insights, but rather to benefit from the diversity and different explanatory powers of these 
insights in the analysis. Following this, I focus closely on depoliticization in the context of 
development and discuss in what ways depoliticization has been visible in the idea and 
practice of development so far.  
 Chapter 3 introduces the methodology of the study. In this brief chapter, I first 
provide detailed information regarding both the data collection methods I employed in the 
study and the process of how I managed to collect data. Following this, I explicate the 
process of how I interpreted and analyzed the collected data and clarify the stages of the 
analysis. Finally, I reflect on my position throughout the research process and explain not 
only what sort of prospects and challenges I faced in the whole process, but also how they 
influenced me as a researcher in particular and my research and findings in general.  
 Chapter 4 presents both a background of GAP’s design and implementation and a 
comprehensive review of GAP-related literature. In order to better explain how the idea of 
GAP came into being and show how the study fills an important research gap with its distinct 
theoretical and methodological approach, I first explicate how the idea of modernizing 
Turkey and ensuring development, integration, and homogenization in political, economic, 
social, and cultural spheres all over the country emerged through tracing their origins since 
the 19th century Ottoman Empire. Second, I discuss the distinct characteristics of 
Southeastern Anatolia Region to demonstrate the reasons as to why specifically that region 
                                                
3 In addition, along with references, a separate part entitled “Appendices” documents the written texts that were 
examined, participants who were interviewed, and the coding frame that was formulated in this study.  
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was chosen as the locus of GAP. Third, I systematically discuss the relevant GAP-related 
scholarly works as well as government documents that were produced so far to illustrate both 
the existing literature in different thematic categories and subcategories and under-researched 
areas in the literature.  
 Chapter 5 is an examination of the historical trajectory of GAP and oscillations in its 
governance since its initiation in the 1970s up until 2015 in the guidance of the historical 
trajectory of the idea and practice of development. By focusing primarily on how the 
architects of GAP have imagined, materialized, altered, and adjusted the project in their 
discursive practices, policy practices, conceptions, and arguments, I demonstrate what kind of 
changes the project has undergone in terms of its modes of governance, focus and scope, and 
embedded concepts, norms, and values and how various national, regional, and global 
processes have influenced and altered the course of the project in more than four decades. In 
relation to this, I identify six broad, interrelated, and at times overlapping periods in which 
GAP was (1) a water and land resources development project, (2) a multi-sectoral and 
integrated project, (3) in limbo, (4) a sustainable human development project, (5) a market-
based project, and (6) “new GAP” and examine the most dominant narratives and notable 
developments within each period. In addition, I present a comprehensive and systematic 
analysis of the state of GAP as of 2015 from the perspective of politicians, bureaucrats, 
experts, and intellectuals. Thus, I not only reflect on the implications of the trajectory of GAP 
on the project in particular and the concept of development in general, but also demonstrate 
what GAP used to be in the past, has recently become, and would look like in the future. 
Chapter 6 is an examination of what kind of sources gave impetus to the design and 
implementation of GAP and through what kind of sources the project has been rationalized in 
the overall project framework over the years. Instead of focusing on the wide range of related 
and unrelated project goals and objectives in many different fields in a simplistic and 
reductionist manner, I closely examine broader, deeper, and more complex sources that 
apparently formed the basis of the design and implementation of the project, which I identify 
as (1) the rectification of differences of GAP region, (2) the admiration of the West and 
Western development trajectory, and (3) the pursuit of development and betterment at the 
expense of destruction. Indeed, rationalization of the project on these grounds was not 
without outcomes. For this reason, I also identify and discuss the implications each major 
rationale led to, such as otherization and infantilization of the local population, legitimization 
of development interventions, characterization of the project as the Turkish nation’s strength, 
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and normalization of development-induced destruction in a critical manner. Thus, I 
demonstrate and explain why GAP was initiated. 
 Chapter 7 is an examination of how GAP and the concept of depoliticization have 
related to each other and what kind of discursive and material practices have constituted the 
sources of depoliticization in the overall GAP framework. I show that in contrast to the claim 
that there has been only one, single, and simple source of depoliticization in the overall 
project framework, depoliticization originated from various complex and interrelated sources, 
which I identify as (1) the employment of technical language in the overall GAP framework, 
(2) the dominance of experts and expert knowledge in the overall GAP framework, (3) the 
neoliberalization of GAP and “biopoliticization” of its character, (4) the 
“developmentalization” of the Kurdish question, and (5) the extension of the visibility and 
authority of the state in the guise of GAP. I also illustrate that depoliticization does not take 
only one, rigid form in GAP, but rather takes various forms such as the negation of 
antagonisms, redefinition of political issues and conflicts along the lines of economics and 
morality, erosion of agency, and transferring of blame, responsibility, and costs to other 
people, institutions, or phenomena that are considered to be beyond human agency and 
control. Thus, I depict and elaborate on how GAP was designed and implemented. 
 Chapter 8 links the “Introduction,” “Background and Literature Review,” and 
“Empirical Analysis” parts together and synthesizes the arguments and discussions uttered 
throughout seven chapters. I first briefly summarize the study and highlight some of the 
significant and unique findings. Second, I identify and discuss the major inferences or “take-
home messages” about both development and GAP, drawn upon the demystification of the 
project. Following this, I clarify the study’s implications on development practice in general 
and GAP in particular. Finally, I discuss some future research directions that can complement 
and strengthen the study as well as initiate new research avenues in the relevant literature. 
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
 12 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, I explain the theoretical framework of the study and discuss how the idea and 
practice of development and the concept of depoliticization relate to each other. The chapter 
comprises four sections. In the first section, I provide a concise history of development from 
the 18th century onwards and discuss (1) the origins of the concept, (2) continuities and 
ruptures in its historical trajectory in the light of major development theories, and (3) 
critiques towards the way development has been conceptualized and practiced. In the second 
section, for the sake of clarity and analytical precision, I explain how I conceive the concepts 
of the political, politics, and depoliticization through the perspectives of prominent thinkers 
such as Carl Schmitt, Chantal Mouffe, and Jacques Rancière as well as more recent 
approaches in the literature. In the third section, I discuss depoliticization in the context of 
development and elaborate on the ways as to how depoliticization has been visible and/or 
operationalized by different development actors. In the fourth and final section, I provide a 
brief summary of the chapter to concisely restate the guiding premises that will be followed 
and applied in the empirical analysis of the study. 
2.1. A Concise History of Development: Origins, Fluctuations, and Critiques 
2.1.1. Origins of Development: A History from the 18th to the mid-20th Century 
In the literature, there is little consensus as to what the concept of development exactly refers 
to; it absorbs different meanings in different contexts. For this reason, there are many 
divergent opinions regarding its definition and objectives. It has been widely associated with 
(mainly economic) growth, progress, (mainly positive) change, and improvement. It has been 
conceived as an “immanent” process which is spontaneous, automatic, objective, and 
unconscious as well as an “intentional” process which requires deliberate and targeted 
policies and practices (Cowen & Shenton, 1995, p. 26). There is also little consensus whether 
development has been a successful or a failed project. While one party praises it for saving 
millions of people from starvation and providing them with new choices and opportunities, 
the other party denounces it for failing to eliminate poverty and inequalities and causing 
environmental and cultural destruction all around the world (Rapley, 2008, p. 177).  
The debate on the meanings and functions of development is not a recent one, though. 
The origins of the idea of development can be traced back to the period of the Enlightenment 
in Europe in the 18th century. Herath (2009, p. 1449) notes that critical investigation of the 
organization and structure of societies, application of reason and science, and the use of 
empirical knowledge gained importance during the Enlightenment and arguably laid the 
foundations of the idea of development. From a Western perspective, the idea of change 
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referred to organic processes composed of stages of growth, maturity, decay, and 
regeneration. The cyclical form of change was later on replaced by the idea of progress, 
which was conceptualized as a linear and irreversible process and associated with the 
potential for unlimited improvement (Nustad, 1997, p. 158). Given these, Cowen and 
Shenton (1995, p. 27) note that development was formulated in the context of social 
turbulences and fear of a revolution in Europe in the 19th century, with the expectation that it 
would tame the chaos induced by progress and address problems that emerged after the 
growth of capitalism such as rapid urbanization, poverty, and unemployment.  
Saint-Simonians, the followers of the positivist political and social movement 
emerged in France in the 19th century,4 were the first to formulate a doctrine of development 
to address the problems induced by the immanent process of capitalism (Nustad, 1997, p. 
158). They viewed capitalism as a critical, unstable, ineffective, and even destructive period 
on the grounds that means of production were in the control of irresponsible capitalists who 
were wasting resources in enormous scale and that the system lacked a general structuring of 
society’s resources. Also, it was impossible for progress to be a natural and uncontrolled 
process. For this reason, they replaced progress with development, which involved active 
agency and intervention (p. 158). Thus, development was not something that occurred during 
a period of history anymore; it was the means through which the present period might be 
transformed into another superior order through the actions of those who were entrusted with 
the future of society (Cowen & Shenton, 1995, p. 31). In this context, Saint-Simonians 
proposed that trustees–a system of banks–had to have control over the means of production 
on the basis of the idea that they had the capacity to make critical and rational decisions about 
the investment of society’s resources (Nustad, 1997, p. 158). Therefore, progress that was 
associated with chaos would be reconciled by order. Also, development that was associated 
with the intentional act of trustees would serve the purpose of taming the disorder. To 
illustrate this idea, John Stuart Mill, British theorist of liberal democracy who was highly 
influenced by Saint-Simonians, argued that development could take place in a society only if 
the conditions for development already existed. In relation to this, he argued that societies 
that were equipped with these suitable conditions had the obligation to guide those that 
lacked these conditions as trustees (Cowen & Shenton, 1995, pp. 35-38). In line with this 
idea, as an employee and mastermind of the East India Company, Mill was in favor of 
                                                
4 Henri de Saint-Simon had a deep influence on the French philosopher August Comte, who worked with Saint-
Simon until they quarreled and parted ways. 
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governing India by a strong imperial circle that exercised trusteeship–and arguably brutality–
to prepare suitable conditions under which development could flourish (p. 38).  
This colonial discourse in the 19th century was based on the crude distinction between 
civilized nations and uncivilized tribes or masses on the grounds that the former were both 
capable and even “destined” to rule the latter due to their incapability to manage their own 
affairs (Ziai, 2016, p. 27). Such a distinction engendered further distinctions between superior 
and inferior, rational and emotional, fit to govern and unfit to govern, and colonizer and 
colonized (p. 28). In the early 20th century, the idea that a colonizer had the obligation to 
improve the material conditions of its colonies rose to prominence. The mandate system of 
the League of Nations was, for instance, justified on this ground. Accordingly, it was 
believed that some countries would not be able to reach the conditions of the modern world 
without the external help of more advanced countries (p. 29). To put it differently, there was 
a gradual shift from colonial discourse to discourse of development as well as from the 
distinction of civilized and uncivilized to a division of developed and underdeveloped (p. 30). 
In this period, colonized subjects became aid recipients and colonial administrators became 
development practitioners (Kothari, 2002, p. 36) because “where colonialism left off, 
development took over” (Kothari, 1988, p. 143, as cited in Pieterse, 1991, p. 19). 
2.1.2. Development as a Political Project and Field of Study: The Post-1945 Period   
The period after the World War II represented the beginning of development as a political 
goal and later on as an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary field of enquiry (Buch-Hansen 
& Lauridsen, 2012, p. 293). From 1945 onwards, this period accompanied a preoccupation 
with reconstruction, decolonization, newly independent states, and division of the world into 
different spatial zones according to their levels of advancement (Currie-Alder, 2016, p. 6). It 
was generally accepted that development emerged on January 20, 1949 when the then 
President of the United States (US) Harry S. Truman made a distinction between the 
“underdeveloped” and “prosperous” areas of the world in his inaugural address–also widely 
known as “the Point Four speech”–and declared that  
[W]e must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas. … More than half the people of the world are living in 
conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. 
Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat 
both to them and to more prosperous areas. … For the first time in history, humanity 
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possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people (Rist, 2008, 
p. 71). 
Even though this idea primarily served the interest of the US, development was introduced as 
“a set of technical measures outside the realm of political debate” that concerned the common 
good of all (p. 78). The idea that development was necessary and desirable was so strong that 
the superpowers of the Cold War period–the US and the Soviet Union–agreed almost only on 
this issue and attached more importance to the “underdeveloped” parts of the world–also 
known as the Third World–to promote development together with international organizations 
(Rist, 2010, p. 20). It should be noted that this period was also the period of decolonization. 
Therefore, one strong motivation for the states to take an interest in development was also to 
address the question as to how the economies of the colonies of Britain, France, Portugal, and 
other European powers that comprised almost one-third of the world’s population could be 
transformed and made more productive (Leys, 1996, p. 5). In relation to this, development 
became a code word for the belief that the South could develop itself instead of being 
developed by the North and the assumption that the South could become as modern and 
wealthy as the North one day provided that it followed the right policies (Wallerstein, 2005, 
p. 1264). Development disciplines and theories began to emerge in this context to meet the 
demands of this new, post-World War II development thinking. Also, development projects 
began to emerge in different colors, shapes, and sizes as mechanisms that bridged “the 
trainers” and their knowledge and expertise to individuals who lacked that specific 
knowledge and expertise (DuBois, 1991, p. 19). These projects were generally expected to be 
innovative, replicable, technical, and predictive models with large effects, especially in order 
to sell solutions to problems and widen the appeal (Mosse, 2005, pp. 36-37).  
Indeed, post-World War II development thinking was not monolithic. On the 
contrary, as Bull and Bøås (2012, p. 320) note, there were discontinuities among different 
development theories and approaches. Roughly speaking, there were ruptures between 
modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s5 and structuralist theories of the 1960s and 
1970s; economic growth approach and alternative approaches critique of environmentalists, 
local developers, and others; and post-modern, post-colonial, and post-development theories 
and the whole idea of development itself. To note a caveat, even though I elaborate on each 
                                                
5 By the term modernization theories, I primary refer to classical modernization and neo-modernization theories. 
Multiple modernities paradigm that emerged in the 1990s as a challenge against classical and neo-modernization 
theories and saw the possibility of many possible modernities, moved beyond equating modernity to 
Westernization, and rejected the necessity of secularization as a requisite for modernity (Göksel, 2016, p. 249) 
was not included in this category. 
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theory below, I allocate more space for discussions on modernization theories for two major 
reasons. First, as Kothari and Minogue (2002, p. 7) put, “the modernization project continues 
to underlie any apparent change in the development project.” Also, the most influential–or 
hegemonic–development thinking is still within the contours of neoclassical economics and 
major tenets of modernization theories. Second, by being either the target of harsh criticisms 
or the source of inspiration for other theories with its major tenets, modernization theories 
contributed to flourishing of new development theories and approaches. For these reasons, 
modernization theories are primus inter pares among other development theories in this 
conceptual framework. 
2.1.2.1. Development from the perspective of modernization theories 
Modernization theories were the first development theories, specifically popular during the 
1950s and early 1960s. They became the reference point for the majority of development 
projects run by the US and the United Nations (UN). Given the hegemonic position of the 
discipline of economics in this period, it was hardly surprising that the primary objectives of 
development were to assist underdeveloped countries with Western capital and technology, 
ensure their economic growth, and promote democracy in these geographies. Especially 
economic growth was considered as an antidote of underdevelopment and “backwardness.” 
The discourse on growth was so dominant that it was generally conflated with development 
based on the idea that the wealth that was acquired by the rich through growth would trickle 
down and provide benefits to the poor (Cannon & Müller-Mahn, 2010). In accordance with 
Keynesian economic thinking, states played a direct and active role in processes such as 
creation of industrial capacity, extraction of natural resources, improvement of agricultural 
efficiency through introduction of technology, and implementation of large-scale 
infrastructure projects (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009, p. 30; Rudnyckyj & Schwittay, 2014, p. 
3). Also, planning was playing a crucial role in the steering of development; five-year 
development plans and development agencies were introduced in many developing and 
newly established post-colonial countries to facilitate their development process (Buch-
Hansen & Lauridsen, 2012, p. 296). In that sense, development according to modernization 
theories was heavily economic growth-oriented and state-led.  
Modernist interpretation of development was based on the dichotomy of traditional 
and modern. Leys (1996, p. 65) indicates that this dichotomy was derived from Max Weber 
via Talcott Parsons, one of the main proponents of modernization theories. According to this 
dichotomous thinking, traditional societies were characterized as communities marked by 
status- and emotion-based relationships, low level of division of labor, low rate of 
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production, and high level of dependence on agriculture while modern societies were 
characterized as just the opposite (p. 65). For Huntington (1971, p. 286), the essential 
difference between modern and traditional society lay in the greater control which modern 
man [sic] had over his natural and social environment. Traditional man expected continuity in 
nature and society and did not believe in his capacity to change or control. In contrast, 
modern man believed in the possibility of change and had confidence in his ability to control 
change to accomplish his purposes (p. 286). The underlying argument was that tradition, 
culture, and values played a key role in the process of development; they could facilitate 
development, but at the same time constitute a barrier against it. To illustrate this point, 
Huntington (2000, as cited in Andrews & Bawa, 2014, p. 927) justified different levels of 
development between Ghana and South Korea on the grounds that Ghanaians had different 
values compared to hardworking, diligent, and disciplined Koreans. For such reasons, the 
view that tradition and culture were obstacles in the process of development necessitated 
taking a radical break with all the preceding historical conditions and abandoning the so-
called detrimental traditional practices as a precondition to become modern or developed.  
Modernization theories were social evolutionist paradigms whose intellectual roots 
could be found in the works of the 19th century sociologists such as Max Weber and Emile 
Durkheim. They also drew their works on Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution in the natural 
world in their search to explain the shift from traditional to modern economies as well as 
change in social and cultural institutions (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009, p. 27. See also Wuketits 
& Antweiler, 2004 for more detailed information on the evolution of human societies and 
cultures). Accordingly, development required a process of transition from traditional to 
modern principles of social organization. Also, it was always a positive and irreversible 
process through which all societies eventually passed in a unilinear and uniform fashion (p. 
27). According to this logic, regardless of its level of advancement, every society could 
achieve economic development provided that they followed specific guidelines and passed 
through the stages of traditional society, pre-take-off society, take-off, road to maturity, and 
mass consumption (Rostow, 1971). For this reason, development was also conceived as a 
temporal problem (e.g., “Country X is 20 years ahead of country Y” or “X Region is 20 years 
behind Y Region”); the source of differences and inequalities between developed and 
underdeveloped countries, regions, or societies was considered to be different times they 
embarked on their development efforts (Pınarcıoğlu & Işık, 2004, p. 20). Modernization 
theories were not the only evolutionist approach, though. Different theoretical perspectives 
also shared evolutionist presuppositions about historical progress from homogeneity to 
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differentiation, savagery to civilization, and static to economically growing societies (Crewe 
& Harrison, 1998, p. 27).  
According to modernization theories, development has always been associated with 
the West and always had Western-centric or Eurocentric implications (Eriksson Baaz, 1999). 
Accordingly, the destiny of non-Western geographies was considered to be following or 
mimicking the historical development trajectory of the West and adopting Western political 
institutions and values. This was considered as a precondition to become modern and 
developed in the fields of economy, politics, culture, and so on (Mitchell, 2000, p. xi, 1). 
Indeed, such an understanding was highly monocultural and ethnocentric. It conceived 
development, modernization, and Westernization as identical concepts. The most significant 
outcomes of Western-centric approach of modernization theories were the construction of 
non-Western societies as supposedly traditional, inferior, primitive, indigenous, backward, 
the other, corrupt, uneducated, different, and deficient in a homogenizing manner and 
justification of development interventions of the Western countries and institutions on the 
grounds that only they could help non-Westerners catch up with them, just as they did during 
the colonial period (Crewe & Harrison, 1998, p. 28). The Eurocentric forms of knowledge 
production and colonialism in this regard also engendered “a sense of inferiority in 
themselves and their own people and a sense of confidence in European people and things” in 
the colonized populations (Chandra, 1992, as cited in Kothari, 2002, p. 37). 
Modernization theories attached great importance to scientific and technological 
advancements. They were considered as necessary elements for the transition from traditional 
to modern conditions. The level of development was even equated to the level of 
advancement in science and technology; it was a significant indicator of superiority. As 
Mitchell (2002, p. 15) explains, development “was a politics of techno-science, which 
claimed to bring the expertise of modern engineering, technology, and social science to 
improve the defects of nature, to transform peasant agriculture, to repair the ills of society, 
and to fix the economy.” Similarly, Scott (1998, p. 4) notes that modernization–or high-
modernist ideology–was based on a strong self-confidence about scientific and technical 
progress to have mastery over physical and human nature as well as design social order 
rationally according to scientific laws. For this reason, for instance, gigantic–even utopian–
infrastructure, energy, and transportation projects were designed and implemented all around 
the world for the sake of both development and nation-building, even though they provided 
more benefits to states and governments than they did to people.  
In relation to the point above, according to modernist interpretation of development, 
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the elites were the key actors and agents of change in the development process with their 
“relative autonomy from non-elite forces” or the mass in classical elite terminology (Parry, 
2005, p. 2), especially in “developmental” states “whose politics have concentrated sufficient 
power, autonomy and capacity at the center to shape, pursue, and encourage the achievement 
of explicit developmental objectives” (Leftwich, 1995, p. 401).6 I should briefly note that the 
introduction of the term elite dates back to the 17th century. The study of the elites, however, 
was established as a part of social sciences in the 19th century thanks primarily to the works 
of Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Roberto Michels (see Parry, 2005 for a detailed 
discussion on their works). The common argument in their doctrine was that in every society 
there existed a small, influential, and dominant group of people who held power, controlled 
the key resources, and made the major decisions (Daloz, 2010, p. 1). To briefly elaborate on 
the views of each thinker, Pareto (1935, as cited in Zannoni, 1978, p. 16) divided society into 
two basic strata according to personal qualities: a lower stratum of less talented non-elites 
and a higher stratum of the most talented elites. Elites were further divided into two as 
governing and non-governing elites. The idea behind the elite-non-elite distinction was that 
only the most talented could assure the most efficient use of resources and that society could 
benefit from the inequality in the distribution of talents among its members only through the 
rule of elites (Pareto, 1971, as cited in Zannoni, 1978, p. 16). Mosca (1939, as cited in 
Zuckerman, 1977, p. 332) also argued that in societies there was always a class that ruled and 
a class that was ruled. The ruling class consisting of a small, excellent, and cohesive group of 
people who were conscious of their positions performed all political functions, monopolized 
power, and enjoyed the advantages power brought (p. 332). Michels (1915, as cited in Brezis, 
2012, p. 6) also emphasized that power was always concentrated in the hands of a few–the 
oligarchy–who had control over resources, information flows, and other aspects of 
organizational functioning. He coined the term “iron law of oligarchy” to claim that being 
ruled by an elite group was inevitable within any organization due to tactical and technical 
necessities (p. 6). The distinguishing characteristics of the elites were, therefore, their 
excellence (being selected individuals), number (being a minority group), criteria of 
distinction (criteria to separate minority and majority), and sources of power (origin of few’s 
position) (Zannoni, 1978, p. 20). Indeed, elites varied in power and type. For instance, there 
                                                
6 Leftwich (1995, p. 405) also identifies six major features of developmental states, which are (1) determined 
developmental elites, (2) relative autonomy, (3) a powerful, competent, and insulated economic bureaucracy, (4) 
a weak and subordinated civil society, (5) the effective management of non-state economic interests, and (6) 
repression, legitimacy, and performance. 
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could exist a few very powerful figures in a decision-making setting and process, whom 
Etzioni-Halevy (1990, p. 320) designates as “the elites of elites.” Also, there existed elites of 
government, bureaucracy, non-government, labor movement, economy, the media, and 
intellectual-academic sphere (p. 323). In a more recent typology, Reed (2012, p. 211) divided 
elites into coercive elites (in military/industrial complex, law enforcement, and security), 
allocative elites (in business, finance, and industry sectors), expert elites (in the media, 
academia, and professional and service firms), and authoritative elites (in central and local 
government and bureaucracy). In this light, by the term elites, I imply actors who are 
powerful enough to have control over both material and symbolic resources at governmental, 
non-governmental, economic, civil society, cultural, and similar institutions to initiate 
political, economic, or social goals and actors who differ within their own and between other 
elite groups in terms of power and type depending on the context. Having noted that, there 
existed a “modernizing cadre” or “modernizing elites” who initiated the forces of self-
conscious transition in any modernization attempt (Frey, 1965, p. 5). To put it differently, a 
small knowledgeable and skillful group within modern state and its rational and bureaucratic 
apparatus were the principle agents to design the conditions that were supposedly the best for 
the population’s well-being (Yılmaz, 2003a, p. 31). This cadre often comprised 
developmentally-determined senior politicians and bureaucrats who were usually close to 
heads of government or state for their power to put the idea of developmentalism into 
practice (Leftwich, 1995, p. 405). In relation to this, this small group of people–specifically 
development experts and planners–enjoyed their “demigod statuses,” as it was widely 
accepted that only they were equipped with the right and sufficient knowledge to solve the 
complexities regarding the order and structure of nature and societies as well as to build a 
legible and predictable future (Pınarcıoğlu & Işık, 2004, p. 20). In the words of Scott (1998, 
p. 342), “the visionary intellectuals and planners behind [large-scale modernization projects] 
were guilty of hubris, of forgetting that they were mortals and acting as if they were gods.” In 
addition, modernization theorists assumed that the elites–often educated and trained in the 
West–in periphery countries would play a key role in diffusing modern values out from the 
center (Leys, 1996, p. 10). The idea was that, even though the external forces could speed up 
the modernization process, the primary impetus had to come from within.  
In brief, modernization theories attached great importance to economic growth and 
rapid process of industrialization through state intervention. They put great emphasis on 
scientific domination of nature, strong belief in linear progress, necessity to break with 
history and tradition, absolute truths, and rational planning of ideal social orders liberated 
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from the irrationalities of myth, religion, and superstition under standardized conditions of 
knowledge and production (Harvey, 1989, pp. 10-38). Also, they included elements of elite-
driven social engineering and ambition to shape economies and societies in an interventionist 
and managerialist fashion through dictating other people what to do in the name of 
modernization, nation-building, progress, and mobilization (Pieterse, 2000, p. 182). For this 
reason, society was conceived as if it were a “raw material” to be transformed into a better 
product and individuals were conceived as if they were “tabula rasa” to be transformed into 
“normalized” or “governable” subjects. Due to such characteristics, modernization theories or 
national developmentalism–understood as the normative belief in development policies 
directed towards achieving national development goals–were subjected to severe criticism 
from the 1970s onwards (Buch-Hansen & Lauridsen, 2012, p. 293). 
2.1.2.2. Development according to structuralism and dependency theories  
The disappointment with the failure of modernization projects to bring about the expected 
development to a large number of people and pull them out of poverty led to the emergence 
of the perspective known as structuralism. Even though modernization theories continued to 
be the dominant approach of international institutions, structuralism was the dominant 
approach among Third World countries in the 1970s. Generally speaking, while the 
contributions in the 1960s and 1970s that were discussed under the banner of structuralism 
and dependency theories were quite diverse, actually they had one common concern, which 
was “a focus on different aspects of relationships of dominance and subordination between 
rich and poor countries as the very backbone of the condition of underdevelopment” (Bull & 
Bøås, 2012, p. 323). To put briefly, structuralist approach criticized modernization theories 
primarily for their positivist orthodoxy, neutrality, ahistoricity, traditional vs. modern 
dichotomy, silence on inequality, and Western-centrism (Andrews & Bawa, 2014, p. 925). 
Based on the works of Karl Marx, this approach saw underdevelopment as a structural 
condition of global capitalism fraught with inequality and exploitation imposed from outside 
(Bennett, 2012, p. 975). In this paradigm, export-oriented policies were considered harmful 
for the periphery countries. Instead, industrialization for domestic consumption and 
imposition of import tariffs were deemed necessary for their development. For this reason, 
import substitution industrialization had to be preferred over export-oriented investment. The 
convergence of Marxism/Neo-Marxism and structuralism brought about the emergence of 
dependency theories (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009, p. 32). Dependency theorists moved further 
away from modernization theories and aimed at overturning their tenets from the perspective 
of the South in general and Latin America in particular. They emphasized that the genuine 
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reasons behind the lack of development and widespread poverty in the Global South were 
actually the exploitative influence of the industrialized nations and their imperialist policies 
(p. 32). On this matter, the father of dependency Paul Baran (1957, as cited in Bull & Bøås, 
2012, p. 324) argued that colonization prevented the colonial countries from developing their 
industries, as the profits that would contribute to their growth were instead siphoned to the 
center of the colonial power. For this reason, exploitation between a capitalist and a worker 
bore a resemblance to the relationship between the First World and the Third World, 
developed and underdeveloped, or center and periphery. Building on Baran’s arguments, 
André Gunder Frank put forward that since the development of the core–the West–was linked 
to the exploitation and constant underdevelopment of the periphery, this process was 
maintained through “development of underdevelopment” (Buch-Hansen & Lauridsen, 2012, 
p. 293). He conceptualized this process as “metropolis-satellite” relations based on the 
hypotheses that (1) there existed a chain of metropolitan-satellite relations within and 
between states in which resources and profits were channeled from the latter to the former, 
(2) satellites had a better economic performance when their links with the metropolis were 
cut, and (3) the most underdeveloped regions were the ones that had close links with the 
metropolis (Chant & McIlwaine, 2009, pp. 34-35). In a context where the whole world was 
encapsulated in a global capitalist system that created obstacles for developing countries to 
improve their conditions, development was considered as something that was impossible to 
attain within the global monopoly capitalist system (Frank, 1966, as cited in Bull & Bøås, 
2012, p. 324) or somewhat possible if the states could have full autonomy to steer the 
development process by themselves (p. 324). Given this, even though former colonies 
became independent, they continued to be exploited through a neocolonialism process in 
which former colonial states as well as large multinational corporations and international 
finance institutions continued to steer the direction of their development paths (Thomas, 
2000, as cited in Chant & McIlwaine, 2009, p. 33). Dependency theories were also subjected 
to criticism for, inter alia, their overgeneralizing, oversimplifying, and overly economics-
focused approach and lost their allure after the abandonment of new economic world order 
and the emergence of neoliberalism as the hegemonic development thinking in the 1980s. 
2.1.2.3. Neoliberal interpretation of development and its global expansion 
Since its inception, neoliberalism has radically shaped national and international development 
policies and practices. Actually, neoliberalism derived from modernization theories despite 
their divergent stances regarding the relationship between the state and the market. To 
elaborate, especially after the oil crisis in 1973 and global recession in 1974, many countries 
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in the South–except oil-exporting countries–suffered from the rise of costs of imports and 
decline in the value of exports due to stagnated world economy marked by acute balance of 
payment difficulties (Wallerstein, 2005, p. 1264). It also became difficult for the 
governments in the West to pursue full employment and welfare policies. Also, a debt crisis 
erupted after many countries in the South failed to repay their debts to the banks in the North 
in the early 1980s. Duo to such developments, there emerged a tendency to perceive 
developmentalism as detrimental; import substitution industrialization as corrupt 
protectionism; state-building as a source of more bureaucracy; financial aid as money spent 
in vain; and government and quasi-government institutions as barrier against 
entrepreneurship (p. 1265). Such perceptions decreased trust in government interventions and 
increased the belief and expectations in the market (Herath, 2009, p. 1454). To illustrate, the 
reports published by the World Bank between 1981 and 1989 were totally unambiguous and 
passionate about exalting market-oriented policies and denigrating the state intervention 
while remaining silent on the issues of inequality (Ziai, 2016, p. 136). This trend that 
challenged the interventionist approach and put great emphasis on the need for the markets to 
operate freely was entitled “neoliberalism.” Thanks to the generous support especially from 
the then US President Ronald Reagan and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK) 
Margaret Thatcher, neoliberal thought became more widespread in the 1980s; many countries 
followed neoliberal policies and embraced privatization, deregulation, free trade, and foreign 
investment (Herath, 2009, p. 1454). In this period, major international development 
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed 
neoliberal reforms onto developing countries fraught with debt and socio-economic crises 
through forcing them to pursue coercive structural adjustment programs (SAPs) within the 
framework of the so-called Washington Consensus. In a way, SAPs that required strict 
austerity measures and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers replaced five-year development 
plans (FYDPs) in this period (Buch-Hansen & Lauridsen, 2012, p. 296). 
Indeed, outcomes of neoliberal reforms varied. In some countries, cuts in government 
expenditure, privatization of public enterprises, trade and domestic market liberalization 
yielded favorable results and allowed these countries to achieve steady growth rates, low 
inflation rate, and low level of unemployment. In some countries, however, the same policies 
created severe unemployment crises, decreasing income levels, and declining socio-economic 
conditions (Herath, 2009, p. 1454). Despite this, specifically after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the implosion of the Soviet Union, neoliberalism not only expanded to new territories 
over time, but also evolved from its market version in the 1980s into institutionally embedded 
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versions in the 1990s and 2000s. For this reason, the importance of “getting the institutions 
right” was widely emphasized under the umbrella term of “good governance,” which led to 
the introduction of a long and expanding list of institutional imperatives to achieve successful 
development at a universal scale (Buch-Hansen & Lauridsen, 2012, p. 296). Therefore, more 
recently concepts such as capacity-building, public-private partnership, community 
involvement, and public responsibility were also considered inherent in neoliberal 
development paradigm (Larner, 2014, pp. 191-192). 
2.1.2.4. Impasse in development theory and searches for alternatives  
It is widely accepted that the idea of development reached an impasse and the practice of 
development reached a crisis in the 1980s on the grounds that states and international 
development institutions failed to eliminate poverty and deprivation in underdeveloped 
countries and reduce economic inequalities between rich and poor countries despite their 
concerted efforts. The reason behind this failure was that development knowledge, models, 
and practices were biased in nature, exogenously imposed in a “one-size-fits-all” manner, 
indifferent to the poor, insensitive to social forces, destructive to the environment, and 
technocratic rather than participatory (Pottier, 2003, p. 13). Also, until the emergence of 
“women and development” approach, women were largely neglected and were not viewed as 
active participants of the development process. There was a tendency to believe that women 
were always benefiting from development and women and men were affected by 
development strategies evenly, while they were actually not (Kothari, 2002, p. 43). In order 
to overcome these deficiencies without breaking away from mainstream development 
approaches, there emerged attempts to find alternatives of development especially from the 
1980s onwards. In the words of Pieterse (1991, p. 5), while developmentalism was 
challenged by new social movements and post-modern approaches in the West, its limits 
were also tested by alternative development strategies in the South. Intensification of feminist 
critiques towards modernist development paradigm since the 1970s and increased influence 
of Gender and Development perspective in the 1980s; introduction of sustainable 
development concept after the UN-sponsored Brundtland Commission’s report in 1987; 
incorporation of the concepts of human development, empowerment, and quality of life into 
“economic-focused” development and formulation of the first Human Development Report 
by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990; shift towards “people-driven” 
development against the domination of experts and introduction of participatory and bottom-
up approaches such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), Participatory Learning and 
Action, Community Based Needs Assessment, and Stakeholder Analysis into development 
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
 25 
discourse and practice in the 1990s were among the major alternative development 
perspectives (Andrews & Bawa, 2014, pp. 926-927; Leal, 2010, p. 89; Nustad, 1997, p. 163). 
In this period, there were also attempts to find alternatives outside mainstream development 
approaches; the idea was not to find alternatives of development, but to find alternatives to 
development. These critical insights on development and calls for a radical change in the 
field later on came to be known as post-development approach. 
2.1.2.5. Post-development approach and searches for alternatives to development  
While there was a wide range of different ideas regarding what development was (e.g., 
economic growth or improved living standards), how it should be attained (e.g., 
industrialization or good governance), or how it should be measured (e.g., national statistics 
or UNDP’s Human Development Index [HDI]), there was only limited discussion about the 
content and desirability of development until post-development approach emerged and 
contested the meaning of development itself in the 1990s (Rapley, 2004, p. 350). As Pieterse 
(2000, p. 176) noted, while anti-development referred to rejectionism due to frustration with 
development business-as-usual and beyond development referred to “looking over the fence,” 
post-development referred to combination of these two approaches influenced by the works 
of Michel Foucault, linguistic turn in social sciences, and post-structuralism. Post-
development approach conceptualized development as a discourse and as a modernist regime 
of knowledge and disciplinary power (Crush, 1995, p. xii). Development project was a 
product of Cold War politics, powered by the unlimited faith in Western science, technology, 
and progress (Bennett, 2012, p. 976). It was “a top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic 
approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be 
moved up and down in the charts of ‘progress’” (Escobar, 1995a, p. 44). Instead of solving 
the problems of Third World countries, development became an instrument of economic 
control over them as well as a mechanism through which they were imagined and 
marginalized. The discourses and practices of development actors made it difficult for people 
to define their own interests and created abnormalities that allowed them to take action 
against (Escobar, 1995b, pp. 206-208). Accordingly, discourses of development had been 
power-laden and allowed Western countries to portray themselves as developed, civilized, 
and advanced while portraying the non-Western countries as underdeveloped, savage, 
uneducated, ignorant, backward, and primitive (Bennett, 2012, p. 977). They also allowed 
Western countries to assign themselves a mission as educator and savior and shape societies 
in their own imagery. Given these characteristics, the genuine goal of development was not 
human improvement, but human control and domination instead (Rapley, 2004, p. 352). 
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There was no way and no need to “do” development better. For post-development approach, 
[t]he idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and 
disappointment, failures and crime have been the steady companions of development 
and they tell a common story: it did not work. Moreover, the historical conditions 
which catapulted the idea into prominence have vanished: development has become 
outdated (Sachs, 2010, p. xv). 
For this reason, the idea of development had to be either abandoned or left to itself to fade 
away and disappear in its natural trajectory.  
Indeed, post-development approach was not without criticism. To mention a few, it 
was criticized for being reactionary and overly romantic, turning a blind eye to the diversity 
of development approaches and projects, selectively focusing on failures to bolster its 
arguments in a biased manner, denying the successful cases where development actually 
worked, completely ignoring the existence of laypeople who demand development and favor 
development interventions in some geographies, denying the agency of the Third World, 
engaging in “criticism for the sake of criticism” and offering no concrete or constructive 
solutions and alternatives, leaving everything in the hands of the self-organizing capacity of 
the poor, and neglecting the sense that development community also takes lessons and adapts 
(Bennett, 2012, p. 980; Corbridge, 2007, p. 189; Pieterse, 2000). Another important yet 
overlooked line of critique associated with post-development approach was how development 
has depoliticized social life and turned the social, political, cultural into technical problems to 
be rationally and neutrally managed by experts. Accordingly, the idea of development was 
considered post-political for its overly optimistic and promising nature that disregarded 
conflict, contestation, dissensus, and controversy, while these were actually constitutive 
elements of the concept of the political. As Schuurman (2009, pp. 834-839) notes, for 
instance, depoliticized notions such as multiculturalism, civil society, good governance, 
social capital, or even UN Millennium Development Goals gradually took hegemonic 
positions in the “globalized” and mainstream development debate especially from the early 
1990s onwards. They led development debate and research away from critical theory and 
towards neoliberal globalization discourses through an “academic governmentality” (see 
Table 1 below for a rough summary of the historical trajectory of development since the 19th 
century). Before discussing how development and depoliticization relate to each other 
further, in the following section I explain the concepts of the political, politics, 
depoliticization, and different forms depoliticization can take in greater detail. 
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Table 1: Changing meanings, explanations, and hegemons of development since the 19th 
century 
Period Approach Meanings of development Explanation Hegemony 
1850s > Colonial economics Resource management, 
trusteeship 
Colonial 
anthropology, 
Social 
Darwinism 
British Empire 
1870s > Latecomers Industrialization, 
catching up 
Classical 
political 
economy 
Latecomers, 
Colonialism 
1940s > Development 
economics 
Economic growth 
through industrialization 
1950s > Modernization 
theories 
Growth, political and 
social modernization 
Growth theory, 
structural 
functionalism 
The US 
1960s > Dependency 
theories 
Accumulation through 
self-reliance and auto-
centrism  
Neo-Marxism Third World 
nationalism, Non-
Aligned 
Movement, G77 
at the UN 
1970s > Alternative 
development 
Human flourishing Basic needs 
approach, 
fulfillment of 
human 
potential in 
non-economics 
terms 
Feminism, 
environmentalism, 
Gandhian thinking  
1980s > Human 
development 
Capacitation, 
enlargement of people’s 
choices 
Capabilities, 
developmental 
state 
Rise of Asian and 
Pacific Rim, large 
emerging markets 
1980s > Neoliberalism Economic growth 
through structural reform, 
deregulation, 
liberalization, 
privatization 
Neoclassical 
economics, 
monetarism 
Globalization, 
finance and 
corporate capital, 
international 
development and 
finance 
institutions 
1990s > Post-development Authoritarian and 
technocratic engineering, 
catastrophe, failure  
Post-
modernism, 
post-
colonialism, 
post-
structuralism 
Hegemonic 
development 
discourse, the idea 
of development 
itself 
Source: Adapted from Pieterse, 2001, p. 7, 9. 
2.2. The Concepts of the Political, Politics, and Depoliticization 
Just as development, the concepts of the political, politics, and depoliticization are difficult to 
define in exact terms. To illustrate this fluidity in reverse order, depoliticization is often 
understood as post-politics, post-democracy, and post-political (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 
2014, p. 6). Politics no more refers only to elections, participation in a political party, policy-
making, and legislative activities of government. Newly emerged forms of politics and more 
participatory and inclusive approaches of democracy heightened the sense that there is a need 
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to distinguish between “routine politics” and the activities that define what falls into the 
category of routine politics (Barnett, 2004, p. 3). The political is no different; for some 
theorists the political is a space of convergence, consensus, freedom, and public deliberation. 
For some theorists, however, it is a space of power relations, interminable conflict, 
contestation, dissensus, and antagonism (Mouffe, 2005, p. 9). In this study, I examine the 
political, politics, and depoliticization in the light of the latter approach that sees the political 
as a space of contestation and agonistic confrontation. I will explain each concept and their 
interrelationship in greater detail below.  
2.2.1. Carl Schmitt’s Conception of the Political and Depoliticization 
Discussions on the concept of the political and political contestation often refer to Carl 
Schmitt’s distinction between friend and enemy as the starting point (Meyer, Schetter, & 
Prinz, 2012, p. 687). To elaborate, in his (in)famous work The Concept of the Political, 
Schmitt (1929/2007, p. 26) claims that just as there is a distinction between good and evil in 
the realm of morality, beautiful and ugly in aesthetics, and profitable and unprofitable in 
economics, there is also a specific distinction between friend and enemy in the context of the 
political. Schmitt considers the distinction between friend and enemy as the motor of history. 
This distinction refers to “the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an 
association or dissociation” (p. 26). Also, regardless of his or her moral or aesthetic qualities, 
the political enemy in this distinction must be the other, the stranger, the different, and the 
alien so that the conflict can occur in extreme cases (p. 27). In this formulation, friend and 
enemy should not be understood by their metaphorical or symbolic meanings and 
conceptualized as economic competitors or debating adversaries from economic and 
intellectual perspectives. On the contrary, they should be conceptualized as fighting 
collectivities of people who confront each other in a combat, in which there is a real 
possibility of physical killing (p. 28, 33). For Schmitt, in case the possibility of combat or 
war disappears, this pacified condition would translate into a world without the distinction 
between friend and enemy or a world without politics (p. 35). A world without politics would 
be shallow and meaningless; people would lack a higher purpose such as sacrificing their 
lives and instead prefer enjoying the frolics of modern entertainment in a depoliticized 
manner in this depoliticized life (Vinx, 2016). Therefore, for Schmitt (1929/2007, p. 35), the 
political should be understood “only in the context of the ever present possibility of the 
friend-and-enemy grouping, regardless of the aspects which this possibility implies for 
morality, aesthetics, and economics.”  
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Schmitt criticizes liberalism on this matter for negating the political and the state, 
diffusing the political into economics and ethics, regarding political entities as economic 
competitors or debating adversaries, and reducing political problems to organizational-
technical and economic-sociological ones (İnce, 2009, p. 8). In other words, liberalism fails 
to draw a line between friend and enemy and, instead, embraces a sort of “political 
romanticism” where there is no last word on anything (Schmitt, 1929/2007, pp. xiii-xiv). For 
instance, the liberal vision that sees the possibility of an overarching state that embraces all 
other states and all humankind has depoliticizing implications. So does the depiction of the 
world as a universe. The explanation for this is, if all different states, governments, religions, 
classes, identities become unified to this degree, eventually the conflict among them and the 
distinction between friend and enemy disappear (p. 53). Instead, culture, civilization, 
economics, morality, law, art, and joy remain behind. For this reason, liberal projects that 
emphasize universality and all-encompassing approaches are associated with total 
depoliticization, dehumanization, neutralization, and the non-existence of states (p. xvi, 55, 
61, 69). Also, according to Schmitt’s theological perspective, a universal world state must be 
rejected, as it represents the paradise or the kingdom to come, which is doomed to fail in this 
life (Meyer, Schetter, & Prinz, 2012, p. 689). In short, Schmitt underlines that there must 
always be room for the distinction between friend and enemy and dichotomous spaces that 
are clearly separated from each other for the political to take place (p. 689).  
In relation to depoliticization, Schmitt (1929/2007, p. 89) also notes that in history 
there has been a series of attempts to reach a neutral domain that can constitute a ground for 
society. A neutral domain was necessary to avoid conflict and controversy, reach a common 
agreement through debate and exchange of opinions, and eventually make security, clarity, 
prudence, and peace possible. Accordingly, there were five major domains of thought in 
which the Western mind passed since the Renaissance. The world was structured around 
theology in the 16th century, metaphysics and scientific/rational research in the 17th century, 
ethical humanism in the 18th century, economics in the 19th century, and finally technicity in 
the 20th century (pp. xxvii-xxviii, 81-82). Specific concepts received their meanings in 
accordance with the context of the central domains. As one domain of thought rose to 
centrality, the problems in other domains were defined and solved in terms of the central 
domain. Schmitt describes the era of technology and technological progress as the age of 
neutralization and depoliticization on the grounds that technology was often considered as the 
absolute and ultimate neutral ground that could bring universal peace. In Schmitt’s words,  
[u]nlike theological, metaphysical, moral, and even economic questions, which are 
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forever debatable, purely technical problems have something refreshingly factual 
about them. They are easy to solve, and it is easily understandable why there is a 
tendency to take refuge in technicity from the inextricable problems of all other 
domains (pp. 90-91). 
Technology, then, contributes to leveling of conflictual aspects of religious, national, and 
social problems into a neutral domain, which is conceptualized as a domain of peace, mutual 
understanding, and reconciliation (p. 91). Technology has depoliticizing implications also in 
the sense that it transforms the state into a huge industrial complex that can run 
automatically. Such a transformation carries the risk of eliminating the need for human 
agency (pp. xxvii-xxviii). It should be noted that, though, each attempt to reach a neutral 
domain inevitably loses its neutrality and becomes contested in time, leading to a new search 
for a new neutral domain. Accordingly, sources of depoliticization such as science and 
technology, bureaucracy and administration, market individualism can also lose their 
neutrality in time and become politicized (Reynolds & Szerszynski, 2014, p. 52).  
2.2.2. Chantal Mouffe’s Conception of the Political and Depoliticization 
Chantal Mouffe is one of the most prominent scholars who built her major arguments on 
Schmitt’s conceptualization of the political. However, as İnce (2009, p. 2) underlines, 
political positions and theoretical focuses of Mouffe and Schmitt are actually quite divergent. 
As widely known, Schmitt is a controversial figure for his conservative stance, thoughts on 
sovereign power and dictatorship, and significant role in the formulation of National 
Socialism. On the contrary, Mouffe is a supporter of radical pluralist democracy, the brain 
behind social indeterminacy and discursivity, and the co-author of Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy–one of the most influential post-Marxist works in the literature–along with Ernesto 
Laclau. Still, opposing positions of both figures did not prevent Mouffe from engaging with 
the works of Schmitt and build arguments similar to his on the necessity of antagonism for a 
social order to come into being, impossibility of liberal universalism, optimism of consensus-
building efforts, and so on (Meyer, Schetter, & Prinz, 2012, p. 688). 
In her famous and concise work On the Political, Mouffe (2005, p. 8) makes a 
distinction between politics and the political. In this distinction, politics refers to the ontic 
level and the political refers to the ontological level. Here, the ontic deals with the practices 
of conventional politics, whereas the ontological deals with how society is instituted (p. 8). 
Accordingly, Mouffe defines politics as “the set of practices and institutions through which 
an order is created” and the political as “the dimension of antagonism … constitutive of 
human societies” (p. 9). Understood this way, she opposes to the idea that political can be 
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reduced to technical to be addressed by expert knowledge on the grounds that the political 
always requires making a choice between conflicting alternatives (p. 10). Mouffe criticizes 
liberal thought on this matter. For her, liberal thought negates antagonism, attaches great 
importance to rationalist and individualist approaches that disregard the nature of collective 
identities, and emphasizes the so-called harmonious and pacified characteristic of the world 
(p. 10). However, she underlines that rather than such liberal values, the ever-present 
possibility of the distinction between friend and enemy and the conflictual nature of politics 
constitute the genuine basis of democratic politics (p. 14).  
Mouffe also claims that the distinction between “us vs. them” can be constructed in 
forms other than antagonistic dimension and puts agonism forward as a new type of 
relationship between “us vs. them” (p. 16, 20). While antagonism refers to an “us vs. them” 
relation where neither side has a common ground and both sides aim to annihilate each other, 
agonism refers to a situation where conflicting sides recognize each other’s legitimacy and 
engage in an adversarial relationship (p. 20). The primary objective of democracy is to tame 
antagonism and transform antagonistic relations into agonistic ones. Once an “us vs. them” 
relationship becomes agonistic or adversarial, it does not signify that antagonism is totally 
eliminated, though. It signifies that antagonism is rather “sublimated” (p. 21). While liberal 
thought sees adversary merely as a competitor and disregards questions regarding hegemony 
and power relations, agonistic struggle deals with configuration of power relations and 
struggles between opposing hegemonic projects that cannot be solved through rationality (p. 
21). In that sense, agonism also opposes to the possibility of a non-adversarial, technical, and 
neutral understanding of the political (p. 34).  
Mouffe criticizes concepts such as partisan-free democracy, dialogic democracy, good 
governance, and global civil society for their anti-political character that aims to obtain a 
world beyond ideologies, hegemony, and antagonism (p. 2). To be more specific, she 
criticizes the post-political views of sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens who 
argue that the model of politics structured around collective identities has become a thing of 
the past due to the increased level of individualism and therefore needs to be abandoned (p. 
35). According to these thinkers, in time modernity has taken the shape of “reflexive 
modernity” and societies have evolved towards a post-traditional condition. For instance, 
Beck sees politics around left and right as obsolete and inadequate to interpret and understand 
the conflicts of reflexive modernity, as he believes that ideological and political conflicts can 
be better characterized by the dichotomies of safe and unsafe, inside and outside, political 
and unpolitical in a risk society (p. 38). Giddens also sees the divide between left and right 
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obsolete, as he believes that an alternative to capitalism is unthinkable and newly arisen 
problems cannot be expressed by the vocabulary of politics around left and right anymore 
(pp. 44-45). However, post-political announcements that point to the end of history, politics, 
and left and right ideologies and emphasize that “there is no alternative [to neoliberalism]” 
are far from ending conflictual relations. Instead, in case the channels of expression for 
dissenting voices are closed and no room is left in the arena of democratic contestation, there 
emerges a grave risk that the repressed returns and antagonism takes violent and radical 
forms such as xenophobic populism, right-wing nationalism, and religious fundamentalism 
(pp. 64-72). In that sense, post-political is a hegemonic order in which antagonism is not 
transformed into agonism, but repressed instead. 
In addition, Mouffe draws attention to another weakening factor of the political, 
which is moralization of politics. It refers to the construction of the distinction between “us 
vs. them” in moral terms such as “good vs. evil.” In this configuration, the distinction 
between friend and enemy is still out there, but expressed in a different language of morality 
(p. 75). The struggle is not defined between right and left, but between right and wrong. 
However, the exercise of politics in moral register prevents the transformation of antagonism 
into agonism because opponents cannot be depicted as adversaries, but only as enemies to be 
annihilated (p. 76). In the light of these arguments, Mouffe follows Schmitt and emphasizes 
that the liberal attempt to eradicate the political has no chance but to fail on the grounds that 
the source of the political originates from various human activities and any antithesis can 
transform itself into a political one if it is powerful enough to sort human beings into the 
camps of friend and enemy (p. 12).     
2.2.3. Jacques Rancière’s Conception of the Political and Depoliticization  
Just as Mouffe makes a distinction between politics and the political, Jacques Rancière makes 
a distinction among the political, politics, and the police. From his perspective, the political 
can be understood as a meeting ground where the process of governance–the police–and 
process of emancipation–politics–encounter each other (Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 128). In this 
formulation, the police refers to the existing order of things, activities of the state that 
contribute to the creation of the order, and institutions that reproduce a given social hierarchy 
(Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 12). Rancière (2001) notes that the essence of the police is 
not to repress people or control the aspects of life. Rather, it is partition or distribution of the 
sensible, which can be understood as “a general law that defines the forms of part-taking by 
first defining the modes of perception in which they are inscribed.” Accordingly,  
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[t]he police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, 
ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to 
a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a 
particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as 
discourse and another as noise (Rancière, 1999, p. 29). 
Having noted this, in contrast to Schmitt and Mouffe who believe that social relations 
are defined by antagonism, Rancière claims that they are defined by equality. The police or 
the distribution of the sensible operates through organizing the inequalities and excluding one 
part of society that is given no part in society (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 12). In the 
words of Rancière (2001), “there is politics inasmuch as ‘the people’ refers to subjects 
inscribed as a supplement to the count of the parts of society, a specific figure of ‘the part of 
those who have no-part.’” In this context, the political is about articulating dissent and 
discomfort to obtain a place in the order of things. It can be conceived as a sphere in which 
“the rabble”–the part of no part–becomes “people” and their “anarchic noise” becomes the 
recognized voice of the people (Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 129). The political is not about 
making demands to the ruling elites to address inequalities. Rather, it is the demand of those 
who are voiceless and not counted to be heard, counted, named, and recognized (p. 129). 
Politics or democracy, therefore, is exercised when those who are part of no part make their 
presence visible in accordance with the equality (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 12).  
Rancière (2001) claims that consensus cannot be at the heart of politics because it is 
just another way of expressing “the end of politics” and another form of returning to the 
normal state of things as they were during the non-existence of politics. For Rancière, post-
political or post-democracy operates not through repression but through disavowal (p. 13). 
Accordingly, the police neutralizes the political agency of those who are part of no part 
through three types of disavowal of politics: archi-politics, para-politics, and meta-politics. 
To briefly explain each, archi-politics disavows politics through establishing a police order 
on the basis of the idea that society is composed of a harmonious, peaceful, and undivided 
whole (Van Puymbroeck & Oosterlynck, 2014, p. 97). Populist and anti-immigrant 
nationalist political movements or the political ideology of Big Society that flourished in the 
UK in the 2000s can be given as an example to this type of disavowal. Para-politics, in 
contrast, views society not as a homogenous entity that lives in harmony, but as an entity that 
is differentiated along multiple lines (p. 98). Still, para-politics disavows politics through 
reducing hierarchical differentiations to institutionalized competition between different 
opinions and parties for places and setting rules and barriers as to where, when, and how this 
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competition can be actualized (p. 98). Representative democracy is an example to this type. 
Finally, meta-politics disavows politics through subordinating politics to a deeper essence 
and pointing to one specific phenomenon as the source of all societal inequalities (Van 
Puymbroeck & Oosterlynck, 2014, p. 98). Neoliberal thought that holds the state interference 
in the market and personal freedoms responsible for all imperfections and inequalities 
constitutes an example to this type. It is also noteworthy that, building on Rancière’s three-
fold typology, Slavoj Žižek adds a fourth type of depoliticization which he calls ultra-politics 
(p. 98). Ultra-politics refers to the establishment of a distinction between “us vs. them” in 
absolute and radical terms as well as denial of any kind of shared symbolic space between 
sides. This configuration leaves no chance of engagement apart from violence (Wilson & 
Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 14). Far-right politics, terrorism, and the so-called “War on Terror” 
exemplify this type. While Mouffe and Rancière define post-political by repression and 
disavowal respectively, Žižek argues that post-political operates through foreclosure (p. 14). 
In the light of these, post-politics can be broadly understood as a combination of  
(1) para-politics in the form of governance-mediated searches for consensus around 
specific issues amongst a plethora of different stakeholders, (2) a meta-political 
reduction of the social order to the mere product of atomizing market-based relations 
of competition, and (3) ultra-political projection of any ideological alternative to a 
capitalist free market society beyond the boundaries of the present into a failed past, 
often backed up by (4) an archi-political appeal to a harmonious and undivided 
national, regional or local community of supposedly equals (Van Puymbroeck & 
Oosterlynck, 2014, p. 98). 
2.2.4. Recent Perspectives on Depoliticization Since the 2000s 
In addition to three perspectives above, there are also recent noteworthy perspectives on 
depoliticization that have been flourishing since the late 1990s and early 2000s. To elaborate, 
Burnham (2001, p. 128) argues that, in the context of British politics in the late 1990s, the 
New Labour government introduced a new form of statecraft or governing strategy that was 
designed to depoliticize various important political issues. In this light, he defines 
depoliticization as “the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-
making” (p. 128). This governing strategy serves two ends. First, depoliticization plays a role 
in changing the expectations of the market about how credible and reliable policy-making is, 
especially in a context where “neutral” and independent experts are considered more 
trustworthy and skillful than politicians in the eyes of the public (Buller & Flinders, 2005, p. 
526). Second, depoliticization allows politicians–who must ensure electoral support–to 
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insulate themselves from the results of controversial policy decisions, negative consequences 
of a policy failure, and blame (p. 526). Similarly, based on Burnham’s definition, Flinders 
and Buller (2006) define depoliticization as  
the range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can attempt 
to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos that 
they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy field or 
specific decision (pp. 295-296). 
It should be noted that, though, depoliticization is actually an inherently political act. It 
should not be conceived as the direct removal of politics from social and economic spheres or 
disappearance of political power (Burnham, 2001, p. 136). Policy-making is always political, 
regardless of who is responsible for making it. Also, politics remains intact while the arena or 
process through which decisions are made is changed in depoliticization. For this reason, this 
process can also be referred to as “arena-shifting” (Flinders & Buller, 2006, p. 296). 
Flinders and Buller identify three distinct tactics of depoliticization. The first tactic, 
institutional depoliticization, refers to the establishment of a principal-agent relationship 
between an elected politician or minister and an appointed administrator or independent 
agency (p. 298). Formation of committees, commissions, or executive agencies regarding 
policy issues and transferring of powers and responsibilities to these institutions on the basis 
of the need to depoliticize decision-making can be given as an example to this tactic. The 
second tactic, rule-based depoliticization, refers to the implementation of a policy that sets 
neutral, universally accepted, and non-discriminatory rules that limit political discretion in 
the decision-making process and leave little or no need for political negotiation (pp. 303-
304). Adoption of exchange rate mechanism in Britain to cope with the problem of high 
inflation in the 1970s is an example to this tactic. The third tactic, preference-shaping 
depoliticization, corresponds to giving reference to an ideological claim, employing a certain 
discourse, and constructing a new reality to present a policy issue as if it is beyond the 
control of politicians, primarily to justify policy decisions (p. 307). The idea that 
neoliberalism is without alternative or that globalization necessitates people to behave in a 
certain way exemplifies this tactic. Indeed, these tactics provide only a rough picture of 
modern governance, which in fact is highly complex. Also, they are not mutually exclusive; a 
government can employ different depoliticization tactics at the same time at different levels 
(p. 310). In the guidance of the arguments of Burnham, Flinders, and Buller, depoliticization–
defined and understood as a form of governing tool–is primarily concerned with transferring 
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of blame, responsibility, transaction costs, and critique of policy-making to other institutions 
as well as abstract phenomena that are beyond human control.   
The more expansive definition of depoliticization does not reduce the concept merely 
to a governing strategy. Instead, depoliticization stands in opposition of politicization 
process–defined as opening up of political space–and refers to the closing off public 
deliberation on a number of issues (Foster, Kerr, & Byrne, 2014, p. 3). In other words, 
depoliticization is concerned with the removal or insertion of choice, deliberation, 
contingency, and agency around issues. In this regard, Hay’s conceptualization of 
politicization and depoliticization in Why We Hate Politics? deserves a special focus. 
Defining politics as “the realm of contingency and deliberation,” Hay (2007, p. 79) makes a 
distinction between the political realm–the realm of contingency–and non-political realm–the 
realm of necessity–as shown in Table 2 below. Accordingly, the political realm includes both 
governmental and non-governmental spheres. These two spheres further spawn into three 
subspheres of public and governmental sphere, public but non-governmental sphere, and 
private sphere. Non-political realm includes fate and necessity.   
Table 2: Political and non-political realms 
Political Non-political 
Realm of contingency and deliberation 
Governmental sphere Non-governmental sphere 
Public and 
governmental 
Public and non-
governmental Private sphere 
Realm of necessity 
Source: Hay, 2007, p. 79. 
 
Figure 1: Politicization and depoliticization processes 
Source: Hay, 2007, p. 80, as cited in Wood and Flinders, 2014, p. 154.  
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Accordingly, as illustrated in Figure 1 above, Hay (2007, pp. 79-80) claims that an issue can 
be politicized if it is promoted from (a) the realm of necessity to the private sphere (Type 1), 
(b) private sphere to the public sphere (Type 2), and (c) public sphere to the governmental 
sphere (Type 3). To provide examples for each type, secularization of a state in which the 
authority of the ruler was previously believed to originate from divine sources signifies a 
shift from the realm of necessity to the realm of contingency and constitutes an example to 
Type 1 politicization (p. 81). The development of personal issues such as abortion, sexual 
harassment, and environmental sensitivity into collective issues after consciousness- and 
awareness-raising campaigns signifies a shift from private sphere to public sphere and 
constitutes an example to Type 2 politicization (p. 81). Finally, entrance of concerns such as 
public health into legislative debates or governmental processes signifies a shift from public 
sphere to governmental sphere and constitutes an example to Type 3 politicization (p. 82).  
In a reverse logic, an issue can be depoliticized if it is demoted from (a) governmental 
sphere to public sphere (Type 1), (b) public sphere to private sphere (Type 2), and (c) from 
private sphere to the realm of necessity (Type 3). For instance, transferring of responsibility 
from governments to public authorities or independent organizations such as independent 
central banks or trans-national institutions signifies a shift from governmental sphere to 
public sphere and provides an example to Type 1 depoliticization (p. 82). Representation of 
environmental degradation or unemployment as the (ir)responsibility of consumers but not of 
governments and businesses signifies a shift from public sphere to private sphere and 
provides an example to Type 2 depoliticization (p. 85). Finally, characterization of 
neoliberalism or globalization as the “only game in town” and, hence, the denial of agency 
and choice as well as justification of policies through such discourses signifies a shift from 
the realm of contingency to the realm of necessity/fate and presents an example to Type 3 
depoliticization (p. 87). 
Indeed, issues are not the only subjects of politicization and depoliticization 
processes; people and social organizations can also become politicized and depoliticized 
(Blühdorn, 2007, as cited in Mishra, 2010, p. 92). For instance, citizens who were previously 
engaged in politics may over time become indifferent and uninterested in engaging in 
political debates and activities. Turnout rates in elections and referenda may be very low. It 
may even be the case that “the extent of public apathy, anger, and frustration with the 
operation of democratic politics [can even go] beyond healthy scepticism and into the sphere 
of corrosive cynicism, even fatalism and about democratic politics’ capacity to resolve major 
social challenges” (Flinders, 2012, p. 640). Similarly, organizations may over time stop 
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embracing and promoting specific political agendas. Politically motivated religious 
organizations may over time evolve into purely religious and philanthropic organizations.  
Summing up these different but interrelated perspectives on depoliticization, the 
concept can be understood as a condition in which all ideological battles come to an end and 
eventually consensus prevails, a set of institutional mechanisms and practices employed to 
reduce politics to consensual management of economic necessity, and the disappearance of 
political differences between “the established institutional arrangements of a given social 
order, and the establishment of that social order on an always absent ground” (Wilson & 
Swyngedouw, 2014, p. 7). Some of the mechanisms that prevent agonism from coming to 
surface and contribute to the formation of these conditions can be identified as 
[m]anagement, administration, and bureaucracy; science and technical reasoning; a 
consensual socio-economic order in which the questions of eudaimonia–of the nature 
of human flourishing–seem to have been settled once and for all; the elevation of 
consumption and market choice as the vehicle of human fulfillment and the 
distribution of goods; the canvassing of public opinion, and mechanisms of conflict 
resolution and mediation (Swyngedouw, 2011, pp. 371-372, as cited in Reynolds & 
Szerszynski, 2014, pp. 50-51). 
Also, depoliticization can be governmental and refer to the demotion of issues from 
governmental sphere to public sphere through passing these issues from the hands of 
politicians to neutral and technocratic bodies. It can be societal and refer to the demotion of 
issues from public sphere to private sphere through a transition from collective to individual 
responses to socio-political challenges. Finally, it can be discursive and refer to the demotion 
of issues from private sphere to realm of necessity through discursive practices and ideas to 
construct a reality without contingency (Wood & Flinders, 2014, p. 165). I will explain how 
development and depoliticization relate to each other in the following section. 
2.3. Interlinkages Between Development and Depoliticization 
2.3.1. Concealment of Conflictual Relations 
Development and depoliticization are interrelated for a number of reasons. Ziai (2016, p. 60) 
notes that development blurs injustice, inequalities, and conflictual relations at both national 
and international levels. Conclusions about how much countries or populations have 
developed based purely on quantitative data regarding gross domestic product, per capita 
income, growth rate often overlook socio-economic inequalities and ignore the heterogeneity 
of development beneficiaries and stakeholders (pp. 60-61). Thus, political and contested 
issues are reframed and concealed through hiding behind numbers, statistics, and figures, 
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which can supposedly fully reflect development levels of states, regions, or people. Similarly, 
Mosse (2005, p. 21) explains that development projects often “involve a special kind of 
writing that, while preserving the appearance of technical planning, accomplish the social 
tasks of legitimation, persuasion and enrolment, becoming richly encoded with institutional 
and individual interests and ambitions and optimisms.” 
At the other end of the equation, politics has been considered as an obstacle to neutral 
and objective decision-making (Beveridge, 2012, p. 53). To illustrate, Hout (2012, p. 417) 
notes that development professionals often put a distance between their work and politics for 
several reasons. For him, development professionals share somewhat similar set of values 
and norms regarding eradicating poverty and “bringing” development to the countries they 
are assigned to. These values and norms also lead them to take a more pragmatic approach in 
implementing development projects and pay little or no attention to political struggles and 
power dynamics in and around development projects. They often do not take a side with a 
part of the population. From their perspective, “doing development” is not about engaging in 
political debates or struggle, but rather about management and implementation of projects 
and disbursing funds to governmental and non-governmental partners to obtain quick, 
painless, and concrete results (p. 418). The depoliticized approach protects them from the 
difficulties of power struggles and conflictual relations in the environment they are in and 
allows them to concentrate on their work without being disturbed (p. 418). 
2.3.2. Rendering Technical 
As Li (2007, p. 7) argues, problematization–spotting deficiencies for correction–and 
“rendering technical” are required in order to translate development into the form of projects. 
These two elements are not separate from each other. On the contrary, together they form the 
basis of how development is practiced in a depoliticized manner. To elaborate on rendering 
technical, arguably one of the most influential works in this regard is The Anti-Politics 
Machine by Ferguson. One of the points of departure of Ferguson’s work is the question why 
and how development projects can still be implemented while development “clearly” does 
not work, specifically in Lesotho where “failure appears to be the norm” (Ferguson, 1994, p. 
8). Even though it is an anthropological study, it primarily focuses not on the people as the 
target of development, but on the apparatus as the provider of development (p. 17). In this 
light, Ferguson takes a Foucaldian approach and focuses on the relationship among 
discourses, power, and governmentality (see Foucault, 1991). Through this framework, he 
examines how a number of development projects implemented in Lesotho between 1975 and 
1984 failed to meet their promises and how development operates in a given context.  
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Ferguson notes that while development projects may fail, their powerful and 
extensive–as well as unintended and unforeseen–consequences should not be overlooked. To 
elaborate, the institutions that form the development industry are not neutral. For this reason, 
development projects are not neutral either and are explicitly designed in accordance with the 
existing political and institutional context (Nadasdy, 2005, p. 218). For Ferguson (1994, p. 
xiv), development institutions employ their own form of discourses that construct a certain 
target as a kind of object of knowledge and create a structure of knowledge around that 
object. For instance, international development institutions represented Lesotho as an 
underdeveloped, isolated, and backward country with an isolated, traditional, aboriginal, and 
peasant society. In return, development interventions were designed and implemented based 
on this created structure of knowledge. However, it is often the case that development 
institutions consider development as a straightforward exercise and offer technical solutions 
to essentially non-technical problems. For instance, in the case of Lesotho,  
[a]t the end of this involved process of theoretical construction, Lesotho [is] 
represented in development discourse as a nation of farmers, not wage laborers; a 
country with a geography, but no history; with people, but no classes; values, but no 
structures; administrators, but no rulers; bureaucracy, but no politics. Political and 
structural causes of poverty in Lesotho are systematically erased and replaced with 
technical ones, and the modern, capitalist, industrialized nature of the society is 
systematically understated or concealed (p. 66).  
Through this process, development discourse or apparatus transforms the 
imperfections of the country into easy-to-solve problems and creates a suitable object for 
development institutions to intervene in a non-political and technical manner (p. 87). This is 
favorable on behalf of the intervener because initiating political change, supporting 
revolutionary struggles for change, or dealing with crucial political questions such as 
gendered distribution of land, winners and losers of the development process, and push 
factors of migration and poverty are always more difficult than formulating and 
implementing technical and supposedly neutral solutions. For this reason, depoliticization is 
considered as an unavoidable result of development. In Ferguson’s oft-cited words,  
[b]y uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising 
technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the 
hegemonic problematic of “development” is the principle means through which the 
question of poverty is depoliticized in the world today. At the same time, by making 
the intentional blueprints for “development” so highly visible, a “development” 
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project can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations involving the 
extension and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under the cover 
of a neutral technical mission to which no one can object (p. 256).  
In other words, while development functions as an “anti-politics machine” and 
depoliticizes “everything it touches” (p. xv), it also causes the extension of bureaucratic state 
power as another unforeseen consequence. The logic here is that if development institutions 
consider development problems as technical problems, their solutions necessitate the 
application of expert knowledge and provision of government services (Nadasdy, 2005, p. 
219). Depoliticized form of development, then, requires the creation of new bodies that deal 
with the bureaucratic aspect of development, construction of new infrastructure for 
development purposes, and consolidation of state power. It might change power dynamics 
and transfer power from the local population to development experts and state officials. Such 
a large expansion of the state and bureaucratic power may end up shaping almost all aspects 
of life as an irreversible legacy of development interventions (Ferguson, 1994, pp. 266-267).  
In a more recent anthropological work, The Will to Improve, Li (2007) examines the 
governmental and non-governmental efforts to improve the lives of the local population in 
Java and Central Sulawesi in Indonesia in the past two centuries in the guidance of the works 
of Foucault, Gramsci, and Marx. According to Doner (2010, p. 644), Foucauldian, 
Gramscian, and Marxian perspectives allowed Li to highlight the tensions between the 
technocratic sterility of development projects initiated by governments and the messiness of 
politics, grasp how and why new identities emerge during the struggle, and recognize the 
power of the market and how displacement and impoverishment follow growth. Based on 
historical accounts, interviews, participant observation, and meticulous readings of planning 
documents of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international development 
institutions, she inter alia draws attention to how NGOs and international development 
institutions systematically render everything technical through excluding power relations in 
their approaches and programs. In other words, her main concern is how development 
attempts have overlooked socio-political and politico-economic causes of poverty and 
rendered genuinely political processes of development technical. In Li’s (2007) words,  
[q]uestions that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical. For 
the most part, experts tasked with improvement exclude the structure of political-
economic relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions. They focus more on the 
capacities of the poor than on the practices through which one social group 
impoverishes another (p. 7). 
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Accordingly, even though development interventions have changed throughout the 
years and put more emphasis on community, participation, and empowerment, they continued 
to contribute to depoliticization in many ways. They still generally aim to contain a challenge 
to the status quo, ignore the character of the ruling governments and turn a blind eye to their 
unacceptable practices for the sake of partnership, disregard power relations and power 
imbalance between the “developer” and “to be developed” or experts and non-experts, and 
ignore the structural causes of inequality and instead assume that properly instructed 
individuals are responsible for the unfavorable conditions they live in, in accordance with the 
neoliberal development paradigm (p. 8, 275). 
In this context, Cultivating Development, the ethnographic work in which Mosse 
examines the relationship between development policy and practice is also worth mentioning. 
Having served as a consultant to the project, Mosse focuses closely on Indo-British Rainfed 
Farming Project (IBRFP) funded by the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) in the 1990s and inter alia asks “[w]hat if the practices of development are in fact 
concealed rather than produced by policy” and “[w]hat if, instead of policy producing 
practice, practices produce policy, in the sense that actors in development devote their 
energies to maintaining coherent representations regardless of events” (Mosse, 2005, p. 2). 
From his perspective, development interventions have to be–or at least appear as–technical 
and based on empirical facts, science, and profession to be persuasive, appealing, and 
legitimate. Technicity of the project and technical expertise of consultants and experts 
contribute to the concealment of the political nature of project choices and objectives or 
criticisms regarding development programs. Therefore, the language of international 
development consensus has never been political, but technical (p. 37). Mosse also discusses 
how development interventions at times remain indifferent to power dynamics among 
beneficiaries. For instance, as Corbridge (2007, p. 188) notes, Mosse demonstrates that while 
community organizers of the project were already competent in participatory development 
and PRA techniques, in the field they had to rely on the mediation of more powerful villagers 
to reach out poor villagers as their real targets. However, it was unknown and unexpected 
that, as opposed to poor–and dependent–villagers, powerful villagers could actually 
understand the specifics of the project quicker and better and present themselves as poor to 
enjoy most of the benefits of the project instead of the target group (p. 188). Despite this 
situation, the privileged position of the powerful village elite remained untouched in order 
not to spoil the long days of hard labor. Thus, local power structures were not undermined, 
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but instead reproduced as an unintended consequence of the project, which was indeed 
designed and initiated with good intentions.  
2.3.3. Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Biopolitics 
Just as modernist interpretation of development tends to devalue or banish politics (Scott, 
1998, p. 94), neoliberalism can also be considered as post-political or depoliticized because it 
is widely dominated by techno-managerial structures, associated with consensus-based 
decision making, and interpreted as a supra-political phenomenon which is above and beyond 
ideologies (Wilson, 2013, p. 220). Kamat (2014, p. 69) also underlines that neoliberalism has 
contributed to depoliticization in the field of development through dissolving the distinctions 
between public and private, state and market, individual and community in favor of a post-
political growth and democracy agenda. States, governments, NGOs, and corporations have 
shared the same vision of development that avoids political contestation and instead 
prioritizes politics of consensus and attaches great importance to harmonization of conflictual 
relations (p. 69). Neoliberalism, then, cannot be confined to a theory or model, as it “reaches 
from the soul of the citizen-subject” and “involves extending and disseminating market 
values to all institutions and social action” (Brown, 2003, as cited in Kamat, 2014, p. 67). In 
this process, neoliberalism is concerned with the management and control of different aspects 
of life both at individual and population levels. These points require a closer examination of 
the Foucaldian concepts of governmentality and biopolitics. 
The meaning of governmentality ranges from “governing the self” to “governing the 
others.” It refers to a specific relation of power that aims at the “conduct of conduct.” In this 
context, “to govern” refers to structuring the field of possible action of others in the spheres 
of political, economic, social, and so on (Foucault, 1982, p. 221, as cited in Ziai, 2016, p. 17). 
This relation of power indeed influences and governs individuals, but does not coerce them to 
act in a certain way. The art of governmentality is about guiding the usage individuals make 
of their freedom (p. 17). Development can be located in the field of power of 
governmentality, as it aims at shaping human conduct through calculation and securing the 
well-being and living conditions at the level of populations without referring to discipline and 
coercion (Li, 2007, p. 5). Also, development is so expansive that it infiltrates almost every 
aspect of life (p. 6). For this reason, it is fair to argue that development can be associated with 
biopolitics and considered as a biopolitical process.  
Biopolitics derives from governmentality. Even though the invention of the term goes 
back as early as the 1920s, Foucault introduced his idea of biopolitics in the second half of 
the 1970s to explain how social and political power was exercised to have control over 
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human life and analyze the effects of liberal governance practices (Liesen & Walsh, 2012, p. 
4). In his widely known three-fold conceptualization of power, Foucault makes a distinction 
between sovereign and disciplinary power. Sovereign or pre-modern power in classical age 
was dealing with the state, sovereignty, violence, and rights. It was primarily juridical, 
negative, and prohibitive (p. 6). In this configuration, the state and society were distinct 
entities and the former had a higher status than the latter. This position allowed the state or 
the sovereign to decide over life and death through laws that determine the boundaries of 
acceptable behavior and prohibit whatever is unacceptable. Punishment was the successful 
employment of a judiciary and technical dispositif of enforcement (Gambetti, 2011, p. 5). 
Beginning in the 17th century, the power over life evolved in two forms. The first 
form was disciplinary power. In contrast with sovereign power, disciplinary power arranged 
the social field through various sets of techniques such as surveillance, categorization, 
systematic selection, and rationalization of bodies at various venues such as prison, school, 
factory, hospital, and barracks. In this context, the state or any other institution by itself 
ceased to be the only locus of power (p. 6). The second form, which emerged from the mid-
18th century onwards, was regulatory power. In the light of his lectures between 1975 and 
1976, Foucault claimed that the major difference between disciplinary and regulatory powers 
was that while the former was concerned with the control of individual bodies, the latter was 
concerned with the management of life at the level of population (p. 6).  
Biopower is a derivative of these regulatory mechanisms. Foucault notes that 
governing technologies of modern political power swing between two ends in the context of 
managing life (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, p. 271). Accordingly, one end sees human 
body “as a machine” to be disciplined, optimized of its capabilities, and integrated into 
efficiency and economic control. This end is called anatomo-politics. The other end sees 
human body “as a species,” filled with the mechanics and biological processes of life such as 
birth, death, health, and longevity (p. 271). This end is called biopolitics. Together, anatomo-
politics and biopolitics constitute biopower. Biopower differs from sovereign power that 
claims the right to kill by its primary concern “to make live.” Contrary to sovereign power 
that punishes, biopower aims to improve the populations’ mental and physical well-being, 
longevity, productivity, and efficiency (De Larrinaga & Doucet, 2008, p. 520). In Foucault’s 
(1991) words, in opposition to sovereignty,  
government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the 
population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, 
health, etc. … [I]t is the population itself on which government will act either directly 
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through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly through techniques that will make 
possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the 
directing of the flow of population into certain regions or activities, etc (p. 100).  
Also, as opposed to other types of power, biopower spreads through society and 
infiltrates everywhere in the depths of the social. Its reach is so extensive that it can 
normalize social acts and manage a wide range of social fields (De Larrinaga & Doucet, 
2008, p. 520). In other words, biopower is invisible, plural, discursive, pervasive, and 
exercised through complex power relationships and therefore carries the risk of ending up in 
an omnipresent and overarching government in which nothing can escape (Liesen & Walsh, 
2012, p. 7). It is a positive or productive force that aimed to produce “docile bodies” and 
“normalized subjects” (DuBois, 1991, p. 5). In this setting, every issue can become a subject 
of analysis and calculation to serve economic and political goals. Individuals can be judged in 
technical sense and compared upon certain standards (p. 18). For this reason, biopolitics 
relies heavily on forecasts, statistics, calculations, and various measures to be able to 
intervene and make arrangements through programmes and activities in the areas of health, 
education, environment, population control, and migration (Buur, Jensen, & Stepputat, 2007, 
p. 14; Duffield, 2006, p. 16).  
In the light of these, it can be concluded that biopolitics or placement of life at the 
center of every theory and practice is linked to liberal thought, which has always aimed to 
depoliticize the public sphere–the key locus of the political (Koljević, 2008, p. 73). With its 
different practices, techniques, and rationalities, neoliberal governmentality contributes to the 
production of self-governed and self-sufficient individuals and shapes their behavior to 
ensure their “voluntary” involvement in biopolitical processes (p. 76). In this context, 
neoliberalism employs indirect governing methods to manage and control individuals and 
populations without being responsible for their actions. Instead, the responsibility for risks 
regarding the aspects of life such as sickness, joblessness, underdevelopment is shifted to the 
individual and collectives and such problems are rendered as problems to be handled by “the 
self” or individual as a responsible and rational (economic) actor (Lemke, 2001, p. 201).  
2.4. Summary 
Even though the origins of the idea of development date back to as early as the 18th century, 
development emerged as a political project and a field of study in the aftermath of the World 
War II. After the reclassification of the countries as underdeveloped and developed, 
development disciplines and theories began to emerge in the 1950s. Modernization theories 
were the first development theories and became widespread in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
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Structuralism and dependency theories rose to prominence in the 1970s. Neoliberalism 
emerged as the hegemonic development paradigm in the 1980s. Based on the idea that 
development reached an impasse and a crisis, searches for alternatives of development 
intensified also in this period. In the 1990s, post-development approach emerged after its 
harsh critique on the concept of development itself and calls to find alternatives to 
development. Given that each theory or approach was built on the imperfections and 
deficiencies of the previous one, development was subjected to criticism on many grounds 
from different perspectives in different time periods for more than half a century. At the 
expense of generalizing, development was often criticized inter alia for its dichotomous 
thinking; ethnocentrism or Western-centrism; portrayal of non-Western societies as 
underdeveloped, savage, traditional, uneducated, ignorant, backward, primitive, and the other 
in a hierarchical manner; social evolutionism; overemphasis on the role of experts; 
overemphasis on scientific and technological advancement; top-down, interventionist, and 
one-size-fits-all approach; failure to eliminate poverty and deprivation; indifference to 
inequalities; indifference to destruction; and indifference to power relations. In relation to the 
last point, development was also widely criticized for its depoliticizing implications.  
Considering that the political is a space of power relations, interminable conflict, 
contestation, dissensus, and antagonism, depoliticization refers to a wide range of phenomena 
including, but not limited to, a condition in which the distinction between friend and enemy 
no longer exists; a condition in which there is no longer any ideological or political struggle; 
diffusion of the political into economics and ethics; redefinition of political adversaries as 
economic competitors or debating adversaries; reduction of political problems to technical, 
organizational, socio-economic problems to be rationally and neutrally managed; disavowal 
of politics through various means; transfer of issues from the hands of politicians to neutral 
and technocratic bodies to offload blame and responsibility; and construction of a reality 
without agency and contingency.  
Understood this way, development and depoliticization can be interlinked for a 
number of reasons. With its optimistic and promising nature, development often disregards 
conflict, contestation, and controversy. It has the power to conceal injustices, inequalities, 
and conflictual relations both at national and international levels. Also, in the context of 
development practice, politics is often viewed as a barrier against neutral and objective 
decision-making. Furthermore, development renders political issues technical or non-political 
through disregarding power relations in its approaches and projects. Finally, it is concerned 
with the management and control of life. In relation to this, it is related to the field of power 
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of (neoliberal) governmentality and biopolitics, as it aims to shape human conduct and 
behavior through improving populations’ quality of life without using coercion. 
Development, then, has been far from being neutral and power-free. On the contrary, with its 
authoritarian and depoliticizing implications, it has contributed, inter alia, to the 
legitimization of even the most controversial development schemes, homogenization of 
different groups and identities, reconfiguration of power dynamics among populations and 
between elites and non-elites, and redefinition of political issues that require engagement in 
conflictual relations and risk taking as neutral, easy-to-solve issues.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, I explain the methodology of the study. The chapter comprises three sections. 
In the first section, I explain through which data collection techniques and what kind of 
processes I collected data. In the second section, I explain how I interpreted and analyzed the 
collected data and provide details on the stages of the analysis process. In the third section, I 
reflect on my position throughout research and discuss what kind of advantages and 
challenges I faced during the process.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the primary focus of the study is on discursive 
constructions. Alfini and Chambers (2010, p. 30) note that words have the capacity to “frame 
our perceptions and thoughts, and affect our mind-sets, ways of ordering our world, and 
actions.” They are by no means neutral and value-free representations of the world. As Hajer 
(2006, p. 67) argues, language has the power to make politics, influence power dynamics, 
define some issues as contentious and some others as uncontentious, and alleviate or create 
political conflicts. A discourse is indeed broader than words, discussion, or everyday 
speeches. It can be conceptualized as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices 
and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Just 
as words and the language, discourses are not neutral, either. As Fairclough and Wodak 
(1997, pp. 271-280, as cited in Van Dijk, 2001, p. 353) note, a discourse concerns power 
relations, constitutes society and culture, relates to ideologies, and represents a form of social 
action. To put it differently, discouses are “virtual arenas in which actors meet to carry out 
controversies over a particular object in order to gain influence over the way the object is 
going to be transformed or managed (Cannon & Müller-Mahn, 2010). Discourses also have 
the power to have a direct or indirect impact on the decision- and policy-making processes. 
On this point, Ünver (2015, p. 141) underlines that even though a single utterance can have 
little or no impact on the policy-making process, discourses that are sustained for a long 
period of time do affect policy and influence action. In specific to development, Alfini and 
Chambers (2010, p. 30) underline that the use and repetition of a certain language influences 
policy and practice of development; therefore, focusing on the language [discourses] of 
development provides valuable insights about the historical shifts in development thinking 
and priorities, the future directions in the field, and power dynamics embedded in its theory 
and practice. Based on these postulations, I asked through what kind of discursive and 
material practices the political, bureaucratic, and expert elite actors of the Turkish state have 
shaped the design and implementation of GAP, along with related minor research questions 
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(see Chapter 1). Data collection and analysis processes were conducted in accordance with a 
coherent combination of major and minor research questions, as will be explained below. 
3.1. Data Collection Techniques 
Even though there is a plethora of literature on GAP (see Chapter 4), a discerning eye can 
recognize that the majority of these studies are based on data drawn from governmental 
organizations and only a small number of studies are based on primary and original data. In 
this study, I combined both primary and secondary data sources as well as different data 
collection techniques such as literature review, archival research, and field interviews to 
diversify my data sources and triangulate the data for more robust findings. To elaborate, first 
and foremost, I conducted literature review to have an in-depth understanding of the previous 
research and key theoretical and empirical issues about my research topic. I searched for 
available primary, secondary, anecdotal, and theoretical sources to gather and synthesize 
information. Initially, I focused primarily on the broad topics of development theories, the 
history of modernization in Turkey, and GAP. Later on, within these broad topics, I narrowed 
down my focus to more specific topics such as critical approaches to development; the 
concept of depoliticization, its different forms, and their relation to development theories; 
continuities, ruptures, and transformations in Turkey’s modernization process since the 19th 
century and the role of the elites as modernization agents in this process; and the history, 
prospects, challenges, and critiques in regard to GAP. This comprehensive review allowed 
me to acquire a theoretical and empirical awareness regarding my research topic as well as 
research gaps in the literature. It also allowed me to build and present my main arguments in 
Chapter 2 and 4 where I discussed the theoretical framework of the study and provided a 
background and literature review of the topic respectively. 
 In addition to literature review, I collected significant portion of the data through 
archival research between May and August 2013 in Ankara and Şanlıurfa provinces of 
Turkey (see below for a detailed explanation regarding the criteria of site selection). In this 
process, I relied on two major sources. The first one was proceedings of GAP-related debates 
at Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM) between 1975 
and 2014, archived in the Journal of Proceedings (Tutanak Dergisi). In other words, I focused 
on legislative discourses, described as “the arguments and speeches made during a legislative 
session, including the primary speaker and the response of other legislators, often determined 
by their agenda and ideology (party affiliation) during the debate” (Ünver, 2015, p. 4). In 
order to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant proceedings, starting from 1975, I 
searched the archives of TBMM through using the following keywords: Aşağı Fırat (Lower 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 50 
Euphrates), Aşağı Fırat ve Dicle (Lower Euphrates and Tigris), Güneydoğu Anadolu 
(Southeastern Anatolia), Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (Southeastern Anatolia Project), and 
GAP. Furthermore, in order to double-check the relevance of the identified proceedings and 
not to miss out any relevant sessions, I made references to Kürt sorunu (Kurdish question), 
Güneydoğu sorunu (Southeastern problem), terör (terror), güvenlik (security), kalkınma 
(development) and gelişme (growth), as GAP has been widely discussed in relation to these 
themes over the years. These criteria provided me with 568 relevant proceedings (see 
Appendix A for the complete list of proceedings). Upon the initial examination of these 
proceedings, I omitted texts in which GAP was not the main focus, GAP was mentioned out 
of context, and merely technical and descriptive information on GAP was copied from 
existing government sources word by word and provided without any change. Thus, the 
number of proceedings to be examined was reduced to 189. Later on, I refined the text 
material into a separate document without taking the discourses out of their context and 
sorted them in chronological order for analysis.  
 Indeed, using parliamentary proceedings as a data source and unit of analysis has 
certain advantages. TBMM has been one of the most significant venues that reflected inter- 
and intra-elite power dynamics in the Turkish political system to a great extent (Loizides, 
2009, p. 282). Also, in contrast to interviews, proceedings of parliamentary debates are 
generally maintained unrefined and unedited by third parties (p. 282). Ünver (2015, pp. 4-5) 
also notes that examining legislative discourses provides certain benefits in comparison to 
examining polls and interviews, as in a legislative setting (1) legislative discourses 
demonstrate the ideological position of the legislators as well as a clear political cross-section 
of a country’s electorate, (2) legislative discourses are political and initiated to have an 
impact on the decision-making and legislative mechanisms, (3) there is room for challenging 
counter-discourses to emerge immediately even against hegemonic discourses, and (4) 
legislators are ideally better informed on a given topic and better equipped with opportunities 
to make their points compared to the electorate.  
While examining proceedings provided me with such benefits, it would indeed be 
one-sided and superficial to solely rely on the archives of TBMM. For this reason, the second 
and complementary source was the archives of GAP Regional Development Administration 
(GAP Bölgesel Kalkınma İdaresi, GAP-BKİ). I followed a similar procedure and initially 
explored 315 scanned documents I obtained from GAP-BKİ’s archive in Şanlıurfa that 
included, but not limited to, GAP-related action plans, final situation reports, sectoral reports, 
province profiles, magazines, public relations documents, third-party research reports on 
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specific topics, and proceedings of various seminars, workshops, and meetings. Based on 
their relevance to my research questions, I identified 86 documents and drew on them in 
Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7 (see Appendix B for the complete list of included documents). 
While these texts were important, it would be inadequate to consider them as the sole 
representations of discourse and “read them at face value without reference to the arguments, 
interests and divergent points of view that they encode and to which they allude” (Mosse, 
2005, p. 15). Therefore, in order to facilitate their “interpretation backwards to reveal the 
social relations that produced them” (p. 15) as well as diversify my sources further, I 
conducted 64 semi-structured interviews with a wide range of active and retired politicians, 
bureaucrats, experts, consultants, and intellectuals from various political parties, 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, universities, and the media between 
March and May 2014 in Ankara and Şanlıurfa.7 These participants would be qualified as 
elites on the grounds that they were “influential, prominent, and/or well-informed” in their 
organizations or communities with their high level of expertise in relation to the research 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 105). Elite interviewing has certain advantages, too. As the 
leaders of their social groups and institutions, elites have exclusive access to and control over 
public discourse and communication and, thus, possess knowledge and information as a 
symbolic resource (Van Dijk, 2001, pp. 355-356). For this reason, I could collect such 
valuable and “insider” information on GAP, GAP-related issues, and the policies and 
positions of involved governmental and non-governmental institutions only from the elites, 
thanks to their high level of experience and expertise, easy access to knowledge, and often 
privileged positions in their organizations.  
To elaborate on how I selected my participants, instead of determining a sample size 
in advance, I used non-probability or non-random sampling and combined purposive, 
snowball, and sequential sampling techniques. The aim was to reach all possible, unique, and 
informative participants that fit particular criteria; identify and contact other difficult-to-reach 
participants in the networks of the elites; and collect data until no new and original 
information is collected (Neuman, 2007, pp. 141-145). Accordingly, I prepared two sets of 
criteria to select participants. Using the first set, I short-listed politicians among 548 MPs at 
TBMM as of 2014 who fulfilled one or more criteria of (1) having served as a representative 
from Southeastern Anatolia Region, (2) having previous experience in the areas of 
                                                
7 I stopped interviewing more participants after the 64th interview as the data obtained from the interviews has 
over time become almost identical to data obtained from previous interviews and reached a saturation point (see 
Creswell, 2013 for more information on saturation).  
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 52 
development or planning in government or private sector, (3) having a documented interest in 
and/or previous information on GAP, and (4) being accessible and available during my stay 
in the field. Thus, I narrowed down the list and interviewed 28 politicians from four different 
political parties represented at TBMM as of 2014: 17 politicians from the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), four politicians from the main 
opposition Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), four politicians from 
the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), and three 
politicians from the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 
MHP)8 (see Appendix C.1. for more information on the participants from TBMM). These 
interviews lasted from 5 to 45 minutes. Except the interviews of four politicians who refused 
to be voice-recorded, I voice-recorded all of the interviews and transcribed them verbatim.  
Using the second set, I looked for participants who fulfilled one or more criteria of (1) 
having served as an expert, consultant, coordinator, director, researcher and such in the 
design and implementation process of GAP at General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
(Devlet Su İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, DSİ), State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama 
Teşkilatı, DPT) or current Ministry of Development (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Kalkınma 
Bakanlığı),9 GAP-BKİ, and universities, (2) having conducted academic or policy-oriented 
research on GAP, (3) descending from a reputable and well-known large landowner family in 
GAP region, and (4) being accessible and available during my stay in the field. Thus, I 
identified and interviewed 36 active and retired experts, bureaucrats, and intellectuals: 18 
employees from GAP-BKİ, six employees from DPT/Ministry of Development, five 
professors and researchers from the academia and think-tank industry, four employees from 
DSİ, two large landowners, and one director from TRT (see Appendix C.2. for more 
information on the participants from these governmental and non-governmental institutions). 
These interviews lasted from 15 to 120 minutes. Except the interviews of four participants 
who refused to be voice-recorded, I voice-recorded all of the interviews and transcribed them 
verbatim. At the end of the interviewing process, I also cross-checked them with secondary 
archival and media sources for triangulation purposes. Overall, the number of participants as 
well as the variety of participants in terms of their backgrounds, political party and 
                                                
8 Around the time I interviewed MPs, AKP had 314, CHP had 131, MHP had 52, and BDP had 21 seats at 
TBMM (“İşte son sandalye dağılımı”, 2014).  
9 DPT was dissolved in 2011 and incorporated into the then newly established Ministry of Development in the 
same year. A long-time employee explained the difference between DPT and the Ministry of Development as 
follows: “Only the sign outside the building changed … Organizational structure remained the same; the same 
people are working only under a different title” (Personal interview, April 30, 2014, Ankara, Turkey). 
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institutional affiliations, and worldviews indicate that the utmost importance was given to 
obtain credible and multiple perspectives from diverse sources.  
I should note that 25% of 64 participants were female. This ratio was lower among 
the participants from TBMM; only 7% of them were female. Even though admittedly I could 
have paid more attention to find a balance between male and female participants, it should be 
kept in mind that around the time I was in the field, in Turkey the rate of female participation 
in the workforce was 30.8%, the rate of female executives in public sector was 9.4% (Türkiye 
İstatistik Kurumu, 2015), the rate of female MPs at TBMM was 14.3% (Tahaoğlu, 2015), and 
the rate of female employees at GAP-BKİ was 30% (GAP-BKİ, 2017b, p. 11). Therefore, 
structural factors also had an impact as to why women’s voice could not be included in the 
study at a higher and a desired degree. 
To explain why I selected Ankara and Şanlıurfa as the research sites, I chose Ankara 
on the grounds that it was the capital city where crucial data sources such as ministries, 
headquarters or liaison offices of governmental institutions, the archives of TBMM, National 
Library of Turkey, and some of the largest university libraries in Turkey were all located due 
to the country’s centralist administrative system. Also, it was a highly accessible and suitable 
site given the limited time and resources I had in the field. Similarly, I chose Şanlıurfa on the 
grounds that (1) arguably it has been the de facto center of GAP as most of the infrastructure 
investments and social projects were concentrated within its close vicinity, (2) the 
headquarters of GAP-BKİ was relocated from Ankara to Şanlıurfa in 2009, (3) the large 
landowner families were easier to reach, and (4) making interactions and observations to 
grasp the bottom-up perspectives of the local population on GAP and enrich the analysis was 
possible. Briefly, the high potential of both provinces to provide rich data and their relatively 
easy accessibility and suitability were the decisive factors in the site selection.  
 As for the ethical considerations of the study, I fulfilled the requirements of Zentrum 
für Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF) Research Ethics Committee and successfully received 
ethical clearance prior to leaving for the research sites. In the field, I also received clearance 
from the Office of Press and Public Relations at TBMM as a requirement of law to enter 
TBMM with a voice-recording device. Throughout the whole interviewing process, I took the 
oral informed consent from all the participants before I started the interviews and voice-
recording the conversations. Also, before the interview, I provided the participants with a 
brief text to inform them about who I was, what my research was about, what kind of 
questions they would be asked, and their rights to withdraw from the interview anytime they 
wanted to. I provided this information orally, too. In addition, I took the utmost precautions 
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in order to ensure the privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality of the participants. In order not 
to disclose their identity, I concealed their name, gender, age, ethnic origin, and exact 
positions at their institutions in all notes and records. Also, I did not offer and give any 
incentive to any of the participants in the data collection process.  
3.2. Data Analysis Techniques 
Based on the research questions and the quality of collected data, the data analysis was driven 
by a post-positivist approach that challenged the positivist principles of hypotheses testing, 
objectivism, empiricism, and naturalism. In this guidance, I adopted a two-dimensional 
approach to examine data both horizontally and vertically to capture its width and depth and 
move beyond mere description of what was supposedly “out there.” Therefore, I employed 
qualitative content analysis (QCA) and discourse analysis (DA) as primary analytical 
approaches to describe, explain, understand, and interpret my material. To explicate, even 
though content analysis is generally associated with quantitative analysis and positivist 
approaches and perceived as an “objective” and “neutral” way to obtain a quantitative 
description of texts, it also includes other forms that are associated with qualitative research 
techniques, such as QCA. In contrast to quantitative content analysis, QCA is not limited to 
counting words; it involves subjective interpretation of the meaning of qualitative material 
and examination of language to classify large amounts of text into an efficient and 
manageable number of categories that represent similar meanings (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, 
p. 1278). It is based on decontextualization of the texts from their source and their 
recontextualization. On the other side, based on the assumption that language intensely 
shapes how one sees the reality rather than it neutrally reflects the reality as it is, DA involves 
“the examination of argumentative structure in documents and other written or spoken 
statements as well as practices through which these utterances are made” (Hajer, 2006, p. 66). 
It also reveals the latent frictions, trends, and transformations in society and demonstrates 
why certain issues are handled the way they are (Cannon & Müller-Mahn, 2010). The 
analysis is especially inspired by critical discourse analysis, as the study covers topics that 
involve socio-political problems and questions as to how power relations, dominance, 
inequality are produced, reproduced, legitimized, or challenged by discourse structures in 
socio-political contexts (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). For this reason, the analysis is made 
through an interpretative and explanatory lens.  
 At first sight, QCA and DA might appear as contradictory approaches. As mentioned 
above, while content analysis generally aims to understand or interpret social reality as it is, 
DA aims to uncover the way that reality is produced. Similarly, while content analysis 
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focuses more on “what” is in the text, DA focuses more on “how” the text is produced. Even 
though one might posit that these differences would lead to methodological incompatibilities, 
it can also be argued that combining both approaches would provide a more detailed and 
systematic description of the text material and a richer examination of socially constructed 
meanings and power relations. Furthermore, qualitative forms of content analysis bear more 
resemblance to DA with their focus less on frequency and more on the usage of words and 
the context in which they are used. They reject the idea that meaning is stable and countable 
in an objective sense (Hardy, Harley, & Phillips, 2004, p. 20). Also, both content analysis and 
DA aim to draw conclusions about some aspect of human communication from a selected set 
of messages. Even though the way they do it is different, there is no reason why their findings 
do not fit together nicely (Neuendorf, 2004, p. 33). For these reasons, QCA and DA do not 
contradict, but rather complement each other in this study.  
To proceed with the analysis, with the assistance of NVivo data analysis software, I 
formulated three different but interrelated coding frames. As the unit of analysis, I used (1) 
proceedings of TBMM, (2) transcripts of the interviews with the politicians, and (3) 
transcripts of the interviews with experts, bureaucrats, and intellectuals respectively. Also, I 
combined inductive and deductive techniques in this process. Employing a mixed approach 
allowed me to remain focused on the theoretical framework of the study and my preexisting 
knowledge of the research topic and, at the same time, be attentive and open to new 
categories that emerged from the data to include in the analysis. As it is generally considered 
difficult to handle more than around 40 categories and subcategories (Schreier, 2012, p. 79), I 
also reduced this number to around 40 in all frames. Also, in all frames, each category 
captured only one aspect of the text material, each unit of coding was assigned to one of the 
subcategories only, each unit of coding was assigned to at least one subcategory, and each 
subcategory was used at least once. In other words, all frames fulfilled the requirements of 
unidimensionality, mutually exclusiveness, exhaustiveness, and saturation (pp. 71-77). Later 
on, I merged three frames to formulate an overarching frame with clear and detailed 
explanations regarding the label, definition, indicators, and examples of each category and 
subcategory (see Appendix D for the complete coding frame). As the final step, I took a 
closer look inside each category and subcategory to identify power-loaded arguments, 
descriptions, narratives, metaphors, and expressions for critical interpretation and analysis.   
3.3. Reflections on My Positionality in the Research Process 
Indeed, my position in terms of my area of study; theoretical lens; ethnical, cultural, and 
educational background; personal experience; status in society; gender; and worldview 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 56 
influenced how I collected and analyzed data in this study. To put it differently, power 
relations were embedded in almost every aspect of the research process, as neither 
researchers nor participants are mechanic tools without histories, emotions, or values. On the 
contrary, they both have agency and own motivations, interests, and agendas. Therefore, I 
should note that conducting this study in a totally objective, neutral, and detached fashion 
was almost impossible. I was aware that my implicit knowledge and past experiences would 
influence how I saw the reality and interpreted my material. I paid the utmost attention to 
prevent my subjectivity from prejudging the study and leading to bias and worked towards 
detaching my “ordinary” identity from my “researcher” identity to the extent possible. 
As I expected, my position as a Turkish male who was conducting a PhD level 
research in Germany on a relatively sensitive topic that involved interviews with politicians 
and high-level bureaucrats in a tense and at times dangerous political atmosphere and field 
research in a region that could be qualified as insecure due to the ongoing Kurdish question 
and its proximity to Syria led to some challenges. To begin with, generally gaining access to 
elites through direct contact involves difficulties. My experience was not an exception. Most 
of the time, I could contact bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals through the 
recommendation or request of other persons in their networks such as supervisors of lower 
level bureaucrats in governmental institutions or experts who worked in the same project in 
non-governmental institutions. Arranging interviews with politicians at TBMM was more 
difficult for several reasons. The security regulations necessitated an employee within 
TBMM to inform the main reception and give my name in advance every time I visited the 
complex. In other words, it would have been almost impossible to get inside and move freely 
as a researcher without my gatekeepers. Challenges continued inside TBMM, as it was 
equally difficult to adjust to the tight schedules of politicians and make an appointment 
accordingly. Most politicians were present at TBMM only on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and 
Thursdays. During their presence, they were extremely busy with attending various sessions 
and meetings as expected. They were also occupied with listening to the problems and 
demands of their constituents when in their offices. To put it differently, speaking to a 
researcher even for a few minutes had a very low priority on behalf of politicians unless they 
had personal or party interests–in the senses of both curiosity and benefit–in the topic. For 
this reason, I had to be present at TBMM during working hours every day to “catch” 
politicians for an interview or constantly check with their secretaries or advisors about their 
availability. Given this aspect, interviews with politicians were conducted in a formal, 
stressful, and “now-or-never” atmosphere.  
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Another challenge was the mistrust and suspicion of some participants during the 
research process. As I anticipated, it was difficult to obtain the consent of some participants 
for a voice-recorded interview due to their suspicion that “someone might hear” and fear of 
“leaving a trace.” Also, some participants–specifically politicians–greeted me with suspicion 
on the grounds that I was a Turkish researcher whose institution was located in Germany. It 
was noteworthy that participants of Turkish origin questioned my motivation to carry out this 
research because, in their eyes, there had to be a “real” reason why I came all the way from 
“there” to “here.” Similarly, participants of Kurdish origin questioned my motives because, in 
their eyes, there had to be a “real” reason why as a Turk I would want to learn more about 
“them” and “their” geography. In that sense, I sometimes felt like I was in limbo because 
sometimes I was not considered “Turkish enough” for living abroad and sometimes I was 
considered “too Turkish” for my background. Arguably, in addition to the low level of trust 
in society in general, this situation was linked to the fact that GAP was widely and almost 
automatically associated with water dispute among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq and the Kurdish 
question. As will be discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, there has been a widespread belief that 
“dark foreign powers” outside and their “collaborators” inside have always been behind the 
emergence and complication of both issues. For this reason, conducting this research as a 
Turkish researcher in Germany sometimes raised eyebrows. To illustrate with three 
examples, in one occasion, after I used the label “Kurdish political movement” in a 
conversation on the Kurdish question, one of the deputy chairpersons of a political party 
refused to talk to me further and asked whether it was “how we were ‘taught’ in Germany” 
before terminating the interview.10 In another occasion, at the end of our interview, a planner 
asked what I was going to do with the “sensitive” information he provided me and advised 
me to make sure my research would differ from previously conducted “malicious researches 
on GAP” and serve the interest of Turkey only, not the others.11 Finally, a university 
professor concluded the interview session by stating that “I don’t normally give credit to 
conspiracy theories but some actors may stir this water problem in the future. For instance, 
Germany. Germany is so interested in this region; your research may be part of this, too.”12 
Due to this atmosphere, I spent more time than I thought I would on constantly (re-
)introducing myself, stating my goals, and assuring the participants that I was not 
representing any government or institution, I was not paid by a third party to carry out this 
                                                
10 Personal interview, May 9, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
11 Personal interview, April 2, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
12 Personal interview, April 22, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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research, I was interested in hearing their opinions for the purposes of research only, and I 
was keeping the data safe and inaccessible by the others. Even though it is difficult to know 
for sure, I cannot conclude that mistrust and suspicion issues spoiled the quality of the 
collected data and had a detrimental impact on the data collection process except slowing 
down the research process. 
There were also occasions where asymmetrical power relations between me–as the 
researcher–and the participants–as the elites–constituted challenges. To elaborate, it was 
sometimes difficult for me to take control of the interview and have the participants answer 
my questions instead of talking about topics of their choices. Especially some politicians had 
the tendency to use the interviews as an opportunity to praise their own parties and leaders 
and criticize their opponents. Also in terms of power relations, being as educated as–in some 
cases more educated than–the participants provided certain advantages and disadvantages. On 
the one hand, my “PhD researcher” title aroused respect and encouraged certain participants 
to be more open to “deep” discussions and even exchange ideas based on the assumption that 
I was their somewhat equivalent in terms of education and expertise. On the other hand, I felt 
that the same title made certain participants feel insecure and discouraged them to provide 
their perspectives based on the assumption that I was “outsmarting” and “belittling” them, 
which was indeed not true at all. During these moments, I felt like I was in another limbo 
because while I was considering the person I was interviewing was an elite, actually that 
person was considering that I was the elite in the room. Both to overcome this challenge and 
keep the conversation going, at the expense of experiencing an inner conflict and ethical 
dilemma, sometimes I had to pretend as if I were totally ignorant of what the participant was 
speaking of or as if I were in full agreement with the participant on certain–generally 
political–topics, despite my stance was exactly the opposite. The presentation of myself as if 
I were “one of them” admittedly worked in terms of breaking the ice and making the 
participants feel more comfortable and eager to pour in their thoughts and opinions.   
As for challenges regarding safety and security in the field, I have always felt secure 
during my stay in Turkey. One important factor behind this was that, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, a peace process to solve the Kurdish question was initiated by the Turkish state in 
2013 and a ceasefire was declared by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan, the PKK) in the same year. For this reason, there was no armed conflict between 
the Turkish security forces and the PKK in southeastern Turkey during my visits in 2013 and 
2014. However, following the civil war in Syria that broke out in 2011, the newly emerged 
violent non-state actor Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) gradually became more active 
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especially in Southeastern Anatolia Region after May 2013. Even though I did not feel the 
presence of ISIS or insecurity due to its growing activities during my stay in Şanlıurfa, I 
learnt how active and dangerous it actually was the hard way in somewhere else. To 
explicate, on March 20, 2014, I took a bus from Mersin to go to Ankara to settle and start the 
interviews. When my bus was stopped for a routine security check in the town of Ulukışla in 
Niğde province in Central Anatolia Region, three ISIS militants who were going from Syria 
to İstanbul got out of their vehicle and opened fire to security officials on the checkpoint. The 
bullets also hit my bus and broke its glasses, causing panic and awe among passengers 
including myself. Unfortunately, two security officials and one civilian were killed and seven 
security officials and one passenger on my bus were wounded (see İdiz, 2014). It took me 
some time to get over the traumatizing impacts of what I witnessed there that day. Still, the 
incident changed my perception about security in the field and led me to take a more 
“fatalist” stance throughout the research process, as it was proven that totally unexpected 
security situations–an ISIS attack in Turkey in 2014–could emerge in totally unexpected 
locations–a small town in Central Anatolia where I passed through maybe hundreds of times 
since my childhood. Overall, I can confidently state that security conditions did not influence 
the research process.  
Finally, admittedly my previous knowledge and disciplinary background initially led 
me to take a more narrow perspective to study GAP, its political dimension, and its position 
in Turkey’s overall development vision. Arguably due to my background in international 
relations and international security studies before I started studying development, I had a 
tendency to conceive GAP as a technical national development project that would provide 
benefits for all, overemphasize its contribution to state security against state actors in the 
Middle East, and conceptualize the state as a “black box” or monolithic entity. However, the 
more I became interested in critical approaches to both security and development, the more I 
distanced myself from technocratic, realist, and state-centric approaches and questioned 
whose security or development was actually at stake in mainstream and supposedly neutral 
approaches. Also, the discrepancy between how development was presented in textbooks and 
most of national and international policy documents and how it was understood, interpreted, 
and put into practice by different elites and local actors in the field was so striking that I 
became almost fully convinced that the concept of development itself had to be questioned 
and problematized. My conception of power and interpretation of power relations also 
dramatically changed. This critical self-assessment also led me to rethink my focus and 
reformulate some additional (sub-)research questions during the research. Overall, the 
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awareness I gained regarding how narrow and reductionist my initial focus was after 
familiarizing myself with critical approaches to development expanded my theoretical, 
methodological, and analytical knowledge and strongly influenced how I formulated the 
research questions of the study and collected and analyzed data throughout the research.  
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4. TURKEY’S DEVELOPMENT PATH AND PATH TO GAP’S INITIATION 
In this chapter, I provide a background of the design and implementation of GAP and a 
comprehensive review of GAP-related literature to explain the long process behind the 
crystallization of the idea of GAP and illustrate how this study fills the gap in the literature 
with its distinct theoretical and methodological approach. The chapter comprises four 
sections. In the first section, I examine the history of how the idea of modernizing Turkey 
and providing development through plans and projects in different forms and scales emerged 
and developed since the 19th century. In the second section, I discuss the distinct 
characteristics of Southeastern Anatolia Region in terms of its natural resources, socio-
economic indicators, and ethnic composition to illustrate why specifically this region was 
chosen as the locus of GAP. In the third section, I discuss the relevant scholarly works as 
well as government documents on GAP in a systematic fashion to present both the existing 
literature in different thematic categories and subcategories and under-researched areas in the 
literature. In the fourth and final section, I provide a brief summary of the background and 
explain the originality, contribution, and position of the study in the literature.   
4.1. The Origins of Turkey’s Will for Modernization and Development 
4.1.1. Efforts to “Catch up” with the West and Maintain the State (19th century-1923) 
Turkey’s modernization process dates back to as early as the late 18th and early 19th centuries 
when the Ottoman Empire made its initial attempts to catch up with the European powers 
after a series of humiliating military defeats that reinforced the idea that the empire had fallen 
behind the West. To elaborate, in the early 19th century, the Ottoman state enlisted experts, 
trainers, and teachers from Europe and sent students to various European capitals to 
understand Western modernity and enable a channel to transfer modern ideas and social 
systems to the empire (Kavas, 2015, p. 518). Even though modernization efforts were 
initially concentrated on reforming the military along European lines, later on they were 
expanded to include remodeling the state based on modern political, administrative, 
educational, and legal systems (Mango, 2008, p. 151). These political and administrative 
reforms were also significant in terms of their contribution to the emergence of the “first 
elites” (Göle, 1998, p. 65). The widespread idea of the period was that the Western way of 
life and mode of thought–alla franca–were progressive and positive while the Ottoman-
Turkish practices–alla turca–were conservative, negative, and even backward (Kavas, 2015, 
p. 519). In this context, the Ottoman state undertook a wide range of modernizing reforms 
across the major periods of the Reorganization (Tanzimat) Era (1839-1876), the Hamidian 
Era (1876-1908), and Second Constitutional Era (1908-1918) until the Armistice of Mudros 
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was concluded between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies at the end of the World War I in 
1918, which also terminated the empire. 
 Indeed, it is beyond the scope and purpose of this study to discuss these reforms and 
their implications individually (see Göle, 1998, pp. 61-85). Still, some reforms that were 
carried out after 1839 deserve a special focus for arguably constituting the first examples of 
economic and social improvement schemes that would be implemented in modern Turkey 
later on. Tekeli (2009, p. 138) notes that the primary reason for the proclamation of the 
Imperial Edict of Reorganization (Tanzimat Fermanı) in 1839 was to “improve property and 
people.” In that sense, it was the first time that the Ottoman concept of development (imar) 
was widened to include the welfare of the empire’s people (p. 138). Around the same period, 
Council of Public Works (Meclis-i Umur-u Nafia) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
established to discuss issues concerning the state of agriculture, trade, industries, education, 
and health in the empire (p. 138). After the dissatisfaction with the pace and results of the 
reforms, Development Councils (İmar Meclisleri) were established in 1845 and sent to 
different states (eyalet) to conduct explorations regarding their development potentials and 
problems. The reports prepared by the Councils after almost a year-long exploration were 
then discussed in Supreme Council of Justice (Meclis-i Vâlâ-yi Ahkâm-i Adliye). Based on 
these reports, various programs that included demands regarding bridges, roads, water needs, 
and infrastructure were prepared to be put into action in states. Even though the application 
of these programs were quite limited, they were still significant in terms of introducing the 
idea that the provision of infrastructure and development was one of the fundamental duties 
of the state (pp. 138-139). The regional organization of the empire was also altered in the 
modernization process. While the empire was administered on the basis of the state system, a 
more centralized structure known as province system was adopted after the 1860s for a more 
effective supervision of rural areas (Ecemiş Kılıç, 2009, p. 1285). In relation to this, 
considering that provision of infrastructure was crucial to extend the reach and control of the 
state, the state began to view infrastructure building as a subject of comprehensive and 
countrywide planning in the 1880s. In this context, Plan for Public Works in Anatolia 
(Anadolu’da İmalat-ı Umumiye Dair Lâyiha) was the first public works program, which 
envisaged navigation on rivers, draining of swamps, irrigation, and construction of roads, 
railways, and seaports (Tekeli, 2009, p. 140). 
Neither such modernization reforms nor Ottomanist, pan-Islamist, or pan-Turkist 
attempts worked in terms of maintaining the state and ensuring its integration. The World 
War I not only terminated the empire, but also devastated its political, social, and economic 
Chapter 4: Turkey’s development path and path to GAP’s initiation  
 64 
structures, as three to four million people were killed in Anatolia alone, physical 
infrastructure of the country and morale of the population were destroyed, and the lands were 
occupied by British, French, and Italian troops (Kayalı, 2008, p. 113). In 1919, Mustafa 
Kemal (later named as Atatürk) initiated the War of Independence against the Allied 
occupation to at least keep the basic Turkish homeland and develop a homogeneous Turkish 
element in Anatolia (Okyar, 1984, p. 47). After four years of national struggle in which 
around 13,000 killed and 35,000 wounded, the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923.  
4.1.2. National Integration Efforts in between Liberalism and Statism (1923-1960) 
Indeed, the establishment of modern Turkey was a fresh start after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and a rupture from its Ottoman past. Still, since the new republic inherited 
many features of the old empire, there were also continuities between two entities. According 
to Keyder (1993, p. 144), the Ottoman Empire did not actually collapse, but continued to 
exist in the guise of the Republic of Turkey. A significant continuity was regarding the 
characteristics of the late Ottoman and early republican elites. To elaborate, 93% of the 
Ottoman staff officers and 85% of the civil servants remained in modern Turkey after the 
collapse of the empire (Rustow, 1964, as cited in Turan, 1984, p. 103). This well-defined 
group of people were predominantly young, urban military officers who were born or raised 
in İstanbul or Rumelia,13 educated in the modern establishments created in the Tanzimat Era 
in the 19th century, and involved in politics as members of Committee of Union and Progress 
(İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Zürcher, 2007, p. 102). 
They were sure of their cultural superiority due to their formal education and adherence to the 
West and distinct from the rest in terms of their language, appearance, manners, and customs 
(Szyliowicz, 1971, p. 391). To illustrate this point, Ziya Gökalp (1959, p. 278, as cited in 
Frey, 1965), the intellectual father of Turkish nationalism, observed that in Turkey  
there [were] three layers of people differing from each other in civilization and 
education: the common people, the men educated in medreses, the men educated in 
(modern) secular schools. The first still [were] not freed from the effects of Far 
Eastern civilization; the second [were] still living in Eastern civilization; it [was] only 
the third group which [had] had some benefits from Western civilization. … [O]ne 
portion of our nation [was] living in an ancient, another in a medieval, and a third in a 
modern age (p. 39). 
Similarly, from the perspective of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1958, p. 58, as cited in Gürpınar, 
                                                
13 Rumelia refers to the possessions of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula. 
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2012), a prominent intellectual of the republican period, people in Anatolia were pious, 
ignorant, superstitious, and needed to be educated. In his own words,  
[W]e knew Anatolia only from the privates sent from there. These privates were 
scared of running into crowds which they had never seen before and which filled the 
courtyards of big mosques … we, children, encircled and made fun of them. We used 
to laugh at them. In Rumelia, Anatolia was associated with these scared privates and 
famines, poverty, and brigands … no, Anatolia was not a place that could satisfy the 
dreams of the sons of Rumelia (pp. 904-905). 
Given these social characteristics and the inherited gap between the elites and non-elites, it 
was hardly surprising that the republican elites placed principles such as positivism, 
militarism, nationalism, and strong state tradition at the center of their modernization vision 
without necessarily taking the needs or demands of the non-elites into consideration. In a 
sense, modernization was “for the people, in the name of the people, and despite the people” 
at the same time (Somer, 2015, p. 147). 
In relation to this, the patriarchal characteristic of the Ottoman Empire remained 
intact to a certain degree in modern Turkey. It was telling, for instance, that Mustafa Kemal 
adopted the surname Atatürk (Father of the Turks) and saw himself as the pater patriae and 
the teacher of the nation (Mango, 2008, p. 165). Also, one of the main tenets of Atatürk’s 
ideas and principles–also known as Kemalism–was etatism,14 which in a broad sense referred 
to a paternalistic approach in which the state was the sole responsible entity to intervene in 
social, economic, cultural, and education activities and organize life (Dumont, 1984, p. 39). 
People, in return, were conceived as “subjects whose prime duty was obedience to their 
benevolent rulers” (Turan, 1984, pp. 103-104). In that sense, the Turkish state has borne 
resemblance to a father-state (devlet baba) that existed to protect its subjects, but at the same 
time suppress and punish them when and if necessary. Its “sacredness” and prestige had to be 
preserved and enhanced under any circumstances.  
The modernization efforts of the modern Turkish state began in this context in the 
early 1920s. The overarching goals of the state were concentrated around nation-building and 
transformation of society, economy, and culture in accordance with Western norms and 
standards on the grounds that the West was the representative of the “level of contemporary 
civilization.” To put it differently, the goal was to “change the Turkish people’s outlook and 
                                                
14 Kemalist ideology was distilled into six principles also known as “Six Arrows,” which were republicanism, 
nationalism, populism, revolutionism, secularism, and etatism. These principles were included in the 
constitution in 1937 (Göle, 1998, p. 91). 
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behavior from inward-looking, passive and shaped by collective religious and institutional 
values to active, outward-looking and more realistic in terms of the economic and 
materialistic values of the modern world” (Okyar, 1984, p. 50). As Atatürk made it clear in a 
speech in İnebolu in 1925, each and every citizen had to prove that they were civilized 
through their ideas, mentality, family life, way of life, and outward aspect (Kavas, 2015, pp. 
531-532). In that sense, from the perspective of the state elites, modernization or social 
change was a linear process through which the entire nation would simultaneously and 
uniformly experience. Also, it was a necessity to abandon the “Oriental” aspects of the 
Ottoman Empire and mimic all that was progressive and good according to the West 
(Hanioğlu, 2011, p. 229; Harris, 2008a, p. 1702). 
The reforms carried out in the political, cultural, and legal spheres to achieve these 
goals included, but not limited to, the creation of a modern state structure with a constitution, 
an elected parliament, and other Western-type institutions; recruitment of a modern 
bureaucracy; abolition of the Caliphate and secularization of the state, education, and the 
legal system; granting women voting rights; adoption of the Latin alphabet and reformation 
of the Turkish language; and urging men and women to adopt Western clothing (Landau, 
1984, p. xii). Also, the People’s Houses (Halkevleri) were established in the early 1930s to 
disseminate these newly introduced modern norms in the depths of society for indoctrination 
and close the wide gap between the state elites and the non-elites (Gürpınar, 2012, p. 909). In 
addition to these predominantly political and cultural reforms, the state further carried out a 
wide range of reforms in the economic sphere primarily to create an independent and national 
economy and, thus, to ensure national integration and homogenization within the country. 
National integration–reorganization of the economic and social relations of individuals within 
the geographical boundaries of the newly founded state–was a prerequisite to ensure national 
loyalty and the failure of absorbing one specific ethnic or regional group to the entire nation 
would be a compromise of the project (Keyder, 1993, p. 62).  
To elaborate on the state of economy and the need for integration in this period, the 
incessant wars since the Balkan Wars in 1912 had caused around two million casualties, 
deportation of the Armenian population from Anatolia in 1915 caused around 1.5 million 
casualties, and the population exchange in 1923 brought about the departure of around 1.2 
million Orthodox Greeks and arrival of around half a million Muslims from Greece and the 
Balkans in return (Pamuk, 2008, p. 275). Amidst such destruction, the newly established 
Turkey inherited a predominantly agricultural economy marked by low living standards, low 
production and productivity levels, and low number of industrial plants, majority of which 
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were owned and run by foreign businesses. Also, the intensified interaction between certain 
regions in the Ottoman Empire and the European markets in the 19th century led to the 
growth of port cities while it decreased the significance of the cities in Central and Eastern 
Anatolia (Tekeli, 2009, p. 51). Prior to the World War I, 55% and 22% of around 300 
industrial firms were located in İstanbul and İzmir respectively (Jafar, 1976, p. 52). Such 
disparities persisted in the early years of modern Turkey, too. The industry was almost non-
existent and the investments were concentrated in more suitable regions due to their climatic 
and geographical conditions, leaving some other regions marginalized and deprived of 
scientific and technological benefits (p. 52).15 To address this issue, the state aimed to 
deconcentrate the population and disperse them to different regions as a part of its regional 
policy (Göymen, 2008). The most significant policies toward this end were (1) the relocation 
of the capital from the former imperial capital İstanbul to a then small town Ankara in 1923 
to initiate a “genuine” modernization process from scratch, (2) creation of modern cities that 
would spread social change in their surrounding regions, (3) extension of a railroad system to 
connect different regions of the country and have control over society, and (4) creation of 
new industries in small and remote cities in Central Anatolia (Tekeli, 2008, pp. 53-54).  
The creation of an independent and self-sufficient economy that would be controlled 
by a national bourgeoisie was a remarkable part of the modernization and nation-building 
process. Since the state adhered to a liberal economic approach in the 1920s, it encouraged 
the private sector to invest in industrialization. In this context, Industry Incentive Law 
(Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu) was enacted in 1927 to provide support for businesses and facilitate 
the development of industries with state incentives. However, due to the lack of private 
capital and entrepreneurs as well as the conditions brought by the Great Depression in the late 
1920s, the state had to act as the leading entrepreneur and pursue import substitution 
industrialization later in the 1930s. It is noteworthy that in this period Sümerbank was 
established to finance textile industry in 1933, First Five-Year Industrialization Plan (Birinci 
Beş Yıllık Sanayi Planı) was formulated with the assistance of the Soviet Union in 1934, 
Mineral Research and Exploration Institute (Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü) was 
                                                
15 Turkey was divided into seven geographical regions according to their distinct characteristics regarding 
climate, flora, fauna, topography, and transportation after the First Geography Congress convened in Ankara in 
1941. These regions were defined as: Aegean Region, Black Sea Region, Central Anatolia Region, Eastern 
Anatolia Region, Marmara Region, Mediterranean Region, and Southeastern Anatolia Region. According to 
Jongerden (2009, pp. 8-9), Turkey “was asocially dehistoricized” by this division as the old names of Ottoman 
states such as Eastern Rumelia, Pontus, and Kurdistan were replaced with Marmara, Black Sea, and 
Southeastern Anatolia regions respectively following “the initial assumption of the ethnically-based, European 
name for the new nation.” 
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established in 1935, Etibank was established to finance electricity sector in 1935, and 
Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration (Elektrik İşleri Etüt 
İdaresi) was established for water resources development and energy planning purposes in 
1935 (Tekeli, 2009, p. 147). In the late 1930s, even though Turkey did not participate in the 
World War II, the approaching war prevented the state from investing in industrialization, as 
public funds were primarily allocated for security purposes.  
Even though etatism had to be abandoned in the early 1940s, the significance of 
industrialization for the economy remained intact. For instance, a Development Plan and 
Program After the War (Savaş Sonrası Kalkınma Plan ve Programı) was formulated between 
1944 and 1946 to further extend the role of the state in industrialization (Yılmaz, 2003a, p. 
183). However, this plan could not be implemented for a number of reasons. To name a few, 
due to the growing dissatisfaction of the single-party regime and state intervention especially 
during wartime, Turkey made a transition to multiparty politics in 1945. Also, the emergence 
of the US as a superpower after the war contributed to the spread of more open political 
systems and liberal economic models worldwide and influenced the policies of Turkey 
(Pamuk, 2008, p. 281). In this context, Turkey signed the Bretton Woods agreement and 
received Marshall aid from the US after the war in 1947. These developments necessitated 
the state not only to change its etatist policies in order to integrate with the post-war 
international economy reconstructed by the US, but also attach more importance to 
agricultural and infrastructural development rather than industrialization in accordance with 
the interests of the US and/or global trends. This policy shift led to the mechanization of 
agriculture and increased the share of road construction as opposed to railway construction 
thanks to the support of the US Public Road Administration (Tekeli, 2008, p. 57).  
In the 1950s, liberalization of the economy engendered the belief that “there would be 
a millionaire in every neighborhood” and “Turkey would become a small America,” which 
later on became the slogan of the government at that time (İnsel, 1996, p. 143). However, 
contrary to the expectations, the mechanization of agriculture and increased extension of 
roads caused rural unemployment and triggered a migration wave from rural to urban areas, 
which later on led to the increase in urban population, slum settlements, land speculations, 
and urban unemployment (Tekeli, 2008, p. 58). Also, the primacy of the private sector 
accelerated the growth of large cities in Marmara and Aegean regions but had little impact on 
the growth and urbanization of eastern and southeastern Turkey. In addition to these, based 
on the model of the US Bureau of Reclamation, DSİ was established in 1954 to plan and 
manage Turkey’s water resources due to the primacy of infrastructural development along 
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with agricultural development. The fact that almost 60% of DSİ’s budget was spent on dams 
between 1953 and 1962 was emblematic in this regard (Tekeli, 2008, p. 58).  
4.1.3. The Period of Planned Economy and National Developmentalism (1960-1980) 
The first military coup staged in Turkey on May 27, 1960 terminated the liberalization of the 
economy and initiated the period of national developmentalism, rapid industrialization, and 
strong protectionism of the domestic market through import substitution. One of the most 
significant changes in this period was the establishment of DPT through Law No. 91 in 1960 
primarily to help governments formulate economic and social policies, coordinate the 
activities of various ministries, formulate FYDPs to address regional development problems 
and monitor their implementation, and mold private sector activities in accordance with the 
objectives of the plans (Türk, 2012, pp. 113-114). Even though the debate on planned vs. 
unplanned economy was a source of contestation among planners and the political elites, 
eventually planning, industrial growth, and urban universalism were preferred to patronage, 
populism, and rural parochialism (Heper & Keyman, 1998, p. 264). “Science” and 
“calculation” were attached great importance on the grounds that the policies pursued by 
politicians in the 1950s were against the scientific and “undeniable” rules of economics 
(Küçük, 1978, p. 272, as cited in Yılmaz, 2003a, pp. 192-193). 
According to Tekeli (2008, p. 69), one strong motivation behind the shift to planned 
economy was the junta’s awareness and concern of the regional disparities between western 
and eastern Turkey. A study conducted by DPT in the early 1960s also indicated that the 
level of living standards and availability of services in all provinces in eastern and 
southeastern Turkey were lower than the rest of the country (Jafar, 1976, p. 124). In this 
context, FYDPs were considered as effective tools to reduce regional disparities and elevate 
the socio-economic status of regions that lagged behind, specifically Eastern Anatolia 
Region. In this period, just as the Fund for the South (Cassa per il Mezzogiorno) was initiated 
in Italy, the Narmada Valley Project was initiated in India, and the Aswan Dam Project was 
initiated in Egypt in the aftermath of the World War II, projects such as Antalya Project 
(1959), Eastern Marmara Planning Project (1960-1964), Zonguldak Project (1961-1963), and 
Çukurova Region Project (1962) were introduced in different regions of Turkey.16 Also, the 
first FYDP (1963-1967) was formulated in 1963. After the junta ordered DPT to formulate 
                                                
16 Other similar projects included, but not limited to, Zonguldak-Bartın-Karabük Regional Development Project 
(1995-1996), Eastern Anatolia Project (1999-2000), Eastern Black Sea Regional Development Plan (1999-
2000), and Yeşilırmak Basin Development Project (2005-2007) (GAP-BKİ, 2008a, p. 3). 
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another plan on eastern Turkey, DPT began to work on a plan that focused on Keban region 
consisted of Malatya, Elazığ, Tunceli, and Bingöl provinces. This project was considered as 
the first step towards developing water and land resources of the Tigris-Euphrates River 
Basin and basis of the project which would be later on called GAP (Tekeli, 2013, pp. 46-47).  
 On May 12, 1971, the military once again took power into its hands through a 
communiqué. Also, the oil crisis in 1973 and global recession in 1974 caused political and 
economic turmoil in the country. Given such developments, import substitution 
industrialization policies and development of various industries throughout the country did 
not reduce regional disparities as expected. On the contrary, the capital-intensive nature of 
investments led to unemployment and triggered migration from rural areas to urban centers. 
For this reason, the gap between western and eastern Turkey was further widened (Eraydın, 
2001, as cited in Göymen, 2008). In this context, during the second FYDP (1968-1972) 
period, some localities–specifically the ones in southeastern and eastern Turkey–were 
designated as “Priority Localities in Development” (Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yöreler) in 1971 
with the aim to reduce regional inequalities through primarily providing industrial 
investments and incentives (Akpınar, 2011, p. 123). These localities were chosen based on 
eight socio-economic indicators in the areas of (1) industrialization and mining, (2) trade and 
finance, (3) agricultural growth and modernization, (4) social and culture, (5) health, (6) 
education, (7) demographics, and (8) communication and transportation (Eşiyok, 2009, p. 
125). It is noteworthy that the terms çevre (periphery/sphere) and yöre (locality) were 
employed instead of bölge (region) based on the idea that bölge supposedly had political and 
separatist connotations and could provoke a Kurdish insurgency (Millî Güvenlik Kurulu 
Genel Sekreterliği [MGK], 1993, p. 74. See following sections for more information on the 
Kurdish question in Turkey).  
It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss each FYDP individually (see MGK, 
1993 for a detailed analysis of the first six FYDPs). It is sufficient to indicate that while the 
first two FYDPs aimed to eliminate regional disparities and attain a “balanced” development 
through regional planning, the third FYDP (1973-1977) emphasized the need to develop the 
priority localities. All three plans acknowledged regional development within national 
planning (MGK, 1993, p. 133). This tendency, however, changed in the fourth FYDP (1979-
1983) after the significance of regional planning was once again recognized by the state 
(Ecemiş Kılıç, 2009, p. 1286). Also in this period, the works on Tigris-Euphrates River Basin 
were attached more importance and accelerated to the extent possible after the completion of 
Keban Dam in 1974 (Tekeli, 2013, p. 47). Still, combined with the political turmoil, the 
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culmination of economic policies of the 1970s was severe balance of payment crisis, high 
inflation, oil scarcity, and shortage of basic items (Pamuk, 2008, p. 285). 
4.1.4. Neoliberal Restructuring of the Economy (1980 onwards) 
Amidst economic and political crises, a comprehensive stabilization package–also known as 
the 24 January Decisions (24 Ocak Kararları)–was announced in 1980. The 24 January 
Decisions marked the encounter of the Turkish state with neoliberalism and the Washington 
Consensus and shift from the state-led, inward-oriented development strategy to private 
sector-led, market-based, and outward-oriented development strategy. As expected, the 
World Bank, IMF, and international banks contributed to this package in different ways to 
ensure its success (Pamuk, 2008, p. 287). Even though another military coup was staged on 
September 12, 1980, the junta also embraced the neoliberal restructuring of the economy and 
its massive crackdown on the political opposition, labor unions, and leftist student 
movements facilitated and accelerated this process. The overarching goal was to integrate the 
country’s economy to the global markets. Tekeli (2009, pp. 129-130) notes that especially the 
adoption of export-led growth strategy, attachment of great importance to infrastructure and 
telecommunication investments, and creation of new institutions such as capital market, free 
trade zones, and reformed banking sector were crucial policy choices for integration purposes 
(see Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion on the neoliberalization of the Turkish economy). 
The neoliberalization of the economy had indeed implications for regional policies 
and development. For instance, trade liberalization and elimination of foreign exchange 
controls and quotas on imports favored provinces and regions that were already considered as 
developed rather than the ones with limited capacities. In this period, the private sector 
continued to invest primarily in western Turkey and refrained from investing in less 
developed regions. Thus, neoliberal policies further widened the gap between the developed 
and less developed regions in western and eastern Turkey (Eşiyok, 2009, p. 104). Still, some 
provinces outside Marmara Region such as Eskişehir, Denizli, Kayseri, and Gaziantep could 
manage to increase their manufacture and export capacities and emerged as challengers to 
Marmara- or İstanbul-based industries (Pamuk, 2008, p. 298).  
Also, the neoliberal shift not only decreased the functionality of FYDPs, but also 
changed their contents significantly. For instance, contrary to previous FYDPs, the fifth 
FYDP (1985-1989) envisaged export-led growth, integration to the global markets, increased 
private sector involvement, and limited state intervention (Eşiyok, 2009, p. 109). It also 
emphasized the significance of regional plans to accelerate development and ensure the 
efficient use of resources in developing regions. GAP was the first and most comprehensive 
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project in this regard (Ecemiş Kılıç, 2009, p. 1289). As discussed in Chapter 5 in greater 
detail, DPT became the responsible organization to administer and manage GAP in 1986 and 
GAP-BKİ was established in 1989 to assume this role. In relation to this, while the share of 
economic and social infrastructure investments in the overall public sector investments was 
around 55% in 1980, it increased to 80% in the early 1990s (Yılmaz, 2003a, p. 239).  
From the 1990s onwards, the idea that private sector had to be involved in the finance 
of infrastructure projects specifically in energy and transportation sectors gradually became 
widespread (p. 241). Also, the state aimed to develop its regional policy in line with the 
standards necessitated by the European Union (EU) and therefore became obliged to 
introduce structural reforms to reduce regional disparities (Göymen, 2008). In this regard, 
regional policies of the EU were taken into consideration for the first time in the sixth FYDP 
(1990-1994), which constituted a model for the following FYDPs (Eşiyok, 2009, p. 110). To 
illustrate, the concept of sustainability was injected into the seventh FYDP (1996-2000) and 
the concepts of integrity, balance of social and economic development, betterment in quality 
of life, participation, and such were injected into the eighth FYDP (2001-2005) as the 
principles of regional development. In the Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013), concepts 
such as development based on local dynamics and local potential, building and strengthening 
institutional capacity at local level, competitiveness, and human development were further 
injected into the overall regional development framework of the state (Türk, 2012, p. 113). 
Arguably, the Tenth Development Plan (2014-2018) was a continuation of this approach, as 
the main objectives of the plan were designated as (1) qualified people, strong society, (2) 
innovative production, high and stable growth, (3) livable places, sustainable environment, 
and (4) international cooperation for development in a sustainable, participatory, and human-
focused approach (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2014, p. 2). In that sense, 
the final stage of Turkish economy’s development can be associated with the regulatory 
phase of neoliberalism within which more emphasis was put on regulatory institutions and 
more importance was attached to social protection (Öniş, 2010, p. 48). 
Despite the strong and idealistic will of the Turkish state to modernize the country 
and eliminate regional disparities to ensure national integration and homogenization through 
various development plans, projects, and policies, striking inter- and intra-regional 
differences within the country still persist. To illustrate, leaving aside the discussion 
regarding how reliable and able HDI is in “measuring” development, while the top ten high-
income provinces in western and northwestern Turkey were at the development level of 
Eastern and Central European countries according to HDI in 2002, the ten lowest-income 
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provinces–which were primarily located in southeastern Turkey–were at the level of Morocco 
or India in the same year (UNDP, 2004, as cited in Pamuk, 2008, p. 297). In this context, 
Southeastern Anatolia Region deserves a closer examination both to discuss its distinct 
characteristics and better illustrate how and why the idea of implementing GAP in 
southeastern Turkey emerged.  
4.2. Southeastern Anatolia Region 
In the words of Kolars and Mitchell (1991),  
Southeastern Anatolia presents something of an anomaly. It contains proportionately a 
third again as much good land as the national average in Turkey and is watered by 
two world-class river systems: the Tigris and the Euphrates. Yet it has for countless 
centuries been a remote backwater. It is sparsely populated, lacks the infrastructure 
one finds in other parts of Turkey, has less industry, and is less mechanized in 
agriculture (p. 46). 
To elaborate on these points, Southeastern Anatolia Region (henceforth GAP region) is 
bordered by Mediterranean Region to the west, Eastern Anatolia Region to the north, Syria to 
the south, and Iraq to the southeast, as shown below in Map 1. The region covers around 10% 
of Turkey’s total surface area and total population and comprises the provinces of Adıyaman, 
Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, and Şırnak, as illustrated 
below in Map 2 and Table 3. 
 
Map 1: GAP region and its location in the Middle East 
Source: University of Minnesota Cartography Lab, n.d., as cited in Harris, 2006, p. 189. 
 
Map 2: Provinces of GAP region 
Source: GAP-BKİ, 2014a, p. 14. 
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Table 3: Surface area and population of GAP provinces 
Provinces Surface area (square kilometer [km2]) Population 
Adıyaman 7,337 602,774 
Batman 4,477 566,633 
Diyarbakır 15,168 1,654,196 
Gaziantep 6,803 1,931,836 
Kilis 1,412 130,655 
Mardin 8,780 796,591 
Siirt 5,717 320,351 
Şanlıurfa 19,242 1,892,320 
Şırnak 7,078 490,184 
GAP region 76,014 8,385,540 
Turkey 780,043 78,741,053 
GAP region/Turkey (%) 9.7 10.6 
Sources: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2015, p. 3, 2016, p. 10. 
GAP region is also known for its lowlands and large plains such as Harran, Suruç, 
Ceylanpınar, and Mardin. Even though it is the hottest and most arid region with high rate of 
evaporation and low rate of rainfall, Euphrates and Tigris flow through the region. Euphrates 
and Tigris are among the longest–around 3,000 and 1,900 km long respectively–and most 
pivotal rivers in the Middle East. Both rivers rise in Turkey, flow through Syria and Iraq, and 
join together to form the Shatt-al-Arab waterway in Iraq before discharging into the Persian 
Gulf. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, around 41% of Euphrates flows within Turkey, while 
the remaining 23% and 36% flow within Syria and Iraq respectively. Similarly, around 28% 
of Tigris flows within Turkey, while the remaining 2.1% and 70.3% flow within Syria and 
Iraq respectively (Tomanbay, 2000, p. 91). Also, contribution of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq to 
the annual flow of Euphrates is respectively 89%, 11%, and zero and of Tigris is respectively 
52%, zero, and 48% (p. 91). As for demand for water, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq demand 52%, 
32%, and 65% of Euphrates water and 14.1%, 5.4%, and 92.5% of Tigris water respectively 
(p. 92). Thanks to both rivers, approximately 20% of total irrigable lands in Turkey and 28% 
of its energy potential are located in GAP region (Altınbilek & Tortajada, 2012, p. 174). 
In terms of socio-economic characteristics of GAP region, official figures indicate 
that the population density, annual population growth rate, fertility rate, average household 
size, infant mortality rate, average number of students per class in primary school, and 
unemployment rate in GAP region have been above Turkey’s average. Also, the rate of 
urbanization, number of beds per 10,000 population, and average gross value added per  
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Figure 2: Distribution, contribution, and demand issues regarding Euphrates and Tigris 
among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq 
Source: Adapted from Tomanbay, 2000, pp. 91-93. 
capita in the region have been below the country’s average. Furthermore, the net migration 
rate has been negative. More details are given on these disparities in Table 4 below.  
Table 4: Selected socio-economic disparities in GAP region as of 2015 
Indicators GAP region Turkey Year 
Population density (person/km2) 112 102 2015 
Rate of urbanization (%) 92.04 92.10 2015 
Annual population growth rate (per 
thousand) 
16.21 13.36 2015 
Fertility rate  3.55 2.14 2015 
Net migration  -70,530 - 2015 
Average household size  5.35 3.6 2014 
Infant mortality rate (per thousand) 16.5 11.1 2014 
Average number of students per class in 
primary school  
39 29 2014 
Unemployment rate (%)  14.5 9.7 2013 
Average number of beds per 10,000 
population  
19.70 26.45 2012 
Average gross value added per capita ($) 4,641 9,244 2011 
Source: Adapted from GAP-BKİ, 2014a, pp. 22-26, 2016a, 2016c; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2015, 2016. 
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In terms of economic activities, agricultural sector occupies a significant position in 
GAP region’s economy, as nearly two-thirds of economic activities are based on agriculture 
(Ünal, 2008, p. 75). While the region contributes to around 5% and 4.5% of value-added in 
industrial and service sectors respectively in the overall Turkish economy, its contribution is 
as high as 10% in agriculture (GAP-BKİ, 2016c, p. 5). The agricultural activities are mostly 
concentrated around the production of wheat, barley, cotton, lentils, pistachios, and grapes. 
Another distinct characteristic of GAP region is the continuing existence of tribal 
social organizations especially in some rural settings. Even though processes such as 
migration, urbanization, improvement of socio-economic conditions, and transformation of 
large landowners into capitalist farmers gradually erode tribal relations, tribal organization 
and codes are not completely dissolved (Mutlu, 1996, p. 65). For instance, a study conducted 
in GAP region in 2004 indicates that 42.3% of Şanlıurfa’s population, 36.2% of Mardin’s 
population, and 23.1% of GAP region’s overall population described themselves as members 
of a tribe (Erkan, 2005, as cited in Karasu, 2014, p. 181). Gökçe (2009, pp. 518-519) notes 
that blood-based traditional family, relative, tribe, and village structures or “feudal” relations 
that are widespread in GAP region prevent people from acting individually and, instead, 
compel them to abide by the strict rules of their communities.  
In relation to the factors above, GAP region has been widely associated with unequal 
land ownership. More than 40% of rural households in GAP region were landless in 1980 
(Mutlu, 1996, p. 63). In addition, according to general agricultural census conducted in 1970, 
even though 61% of the total agricultural enterprises possessed less than five hectares (ha) of 
land, they had control over only 6% of the total lands in GAP region. However, while 5% of 
the agricultural enterprises possessed more than 50 ha of land, they had control over 60% of 
the total lands in the same region (Tekelioğlu, 2010, p. 43). Özer (1998, p. 147) also notes 
that while 65% of the farmers own around 10% of lands, 5-10% of large landowners own 
65% of lands in GAP region. More recently, Gülçubuk (2005, as cited in Görgü, 2006) also 
underlines that the skewed land ownership and the number of landless farmers remained 
almost intact even after the implementation of GAP. Accordingly, the project would allow 
61.4% of small agricultural enterprises to cultivate only 10.5% of lands while 6.2% of large 
agricultural enterprises would cultivate almost 50% of lands. Still, just as tribal social 
structure is in the process of dissolving, arguably large lands are also in the process of 
disintegration (see Kaymak & Teoman, 2016 for the origins of agrarian structures in GAP 
region and Ünal, 2008, pp. 38-71 for the history of attempted land reforms and agrarian 
transformation in Turkey). 
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Another distinct characteristic of GAP region is its ethnic configuration, as the region 
is far from being ethnically homogenous as opposed to other regions with the possible 
exception of Eastern Anatolia Region. Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, and some other minor 
ethnic groups dwell in the region (Mutlu, 1996, p. 65). Even though it is difficult to estimate 
the exact number of each group, one study indicates that 70.6% of the local population in 
villages consider Kurdish as their native language while the remaining 20.6% and 8.8% 
consider Turkish and Arabic as their native language respectively (Gökçe, Kasapoğlu, Kaya, 
& Güler, 2010, p. 37). In the overall region, 50.9% of the population speaks Kurdish, 34.2% 
speaks Turkish, 9.4% speaks Arabic, and 5.5% speaks Zazaki while 73.5% of the overall 
local population speaks Turkish (p. 38). As Map 3, 4, and 5 below illustrate, 26.7% of Kurds 
in Turkey–estimated to be around 15 million–are located in GAP region and 64.1% of GAP 
region’s population is Kurdish, according to a recent study (KONDA, 2011). 
 
      
Map 3: Concentration of the Kurdish population in the Middle East 
Source: Dahlman, 2002, p. 272. 
 
Map 4: Distribution of the Kurdish population in 12 territorial units for statistics 
Source: Somer, 2015, p. 39.  
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Map 5: Ratio of the Kurdish population to population in each territorial unit for statistics 
Source: Somer, 2015, p. 37. 
Given the state’s strong will for development and modernization and long-established 
integration ideal on the one hand and distinct characteristics of Southeastern Anatolia Region 
on the other hand, initiation of GAP in this region was hardly surprising. In this context, GAP 
was designed and implemented initially as a water and land resources development project 
for energy production and irrigation purposes, but later on social, sustainable, and human 
development goals were also included in the overall project framework. Since the historical 
trajectory of GAP will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, it would be sufficient to 
highlight some notable goals of the project at this point. In simple terms, through the 
initiation of GAP, the state aimed to initiate radical social, economic, and inevitably political 
transformations in GAP region and reduce the long-standing disparities between the region 
and the rest of the country. The idea was that the introduction of irrigation would turn the 
region into a food and agricultural export base and, thus, lead to an increase in economic 
activities, employment opportunities, living standards, and the number of people contained in 
the region. As will be discussed in the following section, the state also aimed to have control 
over the flow of Euphrates and Tigris and secure strategic gains over downstream states. In 
addition, as Çarkoğlu and Eder (2001, p. 42) note, GAP allowed the political elites to use the 
project as a propaganda tool to garner political and electoral support for their parties both in 
GAP region and in Turkey in general. Also, it was widely acknowledged that the state 
conceived GAP as a security project and aimed to address the Kurdish question through 
eliminating the socio-economic causes of the Kurdish insurgency and transforming the ethno-
political nature of the conflict (see Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion in this regard). The 
wide range of project goals and objectives indicate that the architects of GAP aimed to ensure 
improvement and transformation in multiple spheres and conceived GAP as a significant 
means to achieve their ambitious modernization and development goals. Due to its multiple 
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goals, enormous scale, and decades-long span, over time there emerged a plethora of 
literature on GAP and its numerous aspects, as will be discussed below. 
4.3. GAP(s) in the Literature 
Indeed, it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss each and every GAP-related work. 
Instead, scholarly works as well as government documents of high relevance are included and 
sorted by their themes to provide a more systematic review of the literature and illustrate the 
gaps (or GAPs) in the literature. To begin with, descriptive overview of GAP (Altınbilek & 
Tortajada, 2012; Bağış, 1989; Benek, 2009; Mutlu, 1996; Taraklı, 1989; Ünver, 1997b), its 
human development dimension (Fazlıoğlu, 2007; Mıhçı, 2012), its sustainable development 
dimension (Akyol, 2013; Dinçsoy & Ichiminami, 2006; Ünver, 1997a), its institutional 
framework (Beleli, 2005), its evaluation from “new developmentalism” perspective 
(Pınarcıoğlu & Işık, 2004), and the administrative structure, policies, and strategies of GAP-
BKİ (GAP-BKİ, 2008b; Polatoğlu, 1995) were discussed from different perspectives in 
different periods. A more thorough examination of the literature indicates that GAP has been 
discussed in three broad categories under which its (1) technical aspects, (2) socio-economic 
aspects, (3) and political aspects are highlighted. These broad categories and their more 
specific subcategories under which a wide range of topics are discussed are provided below.  
4.3.1. GAP and its Technical Aspects 
 4.3.1.1. Energy 
GAP’s energy potential and actual and future contribution to Turkey’s overall energy 
production has been widely discussed under this category. For instance, in his short and 
highly descriptive article, Kaygusuz (1999) provided an overview of the energy and water 
potential of GAP region and discussed its climate, oil reserves, and solar, wind, and hydraulic 
energy potential in the light of data drawn from public sources such as DSİ, State 
Meteorological Institute, and Turkish Petroleum Corporation (see Akpınar & Kaygusuz, 
2012; Yüksel, 2012, 2015 for highly similar and more up-to-date versions of this work from 
an engineering perspective). Around the same period, Özel (2001) examined the geology as 
well as mining and energy resources of each province in GAP region based on the idea that 
documenting and utilizing these dormant resources would yield immense economic benefits 
and enhance energy production. In addition to these scholarly works, it is noteworthy that 
GAP-BKİ (2012c) published a comprehensive report entitled “GAP and Energy” (GAP ve 
Enerji), in which the status of oil, natural gas, coal, hydropower, and renewable resources in 
the world, Turkey, and in GAP region was discussed. Similarly, GAP-BKİ and UNDP (2012) 
published another comprehensive study and action plan entitled “Utilization of Renewable 
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Energy Resources in Southeastern Anatolia Region and Enhancement of Energy Efficiency” 
(Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi’nde Yenilenebilir Enerji Kaynaklarının Kullanımı ve Enerji 
Veriminin Artırılması) that focuses on ways to better utilize GAP region’s water and 
photovoltaic resources to generate renewable energy and ensure energy efficiency. 
 4.3.1.2. Irrigation  
Irrigation has also been widely discussed in the literature, mostly from a technical and 
engineering perspective. To illustrate, Ünver, Voron, and Aküzüm (1993) discussed different 
ways of improving field water distribution and analyzed different applications of equipment 
and management combinations through technical, economic, and operational merits (see also 
Ünver & Voron, 1993 for a similar study on the improvement of canal regulation techniques 
for minimal water loss and economic and operational costs). Around the same period, 
Altınbilek and Akçakoca (1997), as DSİ and GAP-BKİ employees respectively, examined the 
implemented approaches for sustainable water resources development within GAP such as 
the use of unsteady flow simulation models, use of improved canal regulation, water users’ 
groups, reuse of drainage water, and management, operation, and maintenance (MOM) model 
(see Akçakoca, 1997; Kulga & Çakmak, 1997; Yenigün & Aydoğdu, 2008 for similar studies 
on water resources development and management in GAP region and Turkey and Kibaroğlu, 
2002 for a detailed discussion on MOM model). In this regard, Freeman and Angin (1999) 
critically assessed the proposed approaches to deliver water to farmers and offered a different 
organizational perspective that would bring irrigators and GAP managers together for a more 
productive, sustainable, and participatory irrigation process. In addition, a more recent study 
conducted by Yenikale and Yenikale (2012) through GAP-BKİ’s support also provided 
detailed technical and instructional information about irrigation and planning of irrigation 
systems for farmers and farmer organizations from the angle of agricultural engineering. 
4.3.1.3. Agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry 
In close relation to irrigation, agriculture–along with forestry and animal husbandry–received 
extensive scholarly attention. Especially GAP-BKİ published dozens of agricultural research 
reports on a wide range of topics including, but not limited to, the adaptation of feed crops, 
development of fruit and vegetables farming, marketing of cash crops, and establishment of 
plant protection clinics in the early 1990s. It is also noteworthy that a very comprehensive 
study was conducted in 1992 by the joint efforts of GAP-BKİ, TİPAŞ in Ankara, and 
Agriculture and Food International Consulting (AFC) in Bonn on marketing of agricultural 
commodities and planning of crop patterns (TİPAŞ & AFC, 1992). A similar study was 
conducted by GAP-BKİ (2002a) with the support of UNDP on the climate of GAP region, 
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ecological needs of plants that were widely grown in GAP region, and designation of zones 
to grow certain plants (see also Karlı, 1999 for a brief analysis of factors that influenced 
cropping patterns in GAP region). In similar regard, GAP-BKİ (2005) published a more up-
to-date study on the status of agriculture in the world, in Turkey, and in GAP region.  
In addition to these GAP-BKİ-affiliated works, Morvaridi (1990) discussed how an 
agrarian land reform would influence GAP and underlined the need for land consolidation, 
land reform, and agrarian subsidy policy in GAP region in order for the project to operate at 
its full potential. Agricultural mechanization in GAP region was also widely discussed. For 
instance, with the support of GAP-BKİ, Foundation of Agricultural Energy and 
Mechanization Research and Training (Tarımsal Enerji ve Mekanizasyon Araştırma ve 
Eğitim Vakfı, TEMAV) published a detailed technical study about the needs of agricultural 
mechanization in GAP region in 1996. More recently, Türker, Avcıoğlu, and Eliçin (2011) 
also investigated the trends in agricultural mechanization between 1991 and 2007 and found 
that, even though the mechanization level in GAP region was still lower than Turkey’s 
average, there was a significant increase in the number of tractors, average tractor power, and 
power and number of tractors per unit area (see Tobi, Sağlam, Küp, & Çevik, 2012 for a 
similar and more comprehensive study). In addition, from the perspective of agricultural 
economists, Çakmak and Akder (2012) critically assessed the future trajectories of 
agriculture policies in Turkey and the world and underlined that a competitive or globalized 
understanding of agriculture would benefit agricultural businesses the most in GAP’s context. 
Apart from these, Odabaşı and Boydak (1984) and Hızal (1989) examined the habitat, 
geology, climate, and flora of GAP region along with and forestry activities therein in the 
initial stages of GAP and discussed how the project could contribute to the rehabilitation of 
forests (see also Yenigün & Yıldırır, 1999 for the state of forestry in GAP region and 
activities of GAP-BKİ in this regard). Also, Tüzün and Yenigün (1999) discussed the state of 
animal husbandry in GAP region and examined the problems as well as potential changes in 
the sector following the implementation of the project (see Sakarya, Aral, & Aydın, 2008 for 
a similar study). In their more recent, comprehensive, and qualitative work, Selli, Eraslan, 
Chowdhury, and Sukumar (2010) examined Turkey’s animal husbandry sector with specific 
focus on GAP region in terms of its international competitiveness level and reached the 
conclusion that the sector has been weak and vulnerable in terms of its national and 
international competitive power, which would create problems of exploitation in the future.  
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4.3.2. GAP and its Socio-Economic Aspects 
4.3.2.1. Socio-economic structure and change 
In general, social and economic impacts of GAP were widely discussed under this category. 
To mention some notable works, a number of studies were conducted between 1992 and 1994 
with the support of GAP-BKİ on various issues that ranged from social change trends to 
population movements in GAP region to better understand the social fabric of society therein 
and formulate policies accordingly (see Chapter 5 for more details on these studies). For 
instance, the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türk Mühendis ve 
Mimar Odaları Birliği, TMMOB) profiled the social structure, tangible assets, and physical 
conditions of urban and rural communities in GAP region and determined how GAP would 
change this structure (TMMOB Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası, 1993). Based on the survey data 
of these studies, Akşit and Akçay (1997) focused on village types, class structure, power 
relations in decision-making, areas of conflict, and irrigation and water management practices 
and discussed how irrigation practices in rural settlements had an impact on transforming the 
socio-cultural structures and social habits of agricultural communities in GAP region (see 
also Erhan, 1997 and Özer, 1998 for detailed examinations of GAP region’s social structure). 
Also, it is noteworthy that Kalaycıoğlu (2001) examined the views and expectations of local 
people from different segments of society in GAP region on social, cultural, and economic 
change induced by the project through qualitative methods. In a parallel manner, in the 
guidance of qualitative data and archival research, Bakırcı (2001) focused on development 
challenges and prospects of rural settlements that fell outside the areas to be irrigated and 
drew attention to the risk of an increase in intra-regional inequalities in case these areas 
remained neglected. In addition to these, even though a large number of studies regarding 
how GAP has brought or would bring social and economic change were conducted in 
geography, civil engineering, sociology, and economics from the 2000s onwards, the 
majority of them heavily relied on statistics and quantitative approaches (see Arslan & Pulan, 
2014; Benek, 2005; Dereli, 2008; Erçin, 2006; Miyata & Fujii, 2007; Toybıyık, 2003; Yıldız, 
2008). It was remarkable that these studies almost unanimously indicated that, even though 
GAP improved the socio-economic conditions of the local population, the project was far 
from bringing the expected benefits and the region continued to lag behind on many fronts. 
The comprehensive study conducted by Gökçe, Kasapoğlu, Kaya, and Güler (2010) with the 
support of GAP-BKİ and the Turkish Sociology Association was exceptional in this regard, 
as the authors examined change in GAP region’s social and economic structure in a period as 
long as 15 years through employing a comparative approach and mixing qualitative and 
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quantitative research methods. 
It should also be noted that more specific topics under this subcategory did not go 
unnoticed. Yıldız and Bayram (2008) and Kayan (2013) discussed the historical trajectory of 
urbanization process in GAP region and urbanization-induced problems such as the 
emergence of slums and the lack of infrastructure (see also GAP-BKİ, 2012a for descriptive 
information on the level of urbanization and urban infrastructure in each GAP province). On 
education, Demirbolat (1998) discussed the need to attach more importance to formal and 
informal education in GAP region to achieve a higher level of education and social 
development. Similarly, Gündüz and Kaya (2009) discussed the gap between GAP region 
and the rest of the country in terms of the level of education, training, and human capital and 
underlined their significance to achieve designated industrialization goals in the overall GAP 
framework (see also Karlı, Bilgiç, Şimşek, & Eren, 2010 for an analysis of human capital and 
institutional training needs of local administrations in GAP region). On health, Aksoy et al. 
(1995) discussed the health-related risks and consequences of infectious diseases that would 
follow the introduction of new irrigation systems and emphasized the need for preventive 
measures against future epidemics. Similarly, Bozdemir (1998) discussed the factors behind 
high morbidity and mortality of diseases in GAP region and identified potential health 
problems that could emerge after GAP’s implementation such as increase in sexually 
transmitted diseases due to the high level of circulation or in other diseases due to misuse of 
insecticides (see also Diyarbakır Tabip Odası, 2011 and Türkiye Parazitoloji Derneği, 2003 
for the state of health sector and public health in GAP region respectively). 
4.3.2.2. Gender and status of women  
The works that focused on GAP and gender issues began to mushroom in the early 1990s. To 
illustrate, with the support of GAP-BKİ, Development Foundation of Turkey (1994) 
conducted an influential study to scientifically define social, economic, and cultural 
conditions of women in GAP region and formulate policies to integrate them into the 
development process in accordance with the findings (see also Erhan, 1998 for a concise 
work on the same issue). Following the establishment of Multi-Purpose Community Centers 
(Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri, ÇATOM) in 1995, gender issues in GAP region began to be 
largely discussed through–or even became synonymous with–ÇATOM (see Chapter 5 for 
more details on ÇATOM). For instance, as a then GAP-BKİ employee and a sociologist by 
training, Fazlıoğlu (2002) examined the content of programs and activities of ÇATOM and 
their impact on different segments of society. In relation to this, in her qualitative work, 
Genel (2002) focused on ÇATOM from a different perspective and evaluated the interactions 
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and conflicts among the local population as the participants of ÇATOM programs, various 
state organizations such as governorships or “rival” social services providers, and NGOs that 
operated at national level (see also Güven, 2010 for the interaction between international 
organizations and ÇATOM). Around the same period, Harris and Atalan (2002) evaluated the 
position of ÇATOM in the context of the relationship among gender, development, state 
policies, and space from the perspective of feminist geography. It is also noteworthy that 
Kaya (2010) focused on the question as to whether or how ÇATOM created gender 
awareness among women in GAP region and reached the conclusion that, even though 
ÇATOM failed to empower women to a great extent, they undeniably contributed to their 
psycho-social development and increased gender awareness. Women entrepreneurship also 
attracted scholarly attention. For example, in her quantitative study, Elmas (2004) discussed 
how GAP had an impact on the socio-economic status of women and their empowerment and 
indicated that GAP and the urbanization process it triggered actually caused the deterioration 
of social and economic lives of women. In relation to this, Harris (2006, 2008b) similarly 
examined the gender-differentiated impacts of irrigated farming in GAP region and how 
women or certain segments of women were negatively affected by the process (see also 
Konak, 2013 for an ecofeminist critique of how GAP-induced development–or 
maldevelopment–led to ecological and social costs and strengthened the male domination and 
patriarchal development understanding). Also, in her empirical work, Clark (2013) discussed 
the experiences of Kurdish migrant women in GAP region in terms of encountering security 
and insecurity in their daily lives in classroom, courtroom, and home settings from the 
perspective of feminist geography and underlined that the (human) security of women was 
not absolute, but rather embodied and relational. 
4.3.2.3. Environment 
The environmental features of GAP region and how GAP had or would have an impact on 
the environment also received wide scholarly attention. In the 1990s, GAP-BKİ supported 
and conducted various studies to examine the region’s flora, fauna, and water, air, soil, solid 
waste, and noise pollution such as GAP Region Environment Study Dicle Basin (Dicle 
University, 1993) and GAP and Environment (GAP ve Çevre) (GAP-BKİ, 1994b). About a 
decade later, with the support of UNDP, World Wide Fund for Nature Turkey, and GAP-
BKİ, Welch (2004) edited a comprehensive report on the biological diversity in GAP region 
in which the biological diversity hotspots were designated and natural values were 
methodologically and systematically documented. As for the environmental impacts of GAP, 
in the relatively early stages of the project, Beaumont (1996) examined how “a number of 
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large irrigation projects” would bring about agricultural and environmental changes and have 
political and economic implications in the upper Euphrates catchment of Turkey and Syria 
through satellite data. Similarly, Tortajada (2000) briefly evaluated the direct and indirect 
social, economic, and environmental impacts of Atatürk Dam after eight years of its 
construction and attracted attention to the environmental problems that could arise in the long 
term if necessary precautions were not taken (see Akyürek, 2005 for a more comprehensive 
study on the same topic from a civil engineering perspective). Similarly, Berkun (2010) 
examined social, economic, and environmental impacts of GAP from an engineering 
perspective and underlined that, despite its positive contributions, the project also had 
negative impacts in terms of displacement, changes in land use pattern, salinization, soil 
erosion, changes in local climate, pollution, increase of greenhouse gases, and decrease of air 
and water quality in GAP region. The problem of salinization was discussed extensively 
especially from the 2000s onwards. For instance, Aygüney (2002) examined salinization and 
socio-cultural disruption in GAP region and pointed out that the primary reason behind the 
increase in salt concentrations in soil was not the “ignorance” or the lack of education of the 
farmers, but rather the modernization philosophy behind GAP (see Kendirli, Çakmak, & 
Uçar, 2005 and Tekinel, Ünlü, Topaloğlu, & Kanber, 2002 for further discussions on the 
irrigation-induced salinity problems from a technical and engineering perspective). More 
recently, Çullu (2011) discussed different aspects of salinization and provided informative 
guidelines for farmers to raise awareness about the problem in his comprehensive and 
practical study supported by GAP-BKİ. 
4.3.2.4. Historical and cultural heritage 
The historical and cultural heritage in GAP region and GAP’s potential or actual negative 
impacts on this heritage were also widely discussed. For instance, based on consultation 
meetings and interviews with various governmental and non-governmental organizations and 
experts in GAP provinces, Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye 
Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2000) prepared a comprehensive report on how to 
conserve and utilize the historical and cultural heritage in GAP region. Even though the 
ancient sites of Birecik, Halfeti, Suruç, Bozova, and Rumkale attracted scholarly attention 
(see Durukan, 1999), arguably the destructive effects of Birecik and Ilısu dams on the ancient 
sites of Zeugma and Hasankeyf respectively attracted more attention beginning from the late 
1990s. Especially the effects of Ilısu Dam on Hasankeyf, which has been home to around 600 
human-made caves and 300 monuments for at least 12,000 years in the Tigris Valley and a 
significant town within the Kurdish culture, were highly politicized and almost became the 
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sole symbol of resistance against the construction of Ilısu Dam in particular and 
implementation of GAP in general (Ayboğa, 2009). To mention some works in this regard, 
Kömürcü (2001) focused on large dam projects that could endanger the historical and cultural 
heritage from the perspective of international law and discussed the threats to Zeugma and 
Hasankeyf as well as legal instruments and responsibility of the international community to 
protect such heritages (see GAP-RDA, 2001 and Uluçam, 2008 for detailed information on 
the heritage and rescue excavations in Zeugma and Hasankeyf respectively). About a decade 
later, Yalçın (2010) examined the water potential of Tigris and Ilısu Dam from the 
perspective of civil engineering and proposed the construction of five small dams instead of a 
mega dam to save Hasankeyf from flooding with minor economic losses. Similarly, Kocabaş 
(2013) discussed the state’s practices towards fragile sites with a special focus on Hasankeyf 
and emphasized that the state’s lack of sensitivity towards natural and cultural values had 
negative impacts on conservation areas not only in Hasankeyf, but also throughout Turkey. 
More recently, Girard and Scalbert-Yücel (2015) critically examined how different 
conceptualization of heritage in the context of GAP by different governmental and non-
governmental actors became a site of contestation among “heritage actors” and how the 
heritage action led to implications such as redeployment of state power, normalization of 
government methods, and standardization in GAP region.  
4.3.2.5. Migration and resettlement 
In addition to these, a vast number of works were published on how GAP brought about or 
would bring about migration and internal displacement. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the studies of the Department of Sociology at Middle East Technical University 
(METU) to document the geographical and sociological structure of population movements 
in GAP region (METU, 1994) and the Sociology Association (1994) to find out about human 
resources, problems, and expectations of the local population for a smooth resettlement 
process were significant works supported by GAP-BKİ. The findings of the latter was also 
used in the project run by GAP-BKİ with the support of UNDP and Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) between 1997 and 2000 to ensure participatory and sustainable 
resettlement and employment processes for the local population affected by the construction 
of Birecik Dam (GAP-BKİ, 1998. See also Miyata, 2002 for a survey on how the living 
conditions of households changed after resettlement and Polat & Olgun, 2004 for an analysis 
of rural dwellings in new residential areas built for displaced people). Especially Ilısu Dam 
was widely discussed in the context of resettlement. For instance, Morvaridi (2004) discussed 
the processes of the construction of Ilısu Dam and displacement and resettlement of the local 
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population and critically assessed the state’s approach towards local communities specifically 
in relation to the Kurdish question (see Eberlein, Drillisch, Ayboğa, & Wenidoppler, 2010 for 
the analysis of the roles of export credit agencies and NGOs in changing the consequences of 
Ilısu Dam and Warner, 2012 for an analysis of how Ilısu Dam was politicized and 
securitized). As for more recent works, Erkan and Aydın (2010) examined migration trends 
between GAP region and other regions in Turkey and within GAP region and indicated that 
GAP failed to transform the migration trends given the rate of migration from the region and 
high rates of population growth and fertility (see Günal, 2012 for a similar study that 
examined the direction of migration from GAP region to Turkey between 1975 and 2011). 
Around the same period, Güler and Savaş (2011) compared the socio-economic gains and 
losses and integration problems of people who were displaced after the construction of 
Karakaya Dam and concluded that displaced people unwillingly obliged by state’s decisions, 
lost their important sources of income and authority, and felt that their community was 
disintegrated and cultural identity was changed after the resettlement. More recently, in her 
qualitative research, Kurt (2013) explored the social impacts of GAP on internally displaced 
families in Halfeti from a gendered perspective and specifically focused on how resettlement 
influenced the status, roles, daily routines, relations, and life patterns of women and men as 
well as their interaction vis-à-vis each other. 
4.3.3. GAP and its Political Aspects 
4.3.3.1. Hydropolitics of Euphrates and Tigris 
Given the problem of water scarcity and risk of resource conflicts in the Middle East, it was 
hardly surprising that a large volume of academic and policy-oriented works were produced 
on the water dispute among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, especially after the initiation of GAP. 
Turkey’s water policies have been driven by the country’s population growth and distribution 
of population in rural and urban areas, growth and transformation of its economy, and its 
relations with Syria and Iraq (Mutlu, 2011, p. 219). The objective of being independent from 
imported energy sources can also be considered as a driver. Even though the use of Euphrates 
and Tigris waters has been a site of contestation among three countries since the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire, the tensions first heightened in the 1950s when each country made 
attempts to implement large-scale and ambitious water development projects for energy and 
irrigation purposes (Kut, 1993, pp. 3-4). Also, there existed a disagreement among three 
countries regarding the legal definition of Euphrates and Tigris from the perspective of 
international water law. It was unclear whether two rivers formed a single hydrological 
system; were international rivers; or formed a transboundary river. For this reason, it was also 
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unclear whether their waters should be shared based on declared needs or objective criteria 
(see Hakkı, 2007; İnan, 2000; Kibaroğlu, 2013 for detailed legal explanations of the water 
issue). In this context, when the construction of Keban Dam in Turkey and Tabqa Dam in 
Syria temporarily deprived Iraq of some of Euphrates’ flow, Iraq threatened Syria with war in 
the 1970s (Gruen, 2000, p. 566). Relations were further strained after Turkey decided to 
initiate GAP. Despite this, three countries could manage to establish a Joint Technical 
Committee for general discussions regarding the project and exchange of hydrological and 
meteorological data in the early 1980s (Bağış, 1997, p. 575). Also, in 1987, Turkey and Syria 
signed the Protocol of Economic Cooperation, according to which Turkey guaranteed to 
release 500 cubic meters of water per second from Euphrates with deficiencies in any month 
to be compensated the next month (Mutlu, 2011, p. 221). A significant feature of this 
protocol was that the Kurdish question and water dispute were linked for the first time, as 
Syria would stop harboring the PKK in return for water (Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2001, p. 60). A 
crisis among three countries erupted in 1990 when Turkey diverted the water of Euphrates for 
a month to fill the reservoir of Atatürk Dam and Syria and Iraq demanded more Euphrates 
water. The crisis was solved after Syria and Iraq agreed to receive respectively 42% and 58% 
of Euphrates water that reached the border between Turkey and Syria (Williams, 2001, p. 
30). In this period, Turkey also offered Syria and Iraq a Three Stage Plan to ensure optimum, 
equitable, and reasonable utilization of the basin waters on the grounds that establishing a 
joint body to collect and exchange data regarding water and land resources would facilitate 
estimations and allocations (Kibaroğlu, 2012, p. 75). This plan was not welcomed by Syria 
and Iraq. Moreover, two countries joined forces and not only sent official notes to Turkish 
government, but also dispatched threatening letters to funding companies in the mid-1990s to 
stop Turkey from constructing Birecik and Ilısu dams (Warner, 2012, p. 237). As Turkey’s 
relations with Syria significantly improved in the 2000s especially after the capture of the 
PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, GAP-BKİ and General Organization for Land 
Development in Syria agreed to carry out joint projects and technological exchange in 2001. 
However, considering the deterioration of Turkish-Syrian relations after the breakout of the 
civil war in Syria in 2011; the ongoing political instability in Iraq since the US invasion in 
2003; the rise of violent non-state actors such as Free Syrian Army, Kurdish groups 
Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitîya Demokrat) and People’s Protection Units 
(Yekîneyên Parastina Gel), and jihadist ISIS; the involvement of external actors such as 
Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, and the US in the ongoing political turmoil in 
Syria, it appears difficult for Turkey, Syria, and Iraq to reach an agreement on water sharing 
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or allocation in the near future (see Kibaroğlu & Scheumann, 2013 for a detailed analysis of 
the historical evolution of transboundary water policies in Tigris-Euphrates River Basin).  
 To mention some notable works on the position of GAP in the water dispute among 
three countries, in their seminal study, Kolars and Mitchell (1991) examined the northern part 
of Euphrates in terms of its average annual discharge, river depletion, water quality, and 
similar characteristics in relation to hydropolitical practices of three countries from a 
multidisciplinary perspective and discussed how GAP would have an impact on Syria and 
Iraq in terms of depleting both the amount and quality of the Euphrates water and continue to 
be a source of dispute. Turan (1993) also discussed the problem of scarce water resources in 
the Middle East and Turkey’s position in this context and indicated that addressing the 
demand-driven causes and changing the patterns of agricultural and industrial production, 
water consumption, and birth rates were imperative for a genuine and long-term solution (see 
Kut, 1993 for a similar work on hydropolitics of the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin with more 
attention given to GAP). Similarly, Kukk and Deese (1996) focused on how water scarcity 
might cause or aggravate conflict in Jordan River Basin, the Nile River Basin, and the Tigris-
Euphrates River Basin and emphasized that GAP would reduce the water flow into Syria by 
40% and Iraq by almost 90%, yet also noted that the conflict was not necessarily inevitable. 
Around the same period, Lorenz and Erickson (1999) examined the Tigris-Euphrates River 
Basin from the perspective of the US (military) interests in the Middle East and discussed 
how GAP would influence political, legal, and economic relations among three riparian 
countries and lead to political, social, and environmental implications for Turkey. Arguably, 
the works that were produced in the 2000s and more recently in the 2010s were not critically 
distinct from the above-mentioned works; they presented more up-to-date information on the 
same topic with similar approaches and reached almost the same conclusions. Analyses of 
Korkutan (2001) and Yılmaz (2003b) as Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) staff, the follow-up 
study of Lorenz and Erickson (2013) with more focus given to Iraq, and (re-)examination of 
GAP’s position in hydropolitical relations among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq by Dohrmann and 
Hatem (2014) can be given as examples to these works. 
4.3.3.2. The Kurdish question   
GAP was widely discussed in the context of the Kurdish question, too. To provide a brief 
history of the Kurdish question, it has been one of the most complex, challenging, and 
sensitive problems of modern Turkey since its inception in 1923. The Kurds held a semi-
autonomous status during the Ottoman Empire that was built on religious, ethnic, and 
linguistic heterogeneity. Under the millet (nation) system, religion was the only criterion for 
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the definition of a minority group. Millet had a different meaning then, as “nationality” under 
the Ottoman rule referred to people’s membership in a religious community. For this reason, 
Muslims formed the Islamic community under the rule of the sultan and caliph (Kirişçi, 1998, 
p. 228). Accordingly, Kurdish feudal lords and leaders were also part of this community and 
identified themselves as Muslims regardless of their ethnicity.    
In the 19th century, the intra-tribal conflicts among the Kurds and Ottoman state’s 
efforts to extend its rule and control throughout the empire for a more modernized and 
centralized state structure led to unrest and revolts among the Kurds (Özçelik, 2006, p. 135). 
This reaction was not entirely surprising given that the rural areas were often perceived as a 
threat to a state’s orderliness due to their confusing variety of types and denominations as 
opposed to urban areas and that (re-)ordering of the rural areas was often considered as 
imperative to break the power of influential landlords and autonomous communities in the 
state-building processes (Mielke & Schetter, 2007, p. 73). Following the World War I, the 
Treaty of Sèvres between the Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire partitioned the empire 
and granted the Kurds an autonomous Kurdistan in 1920. However, this treaty was never 
implemented and led to the War of Independence that would eventually establish modern and 
unitary Turkish state. According to the Treaty of Lausanne–signed after the War of 
Independence and became the legal basis of Turkey’s international recognition as an 
independent state–only Armenians, Greeks, and Jews as non-Muslims were granted special 
minority and cultural rights (p. 136). In contrast to theocratic and cosmopolitan Ottoman 
society, “Turkishness” was defined as an ethnic category in this state- and nation-building 
process. In the words of Atatürk, the form of government in the new republic “has changed 
the nature of the common ties among the members of the nation that persisted for centuries; 
instead of religious and sectarian ties, it now assembles the members of our nation through 
the bond of Turkish nationality” (Parla & Davison, 2004, p. 71, as cited in Heper, 2007, p. 
83). For this reason, modernizing reforms based primarily on secularism and Turkish ethnic 
identity were met with backlash from the Kurds; there were 18 revolts between 1923 and 
1938, among which the revolts of Sheikh Said in 1925, Ağrı between 1926 to 1930, and 
Dersim (renamed Tunceli) in 1937 were significantly serious. These revolts were brutally 
suppressed and the expression of Kurdish identity was heavily restricted afterwards (Barkey 
& Fuller, 1997, p. 63). In the words of Ekinci (2011, p. 54), the period between 1938 and 
1950 represents “the years when the political life was crippled and the history was silent in 
Kurdistan.”  
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Beginning from the 1950s, the Kurdish identity was gradually revived due to various 
factors such as the transition to multiparty politics, population movements, and political and 
economic liberalization. Also, the emerging Kurdish movement allied itself with the left-
wing political movement in Turkish politics, especially with the Turkish Labor Party that 
openly recognized the existence of the Kurds in Turkish political landscape and supported 
pro-Kurdish policies (Heper, 2007, pp. 155-156). Towards the mid-1970s, Kurdish leftist 
groups began to distance themselves from Turkish leftist groups on the grounds that their 
conception of the Kurdish problem was different and their policy of socialist revolution was 
poor (p. 157). The PKK was established in this context as a Marxist-Leninist organization 
under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan in 1978. Its primary goal was to fight against 
feudalism and colonialism and establish an independent and unified Kurdistan carved out of 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey through a radical revolution and the use of violence (p. 157). 
However, since the first attack of the PKK in 1984, the demands of the Kurdish political 
movement changed in accordance with domestic and international context. For instance, an 
independent Kurdistan, democratic republic, democratic confederalism, democratic 
autonomy in general and strengthening of local administrations, equal citizenship, and 
recognition of cultural and language rights in particular were demanded in different times and 
contexts (see also Uluğ, 2016 for subjective understandings of and conflict resolution 
suggestions for the Kurdish question).  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, (1) repressive and inhumane policies towards the Kurds 
under the junta regime following the military coup in 1980, (2) violent and sensational 
activities of the PKK that further encouraged insurgency, (3) the influx of Kurdish refugees 
into Turkey due to the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988, (4) the rise of identity politics 
worldwide in the post-Cold War period, and (5) the establishment of a semi-autonomous 
Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq that would resemble a model for Kurds in 
Turkey significantly increased the degree of Kurdish nationalism and visibility of the Kurdish 
question (Özçelik, 2006, p. 137). Following the capture of Öcalan in 1999, the conflict 
deescalated due to the PKK’s ceasefire declaration until 2004 (Gunter, 2008, pp. 59-93). To 
conclude a peaceful solution to the conflict, the “Kurdish Initiative” or “Kurdish Opening” 
was initiated in 2009 to grant Kurds more cultural rights and freedoms. In addition, several 
high-level meetings were held between the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Millî 
İstihbarat Teşkilatı) and PKK leadership in Europe between 2009 and 2011 in Oslo to discuss 
the demands of each party and negotiate peace. Even though the “Oslo Process” collapsed in 
2011, direct talks between the state and Öcalan continued and a ceasefire was declared in 
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2013. In this process–also known as the “Peace Process,” “Solution Process,” or “İmralı 
Process”–the state and Öcalan negotiated on a roadmap to end the conflict according to 
which the PKK would disarm and withdraw from Turkey and the Turkish state would make 
constitutional changes to grant the Kurds political and cultural autonomy and improve the 
detention conditions of Öcalan. However, the peace process officially collapsed after, inter 
alia, the intensification of reciprocal distrust, hostilities, and violence in 2015. The re-
escalation of the conflict once again led to killing of hundreds of civilians, TAF and police 
personnel, and PKK members; jailing of activists, journalists, and scholars; closure of 
newspapers, radios, and television channels; and similar human rights abuses in 2016. Even 
though numbers vary, it is generally accepted that the low-intensity war between the PKK 
and Turkish state caused the death of more than 40,000 civilians and soldiers, extrajudicial 
killing of around 5,000 people, displacement of one to four million people, annihilation of 
around 4,000 villages, and weakening of the Turkish democracy, economy, society, and 
foreign policy for decades (Clark, 2013, p. 841; Somer, 2015, p. 188). 
Indeed, the definitions of the Kurdish question vary. Yeğen (1999, p. 555) argues that 
while the Kurdish question was actually an ethno-political problem, it was instead defined as 
a problem of political reaction, tribal resistance, and regional backwardness in the official 
Turkish state discourse. Özçelik (2006, p. 134) notes that the question was often defined as a 
problem of international and domestic terrorism, economic and social underdevelopment, or 
ethnic and identity conflict. More recently, in his analysis of discursive practices in the 
European Parliament, US Congress, and TBMM between 1990 and 1999, Ünver (2015, pp. 
9-10) demonstrates that the Kurdish question was defined as (1) a human rights problem, (2) 
a democratization problem, (3) an excessive force problem, (4) an ethnic-identity conflict, (5) 
a conflict intensified by TAF, and (6) a PKK terrorism problem. At TBMM, the Kurdish 
question was further defined as a problem (7) intentionally created by the “dark foreign 
powers,” (8) fueled by the poor application of law or lawlessness, (9) exacerbated due to the 
mismanagement of the security forces in the region, and (10) emerged due to the lack of 
education, infrastructure, jobs, and poor living standards (see also Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017b for 
more on the MPs’ understandings of the Kurdish question and Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016, 2017a 
for laypersons’ conflict frames and representations of the Kurdish question). Given the 
multiplicity of perceptions and definitions, there has been more than one measure taken by 
the state to address the problem. According to Heper (2007, p. 180), these measures included 
(1) the maintenance of law and order for security and socio-economic reasons, (2) the policy 
of non-recognition to suppress the Kurdish identity, (3) creation of a modern state structure to 
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rid the Kurds from the influence of sheikhs and tribal leaders, (4) “taming” of the Kurds to 
prevent future revolts and integrate them into socio-economic and political life, and (5) 
creation of an effective public administration to provide goods and services in GAP region.  
In this context, the question as to how GAP contributed or would contribute to 
address the Kurdish question was widely discussed in the literature. In the 1990s, in his 
comprehensive and two-part study, Nestor (1996) focused on the link between the Kurdish 
question and GAP and empirically examined the potential of GAP in terms of ensuring the 
socio-economic integration of the Kurds into the mainstream of Turkish state system and 
escalating or deescalating the conflict in the future. Later in the 2000s, from an international 
relations perspective, Çarkoğlu and Eder (2001) emphasized that GAP-related domestic 
political concerns were in fact linked to Turkey’s relations with Syria and Iraq and discussed 
how the Kurdish question was a such concern to be addressed by eliminating the economic 
causes of the conflict. Towards the mid-2000s, in the guidance of critical approaches to 
development, Özok-Gündoğan (2005) indicated that, along with changing development 
discourses and practices at global level, the escalating conflict between the state and the PKK 
played a significant role in the appearance of social development in the overall GAP 
framework in the 1990s as a complementary means of counterinsurgency and a social control 
mechanism in GAP region (see also Özok, 2004 for the extended version of this article and 
Harris, 2002 for a similar work claiming that GAP was a novel and less violent means to 
manage populations and address conflict). Similarly, in his concise and strongly-worded 
article, Jongerden (2010) argued that the construction of dams in GAP region were utilized as 
a means to fight against the PKK in various ways including (1) using Euphrates and Tigris as 
a bargaining chip to force Syria and Iraq to cut their support to the PKK, (2) providing 
economic and social development to transform the Kurdish population, (3) wiping out the 
history and culture of Kurds, and (4) using dams against physical barriers against the mobility 
of the PKK. In a highly similar manner, Hatem and Dohrmann (2013) argued that GAP 
actually “erased” the Kurds, as the Turkish state has employed GAP as a tool to enable 
“assimilation and government control over an area that is notorious throughout Turkish 
history for being difficult to dominate” and “permanent displacement of Kurdish populations 
and the destruction of Kurdish culture.” More recently in 2014, I discussed that linking 
security and development in the context of GAP might not always lead to positive and 
expected outcomes and the link between two broad concepts as well as GAP and the Kurdish 
question should be conceptualized in relative, not absolute terms (Bilgen, 2014). 
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4.3.3.3. State practices and their implications 
In addition to a handful of above-mentioned critical works, a small number of studies that 
could be qualified as critical discussed how development was implemented in the overall 
GAP framework and focused primarily on the state practices and their implications. For 
instance, in his qualitative study, Öktem (2002) discussed to what extent GAP has (1) 
become successful in terms of providing solutions to economic, social, and political problems 
in GAP region, (2) led to unforeseen consequences and even worsened social and economic 
inequalities, and (3) been an extension of past development policies towards GAP region. 
Çarkoğlu and Eder (2005) evaluated GAP in the theoretical guidance of “developmentalism” 
and discussed the top-down and bottom-up approaches taken so far in the project framework. 
Around the same period, Pool and Grover (2006) focused on conceptions and arguments of 
different governmental and non-governmental actors who were involved in the decision-
making process in the overall GAP framework and examined how they had an impact on the 
power dynamics and governance of GAP in the context of the Kurdish question in the partial 
guidance of depoliticization. Similarly, in her ethnographic studies, Harris (2009, 2012) 
examined how the introduction of irrigated farming in GAP region had an impact on the 
reach of the state, perception and understandings of the state practices in the eyes of rural 
population, and interaction between rural population and the state. 
4.4. Conclusion 
A strong will and idealistic ambition for progress and development have been indispensable 
features of Turkey’s modernization process since the inception of the country in 1923 or even 
the 19th century Ottoman Empire period. This will was built primarily on the principles of 
elevating the nation to the level of contemporary–also understood as the Western–standards 
and ensuring integration and homogenization at national level in political, economic, social, 
and cultural spheres. For this reason, dispersing the population and services throughout the 
country and reducing the long-standing and inherited disparities between the coastal and 
inner regions as well as western and eastern Turkey regions have been of utmost importance 
for the Turkish state to achieve its regional policy and modernization goals and objectives. 
However, despite the intense efforts to achieve these goals through various development 
plans, projects, and policies and relative success of the state’s socio-economic performance, 
inter- and intra-regional differences within the country persisted. Especially since the 1960s, 
with its distinct characteristics in terms of its rich natural resources, socio-economic 
indicators that have lagged behind the rest of the country, and heterogeneous ethnic 
composition, Southeastern Anatolia Region has been considered and designated as a space of 
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intervention by the Turkish state. In this context, GAP was designed and implemented as an 
ambitious project to develop long “underdeveloped” Southeastern Anatolia in the 1970s. 
Even though the project’s primary focus was on energy production and irrigation at this 
initial stage, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, its focus, scope, and 
character have undergone significant changes over time and also led to confusion, 
controversy, and contestation regarding the project on many fronts.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the review of GAP-related literature indicates that the 
project and its wide range of different aspects have been subjected to examination and 
analysis from the perspectives of various disciplines over the years. The review also indicates 
that, despite an increase in the quantity and quality of critical studies since the early 2000s, 
studies that take GAP and the concept of development for granted and examine the project 
and its different aspects from a “neutral” perspective still dominate the literature. Even 
critical studies rarely go beyond mainstream development approaches and problematize 
development. Power relations embedded in the overall GAP framework and politics–and 
non-politics–of the project are often neglected in the analyses. Also, only few studies focus 
on and analyze GAP-related discursive constructions and practices, how and by whom they 
are employed, and what kind of implications they led to. Furthermore, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the data used in most of the analyses is generally quantitative and obtained from 
secondary sources, especially government publications and statistics released by the state 
institutions. Given these circumstances, this study aims to fill an important gap in the 
literature with its reliance on critical and post-positivist theoretical and methodological 
approaches and a balanced combination of primary and secondary data. Also, the study 
stands out with its originality in terms of making an attempt at examining the what, why, and 
how of GAP all together or “seeing GAP like a state” and, more importantly, being the most 
comprehensive study that has examined the depoliticizing implications of the project so far. 
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5. FROM A SINGLE GAP TO MULTIPLE GAPS: THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF GAP 
AND OSCILLATIONS IN ITS GOVERNANCE 
In this chapter, I examine the historical trajectory of GAP and oscillations in its governance 
since its initiation in the 1970s up until 2015 in the guidance of the historical trajectory of the 
idea and practice of development. In this examination, I focus on how designers and 
implementers of GAP have envisaged the project in their discursive practices, policy 
practices, conceptions, and arguments. With this, I aim to illustrate how the focus and scope 
of GAP have undergone changes over time; how continuities and discontinuities in the modes 
of project’s governance have taken variety of forms; how various concepts, norms, and 
values have gained prominence or lost their significance in the overall project framework in 
different periods; and how various national, regional, and global processes have influenced 
the course of the project throughout the years.  
 The chapter comprises eight sections. In the first six sections, I examine six broad and 
interrelated–and often overlapping–periods of GAP and discuss the most significant 
developments, policy issues, and discourses within each period. I identify these periods as (1) 
GAP as a water and land resources development project, (2) GAP as a multi-sectoral and 
integrated project, (3) GAP in limbo, (4) GAP as a sustainable human development project, 
(5) GAP as a market-based project, and (6) GAP as “new GAP.” In the seventh section, I 
provide a holistic and systematic analysis of the state of GAP as of 2015 from the perspective 
of politicians, bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals. In the eight and final section, I provide a 
brief summary of the chapter and discuss what the decades-long trajectory of GAP reveals 
about the project in particular and the concept of development in general.  
5.1. GAP as a Water and Land Resources Development Project (1970s-mid-1980s) 
GAP was originally planned by DSİ as a combination of 13 project schemes on Euphrates 
and Tigris primarily for the purposes of water resources development, irrigation, and 
hydropower generation. Indeed, the construction of water use systems in Anatolia is not a 
recent phenomenon. Since the Hittites and Urartu periods–as early as the 30th century BC–
many urban waterworks have been built. In more recent periods, Greeks, Persians, and 
Romans built complicated aqueducts and cisterns in Asia (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, p. 8). 
Especially Seljuk and Ottoman Turks built “hundreds of fountains and diversion dams for 
domestic use in towns and villages and for watering animals on common pastures” (p. 9). 
Based on the belief or “law” that “water was Allah’s gift and no one had an ownership claim 
to it,” Ottomans constructed irrigation projects along caravan routes and dams such as Topuz, 
Büyük, Valide, Kirazlı, and Elmalı in İstanbul between the 17th and 19th centuries (p. 9). Even 
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though such dams and waterworks were present before the inception of modern Turkey, the 
idea of constructing a dam and a HPP on the upper Euphrates dates back to the 1930s. It was 
generally accepted that it was Atatürk who envisaged diverting Euphrates and Tigris to 
western Turkey for irrigation purposes and laid the foundation of developing water resources 
of southeast Turkey after he was fascinated by the Dnieper development plan in the Soviet 
Union (Turgut, 2000, p. 47). Still, even though Electrical Power Resources Survey and 
Development Administration conducted various studies and collected data on Euphrates and 
Tigris in the 1930s and 1940s, it was not until the establishment of DSİ in 1954 that the idea 
could be translated into concrete plans and feasibility studies. With the establishment of 
Euphrates Planning Authority (Fırat Planlama Amirliği) under DSİ in 1961, greater 
importance was attached to the construction of Keban Dam and utilizing the rest of 
Euphrates’ water potential. In 1966, the construction of Keban Dam and HPP with a total 
power production capacity of 1,330 megawatts (MW) was initiated by an international 
consortium after the World Bank refused to fund the project due to the failure of Turkey and 
Syria to reach a settlement regarding water sharing (Öktem, 2002, p. 315). In the meantime, 
DSİ formulated Reconnaissance Report for the Euphrates Basin (Fırat Havzası İstikşaf 
Raporu) in 1964 and projected to build two dams and two HPPs on the river mouth of Keban 
Dam with a total power production capacity of 1,900 MW to produce 8,100 gigawatt-hours 
(GWh) per year and irrigate 480,000 ha of land (DSİ, 2012, p. 2). DSİ further formulated 
Reconnaissance Report for the Tigris Basin (Dicle Havzası İstikşaf Raporu) in 1968 and 
projected to build 20 dams and 16 HPPs in various sizes with total power production capacity 
of 770 MW to produce 3,900 GWh/year and irrigate 190,000 ha of land (p. 3). After 
assessing the feasibility of these projects in 1970, DSİ decided to increase the power 
production capacity of the dams on the river mouth of Keban Dam from 1,900 MW to 2,700 
MW and power production out of the same dams from 8,100 GWh/year to 14,800 GWh/year. 
Also, the size of lands to be irrigated was increased from 480,000 ha to 700,000 ha (p. 3). In 
1974, DSİ had to make further modifications to increase the energy production capacities of 
Karakaya, Karababa, and Gölköy dams due to the 1973 oil crisis. The then Prime Minister 
Süleyman Demirel17 described “Southeastern Anatolia irrigation” plan as one of the “special 
plans to develop eastern and southeastern regions” as follows in 1975: 
                                                
17 Demirel received his degree in civil engineering from İstanbul Technical University. He was also granted the 
Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship in the US. Before entering the politics in 1962, he served as the Head of 
Department of Dams at DSİ between 1954 and 1955 and Director General of DSİ between 1955 and 1960. For 
this reason, he was also widely referred to as “King of Dams” (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, p. 25).  
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This project was actually about building four dams to generate 20 billion kilowatt 
hour (kWh) electricity in the 200-km-long zone between Keban and Birecik on 
Euphrates and transferring nine billion kWh of this 20 billion kWh to a 21-km-long 
tunnel through a pumping station to be built in Bozova in Urfa to reach Harran Plain 
over Urfa.18 The diameter of this tunnel [would] be 10 meters and there [would] be 
two canals at the end of this tunnel. … 10 million ha of land [would] be irrigated 
there, the outlines of the project are ready. Karakaya and Karababa dams are the 
second and third stages of this project (TBMM, 1975b, p. 418). 
In 1980, DSİ added two dozen dams and half a dozen of HPPs to be built on Euphrates, 
modified some projects on Tigris, and merged all projects on Lower Euphrates and Western 
and Middle Tigris basins together under the name of Southeastern Anatolia Project (DSİ 
(2012, p. 3).19 Below, Figure 3 and 4 illustrate major dams to be built on Euphrates and Tigris 
and Table 5 and Map 6 provide detailed information about the main components of GAP. 
A careful examination of the archives indicates that GAP was conceived as a project 
with a potential to bring remedy to socio-economic and socio-political problems of GAP 
region even when it had a purely technical character. To illustrate this tendency in legislative 
discourses of the period, in 1975, Ömer Naimi Barım, an MP who represented Elazığ, 
underlined the need to accelerate “public investments and implementation of infrastructural, 
industrial, husbandry, and irrigation projects” to “save these regions from backwardness 
immediately” and drew attention to the potential of Lower Euphrates Project to provide 
economic development to families through the irrigation of one million ha of land (TBMM, 
1975a, p. 590). In the same year, the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel similarly 
mentioned “Southeastern Anatolia irrigations” for it would “accelerate development” and 
“bring transportation opportunities, communication opportunities, education, health, 
everything regarding infrastructure, job opportunities, income opportunities” (TBMM, 
1975b, p. 418). 
Arguably, the tendency to evaluate GAP and its potential impacts in a narrow 
framework that prioritized economic and infrastructural development remained intact in the 
early 1980s. To illustrate this continuity with two examples, in 1984, the importance of 
irrigation was explained by Ayhan Fırat, an MP who represented Malatya, as follows: 
 
                                                
18 Urfa is used interchangeably with Şanlıurfa. 
19 Some sources also indicate that 13 projects were merged under the banner of GAP in 1977 (see Turgut, 2000, 
p. 106).  
Chapter 5: The historical trajectory of GAP 
 100 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Major dams on Euphrates20 
Source: DSİ, 2013, p. 12.  
 
Figure 4: Major dams on Tigris21 
Source: DSİ, 2013, p. 14.  
 
                                                
20 Keban, Karakaya, Atatürk, Birecik, and Karkamış dams became operational respectively in 1974, 1987, 1993, 
2000, and 1999.  
21 Kralkızı, Dicle, and Batman dams became operational respectively in 1998, 1999, and 2003. The construction 
of Ilısu Dam and design of Cizre Dam continue as of 2017. 
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Table 5: Main components of GAP as of 1989 
 
 
 
Projects and units Irrigation area (ha) 
Power 
capacity 
(MW) 
Power 
production 
(GWh/year) 
Province(s) 
Euphrates River 
1 Lower Euphrates Project 
1.1 Atatürk Dam and HPP - 2,400 8,100 Adıyaman/Şanlıurfa 
1.2 Şanlıurfa Tunnel and HPP - 48 124 Şanlıurfa 
1.3 Şanlıurfa-Harran irrigation 141,535 - - Şanlıurfa 
1.4 Mardin-Ceylanpınar 
irrigation     
1.4.1 First stage 230,130 - - Mardin/Şanlıurfa 
1.4.2 Second stage 104,809 - - Mardin/Şanlıurfa 
1.5 Siverek-Hilvan pumped 
irrigation 160,105 - - Şanlıurfa 
1.6 Bozova pumped irrigation 69,702 6 16 Şanlıurfa 
2 Karakaya Dam and HPP 
Project - 1,800 7,354 Diyarbakır/Şanlıurfa 
3 Border Euphrates Project 
3.1 Birecik Dam and HPP  - 672 1,797 Gaziantep/Şanlıurfa 
3.2 Karkamış Dam and HPP - 180 470 Gaziantep/Şanlıurfa 
4 Suruç-Baziki Project 146,500 44 107 Şanlıurfa 
5 Adıyaman-Kahta Project 
5.1 5 HPP projects - 196 509 Adıyaman 
5.2 5 irrigation projects 77,409 - - Adıyaman 
6 Adıyaman-Göksu-Araban 
Project 71,598 - - Adıyaman/Gaziantep 
7 Gaziantep Project 81,670 - - Gaziantep 
 Subtotal for Euphrates 
River Basin 1,083,458 5,346 18,477  
Tigris River 
8 Dicle-Kralkızı Project 
8.1 Kralkızı Dam and HPP - 90 142 Diyarbakır 
8.2 Dicle Dam and HPP - 110 118 Diyarbakır 
8.3 Dicle Right Bank irrigation 52,033 - - Diyarbakır 
8.4 Dicle Right Bank Pumped 
irrigation 74,047 - - Diyarbakır 
9 Batman Project 
9.1 Batman Dam and HPP - 185 483 Diyarbakır/Siirt 
9.2 Batman Right Bank 
irrigation 18,758 - - Diyarbakır 
9.3 Batman Left Bank irrigation 18,986 - - Siirt 
10 Batman-Silvan Project 213,000 300 1,500 Diyarbakır 
11 Garzan Project 60,000 90 315 Bitlis/Siirt 
12 Ilısu Dam and HPP - 1,200 3,028 Mardin/Siirt 
13 Cizre Project 
13.1 Cizre Dam and HPP - 240 940 Mardin 
13.2 Silopi irrigation 32,000 - - Mardin 
13.3 Nusaybin-Cizre-İdil pumped 
irrigation 89,000 - - Mardin 
 Subtotal for Tigris River 
Basin 557,824 2,215 6,526  
 TOTAL FOR GAP 1,641,282 7,561 25,003  
Source: SPO, 1989a, p. 5.25.  
Chapter 5: The historical trajectory of GAP 
 102 
 
Map 6: Locations of the main components of GAP 
Source: Akpınar and Kaygusuz, 2012, p. 1149. 
If we bring irrigation to villages, it is possible to spread welfare benefits through 
helping the improvement of farmers’ and villagers’ economic situation. In this case, 
rural-urban migration will be prevented and hundred thousands of unemployed will be 
provided job opportunities in their own villages and regions. National economy will 
be relaxed, national income will be increased, agro-based industries will be developed 
(TBMM, 1984a, p. 37).  
Similarly, the future prospects of GAP were expressed in the same year by Saffet Sert, an MP 
who represented Konya, as follows: 
When GAP is completed, large amount of lands in Southeastern Anatolia will become 
fertile as they are in Çukurova.22 … 16 billion kilowatt/hour of energy, which is equal 
to half of Turkey’s production today, will be produced from Atatürk and Karakaya 
dams. … It is a fact that putting these projects into operation will change the face of 
Turkey. It is the biggest step towards realizing the legend of the economically “strong 
Turkey” we have long dreamed of (TBMM, 1984b, p. 518).  
Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the sole focus of GAP on water and land 
resources development began to change. Other sectors were gradually included in the overall 
project framework. In the words of a former deputy undersecretary from DPT, GAP’s focus 
and scope were widened primarily to “transform the sectoral planning into a multi-sectoral 
and spatial planning and link it with a regional plan” on the grounds that “the socio-economic 
                                                
22 Çukurova is a geographical, economic, and cultural region that covers Mersin, Adana, Osmaniye, and Hatay 
provinces in southern Turkey and known for its fertile lands, high agricultural productivity, and large and 
diverse agricultural production.   
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structure of the region would change after technical infrastructural investments.”23 I will 
provide a detailed account of this widening process in the following section.  
5.2. GAP as a Multi-Sectoral and Integrated Project (Mid-1980s-1989) 
5.2.1. Moving beyond DSİ’s Technical and Engineering Focus 
One of the outcomes of the growing awareness about social and humanitarian impacts of 
GAP was the increased role and significance of DPT in the overall project framework. In 
1986, DPT replaced DSİ as the new coordinator of GAP and carried out some institutional 
changes to better manage the project. For instance, the Research and Project Promotion 
Group (Müsteşarlık Araştırma Grubu, MAG) was established with responsibilities such as 
determining priorities of required infrastructure establishments, using financial resources 
efficiently for plans and programs, and enhancing the rate of returns on investments (SPO, 
1989a, p. 1.1). Also, a unit entitled Project Management Unit (Proje Yönetim Birimi, PYB) 
was established under the coordination and supervision of MAG in 1986 to facilitate planning 
and implementation of regional development through employing local and foreign expertise. 
Following this, apart and separate from MAG, another unit entitled Southeastern Anatolia 
Project Group (DPT Müsteşarlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Grup Başkanlığı, DPT-MGAP) 
was also established. In parallel with these institutional changes, industrial sector, 
transportation sector, social sector, and similar sectors were included in the overall project 
framework. The widening of GAP’s focus and scope was a concrete step towards 
transforming the project into a multi-sectoral and integrated project. An expert from GAP-
BKİ explained the need for GAP to have an integrated nature as follows:  
Irrigation automatically triples farmers’ income. First, they expand their cropping 
patterns and start producing agro-industrial goods. Their market share increases. 
Second, industries flourish thanks to these goods and raw materials and, therefore, 
labor requirements arise. … While emigration stops, the region starts receiving 
migrants. Urban transformation occurs. [Therefore], individual, societal, and urban 
capacities should be expanded to avoid infrastructural and social problems.24  
 Towards the end of the 1980s, political elites also began to acknowledge the growing 
multi-sectoral and integrated character of GAP. To illustrate, Hikmet Çetin, an MP who 
represented Diyarbakır, underlined in 1988 that his party conceived GAP not “solely as an 
engineering project” but as “an integrated, wide regional project that [could] change the 
                                                
23 Personal interview, May 16, 2014, Ankara, Turkey.  
24 Personal interview, March 21, 2014, Ankara, Turkey.  
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destiny of the whole region.” Therefore, he added, “with its roads, airports, residential areas, 
land distribution problems, industrialization, and everything, it [had to] be handled as a huge 
project” (TBMM, 1988a, p. 624). Similarly, Erdal İnönü, an MP who represented İzmir, 
emphasized also in 1988 that GAP “[was] not solely an energy production and irrigation 
project. This project [had to] be evaluated as a whole with its economic, social, and cultural 
contributions. GAP, as the largest project of our republican history, [had to] primarily benefit 
the local community” (TBMM, 1988d, pp. 96-97). The multi-sectoral and integrated nature 
of GAP was further strengthened by the formulation of GAP Master Plan and establishment 
of GAP-BKİ in 1989, as will be discussed below.   
5.2.2. The Formulation of GAP Master Plan (April 1989) 
GAP Master Plan was prepared by the joint venture team of Nippon Koei from Japan and 
Yüksel Proje from Turkey with the support of PYB between 1988 and 1989 (SPO, 1989a, p. 
1.2). Even a cursory inspection of the range of working papers that were prepared by DPT to 
support GAP Master Plan indicated that the technical nature of GAP was gradually changing. 
Transportation sector, land use patterns, agronomic evaluation of cropping patterns, 
municipal and regional planning, livestock sector, changing socio-cultural structures and land 
tenure system, tourism sector, manufacturing sector, fishery sector, social needs, migration 
within GAP region, and similar topics had been thoroughly examined (pp. 1.4-1.5). 
Therefore, the plan was novel in terms of identifying environmental, human, and financial 
resources as “critical” resources to be developed in addition to water and land resources (pp. 
5.1-5.24). In line with this, GAP’s objectives were designated and divided as agricultural, 
industrial, and overall objectives, as shown in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: GAP’s development objectives according to GAP Master Plan as of 1989 
Agricultural  Industrial  Overall  
Increasing the 
income level in 
rural areas 
Increasing 
agricultural 
productivity 
Ensuring 
economic 
development 
Increasing 
demand for 
education and 
technology 
Increasing the 
income level to 
address regional 
income 
disparities 
Utilizing 
regional 
resources 
efficiently 
Diversifying 
farming 
activities 
Providing inputs 
to agro-based 
industries 
Enhancing the 
region’s image, 
social welfare, 
and local 
population’s 
motivation 
Reducing 
regional income 
inequalities 
Creating job 
opportunities in 
rural areas 
Increasing the 
assimilative 
capacity of large 
cities in the 
region 
Increasing job 
opportunities to 
curb migration 
Producing 
exportable 
surplus 
Promoting 
exports 
 
Accumulating 
foreign currency 
Increasing 
productivity in 
rural areas 
Contributing to 
national 
economic 
growth, export 
promotion, and 
social stability 
Source: Adapted from SPO, 1990, p. 3.  
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In the light of these objectives, the fundamental development scenario was to 
transform GAP region into an “agro-related export base” in three phases; (1) the period 
between 1989 and 1994 would be dedicated to preparation for take-off, (2) the period 
between 1995 and 2004 would be dedicated to economic restructuring and accelerated 
growth, and (3) the years from 2005 onwards would be dedicated to achieve stable and 
sustained growth (SPO, 1990, p. 5). The culmination of this process would be “an open 
society with an open economy directly linked to many countries as well as other regions of 
Turkey” (p. 5). Thus, GAP region would be “one of the growth and industrialization centers 
of not only Turkey, but also the whole Middle East” (MGK, 1993, p. 226). Also, three 
different development alternatives were presented in the plan. Alternative A was based on 
irrigation and prioritized irrigating all initially planned areas by 2005. Alternative B was 
based on energy production and prioritized maximizing power generation together with the 
realization of priority irrigation projects. Alternative C was based on implementing only 
priority irrigation and hydropower schemes by 2005 (Bağış, 1989, pp. 219-220). Eventually, 
Alternative C had to be adopted as a development framework due to constraints on public 
finance in Turkey during that period. Accordingly, GAP would be fully completed by 2005 at 
a total cost of $32 billion including the past investments made in agriculture and energy 
sectors before 1980 (Kut, 1993, p. 6).  
While GAP Master Plan widened the focus and scope of GAP, the multiplicity and 
complexity of project objectives and alternative scenarios also led to some intra- and inter-
institutional conflicts over time. It became clear that a project of this scale necessitated better 
coordination and organization. It was therefore envisaged that establishing a new and 
separate organization with a certain degree of autonomy would prevent further institutional 
and organizational conflicts and facilitate project’s implementation. GAP-BKİ was 
established in such a context to fill this vacuum, as will be discussed below. 
5.2.3. The Establishment of GAP-BKİ (November 1989) 
GAP-BKİ was established on November 6, 1989 for a period of 15 years25 upon the 
Government Law Decree No. 388 to operate directly under the Prime Ministry as a separate 
public legal entity, whose director was also directly appointed by the prime minister 
(Polatoğlu, 1995, p. 199). According to Abdülkadir Aksu, the then Minister of Interior, GAP-
BKİ was established in order to  
                                                
25 The mandate of GAP-BKİ was extended for three years in 2004, for five years in 2007, for another five years 
in 2012, and again for three years in 2016. Accordingly, its mandate expires on December 31, 2019.  
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rapidly develop territories under GAP’s coverage; deliver planning, infrastructure, 
licensing, housing, industry, mining, agriculture, energy, transportation, and other 
services to realize investments or have them delivered; take required measures to raise 
the education level of the local population or have them taken; and ensure 
coordination among agencies and organizations (TBMM, 1990a, p. 432). 
As illustrated in Figure 5 below, GAP-BKİ was composed of the High Council of 
GAP, Directorate of GAP-BKİ, and GAP Coordination Council. The High Council was the 
political body of the administration, chaired by the prime minister and composed of the state 
minister in charge of GAP, the state minister in charge of planning, and the minister of public 
works and settlement (Ünver, 1997b, p. 463). Directorate of GAP-BKİ was the technical 
body with its headquarters in Ankara and regional directorate in Şanlıurfa, composed of 
experts with engineering, economics, social sciences, and urban and regional planning 
backgrounds (p. 464). Finally, GAP Coordination Council was the forum to exchange ideas 
and critique, chaired by state minister in charge of GAP and composed of various related 
government agencies, NGOs, local governments, and similar bodies (p. 464). 
 
Figure 5: Organization of GAP-BKİ as of 1989 
Source: Adapted from Ünver, 1997b, pp. 463-464. 
As mentioned before, an important reason behind the establishment of GAP-BKİ was 
the intensification of intra-institutional conflicts. Especially the organization of DPT and its 
internal dynamics raised the need to manage and coordinate GAP in a different mode. To 
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elaborate, DPT was operating at undersecretary level under the direct supervision of the 
Prime Ministry. There were three bodies that operated at deputy undersecretary level under 
the supervision of the undersecretary. These bodies were concerned with (1) social and 
economic planning, (2) coordination among different sectors, and (3) implementation of 
investments. However, MAG was also under the supervision of the undersecretary and 
responsible to conduct research on critical sectors and provide consultancy to the 
undersecretary. In addition, DPT had a top-down and three-staged planning approach that 
involved macro, sectoral, and project levels (Yılmaz, 2003a, p. 202). Accordingly, a macro 
model was designed in the guidance of macro variables regarding population, income, and so 
on at the first stage; sectoral targets were designated through macro variables and an input-
output analysis for different sectors in the country at the second stage; and solid projects were 
then selected for evaluation for each sector at the third stage (p. 202). For this reason, DPT 
lacked regional or local organizations elsewhere in other regions in Turkey.  
Given this organization, a number of incompatibilities emerged after DPT took over 
DSİ’s responsibility regarding GAP’s management and coordination. Since GAP was not 
merely a technical and economic project anymore after its focus and scope were widened, it 
was unfeasible to administer it under economic planning only. It was equally unfeasible to 
administer it under social planning only. It was also unfeasible to administer GAP through 
DPT’s institutionalized sectoral planning and centralist approach, as the project required 
regional planning and integrated approach. For such reasons, as a former deputy 
undersecretary from DPT explains, GAP was conceived as a research topic by itself that 
would be of interest for MAG and, therefore, placed under the responsibility of this research 
group. However, over time “experts from DSİ, mining engineers, chemical engineers, city 
planners, sociologists started to join [the research group] and participated in the project”26 
and created an obscurity regarding project’s administration. Another incompatibility was 
regarding where to locate GAP within the overall governance structure in Turkey. Even 
though the undersecretary of DPT was directly responsible to the Prime Minister, there was 
already a state minister in charge of GAP in the cabinet. Furthermore, another ministerial 
position entitled “state minister in charge of DPT” was created later on. This complex 
structure further blurred under whose supervision MAG was supposed to operate and GAP 
was supposed to be administered. The establishment of DPT-MGAP to operate at the deputy 
undersecretary level to address this problem also failed to solve the conflict. Finally, the 
                                                
26 Personal interview, May 16, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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solution was found in the establishment of GAP-BKİ as a separate administration from DPT.  
The establishment of GAP-BKİ marked a significant shift from central planning to 
regional planning, from sectoral planning to multi-sectoral and spatial planning, from a 
centralized organization to a more decentralized and regional organization, and from a 
technical focus to a widened focus. However, a complete transformation could not be 
achieved as immediately as it was expected. The period of transition in which GAP swayed 
between the old and new project approaches will be explained in the following section. 
5.3. GAP in Limbo: Vacillation Between Technical and Integrated Focuses (1989-1993) 
From 1989 onwards, GAP came to be defined as a multi-sectoral and integrated regional 
development project that included “dams and hydro-electric power plants, irrigation facilities, 
agriculture and transportation infrastructure facilities, urban and rural infrastructures, 
investments in industry, commerce, health, education, housing, and services” (GAP-RDA, 
1993, p. 2). However, many politicians, bureaucrats, and experts were doubtful that this was 
actually the case. For instance, a former deputy undersecretary from DPT emphasized that 
“even though DSİ’s former engineering, infrastructure, energy and irrigation project became 
an integrated project, [the government] poured every dime into Atatürk Dam. Irrigation 
investments were going very slow. … The planning project once again became an 
engineering implementation project.”27 This regression was linked to the political and 
administrative problems in the overall GAP framework. To exemplify, it was generally the 
minister of public works and settlement who had the upper hand in decision-making among 
the ministers within the High Council of GAP. Since DSİ was operating under the 
supervision of that ministry, more importance was given to dam and infrastructure 
construction than to investments in the agricultural sector.28  
Political elites also raised their concerns regarding how GAP overlooked social and 
humanitarian factors with its predominantly technical focus despite a series of change. To 
illustrate, in 1990, Erdal İnönü, an MP who represented İzmir, criticized the then government 
for perceiving GAP not as a project that would directly contribute to socio-economic 
development of the local population, but rather as a project that would have macro-level 
contributions (TBMM, 1990b, p. 94). He underlined that “human dimension [had to] be 
added to the project” and “the project [had to] be redesigned in such a way to have a direct 
                                                
27 Personal interview, May 16, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
28 According to an alternative assessment, the reason for the duality between dam construction and investments 
in agriculture–or between hydropower and irrigation development–was not specifically the strong position of 
the minister of public works and settlement within the High Council, but rather a broader national policy that 
was pushed by DPT and approved by the government. 
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impact on the economy and social life of the local population” (p. 94). In 1991, İsmail Köse, 
an MP who represented Erzurum, drew attention to a similar problem and stated that 
dams [would] be built, energy [would] be generated, canals [would] be built, 
irrigation [would] be utilized in agriculture, new products [would] be produced and 
our citizens [would] find great opportunities, however, while plains [were] irrigated, 
energy [was] generated, our citizens whose places were submerged under the 
reservoirs [were] forgotten (TBMM, 1991a, p. 149). 
Celal Kürkoğlu, an MP who represented Adıyaman, also criticized GAP for being far from an 
integrated project on the grounds that the “preparation of irrigation infrastructure and 
irrigation canals was neglected” and “GAP was handled with its economic and technical 
aspects but not with its social aspect” (TBMM, 1992a, pp. 738-739). 
 Amidst criticisms and concerns regarding GAP’s trajectory, GAP-BKİ prepared two 
studies arguably to rectify the missing details of GAP Master Plan and reverse the project’s 
vacillation back towards technical approach. The first study was GAP Region Action Plan 
(1993-1997), which was prepared in April 1993. Its primary objectives were to (1) at 
maximum level increase the investments that would foster economic development and 
increase income in the region, (2) raise the standards of health and education services to the 
national average, (3) increase employment opportunities, (4) improve infrastructure and 
increase livability of cities to contemporary conditions to attract qualified personnel and 
create a healthier urban environment, (5) complete deficient infrastructure in rural areas, (6) 
increase accessibility within the region and between regions, and (7) fulfill the infrastructure 
need of the existing and future industrial complexes (GAP-BKİ, 1993a, p. 2). The second 
study was GAP Regional Transportation and Infrastructure Development Study, which was 
prepared in July 1993. It was concerned with issues of spatial and transportation planning, 
development plans and infrastructure projects for expanding settlement areas, detailed water 
supply project, and special transportation projects (GAP-RDA, 1993, pp. 3-4). 
The efforts to institutionalize GAP as a multi-sectoral and integrated project coincided 
with a period in which new development theories, approaches, and concepts gradually spread 
and influenced development policy and practice worldwide (see Chapter 2 for a detailed 
discussion). GAP was not immune to these new debates and trends. As a result, a number of 
new concepts were injected into the overall GAP framework to redefine the project as a 
sustainable and human-centered project, as will be shown below.  
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5.4. GAP as a Sustainable Human Development Project (1993 onwards) 
5.4.1. Moving Towards Sustainable, Participatory, Social, and Human Development  
The concepts such as sustainability, community participation, public-private partnership, 
empowerment of women, efficient use of resources, environmental protection, and provision 
of education, health, and social services entered into the lexicon of designers and 
implementers of GAP in the early 1990s (Pool & Grover, 2006, p. 381). According to a 
coordinator from GAP-BKİ, “sustainable development, participation, social development, 
and human-centered development became the essential principles of the project” especially 
after “the Seminar on Sustainable Development and GAP,” which was organized jointly by 
GAP-BKİ and UNDP in Şanlıurfa in 1995.29 Also, some global events such as the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992; International 
Conference on Population and Development coordinated by the UN in Cairo in 1994; the 4th 
World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace convened by the 
UN in Beijing in 1995; World Summit for Social Development convened by the UN in 
Copenhagen in 1995; Habitat II on Human Settlements convened by the UN in İstanbul in 
1996; and the 2nd World Water Forum convened by the World Water Council in the Hague in 
2000 played a significant role in the inclusion of these concepts in the overall project 
framework (GAP-BKİ, 2002b, p. 2).  
Sustainability has been understood in various ways in GAP. After all, it was one of 
the most widely used (buzz)words of the period and almost everything could be described as 
“sustainable” and hyphenated or paired with the term, such as sustainable cities, growth, 
livelihoods, and indeed development (Scoones, 2001, p. 153). The oft-cited definition of 
sustainable development was “development that [met] the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission 
on Environment and Development, 1987). Ünver (1997b, p. 467), the then President of GAP-
BKİ, noted that even though social, economic, cultural, gender, educational, health, physical 
planning, agricultural, environmental, and institutional issues could be considered under this 
broad definition, “human” was always at the center of all these issues either as an object or an 
agent, or both. Therefore, human development has been considered inherent in sustainability 
as well as GAP. In relation to this, equity and fairness, participation, and human resources 
development were also considered as essential elements of sustainability within GAP 
framework (Kut, 1999, p. 29). Equity and fairness referred to the inclusion of the poor into 
                                                
29 Personal interview, May 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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the development process and improvement of their health, education, employment, and social 
security levels (p. 29). Participation referred to active participation of the local population, 
local administrations, and voluntary organizations in decision-making processes at all levels 
(p. 29). Participation was also defined as a creative, directive, and adaptive process initiated 
by organized, informed, conscious, and mentally self-sufficient people where they could be 
no longer conceived as passive objects, but instead considered as active subjects (GAP-BKİ 
& UNDP, 1995, p. 7). Finally, human resources development referred to ensuring social 
welfare and improving the quality of life to provide everyone minimum standards to live a 
humane and secure life (Kut, 1999, p. 29). Given these definitions, sustainable development 
implied a shift from “production-centered” approach to “human-centered” approach in which 
the objective was to create a society made up of healthy, educated, and employed individuals 
with sufficient income (GAP-BKİ & UNDP, 1995, p. 24).  
With the rise of “human” to a central position in the project framework, there 
emerged a need to “on the one hand produce knowledge about socio-cultural structure of the 
region and expectations and inclinations of people and, on the other hand, develop concrete 
action plans in the light of this knowledge to be shared with implementer institutions” 
(Ertürk, 1993, p. 20). It is noteworthy that the lack of sufficient knowledge about the local 
population and their socio-cultural backgrounds was already emphasized in GAP Master Plan 
in 1989. For instance, it was indicated that  
[e]stimates of the number and the socio-economic characteristics of migrants by 
origin and destination have not been documented … Since the expected number of 
seasonal migrants, return migrants and new migrants to the region [would] be 
considerable, past census records and current population movements [had to] be 
studied and upcoming/planned surveys [had to] be prepared to accommodate these 
information needs to determine (a) origins and destinations, (b) sex/age structures, (c) 
household characteristics, (d) educational levels, (e) occupations, (f) human 
relation/connection within the region and outside the region, (g) intention/preference 
on value-added activities in the region (SPO, 1989b, p. G-6). 
In this context, as mentioned in Chapter 4, various studies were conducted between 1992 and 
1994 to produce knowledge about GAP region and its local population and formulate sound 
social policies based on this data. After all, communities had to be “investigated, mapped, 
classified, documented, interpreted” or “rendered technical” through specialized techniques 
such as surveys, focus group discussions, and PRA for the facilitation of their governance 
(Li, 2007, p. 234). The nation state had a natural interest and tendency to “map the land 
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owned by the state and its citizens exactly” and bind “each citizen to the smallest fixed 
territorial unit possible in order to identify and localize him/her whenever it [felt] this [was] 
necessary” to achieve a high degree of control over its territory and population (Mielke & 
Schetter, 2007, p. 72). Brief information about when, where, why, and by whom each study 
was conducted is provided in Table 7 below.  
Table 7: Studies on GAP’s social dimension conducted between 1992 and 1994 
Management, Operation and Maintenance (MOM) Project Socio-Economic Studies (1993) 
This study was conducted by Department of Sociology at METU in 12 different irrigation areas to determine 
social variables in order to pinpoint the most viable, accepted, and appropriate MOM model for irrigation 
systems within GAP framework as well as to discover ways to ensure farmer participation in this process.  
Survey on the Trends of Social Change in the GAP Region (1993) 
This study was conducted by TMMOB the Chamber of Agricultural Engineers in Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, 
Gaziantep, Mardin, and Şanlıurfa to discover and profile the social structure, tangible assets, and physical 
conditions of urban and rural communities in GAP region and determine how GAP would change this structure. 
Population Movements in GAP Region (1994) 
This study was conducted by Department of Sociology at METU in Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Mardin, 
Şanlıurfa, Adana, İzmir, and İstanbul to find out about the existing migration patterns and characteristics of 
migration-giving and migration-receiving settlements as well as of migrants, determine how GAP would 
influence reverse migration, and make projections about future trends.  
Survey on the Problems of Employment and Resettlement in Areas Affected by Dam Lakes in GAP Region 
(1994) 
This study was conducted by the Sociology Association in the areas where Karakaya, Hancağız, Hacıhıdır, 
Atatürk, Dicle, Kralkızı, and Batman dams had affected the local population to find the most viable solution to 
relocate the affected population with minimum losses and encourage those who received their expropriated price 
to make smart and productive investments.  
Women’s Status in the GAP Region and Their Integration to the Process of Development (1994) 
This study was conducted by Development Foundation of Turkey in 13 urban and 81 rural settlements in 
Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Mardin, and Şanlıurfa to determine social, economic, and cultural conditions 
in which women in the region lived, pinpoint structural and individual problems they faced, find out about their 
expectations and needs, and formulate policies, strategies, and measures to elevate their status and integrate 
them into the development process. 
Source: Adapted from GAP-BKİ, 1996, pp. 6-7; Çabuk and Turan, 1999, pp. 280-283. 
Following these studies, GAP Social Research and Action Committee–consisted of 
scholars and experts from METU, Ankara University, Hacettepe University, DPT, 
Development Foundation of Turkey, Sociology Association, and GAP-BKİ–formulated GAP 
Social Action Plan in late 1994 to ensure social development based on participatory 
approaches, strike a balance between technical and economic projects and human resources, 
and include disadvantaged groups–women, children, unemployed youth, street children, 
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migrants, those whose settlements were submerged due to dam construction, and farmers 
whose lands were out of the reach of irrigation networks–into the development process 
(GAP-BKİ, 1996, p. 28; GAP-RDA, 1999, pp. 3-4; Ünver, 1999, p. 32). An expert from 
GAP-BKİ evaluates the formulation of GAP Social Action Plan as follows: “it [was] easier to 
solve problems in engineering because it [was] possible to get the same results with the same 
practices. Social events [were] different. Social intervention [was] mandatory to equalize 
different levels.”30 The plan was novel in the sense that, in the words of a former coordinator 
from GAP-BKİ, “the social aspect of GAP was missing in GAP Master Plan but the 
following plans, especially GAP Social Action Plan, always included a social aspect and 
touched people’s lives somehow.”31 The plan was also novel in terms of being participatory, 
as the same coordinator underlines that GAP-BKİ “was probably the first institution to adopt 
participatory planning approach in Turkey” and they “went into the field, moved door to 
door, and conducted focus group discussions to find out about people’s expectations, 
priorities, and potentials.” 
The increasing circulation of new concepts also influenced how political elites 
conceived the project. To illustrate, Abdülkadir Aksu, the then State Minister in charge of 
GAP, underlined in 1996 that GAP did not consist “only of dams, energy facilities, and 
irrigation networks. GAP [was] an integrated development project whose focus [was] human. 
It [was] our national project that gained worldwide reputation with its integrated structure, 
sustainable development philosophy, and human-oriented goal” (TBMM, 1996, p. 135). 
Similarly, Algan Hacaloğlu, an MP who represented İstanbul, underlined in 1997 that in 
order for GAP to succeed, factors such as economic, natural, and societal dynamics; efficient 
use of human, water, and land resources; participation of the local population; protection of 
nature and environment; and sustainable economic development had to be considered as 
integral parts of the project (TBMM, 1997, p. 402). 
Throughout this period, various studies and projects on the reuse of irrigation return 
water, land consolidation and extension activities, participatory resettlement and regional 
development, rehabilitation of street children, re-relocation of displaced people back to their 
villages,32 public health, biodiversity, environmental education, and research, excavation, and 
                                                
30 Personal interview, March 21, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
31 Personal interview, May 25, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
32 An East and Southeast Anatolia Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project Sub-Regional Development 
Plan (Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi Köye Dönüş ve Rehabilitasyon Projesi Alt Bölge Gelişme Planı) 
was announced in 2001 to reconstruct around 3,000 evacuated and destroyed villages and resettle around one to 
three million displaced people in southeastern Turkey (Jongerden, 2009, p. 6). GAP-BKİ was given the 
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rescue of archeological sites were carried out in the light of sustainability, participation, 
social development, and human-centered development concepts (Kibaroğlu, 2006, p. 179). In 
this context, especially the establishment of ÇATOM, increasing environmental and cultural 
sensitivity, increasing emphasis on private sector investments, and formulation of GAP 
Regional Development Plan deserve a special focus arguably for encapsulating the newly 
injected concepts and constituting four pillars that facilitated GAP’s transformation into a 
sustainable human development project.  
5.4.2. The Establishment of ÇATOM (November 1995)  
ÇATOM were established according to the principles of participatory development with the 
support United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in November 1995 (Turgut, 
2000, p. 489). According to a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ who took an active role in 
their design, ÇATOM were established “for women and target groups of high priority to 
participate more in social and economic life in development.”33 They were “modeled on 
community centers all around the world, but of course adjusted to the context of Turkey and 
the region.”34 The objectives of ÇATOM were raising women’s awareness about their own 
problems and their capability to address them, increasing their participation in the public 
sphere, enhancing their employment and entrepreneurship, and empowering them towards a 
gender-balanced development (GAP-RDA, 2015b). To achieve these objectives, numerous 
programs on training, health, education, entrepreneurship, social support, and culture were 
carried out at ÇATOM. Some notable examples include the provision of courses on literacy, 
legal rights, home economics, nutrition, computer skills, environmental protection, personal 
hygiene, maternal and child health, handicraft, machine-knitting, stone works, soap making, 
hairdressing, and cooking; provision of marketing support, grants, scholarships, and cash 
assistance; and organization of seminars, exhibitions, and interactive meetings (2015b).  
In the original model, ÇATOM would be established in not only urban, but also rural 
areas. Also, different institutions in charge of agriculture, education, and health would 
                                                
responsibility to execute this plan. However, the pilot projects of the plan failed after it received serious 
opposition from other state institutions as well as displaced people (p. 7). Even though this plan could not be 
implemented as it was after AKP came to power in 2002 (p. 8), many different “return to village” projects have 
been implemented ever since and large amounts of grants have been disbursed to this end up until today.  
33 Even though women are the primary target group of ÇATOM, children, adult males, or all household 
members are also occasionally included into ÇATOM programs. As of 2017, there are 44 ÇATOM in GAP 
region. In addition, there are 24 other centers to provide support and services for different disadvantaged groups 
including children, youth, disabled, and elders (GAP-BKİ, 2014a, p. 28). The latest figures indicate that around 
25,000 women and children attend the programs offered by ÇATOM each year and more than one million 
people benefited from various ÇATOM programs, activities, and services between November 1995 and 
December 2016 (GAP-BKİ, 2017b, p. 56).  
34 Personal interview, April 9, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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operate in coordination to provide services. However, difficulties regarding access, 
transportation, and coordination and the lack of qualified staff and financial resources 
prevented the realization of the initial model. For such reasons, GAP-BKİ had to cooperate 
with Development Foundation of Turkey to run ÇATOM in a more independent and 
decentralized manner. Accordingly, ÇATOM were run by ÇATOM committees, which 
comprised trainers from the local population and five to seven elected members. An expert 
from GAP-BKİ explained that, instead of bringing experts or trainers from larger cities in the 
region or Turkey, they found “promising women with high leadership skills from the region,” 
as they “knew about local dynamics and social fabric.”35 A former consultant from GAP-BKİ 
underlined that “ÇATOM was about ensuring voluntary participation of people in 
[development] process. It [was] not social engineering. It [was] mobilizing some dynamics. 
… Values in planning [were] determined by their participation.”36 Also, “if ÇATOM were 
under the heavy control of the state,” said a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ, “they would 
not be that popular and effective. Such mechanisms allowed even the use of local languages. 
That [was] because employees [were] not government clerks. They [were] entirely locals.”37 
Indeed, ÇATOM were also subjected to criticism from both development experts and 
scholars for failing to ensure women’s participation in labor force, equip them with necessary 
entrepreneurial skills to start their own businesses, and empower them in general. The 
comments of a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ on this matter are as follows:  
Today [in 2014] we face difficulties in finding technical support due to either 
financial or bureaucratic problems. Thanks to an established system and 
infrastructure, things somehow work. But we cannot move beyond. We cannot quite 
ensure women’s participation in the economy and income generating activities and 
raise their awareness. Our efforts are more limited to some courses such as literacy, 
computer usage, sewing, hairdressing. Marketing, empowerment, organization… We 
could not achieve much of them.38   
Similarly, a professor from Ankara University lamented that 
it would be better if women and men were equally included. … ÇATOM were 
transformed into a structure where the focus [was] always on women’s household 
labor. That justified the gender roles. From a gender perspective, they [were] far from 
                                                
35 Personal interview, March 21, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
36 Personal interview, March 27, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
37 Personal interview, April 9, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
38 Personal interview, April 9, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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being community centers as we [understood] in Western standards … Still, they at 
least taught women how to read and write, handicraft, and stuff. Some women 
became small entrepreneurs. These [were] gains, but small gains in terms of women 
empowerment. Women from other politicized NGOs and associations in the East 
[were] more powerful and conscious than the ones at ÇATOM.39 
In addition, Girard and Scalbert-Yücel (2015, p. 202) note that, contrary to the widespread 
belief, the economic benefits of handicraft production at ÇATOM are actually minimal 
because women producers are paid piece rates and generally only when the piece is sold. 
Also, even when large companies work with ÇATOM and buy handicrafts in high quantities, 
ÇATOM provide the labor market with cheap and unqualified workforce more than they lead 
to economic liberation and empowerment of women (p. 202). 
5.4.3. Increased Emphasis on Environmental and Cultural Sensitivity 
Another outcome of GAP’s exposure to new development concepts was the increase in 
environmental and cultural sensitivity in the overall project framework from the mid-1990s 
onwards. Indeed, it would be wrong to claim that sustainability was totally neglected in the 
initial stages of the project. Arguably, sustainability was actually embedded in the project 
framework before the 1990s; however, it was not as overt and prevalent as it was in the mid-
1990s. On this point, a former deputy undersecretary from DPT stated that  
the buzzword was sustainable development. Its birth date[d] back to the 1980s. I was 
against this concept because sustainability [was] inherent in planning anyway. If you 
neglect[ed] sustainability, you fail[ed] in planning. Planning [had] principles: 
rationality, functionality, integrity, sustainability, continuity… It [was] a cyclical 
process. Sustainability [was] not a principle by itself.40 
Also, it was acknowledged in GAP Master Plan that “economic growth in any region, 
especially under severe natural conditions, [could not] be sustained without having 
concomitantly proper management of the environment” (SPO, 1989a, p. 5.12). It was further 
acknowledged that GAP “[would] have significant effects on the environment” and “change 
the land and water regimes in the Region substantially [and] … affect fauna and flora as well 
as human beings” (p. 5.12). To counter these effects, it was proposed that an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) would be initiated and efforts to address soil erosion, waterlogging, 
salinization, climactic changes, and water-borne diseases through agricultural extension, 
                                                
39 Personal interview, April 8, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
40 Personal interview, May 16, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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demonstration, and monitoring would be intensified (p. 5.14) (see Değirmenci & Evcimen, 
2013 for an analysis of EIA and Social Impact Assessment in Turkey). In other words, 
contrary to the widespread perception, sustainability and environmental and cultural 
sensitivity were not entirely unknown to designers and implementers of GAP before the 
1990s or in the early 1990s.   
As a coordinator from GAP-BKİ indicates, while “economic objectives were 
prioritized in planning” in the first half of the 1990s, “environmental sensitivities and 
concerns regarding the conservation of cultural heritages were really taken into 
consideration” in the second half of the decade.41 In this period, GAP-BKİ not only 
implemented various projects on environment, biological diversity, climate change, and 
culture, but also urged other state institutions to embrace sustainability. In the words of a 
former coordinator from GAP-BKİ, 
we were telling other institutions that we should not look at [GAP] solely from a 
technical lens, that there [was] a social aspect, an environmental aspect. … We were 
telling them not to destroy the environment. Sustainability. We imposed such values 
to many governmental institutions and changed their visions. At first they resisted, but 
trends in the world also forced them to adopt these values.42 
As for the increase in cultural sensitivity, especially the manner how the state 
responded to the problems of people who were negatively affected by dams significantly 
changed after the mid-1990s.43 In the 1960s and 1970s, Keban Dam and the physical and 
livelihood displacement it brought “deprived the local communities of their means of 
production and dislocated them from their former socio-cultural milieu. While compensation 
was paid, it hardly reached the ones most in need” (Öktem, 2002, p. 316). Similarly, during 
the construction of Atatürk Dam in the 1980s, three towns, four townships, and 135 villages 
were submerged or semi-submerged and 55,000 people were forcefully displaced (Turgut, 
2000, p. 170). Around 25,000 parcels that roughly equaled to 45,000 ha of lands were 
expropriated. The values of these assets were assessed by DSİ. Even though compensation 
was paid to those who opted for self-resettlement in installments over a period of five years, 
compensation payments were below market prices. The reason behind this gap was that the 
                                                
41 Personal interview, March 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
42 Personal interview, April 25, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
43 According to the estimated figures of 2001, the dams that were constructed under GAP in Tigris-Euphrates 
River Basin affected around 200,000 people who lived in 382 villages and settlements (Sahan, Zogg, Mason, & 
Gilli, 2001, as cited in Terminski, 2015, p. 102). The figures of Export Credits Guarantees Department (2002, as 
cited in Kurt, 2013, p. 71), however, indicated that the total number of displaced population was 162,271.   
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assessed values were calculated according to the real estate tax statements of those affected 
(Scheumann et al., 2014, p. 155). As many victims filed lawsuits to receive more 
compensation and the court decided in favor of the plaintiffs in most cases, DSİ had to spend 
30% more for expropriation costs (p. 155). On this matter, a former project consultant from 
GAP-BKİ regretted that 
very large amount of lands were expropriated and submerged due to Atatürk Dam. A 
lot of villages were submerged. Affected people became scattered. They lived in 
miserable conditions. A law has already been enacted to help and resettle those people 
but everything was so unprecedented for us; we were taken aback.44  
In contrast, in the late 1990s, when nine villages were submerged, three villages were 
semi-submerged, and around 30,000 people were affected by the impoundment of Birecik 
Dam, GAP-BKİ prepared a Resettlement Action Plan for the first time in order to provide 
timely and accurate information to those who would be affected (Scheumann et al., 2014, p. 
160). In this context, social surveys were conducted in 13 most affected villages and more 
than a thousand families were interviewed. An information and advisory center was 
established in Halfeti to inform people about their rights and options in public gatherings (p. 
160). Also, GAP-BKİ ran a project between 1997 and 2000 with the support of UNDP and 
FAO regarding the resettlement of affected people and their employment and economic 
investment opportunities. This project was also based on participatory development. A 
professor from Hacettepe University who was involved in the project explained that they 
“moved a whole town to the new location upon the requests of the local population” as they 
“discussed with them, lived together with them for a year, talked to them, asked them what 
they wanted, and presented them different alternatives.”45 Combined together, these examples 
indicate a growing awareness regarding environmental and cultural issues as well as a shift in 
how development was practiced in the overall GAP framework. 
5.4.4. Increased Emphasis on Private Sector Investments  
From a neoliberal perspective, a governance approach that involves the mobilization of 
crucial private actors through business elites or public-private partnerships is widely 
supported for allegedly being more technically efficient, flexible, collaborative, and 
participatory (Jessop, 1997, as cited in Vento, 2017, p. 70). The idea that private sector 
investments, public investments, and public participation should complement each other for 
                                                
44 Personal interview, April 30, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
45 Personal interview, April 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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the successful implementation of sustainable development within GAP framework became 
prevalent after the mid-1990s (Ünver, 1999, p. 32). It should be noted that similar ideas that 
emphasized the need to attract private sector investments and foreign capital to realize project 
goals had been emphasized numerous times in the late 1980s and early 1990s. To illustrate, in 
1989, Melih Araz, the then Chief Executive Officer of İnterbank in Turkey emphasized that 
“GAP [would] create a myriad of business opportunities which in turn [would] necessitate a 
wide range of financial services. The full potential of GAP [could] only be realized through 
foreign and local investment” (Bağış, 1989). In 1991, it was proposed that an Economic 
Development Agency that would support industrialization based on private entrepreneurship, 
enhance the skills of industrial labor force, improve the region’s business and investment 
environment, and increase the level of management, technology, efficiency, and 
competitiveness of the regional industry had to be established in accordance with free market 
principles (GAP-BKİ, 1996, p. 13, 35). Similarly, in 1993, it was recommended that 
“Investment Consultancy Services” and “Information Offices” that would provide 
information and services to entrepreneurs had to be developed (GAP-RDA, 1993, p. 13). 
Such ideas gained more currency in the second half of the 1990s. For instance, Olcay Ünver, 
the then President of GAP-BKİ, defined this period as follows:   
We approach a period in which the role of the state gradually diminishes in the 
development process in Southeastern Anatolia. Entrepreneurs (investors) [sic] have 
reached a level they are supposed to be at both regional and national levels. Private 
investments must be the real engine of development. GAP region, which is becoming 
a center of attention even for international capital, is a favorable area of investments 
for Turkish entrepreneurs in every sense … (GAP-BKİ, 1996). 
A concrete outcome of the orientation towards private sector was the establishment of 
GAP Entrepreneur Support Centers (GAP Girişimci Destekleme ve Yönlendirme Merkezleri, 
GAP-GİDEM) in 1997 with the cooperation of GAP-BKİ, Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB), and 
Chambers of Industry and Trade in five provinces to provide consultancy services to potential 
foreign and domestic entrepreneurs and investors (Ünver, 1999, p. 32). GAP-GİDEM were 
established also to prevent the capital from flowing outside GAP region. A former 
coordinator from GAP-BKİ explained this point as follows:  
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Irrigation systems in Urfa had a terrific impact on the change. … [People] made huge 
amounts of money. First, they experienced a “richness crisis.” They married to their 
second, third wives. They went to nightclubs in Antep.46 They bought cars. The 
money was spent for nothing. That was the reason for us to establish GİDEM: Was it 
possible to use this capital for investment? … We thought about channeling this 
capital for investment and we succeeded.47 
5.4.5. The Formulation of GAP Regional Development Plan (November 2002) 
The culmination of the above-mentioned changes within GAP was arguably the formulation 
of GAP Regional Development Plan with UNDP’s support in 2002. To elaborate on its 
formulation process, GAP-BKİ and UNDP cooperated and initiated Sustainable Development 
Programme in GAP Region in 1997 in order to minimize the region’s socio-economic 
inequalities with 33 subprojects. In 1998, it became clear that GAP would not be completed 
by 2005 as planned. The main factors that prevented the completion of the project as 
scheduled were specified as difficulties in public finance, economic crises, activities of the 
PKK, changing balances in the Middle East, and changing socio-political landscape of GAP 
region in the 1990s (GAP-BKİ, 2002b, p. 12). In this context, the Committee of Inter-
Ministerial Implementation and Coordination made a decision to complete the project by 
2010 and the idea of formulating a new plan towards this end emerged then. 
It was expressed in the plan that “globalization, new development approaches, and 
international relations” heavily influenced its formulation (GAP-BKİ, 2002b, p. 2). Also, in 
the words of Vedat Özbilen, the project coordinator of the plan, another factor was that “the 
projects that looked so right from an engineer’s perspective totally changed in reality when 
we discussed with people and took their social and cultural structures into consideration. We 
realized some mistakes as technicians” (GAP-BKİ, 2000a, p. 15). Accordingly, the primary 
goals of the plan were to “increase income and welfare through protecting and enhancing 
environment and resources based on the principles of equity and fairness, consider and 
integrate disadvantaged groups into development, and ensure sustainability and private sector 
and public participation at all stages” (GAP-BKİ, 2002b, p. 13). This plan was also based on 
participatory development; a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ explained that  
for the first time the plan was prepared dominantly through consulting the public. … 
We delegated the study directly to NGOs. … For instance, something about health. 
                                                
46 Antep is used interchangeably with Gaziantep. 
47 Personal interview, April 25, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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We went to Diyarbakır. We told the Chamber of Doctors that, “We withdraw now. 
You formulate GAP’s health policy. Then we carry your framework through working 
with the technical group and the state.” … These were nice, bottom-up works.48  
GAP Regional Development Plan was never implemented and became a null and void 
document due to political and inter- and intra-institutional conflicts in the early 2000s. In the 
same period, there emerged the need for the government to carry out certain reforms as a 
condition of Turkey’s membership to the EU. The changes necessitated by the EU had a 
significant impact on the governance of GAP, too, as will be discussed below. 
5.5. GAP as a Market-Based Project (2002 onwards) 
5.5.1. Initial Financial and Administrative Impacts of Turkey’s EU Candidacy on GAP 
After Turkey assumed a candidate status during the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government in Helsinki in 1999, the state became obliged to, inter alia, change its 
conception of regional development and develop a national policy to redress intra-country 
disparities to become a full EU member. A subsidiary reason for Turkey to carry out these 
changes was its motivation to benefit from financial assistance, incentives, and funds 
provided by the EU for regional development purposes (Mengi, 2001, p. 33). Large portion 
of the financial assistance would be allocated to economic and social harmonization projects 
and local administrations would greatly benefit from these funds. To illustrate how the EU 
funds were used to support regional policy, in 2001, GAP Regional Development Programme 
was initiated by GAP-BKİ and the EU through the EU’s financial support that amounted to 
€47 million. Some of its objectives included enhancing the entrepreneurship, management, 
and administration capacities of local small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); 
supporting local and foreign entrepreneurs and investors; enhancing and diversifying rural-
based income generating activities; and establishing a Cultural Heritage Fund and preparing a 
Cultural Heritage Strategy to reveal GAP region’s tourism capacity (Açıkgöz, 2005, pp. 11-
12). A former coordinator from GAP-BKİ explained that thanks to the EU funds they could  
create a conceptual awareness on production techniques, markets, material values of 
production and stuff. These [were] crucial for development. … There need[ed] to be 
an integration. The government prepare[d] the budget but the private sector hardly 
[made] investment. … As long as the EU funds were used in this process, it worked. 
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Projects were based on participation, sustainability. They emphasized environment 
and women. EU grants and credit supports made a significant difference.49  
Another change necessitated by the EU accession process was the adoption of NUTS 
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) classification in 2002. NUTS classification 
provides a framework to formulate regional development policies, collect regional data, and 
enable the creation of a comparable statistical database in accordance with the EU regional 
statistics system (Altınbilek & Tortajada, 2012, p. 175). Also, planning and incentive 
decisions are made in respect to the status of regions in terms of NUTS classification. 
Accordingly, while Turkey’s seven geographical regions and 81 provinces remained intact, 
the country was divided into 12 regions (NUTS 1 level), 26 subregions (NUTS 2 level), and 
81 provinces (NUTS 3 level) as a parallel classification. GAP region was defined as a region 
at NUTS 1 level and divided into three subregions at NUTS 2 level and nine provinces at 
NUTS 3 level, as shown in Table 8 below.    
Table 8: Turkey and GAP region according to NUTS classification 
NUTS in Turkey 
NUTS 1 level NUTS 2 level NUTS 3 level 
12 regions 26 subregions 81 provinces 
GAP Region 
Region (NUTS 1) Subregion (NUTS 2) Province (NUTS 3) 
Gaziantep (TRC11) 
Adıyaman (TRC12) Gaziantep  (TRC1) 
Kilis (TRC13) 
Şanlıurfa (TRC21) Şanlıurfa (TRC2) Diyarbakır (TRC22) 
Mardin (TRC31) 
Batman (TRC32) 
Şırnak (TRC33) 
Southeast Anatolia (TRC) 
Mardin (TRC3) 
Siirt (TRC34) 
Source: Adapted from Altınbilek and Tortajada, 2012, p. 175. 
5.5.2. Increased Emphasis on Local Potentials and Competitiveness 
Another outcome of Turkey’s EU accession process was that the idea of utilizing local 
potentials and making them the engine of development gained currency. For this reason, 
instead of concentrating only on GAP region, it was widely proposed that development 
projects had to be equally spread throughout the country to increase welfare in every region 
and province. The following quotation by Abdüllatif Şener, the then Deputy Prime Minister, 
better illustrates this point: 
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[We] have 81 provinces and GAP-BKİ was established to cover only nine provinces 
in Southeastern Anatolia Region. … However, all countries are in international 
competition. Countries that fail to compete, … mobilize country’s all potential at 
maximum level will be on decline and drift away from competition. For this reason, 
all development potentials of the whole country should be mobilized … GAP-BKİ is 
the only regional development administration in Turkey,50 but in today’s world no 
country can make progress in global competition only though considering one region 
as special and mobilizing its potential (TBMM, 2004b, pp. 171-172). 
A professor from METU explains this point as follows:  
Between 2002 and 2007, GAP was not a priority for the government. The priority was 
development agencies. … GAP experience was considered as a handicap while they 
were working on development agencies, local authorities. … The logic in Turkey was 
like, “Why would we block private sector? Let them do. We need to take risk to 
develop.”51 
In this context, the Law no. 5449 on the Establishment, Coordination and Duties of 
Development Agencies entered into force in 2006 to establish regional development agencies 
in subregions at NUTS 2 level. These agencies were expected to operate under the 
coordination of DPT and contribute to achieve regional development, attract financial support 
for regional development projects, function as a bridge between public and private sectors, 
and include NGOs into the development process (Altınbilek & Tortajada, 2012, p. 177). In 
the words of an expert from GAP-BKİ, “local entrepreneurs [could] reach agencies more 
easily. Agencies [had] a chance to use the EU funds. … Their establishment was very useful 
for the region in terms of utilizing foreign funds.”52 According to Abdüllatif Şener, the then 
Deputy Prime Minister, agencies represented a model within which “the logic of private 
sector came into play” (TBMM, 2004b, p. 172). The establishment of GAP Development 
Platform in 2006 can also be given as an example to the increased influence of private sector 
within the project. In this platform, businesspersons, presidents of chambers of commerce 
and industry, general director of the Development Bank, president of GAP-BKİ, governors, 
mayors, and MPs convened to discuss ways to encourage entrepreneurship, stimulate local 
dynamics, attract investors, and activate the region’s potential (TBMM, 2007a, p. 97).  
                                                
50 GAP-BKİ is no longer the only regional development administration in Turkey. More information on the 
other administrations is provided in the following sections.   
51 Personal interview, April 10, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
52 Personal interview, April 22, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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 Competitiveness also rose to prominence during the EU accession process. For 
instance, a study entitled “Competitiveness Agenda for the GAP Region” was prepared in 
2007 through the cooperation of GAP-BKİ, Delegation of the EU Commission to Turkey, 
UNDP, and GAP-GİDEM. The primary goal of the study was to transform GAP region into 
“a new, value-added economy” based on a redefined identity of “the cradle of sustainable 
civilization,” rebranded international positive image, and “a dynamic mix of sustainable 
agriculture, productive and ‘clean tech’ manufacturing, and innovative service industries that 
create jobs and a rising standard of living for all its people” (GAP-GİDEM, 2007, p. 12). 
Strategies such as sustainable production, entrepreneurship development, internationalization 
program, applied technology, and clustering and networking were proposed to achieve these 
goals (pp. 12-13). In a sense, the study redefined GAP around principles such as 
competitiveness, risk-taking behavior, high productivity, added value, regional 
distinctiveness, and multi-level partnership. Arguably, the accumulation of the above-
mentioned changes necessitated by the EU accession process eventually influenced and 
brought about the formulation of GAP Action Plan (2008-2012), as will be discussed below.  
5.5.3. The Formulation of GAP Action Plan (2008-2012) (May 2008) 
GAP Action Plan (2008-2012) was formulated by the joint efforts of GAP-BKİ and DPT in 
2008 to accelerate the project schedule and complete the project in 2012. According to a 
coordinator from GAP-BKİ, the plan was “a comprehensive project package with a budget of 
27 billion TL,53 within which 21 billion would be spent from the public funds and the rest 
from other mechanisms such as build-operate-transfer (BOT). Almost half of the budget was 
allocated to irrigation investments of DSİ.”54 The increase in the share of public investments 
allocated to GAP after GAP Action Plan (2008-2012) is illustrated in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: The share of public investments allocated to GAP between 1990 and 2017 (%) 
Source: GAP-BKİ, 2017a. 
                                                
53 27,000,000,000 TL roughly equals €7,000,000,000 as of 2017. 
54 Personal interview, March 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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GAP Action Plan (2008-2012) was also based on participatory development in the 
sense that government officials in the region, representatives of local professional 
associations and NGOs, and MPs of the region provided their views at Economic and Social 
Council meetings held in each province in GAP region and GAP Development Platform 
meetings (GAP-BKİ, 2008a, p. 9). In this regard, one of the vice presidents of GAP-BKİ 
stated that “we bureaucrats prepared this action plan in a purely participatory approach. We 
visited all provinces with our minister. … Our minister gave us a clear instruction to list and 
determine all the needs uttered by the local representatives.”55 The plan also encapsulated 
other concepts such as competitiveness, growth based on local dynamics and endogenous 
potential, institutional capacity, as it was heavily influenced by the above-mentioned 
Competitiveness Agenda study and the Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013). Accordingly, 
(1) economic development, (2) social development, (3) infrastructure building, and (4) 
institutional capacity building were designated as four development axes of the plan (p. 9). 
The goals under these four axes included, but not limited to, creating job opportunities, 
diversifying production, increasing access and integration to international markets, creating 
city-based “centers of attraction” and promoting tourism (p. 21); improving health, education, 
employment, and social protection indicators and enhancing human capital through Social 
Support Programme (Sosyal Destek Programı, SODES) (p. 35); improving electric, gas, 
transportation, industrial, and commercial infrastructure services and completing the 
irrigation projects on 1,060,000 ha of land through public-private partnership (p. 57); and 
improving institutional capacity and human resources, establishing three regional 
development agencies, providing support to professional associations and NGOs, and 
strengthening GAP-BKİ’s institutional capacity (p. 71).  
To explain some novelties, initiated for the first time, SODES was designed to 
enhance human capital and ensure social cohesion based on various projects that improve 
employability, enable participation of disadvantaged groups into social and economic life, 
and integrate youth and women into society through cultural, artistic, and sport activities 
(GAP-RDA, 2015a). One of the deputy undersecretaries from the Ministry of Development 
explained the logic behind SODES as follows: 
The then government was using an expression like “social restoration.” Even though 
there was no such expression in the literature, we interpreted what was meant by it 
and prepared a program towards this goal. … Economic and social development [had 
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to] go hand in hand. SODES was prepared to achieve this, to improve social 
development in the region. It was a program designed to bring mobility and vitality by 
giving support to social inclusion, culture, art, sport, and employment projects.56 
It should be noted that SODES was also subjected to criticism in terms of its motives and 
perception in the eyes of the local population (see Kurtipek, 2012 for a critical analysis of the 
programme). For instance, a professor from METU explained the idea of SODES as follows: 
The state actors think like: “Why do they [Kurds] go to mountains? Because they 
don’t have jobs and bread. So let’s find them jobs and bread. Let’s initiate SODES 
and find them income generating jobs. Let’s embrace social inclusion and try to 
include them.” … However, [the local population] does not care about women 
empowerment or inclusion. Everybody thinks like: “the state is giving money for free, 
let’s go get our share.” Projects, SME projects, SODES, all of them are seen this way. 
They think it is their money by right; they don’t think it is an abuse.57  
Other novelties were the establishment of Dicle, Karacadağ, and İpekyolu 
development agencies respectively in Mardin, Diyarbakır, and Gaziantep in 2008 and 
relocation of GAP-BKİ’s headquarters from Ankara to Şanlıurfa in 2009.58 Especially the 
relocation of GAP-BKİ was highly controversial and led to conflicting opinions among 
politicians, bureaucrats, and experts. To exemplify, according to a former deputy 
undersecretary from the Ministry of Development,  
it [was] not a wrong decision considering the logic behind GAP Action Plan because 
the plan was prepared through carefully selecting and updating the prioritized projects 
in GAP Master Plan. … The goals to be achieved in five years were very ambitious, 
too. … Therefore, these had to be followed in their local environment, own place.59 
Similarly, an MP who represents Şanlıurfa proudly expressed that the relocation had been 
“their suggestion for a long time” because  
local organizations, municipalities, governorships, subgovernorships, most 
importantly our citizens had to contact GAP-BKİ frequently for various businesses 
                                                
56 Personal interview, April 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
57 Personal interview, April 10, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
58 In addition, beginning from 2011, GAP-BKİ ceased to operate under the Prime Ministry and began to operate 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Development. In relation to this change, the High Council of GAP was 
abolished and two new bodies, the High Council of Regional Growth and Regional Growth Committee, were 
established and assigned similar duties and responsibilities to ensure cooperation and coordination among 
responsible institutions involved in the overall GAP framework (GAP-BKİ, 2016b). Also, GAP-BKİ’s liaison 
office in Ankara was completely shut down at the end of 2016.        
59 Personal interview, May 2, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
Chapter 5: The historical trajectory of GAP 
 127 
and projects. Some had to obtain approval. Because GAP-BKİ was like the sole 
authority for giving permission to all kinds of works within nine provinces, decision 
of relocation contributed to our national economy a lot. Nobody [had] to come to 
Ankara from GAP region just for a signature anymore.60  
In contrast to these positive views, an expert from GAP-BKİ described the relocation 
as “a disaster for the administration, for the region, and for employees” on the grounds that  
GAP was part of a centralist system and we had a regional directorate in Urfa. All 
ministries [were] in Ankara. We were organizing meetings, intervening in investment 
programs, setting priorities. Regional directorate was doing its job there. Coordination 
meetings were really systematic. GAP’s relocation did not provide any benefits. The 
decision was political anyway. GAP suffered a lot after the relocation.61  
In a parallel manner, a coordinator from GAP-BKİ lamented the decision and explained that  
we were suddenly told to go to Urfa. After we went there, our families were split 
apart. We experienced a “staff slaughter.” We lost at least 70 regional development 
experts. The new staff we hired there [were] dominantly new graduates; they [did] not 
even have experience in their own fields, let alone regional development. How 
[could] you run a project of this scale under these conditions?62  
Finally, another former coordinator from GAP-BKİ underlined that the relocation 
reduced the project’s scale and localized it. Even though regional development was 
the primary goal, GAP had an international dimension. This dimension [was] lost. In 
Urfa, it [was] also more difficult to establish relationship with private sector. The 
project [was] totally localized and productivity and synergy [were] gone.63 
It is also noteworthy that three additional regional development administrations were 
established in 2011 based on GAP-BKİ’s model and past applications (GAP-BKİ, 2017b, p. 
17). These administrations were Eastern Anatolia Project Regional Development 
Administration that focused on Ağrı, Ardahan, Bingöl, Bitlis, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, 
Hakkâri, Iğdır, Kars, Malatya, Muş, Tunceli, and Van in eastern Turkey; Eastern Black Sea 
Project Regional Development Administration that focused on Artvin, Bayburt, Giresun, 
Gümüşhane, Ordu, Rize, Samsun, and Trabzon in northeastern Turkey; and Konya Plains 
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62 Personal interview, March 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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Project Regional Development Administration that focused on Aksaray, Karaman, Konya, 
and Niğde in central Turkey. 
Despite GAP’s transformation into a market-based project thanks primarily to the EU 
norms and ambitious goals–and budget–of GAP Action Plan (2008-2012), the project could 
not be completed as scheduled in 2012 and the efforts to complete GAP continued after 2012. 
However, it was almost evident in legislative and elite discourses that a sharp distinction was 
made between GAP(s) in pre- and post-2012 periods. While GAP until 2012 was widely 
declared as “old” and in a way “dead” in official statements, GAP after 2012 was hailed as 
“new” and somehow “reanimated” in this period, as will be discussed below.  
5.6. GAP as “New GAP”: The “End” of GAP in its Classical Sense (2012 onwards) 
In 2012, Cevdet Yılmaz, the then Minister of Development described the post-2012 period as 
“the period in which the old GAP [was] closed and new GAP [was] opened” (TBMM, 2012a, 
p. 60). It was also emphasized that “in the classical sense, GAP [was] in the process of 
finalization” in this period after 2012 (GAP-BKİ, 2014b, p. 7). In relation to these, an MP 
who represented Şanlıurfa compared pre- and post-2012 periods as, “so far, money was spent 
on dams or large canals and buried in the ground without getting any returns. Next five years 
[would] be the years that GAP [would] provide returns and citizens [would] feel GAP 
directly.”64 Namely, there was an emerging tendency specifically among political elites of the 
ruling party, a group of government officials, and GAP-BKİ administration to consider GAP 
in the post-2012 period as a project different than what it was in the past.  
The latest GAP Action Plan (2014-2018) was formulated in this context in 2014. Even 
though it was a “new” plan that was formulated for “new GAP” through a “new” perspective, 
actually there were numerous similarities between the old and new action plans. The 
overarching goal of GAP Action Plan (2014-2018) was to complete the incomplete projects 
and investments that were proposed in GAP Action Plan (2008-2012). Just as the previous 
plan, new action plan was prepared based on participatory development. Also, just as the 
previous plan was heavily shaped by the Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013), the new plan 
was heavily influenced by the Tenth Development Plan (2014-2018), which was prepared by 
the Ministry of Development to attach more importance to local dynamics, enhance 
institutional capacity at local level, ensure rural development, and put more emphasis on 
livability in spaces and sustainable environment (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development [OECD], 2014, p. 282). The new plan was further influenced by National 
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Strategy for Regional Development (2014-2023), which was also prepared by the Ministry of 
Development around the principles of sustainability, productivity, participation, localization, 
and subsidiarity to fulfill the requirements to close Chapter 22 on Regional Policy and 
Coordination of Structural Instruments in the EU accession process (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2013). Given these, it was not entirely surprising that the primary goals 
of GAP Action Plan (2014-2018) were improving the citizens’ welfare and living standards 
and ensuring their peace and happiness through economic expansion, social growth, and 
employment creation in accordance with the principles of human-centeredness, participation, 
inclusion, accountability, and transparency (GAP-BKİ, 2014a, p. 36).65 In line with these 
goals, in addition to four development axes in the previous plan, “increasing the livability of 
cities” was added as a new development axis due to the “placement of urbanization into the 
focus of growth, increasing dominance of urban economies and lifestyles, and important role 
cities with knowledge-based economies, financial and professional services, qualified 
workforce, research and development, and innovation capacities play in global 
competitiveness” (p. 15). Similarly, an expert from GAP-BKİ explained that this axis was 
included in the plan because GAP 
became dominantly human-focused as transportation or infrastructure investments 
[were] almost completed. The conditions of roads [were] better than the ones here [in 
Ankara]. Irrigation networks [were] almost completed. Plains [would] be irrigated. 
Dams on Euphrates [were] completed; only two more left on Tigris. Therefore, our 
goal now [was] more human-focused: clean cities, culture, tourism, socio-economic 
development, women…etc. All of them [had] a humanitarian, social aspect.66 
The content of GAP Action Plan (2014-2018) and the trajectory of GAP indicate that 
despite the claim that there was a clean break between the so-called old and new GAPs, there 
was a continuity rather than a discontinuity between two project constructs. As for “the end” 
of GAP in actuality, official figures indicated that 74% of energy and 23.6% of irrigation 
projects were completed as of 2014 (GAP-BKİ, 2015, pp. 33-37). Given the official figures 
                                                
65 The plan also focuses on the problems of Syrian refugees and aims to take necessary cautions to fulfill their 
food, housing, health, education, and similar needs (GAP-BKİ, 2014a, p. 15). In line with this goal, different 
projects such as “Mitigating the Impact of Syrian Crisis on Southeast Anatolia Region” through the support of 
the EU, “Strengthening Social Stability in Southeast Anatolia” through the support of the Government of Japan, 
“Support to Adaptation of Syrian Women Living in Southeast Anatolia to Social and Economic Life” through 
the support of the Government of Kuwait and Unilever, and “Informal Education Programme for Syrian 
Refugee Children and Turkish Adolescents in Turkey” through the support of UNICEF were implemented 
between 2015 and 2017 (GAP-BKİ, 2017b, p. 95). 
66 Personal interview, April 22, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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and slow rate of past policy implementations, it is difficult to reach the conclusion that GAP 
is near completion soon. It is equally difficult to conclude that there is a completed GAP on 
the one hand and a separate GAP to be completed on the other hand. Due to its size, focus, 
scope, significance, and decades-long span, the project defies easy labels and simple 
distinctions between the old and new, classical and unconventional, or complete and 
incomplete. For this reason, a comprehensive analysis of how the architects of GAP have 
perceived the project over four decades better illustrates the state of the project as of 2015 
and reveals its complexities and multifaceted features, as will be discussed below. 
5.7. The State of GAP as of 2015: The Perception of GAP in the Eyes of its Designers 
and Implementers 
The systematic analysis of GAP-related legislative and elite discourses between 1975 and 
2014 indicates that there are six major categories as to how GAP was narrated among its 
designers and implementers: (1) characteristics of GAP region, (2) characteristics of GAP, 
(3) objectives of GAP, (4) drawbacks of GAP, (5) factors behind GAP’s delay and 
incompletion, and (6) factors behind GAP’s popularity loss (see Appendix D for the complete 
coding frame that displays all main and subcategories with detailed information). 
To briefly explain each category, in terms of its historical and more recent physical, 
political, socio-economic, and cultural characteristics, GAP region was perceived and 
characterized as a region that was arid and barren, backward and underdeveloped, 
discriminated and neglected, feudal and unjust, but at the same time resourceful, diverse, and 
full of potential. In other words, the region was associated with low rainfall and extreme 
temperatures, low socio-economic standards, low educational level, discrimination against 
the Kurds, and inequalities in land ownership. It was, however, at the same time associated 
with abundant land, water, and human resources and potential to be utilized and developed.  
GAP itself was perceived and characterized in many diverse ways. In terms of its size, 
focus, scope, and significance, it was viewed as a long-established, huge and vital, multi-
sectoral, integrated, sustainable, participatory, and human-focused development project. It 
was also viewed as a non-political project for its technical character, but at the same time as a 
political project for its function to attract votes from GAP region and potential to exert 
political influence on people and institutions. In addition, it was seen as a supra-political, 
national security and peace project for supposedly representing Turkish nation’s strength and 
playing a strategic role in Turkey’s international relations with the countries in the Middle 
East. Also, it was seen as a transformative, exploitative, and assimilative project for allegedly 
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transforming and assimilating the Kurds as well as transferring the resources of eastern 
Turkey to western Turkey. 
Objectives and contributions of GAP were as diverse as its perceived characteristics. 
On the one hand, GAP was perceived as a project with technical objectives such as improving 
agricultural and industrial production and efficiency, irrigating agricultural lands, 
producing energy, raising the infrastructural standards, and rationally utilizing and 
efficiently developing natural resources of GAP region. On the other hand, it was perceived 
as a project with socio-economic objectives such as eliminating regional disparities between 
GAP region and the rest of the country, generating national income and providing added 
value, raising the socio-economic standards of the local population, and changing the destiny 
and face of Turkey. It was also perceived as a project with political objectives such as 
preventing migration and containing the local population in GAP region, eliminating the 
remnants of feudalism and land ownership inequality, and contributing to the efforts to fight 
against the PKK to solve the Kurdish question. 
Indeed, the perception of GAP was not always positive. The project’s past, recent, and 
potential future negative impacts as well as unintended and unforeseen consequences were 
also widely discussed. Accordingly, GAP was perceived and criticized as a project with 
various social and environmental drawbacks such as harming the environment through 
causing soil salinization and desertification, harming cultural and historical heritages 
through flooding historical sites and monuments, and causing internal displacement, income 
inequality, and social degeneration. GAP was further criticized for its administrative 
drawbacks, as the project was perceived as a delayed and incomplete project that deviated 
from its integrated approach with its prioritization of energy projects, detached from the 
local population for its failure to trickle down and bring the expected benefits, and lacked 
scientific focus due to limited partnership between the academia and public institutions and 
limited high-quality and practical scientific research on a wide range of GAP-related topics.  
There were different explanations as to why GAP had such drawbacks and lingered 
for so long. Accordingly, it was perceived that GAP was incomplete due to administrative 
factors such as strong centralized governance structure in Turkey, cumbersome bureaucracy 
and the lack of coordination among state agencies, the lack of qualified personnel at national 
level, poor and insufficient planning, and GAP-BKİ’s ambiguous tenure, relocation, 
insufficient capacity, and lack of authority. It was also perceived that economic factors such 
as the lack of financial resources, public funds, and public and private investments played a 
significant role in delays. In addition, political factors such as foreign powers for allegedly 
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preventing Turkey from implementing the project, the PKK for sabotaging the project and 
preventing private sector investments, and the lack of political will, stability, and competence 
were also counted as factors behind the drawbacks of GAP and its incompleteness.  
Finally, it was perceived that GAP lost its popularity over the years due to global 
processes such as changing development paradigms and practices and domestic processes 
such as implementation of various huge, ambitious, sensational and thus vote-garnering 
projects such as Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, the Third Airport, and Channel İstanbul (see 
Doğan & Stupar, 2017 for a recent analysis of these megaprojects), disappointment and loss 
of excitement of the local population due to broken promises and unmet goals, and 
indifference of society to the project in general (see Figure 7 below for a bird’s eye view of 
GAP as of 2015). 
5.8. Conclusion 
Even though the idea of using Euphrates and Tigris waters for energy production and 
irrigation purposes dates back to the 1930s, GAP was initiated in the 1970s as a technical and 
engineering project to develop the water and land resources of Southeastern Anatolia Region. 
In the 1980s, the project was redefined as a multi-sectoral and integrated project after its 
focus and scope were widened. In the 1990s, a new set of development concepts such as 
sustainability, participation, human development, and social development were injected into 
the overall project framework. Following this, in addition to its multi-sectoral and integrated 
character, GAP came to be defined as a sustainable human development project. In the 2000s, 
GAP became a highly market-oriented and market-friendly project thanks to the spread and 
domination of the EU norms such as utilization of local potentials, prioritization of private 
sector investments, and competitiveness in the project. In the 2010s, a group of politicians, 
bureaucrats, and experts announced “the end of GAP in its classical sense” and redefined and 
rebranded the project as “new GAP.” However, a careful analysis indicates that there was a 
continuity rather than discontinuity between the so-called old and new GAPs and the project 
has over time become too complex and multifaceted to be reduced to such simple 
conceptions and binaries. Given that a wide range of associated or disassociated development 
activities such as dam construction, energy production, irrigation, sustainability, women’s 
empowerment, entrepreneurship are conflated under GAP and a wide range of–even 
opposite–terms such as political and non-political, exploitative and sustainable, human-
focused and national security are simultaneously employed to define the project, it would be 
more accurate to conceive GAP at its current state as a conglomerate and accumulation of 
multiple GAPs of different size, focus, and scope rather than a new and separate project. 
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Figure 7: The state of GAP as of 2015 in the eyes of its designers and implementers 
Characteristics of GAP region 
• Arid and barren 
• Backward and underdeveloped 
• Discriminated and neglected 
• Feudal and unjust 
• Resourceful, diverse, and full of potential 
Characteristics of GAP 
• Exploitative and assimilative 
• Huge and vital 
• Long-established 
• Multi-sectoral and integrated 
• National and supra-political 
• National security and peace 
• Non-political 
• Political 
• Sustainable, participatory, and human-focused 
• Transformative 
Objectives of GAP 
• Addressing the Kurdish question 
• Changing the destiny and face of Turkey 
• Eliminating feudalism and land inequality 
• Eliminating regional disparities 
• Generating national income and providing added value 
• Improving agricultural and industrial production and efficiency  
• Irrigating agricultural lands 
• Preventing migration and containing the population 
• Producing energy 
• Raising the infrastructural standards of GAP region 
• Raising the socio-economic standards of the local population 
• Rationally utilizing and efficiently developing natural resources 
Drawbacks of GAP 
• Delays and incompleteness 
• Detachment from the local population 
• Deviation from the integrated approach 
• Harming the environment and cultural and historical heritages 
• Insufficient scientific research 
• Negligence of irrigation projects 
• Source of forced migration, income inequality, and social degeneration 
Factors behind GAP's delay 
• Administrative structure of GAP-BKİ 
• Foreign powers 
• Strong centralized governance structure 
• Poor and insufficient planning 
• Cumbersome bureaucracy and the lack of coordination 
• The lack of financial resources 
• The lack of investments 
• The lack of political will, stability, and competence 
• The lack of qualified personnel  
• The PKK 
Factors behind GAP's loss of popularity	  	  
• Changing development paradigms and practices 
• Completion of vote-garnering projects 
• Disappointment and loss of excitement 
• Indifference of society 
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The oscillations in the governance of GAP were not independent from the unstable 
meaning of development and changing development paradigms that influenced how 
development was interpreted and practiced worldwide. GAP’s gradual shift from its state-led, 
purely technical, purely engineering, purely infrastructure-based, purely economic 
development-oriented character to its market-friendly, sustainable, participatory, human-
centered, social development-oriented character did not happen automatically. The historical 
trajectory of development theory and practice and continuities and discontinuities within 
them had a decisive role in this shift. The prevailing words and expressions in development 
discourse have been changing as well. As Alfini and Chambers (2010, p. 29) indicate, words 
and expressions such as poverty, gender, sustainability, and livelihood were the long-term 
survivors year after year; terms such as scheme and integrated rural development had their 
days and faded away; and some others such as liberalization, privatization, and globalization 
marked major shifts in ideology, policy, and reality. The shift in the governance of GAP 
should not necessarily be understood as the total abandonment of a development approach 
and its replacement with another approach in the overall project framework, though. The 
erosion of the project’s technical character that prioritizes infrastructure building or economic 
development does not indicate that GAP no longer embodies a modernist interpretation of 
development. Similarly, the gradual injection of concepts that prioritize sustainability or 
entrepreneurship does not indicate that GAP embraces a fully neoliberal development 
paradigm. Likewise, the adoption of participatory and bottom-up development approaches or 
human development does not indicate that from now on only alternatives of development are 
sought in GAP framework. While all the various characteristics that define GAP remained 
intact in the project framework, their degree of dominance increases or decreases in 
accordance with the changes as to how development was understood and practiced primarily 
on a global scale and secondarily on a national scale. Accordingly, global development 
discourse often shaped how politicians, bureaucrats, and experts as the key drivers of the 
project conceived development and how they conceived development shaped how they 
steered the trajectory of GAP. Implementation of GAP according to certain theories or 
approaches further shaped the conduct and behavior of the local population, as the roles 
prescribed to people and what is expected from them differ in modernization theories, 
structuralism, neoliberalism, and post-development approach. In that sense, GAP was a 
product of a set of norms, values, concepts, and standards that were borrowed, imported, and 
to a certain extent adjusted to local context rather than a product of original and homegrown 
ones that were based on the sensitivities and demands of the local population.  
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The oscillations in the governance of GAP also indicated that the project resembled a 
flexible and adaptive structure that was constantly redefined, redesigned, and rebranded in 
accordance with contextual necessities, conditions, and interests. Given its malleability, 
different actors at the elite level attached different meanings and attributions to the project 
and the concept of development in accordance with their own set of beliefs, worldviews, and 
institutional and personal interests. In that sense, the project resembled an empty signifier-
like container,67 into which different–even opposite–meanings could be placed in different 
contexts. To put it differently, while as a signifier GAP remained intact for more than four 
decades, what GAP signified has been under the process of constant change and 
reproduction. Therefore, at the current stage of its historical trajectory, there is no more one, 
precise, and well-defined GAP as it was once implemented in the Tigris-Euphrates River 
Basin. Rather, there are multiple, amorphous, and loosely-defined GAPs that are loaded with 
infinite number of meanings and attributions and that permeated almost every aspect of life in 
the whole GAP region in an omnipresent manner. This fluid structure has strengthened and 
sustained the “mystique” of GAP and facilitated the maintenance of its “special,” 
“untouchable,” and “sanctified” status, as it enabled (1) the justification of the project’s 
imperfections and drawbacks caused by the project at all times and in all contexts, (2) the 
concealment of project-related discontents and their implications which were in fact political 
in nature, and (3) the insulation of the project from a rigorous problematization and 
investigation to the extent possible.  
                                                
67 According to Laclau (1996, as cited in Ziai, 2009, p. 196), empty-signifier “has no content, because it only 
exists in the various forms in which it is actually realized … [it] is present as that which is absent; it becomes an 
empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their efforts 
to present their particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack.” 
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6. “GAP HAD TO BE INITIATED BECAUSE…”: SOURCES OF IMPETUS AND 
RATIONALIZATION OF GAP’S DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
In this chapter, I examine what kind of sources gave impetus to the design and 
implementation of GAP and through what kind of sources the project has been rationalized. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, GAP has included a wide range of associated and disassociated 
development goals and objectives in the fields of agriculture, energy, infrastructure, politics, 
economy, social, and culture. They vary from irrigating arid lands to producing energy, from 
providing job opportunities to preventing migration, from improving socio-economic 
conditions in GAP region to eliminating the remnants of feudalism and land ownership 
inequality therein. While achieving these goals and objectives was indeed crucial for the state 
in terms of performing its duties and functions, it is simplistic and reductionist to claim that 
they alone formed the basis of the design and implementation of GAP. Given the size, scope, 
significance, and forty years-long span of GAP, the question as to why the project was 
initiated needs to be answered by taking into consideration more complex and more genuine 
factors that are more latent than the ones widely and explicitly presented in written and 
spoken texts. Accordingly, through a careful analysis of legislative and elite discourses, I 
identified the major rationales of GAP as (1) the rectification of differences of GAP region, 
(2) the admiration of the West and Western development trajectory, and (3) the pursuit of 
development and betterment at the expense of destruction.  
To briefly clarify how and why I identified these broad rationales and focused 
specifically on them instead of other project goals and objectives, the individual goals and 
objectives implicitly or explicitly prescribed progress, change, and transformation of GAP 
region and its local population in different spheres and in varying degrees. The question as to 
what aspect(s) of the region and population were considered problematic became clear when 
dominantly negative and derogatory representation of GAP region as arid, barren, backward, 
and underdeveloped were taken into account. Accordingly, when the categories of perceived 
characteristics of GAP region and objectives of GAP were interpreted and analyzed as 
interrelated and even interlinked, rectification of differences crystallized as a broader 
objective in the overall project framework. Similarly, even though goals and objectives 
imposed development and change, the questions as to towards which direction these 
processes had to be diverted to and how the culmination of these processes would appear 
were more implicit. When the implicit meanings and arguments were discovered and 
evaluated in the light of the historical trajectory of Turkey’s modernization and the crucial 
and special position of the West in this process, the admiration of the West and Western 
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development trajectory came to the fore as another broader objective within GAP framework. 
Finally, even though project goals and objectives exclusively pointed to a future direction, 
they alone revealed very little regarding the consequences of the development process. 
However, when these goals and objectives were interpreted and analyzed in conjunction with 
the category of perceived drawbacks of GAP such as harming the ecology and causing 
involuntary displacement, the pursuit of development and betterment at the expense of 
destruction emerged as the other broader objective within GAP. In short, I focused on these 
broad rationales for they comprehensively cover the wide range of different project goals and 
objectives, better reflect the depth and complexity of the project, and better illustrate the 
interrelatedness of different categories and subcategories of the analysis of legislative and 
elite discourses.  
The chapter comprises four sections. In the first three sections, I discuss the above-
mentioned rationales in greater detail and also thoroughly examine the various implications 
of each rationale in each section. In the fourth and final section, I provide a brief summary of 
the chapter and concisely discuss the overall implications of these rationales.  
6.1. The Rectification of Differences of GAP Region 
6.1.1. Differences of GAP Region and its Local Population 
Development interventions are generally made in order to overcome a “problem” or correct 
an “anomaly,” which are pinpointed and constructed by certain discourses (DuBois, 1991, p. 
19). Accordingly, one of the most significant goals of a development project is arguably 
“rectification,” defined as “the ‘objective’ assessment of a situation in which there is a ‘need’ 
and the ‘scientific’ prescription of a set of actions intended to remedy said need” (p. 19). In 
line with this argument, GAP region has been widely characterized as “different” on many 
grounds. It would not be far-fetched to argue that even the words “East” or “Southeast” have 
often provided a negative image of poverty, misery, tradition, ignorance, and a sense of 
otherness in the eyes of Turkish society. To illustrate this long tendency, some of GAP 
region’s differences that were at the same time framed as problems included, but not limited 
to, its low level of income, migration patterns, unsuitable topographical and climatic 
conditions, maldistribution of water resources, arid lands, insufficient social services, and 
distorted land ownership (SPO, 1989a, p. 2.4). Also, as a former project consultant from 
GAP-BKİ explained, when she was appointed to Southeastern Anatolia Region due to a 
development project in the 1960s, “society [she] found there was beyond [her] imagination. 
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… It was so different, so different than all other regions. … The language, culture, and 
ethnicity were different. Lifestyles were very different.”68 A detailed analysis of legislative 
and elite discourses indicates that GAP region and its population were characterized as 
different specifically along the lines of (1) GAP region’s ancient past, (2) local population’s 
“ignorance,” and (3) local population’s traditional lifestyle and that the last two lines were 
problematized and considered as obstacles for development of GAP region. Each will be 
discussed below to illustrate how rectification of GAP region’s differences constituted one 
significant rationale of GAP. 
6.1.1.1. GAP region as the continuation of ancient Mesopotamian civilization  
Apparently, designers and implementers of GAP have had a tendency to imagine GAP region 
as the continuation of ancient Mesopotamian civilization and exalt its once glorious past. 
According to this narrative, Mesopotamia, which meant “between two rivers” in Greek, used 
to be “the cradle of civilization” for being home to the invention of city, writing, wheel, 
animal domestication, agriculture, irrigation, and similar groundbreaking developments. 
Also, it used to be the home to Sumerians, Akkadians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Persians 
in history with its fertile lands, mild climate, and abundant water resources. GAP region, the 
narrative goes, was the continuation and representative of this rich civilization. It was widely 
emphasized both in policy documents and anecdotal resources that GAP aimed to 
“reanimate” the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin, which was once described by the famous 
traveler Evliya Çelebi in the 17th century as a huge oasis which he could not even see the sun 
“all the way to Baghdad due to citrus trees” (Bağış, 1989, p. 7; Turgut, 2000, p. 95). 
Similarly, according to Muammer Yaşar Özgül, the then President of GAP-BKİ in 2006,  
GAP region has been home of civilization, science, culture, and humanity for 
thousands of years. Today, this region in some way contributed to progress and 
accumulation all around the world, from east to west, from north to south. The region 
fed by Tigris and Euphrates rivers, or Mesopotamia, [was] also known as the most 
fertile and abundant lands where agriculture first took root. Also, this region [was] at 
the heart of the most dynamic and strategic geography (Türkiye Genç İşadamları 
Derneği, 2006). 
The political elites have also had a similar tendency to associate GAP region with the 
Mesopotamian civilization. Numerous times GAP was considered as a project to ensure the 
“rebirth of the prosperity which Mesopotamia enjoyed thousands of years ago, accompanied 
                                                
68 Personal interview, April 30, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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by modern technology” (Bağış, 1989, p. 5); “restore peace and abundance in Mesopotamia 
where God brought divine peace and abundance to humanity” (TBMM, 2003, p. 344); and 
“create a new and brighter civilization in Upper Mesopotamia, the home of first civilizations” 
(TBMM, 2006a, p. 149). Even though these examples suggest that the supposed link between 
GAP region and Mesopotamian civilization was romanticized rather than problematized, they 
indicate that this link was seen as a crucial character which made GAP region unique among 
other regions in Turkey. Unlike this distinct characteristic, however, local population’s 
“ignorance” as the other line of difference was quite derogatory, as will be explained below. 
6.1.1.2. “Ignorance” of the local population in GAP region  
Since ignorance is an elusive term, different meanings were attached to ignorance in the 
context of GAP. In legislative and elite discourses, it was often reduced to the total absence 
or lack of formal education or proper communication skills, especially in Turkish language. 
For instance, according to a coordinator from GAP-BKİ, “the region [was] still very 
backward in education because it [was] impossible to equalize the birth rate and education 
investments. In Urfa, everyone [had] ten children.”69 Similarly, an expert from the same 
institution underlined that “if women [were] kept ignorant, kids continue[d] to be ignorant” 
and explained that “to prevent this, [they] organized agriculture camps, … trained farmers’ 
kids about irrigation, taught them how to swim, use computer … and speak proper, not 
broken Turkish.”70 A professor from Ankara University also underlined that in GAP region 
“women [had to] be included in education because education [was] important. Schooling 
[was] required. Population [had to] learn Turkish. This [was] necessary when information 
[was] given about health, birth control, injection…etc.”71  
 The “ignorance” was also reduced to the local population’s supposed lack of self-
sufficiency, capability, consciousness, and responsibility in comparison to people in other 
regions of Turkey. For instance, “local entrepreneurs” in GAP region were found extremely 
prudent, reluctant and scared for cooperation, narrow-minded and short-sighted, and 
inexperienced in a survey conducted in 1996 to reveal the investment potential of GAP 
region (GAP-BKİ, 1996, p. 18). Similarly, based on her belief that people were the decisive 
factor that made a difference in the development process, an expert from GAP-BKİ compared 
provinces and people of western and eastern Turkey and made the following explanation:  
                                                
69 Personal interview, March 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
70 Personal interview, March 21, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
71 Personal interview, April 8, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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Have you ever been to Çanakkale?72 What’s there anyway? There are more things to 
do in Urfa. Çanakkale also needs to be developed, but its people are more intellectual 
and more conscious. This is one of the disadvantages of Southeastern and Eastern 
Anatolia; they expect everything from the state while others do it themselves.73 
In a parallel manner, a deputy undersecretary from the Ministry of Development underlined 
that working with the local population was extremely difficult due to their “different” 
business etiquette that stemmed from their “different” social backgrounds. According to his 
observation, they were “psychologically used to transfers. They [did] not say ‘I should be the 
one to produce, make money, become richer, become an entrepreneur, and have a stable job.’ 
Instead, they said ‘the state [had to] make social transfer payments to me.’”74  
The examples indicate that although there are different interpretations of ignorance, 
they all contribute to the characterization of GAP region and its people as different from their 
equivalents. They also reveal how “ignorance” has been viewed as a problem to be rectified 
and a barrier against the development of GAP region. The local population’s traditional 
lifestyle as the other problematized line of difference will be discussed below. 
6.1.1.3. Traditional lifestyle of the local population in GAP region  
Traditional lifestyle is also an elusive term. In the context of GAP, it was often conceived 
along the lines of feudalism, tribalism, and large land ownership,75 which could be hardly 
observed in other regions in Turkey with the possible exception of Eastern Anatolia Region. 
To illustrate this linkage, according to GAP Social Action Plan, in GAP region 
a traditional social and cultural structure [was] still predominant. A semi-feudal 
structure in agriculture, traditional ways in animal husbandry and semi or even full 
nomadism [were] predominant socio-economic forms of organization in the Region. 
As a natural consequence of this centuries-old forms of organization, traditional 
institutions such as landlords, sheikhs and tribal chiefs still survive[d] and 
maintain[ed] their influence to a considerable extent (GAP-RDA, 1999, p. 4).  
The analysis revealed that designers and implementers of GAP problematized these 
traditional social and cultural structures as well as actors, traditions, customs, and morals that 
were inherent in these structures on the grounds that they had detrimental effects on the local 
population, represented the “wrong” and obsolete way of life in a modern setting, and 
                                                
72 It is a province located on the Dardanelles Strait in Marmara Region in the northwestern part of Turkey. 
73 Personal interview, April 22, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
74 Personal interview, May 2, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
75 The analysis points to a general tendency among designers and implementers of GAP to consider feudalism, 
tribalism, and large landownership as the same phenomena and use them interchangeably. 
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constituted an obstacle for the development of GAP region. According to an expert from 
GAP-BKİ, these structures “sabotaged development” and “allowed feudal lords to keep the 
local population under their patronage ‘uneducated’ and ‘unconscious’ about the unjust 
system they lived in.”76 It was also noted in GAP Social Action Plan that 
there [were] serious barriers to the process of development of the Region embedded in 
its structural characteristics. The first of these [was] the introversion or the closed 
character of an important section of even the urban communities, let alone the rural 
societies. Second [was] the dependence of local people on an intricate system of 
ancient institutions such as tribes, sheiks and landlords which predominate[d] 
relations of production and social organization. Although these structural 
characteristics [were] in the process of dissolution, they [were] still strong enough to 
influence social developments (GAP-RDA, 1999, p. 6). 
At this point, it is apt to briefly discuss how the role of GAP in terms of changing the 
traditional structures was perceived. The analysis points to two competing narratives in this 
regard. The first narrative emphasized that the introduction of irrigated farming and modern 
agricultural techniques had a decisive impact on both weakening feudalism and changing 
land ownership patterns dramatically. Indeed, except a few extreme cases, it was no more 
possible to claim the dominance of feudalism in GAP region. In addition to the initiation of 
GAP, rural population flow to the cities, increased symbolic and material exchange between 
the region and national centers, transformation of relations of production, and Turkey’s 
modernization process in general weakened this structure. It was equally difficult to claim the 
dominance of tribalism in GAP region in the post-GAP period. As a professor from METU 
also argued, even though some people still identified themselves with their tribes, it was only 
at a symbolic level. Processes of urbanization, demographic transformation, and social 
change dissolved and disintegrated tribalism.77 Large land ownership was no exception to this 
trend, either. After GAP, almost all large lands were shared among relatives or heirs in 
smaller surface areas and the ownership pattern changed over time. To illustrate, a planner 
who worked with GAP-BKİ on ad-hoc basis explained that there used to be local people who 
owned lands as large as 300,000 to 500,000 acres in the late 1980s.78 A wealthy landowner in 
Şanlıurfa, however, explained in 2014 that “contrary to the common belief, no large 
landowner was left here. Whom to call a large landowner anyway? The ones who owned 100 
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77 Personal interview, April 10, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
78 Personal interview, April 3, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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acres? 1,000? 5,000? … Irrigation eliminated feudal relations and GAP had a decisive effect 
on this.”79 
The second narrative emphasized that GAP had little or no impact on weakening the 
traditional structures and claimed that it even strengthened these structures further. According 
to this narrative, GAP initiated social change only at a superficial level and even worsened 
the existing inequalities and power imbalances in some cases. On this matter, a professor 
from Ankara University rejected the idea that GAP dissolved tribal relations and underlined 
that GAP-induced social change was far from being genuine. Her explanation was as follows: 
My husband is from [GAP] region and he is a member of a tribe. He studied in 
İstanbul, but they still live with those values. So different than people in the West. 
They don’t change. Tribalism may not work in economic terms, but it is still alive 
culturally. Changes are very minor. You see a man moving to a modern apartment, 
buying a jeep, living a modern life, but at the same time getting five women, 
dominating them, beating his daughters, involving in armed fights.80 
The other claim that GAP worsened the existing inequalities and power imbalances was 
based on the idea that the project provided wealthy people with ample opportunities to 
generate more income from irrigated farming and modern agricultural techniques and exert 
more influence (see Harris, 2005 for a discussion on this matter). A caveat is necessary here 
before elaborating further. There were two significant changes in the irrigation management 
and practice in Turkey in the last two decades. The first change was the shift from small-scale 
irrigation with groundwater to large-scale irrigation with surface water. The second change 
was the shift to participatory irrigation management to include farmers into the management 
process (Özerol, 2013, p. 78), as it was widely acknowledged–and also advocated by the 
World Bank–that active community participation in the water sector would empower the 
target groups and lead to more transparency and sustainability of development projects 
(Eguavoen & Youkhana, 2008). As a result of these shifts, irrigation associations were 
formed under the auspices of DSİ in 1994. These associations gained the right to manage 
irrigation systems and became responsible for distributing water to farmers, operating and 
maintaining canals, and collecting irrigation fees. The associations were operating based on 
participation and cooperation among local authorities, farmer representatives, and farmers, at 
least on paper (p. 78). However, they failed to yield the expected development outcomes. 
                                                
79 Personal interview, May 30, 2014, Şanlıurfa, Turkey. 
80 Personal interview, April 8, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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Also, in the words of a professor from Ankara University, over time “the associations 
engaged in politics” and began to “act like a political or industrial union.”81 Combined with 
this imperfect and malfunctioning model of irrigation associations, it was hardly surprising 
that GAP served the interest of those who were already wealthy and influential in GAP 
region. In this regard, a professor from METU underlined that it was large landowners who 
benefited from GAP and irrigation associations because “small landowners [could] not afford 
to pay the amount determined by the associations anyway. For this reason, associations 
actually worsened the inequality.”82 Another indicator of the worsening inequality was that, 
even though irrigation associations were ideally designed as participatory and democratic 
institutions, their heads and administrators were often chosen among the wealthiest and most 
influential people in their districts; skills or merit did not play any role. As a head of a 
division from DSİ explained, the heads of associations were “very ignorant” and “chosen for 
their influence, not for their quality.”83 Still, arguably these drawbacks were not entirely 
unexpected given that factors such as the heavy focus of projects on technical and financial 
issues, the lack of human capacities and technical means, and complex but overlooked 
political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural realities of communities have long made it 
difficult for water projects to yield successful results (Eguavoen & Youkhana, 2008). It was 
also not entirely unexpected as issues regarding power such as the redistribution of property 
rights, transfer of authority as well as the reallocation of natural and social resources might 
lead to a reassertion of powerful interest groups and to resource capture by different elite 
groups (Kothari, 2001, as cited in Hauck & Youkhana, 2008).  
Regardless of whether GAP was successful or unsuccessful to eliminating traditional 
social and cultural structures in GAP region, examples indicate that just as the local 
population’s “ignorance,” being traditional–however it was defined–was perceived as a 
difference, a problem, and an obstacle for development to flourish. Still, characterization of 
GAP region as different and problematization of its differences were not without 
implications, as will be discussed in the following section.  
6.1.2. Implications of Rectifying the Differences of GAP Region 
6.1.2.1. Otherization of the local population 
One of the outcomes of the problematization of differences was the otherization of the local 
population in GAP region. Constant utterance of differences in legislative and elite discourses 
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led to the emergence and/or consolidation of dichotomies of ignorant and educated, 
traditional and modern, and different and normal. According to this dichotomous thinking, 
GAP region and its population represented an aberrance or deviance from the norm due to 
their socio-economic and socio-cultural characteristics. As Ziai (2016, p. 220) notes, the 
naturalization of “the self” brings about problematization of “the other,” and this 
problematization brings about the construction of “the self” as superior and normal and 
construction of “the other” as inferior and deviant. In this process, GAP-related discourses 
played a significant role in producing and reproducing norms and ideal standards. For this 
reason, they directly or indirectly defined who or what “normal,” “abnormal” or “other” was, 
and why. Also, otherization based on differences indicated that the motor of development 
inherent in the overall project framework was spotting an “abnormality” and then fixing it in 
accordance with the self-defined standards of normality. Given the power imbalance between 
“the self” and “the other,” it was not entirely surprising that the will to rectify differences also 
brought about infantilization of the local population, as will be discussed below. 
6.1.2.2. Infantilization of the local population  
Constant characterization of the local population as miserable, incapable, passive, helpless, 
and inferior constructed a reality in which they had to be controlled, shaped, and elevated to 
the level of self-sufficiency. As a strictly top-down condition, infantilization signified a 
power imbalance between the local population as “the infant” and designers and 
implementers of GAP as “the caregiver.” This hierarchy elevated the latter to a level where 
they could be perceived–or perceived themselves–as the benevolent providers of 
development and the sole authority to decide on the lives of the “infantilized” population. For 
instance, their grandioso and even utopian objectives such as “overcoming the ill-fate of the 
East” (TBMM, 1985, p. 303), “changing the destiny of history and geography” (TBMM, 
1988b, p. 75), “drilling not only the mountains but also epochs,” and “placing another great 
civilization on top of all the past civilizations in Anatolia” (Turgut, 2000, p. 146) disclosed 
their strong self-confidence. Although in a slightly different context, Zeydanlıoğlu (2008) 
defined this self-assigned task of the (Turkish) elites to carry out a “civilizing” mission on the 
supposedly ignorant and traditional non-elite populations as “white Turkish man’s burden.” 
Such ambitious objectives also indicated their belief in the omnipotential of science and 
technology in reshaping concrete phenomena such as physical nature and abstract phenomena 
such as human nature, destiny, and fate (see Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion on the 
dominance of experts and expert knowledge in the overall GAP framework). 
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Infantilization of the local population further signified their reduction to “academic 
objects” to be studied and researched from outside in a supposedly controlled environment. 
For instance, a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ explicitly considered GAP “as a 
laboratory where especially sociologists, anthropologist, and social workers [could] find and 
learn a lot.”84 Similarly, a professor from Ankara University engaged in self-criticism as to 
how little researchers engaged with the local population and admitted that they “enter[ed] and 
exit[ed] the field quickly. … It [made] no sense to spend two days with women in a village. 
… Community meetings, focus groups, quick interviews [were] not really helpful.”85 In 
relation to this point, one of the former presidents of GAP-BKİ complained that while he then 
needed talented sociologists who could understand “sociology of the masses, sociologists 
worked as if they were social researchers there. They tried to make analyses out of people’s 
group affiliations.”86 The perception of GAP region and its local population as such also 
facilitated the legitimization of interventions from outside, as will be discussed below. 
6.1.2.3. Legitimization of development interventions  
Problematization of differences engendered the need of their rectification. Arguably, this 
alleged need formed one of the most important bases of how politicians, bureaucrats, and 
experts could legitimize their policy decisions with less difficulty. To explicate, GAP region 
was often imagined as a different geography and characterized as a chaotic and disorderly 
space. As Crush (1995, p. 9) notes, “the language of crisis and disintegration creates a logical 
need for external intervention and management.” A similar language was employed at the 
elite level to make a case for intervention to change GAP region into the opposite of what it 
actually was. To illustrate a few peaceful and orderly images of GAP region, in the mid-
1990s, GAP region in its ideal shape was as follows from the perspective of the then 
President Süleyman Demirel: 
When we look from here in ten years, we will see a sea down there. This sea will be a 
green sea. In it, there will be bread, abundance, pearl-like cities, pearl-like villages, 
pearl-like towns, and bright people. That corner of our Turkey will be decorated like a 
garden (Turgut, 2000, pp. 154-155).   
Similarly, the ideal GAP region in the early 2010s from the perspective of Cevdet Yılmaz, 
the then Minister of Development was as follows: 
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There are bright days ahead in GAP’s future. We march towards a GAP in which we 
use our potential at maximum level; we build richer and better cities; we have a more 
diverse and colorful environment with universities, civil society, the media, and 
activities of culture and arts; and our people, specifically our youth and women, 
participate much more in social and economic life (GAP-BKİ, 2012b, p. 7). 
Reaching such an advanced stage of development and attaining a “difference-free” 
environment in GAP region required intervention. Also, this intervention had to be as radical 
and irrevocable as possible. For instance, a researcher in water politics explained this need 
with an analogy and underlined that “instead of peeling one layer of an onion one at a time, it 
had to be cut at once” because “no piecemeal approach ever worked in the region before.”87  
Also, characterization of GAP region as a static geography that supposedly remained 
unchanged for decades–or even for millennia if its links to Mesopotamian civilization are 
taken for granted–also legitimized intervention on the grounds that the region’s rich, but 
dormant and underused potential had to be activated. In this regard, the then Prime Minister 
Süleyman Demirel openly expressed in 1993 that development policies aimed to “activate a 
country’s resources and channel them to welfare of the population” because “[n]othing 
[came] out of dormancy. Resources always existed. The important thing [was] to pair them 
with knowledge, science, and technology as the products of human intellect” (GAP-BKİ, 
1993b, p. 4). Similarly in 1998, Demirel explained the motivation behind GAP and 
legitimized its implementation on the grounds that 
Euphrates took many lives, prevented passage … spread fear, became a source of 
threat and danger, inflicted damage, and flowed to deserts in vain for years. It was not 
Euphrates’ fault. Putting it into the service of civilization, making it serve for welfare 
and happiness of humanity, making it contribute to our country’s wealth, making it 
the main pillar of region’s development was the job of knowledge, science, technicity, 
and finally determination (Turgut, 2000, p. 244). 
The examples suggest that the urge to rectify the differences of GAP region and its local 
population was not only a strong motivation for the architects of GAP, but also a means to 
legitimize their interventions, which were at times against the will of the target groups.  
6.1.3. Summary 
GAP region and its local population have long been considered as “different” due to the 
ancient past of GAP region, “ignorance” of its local population, and their traditional lifestyle. 
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In the context of GAP, ignorance–generally understood as the lack of education, 
communication skills, self-sufficiency, and self-consciousness–and traditional lifestyle–
generally understood as feudalism, tribalism, and large land ownership–were problematized 
and viewed as barriers against the development of GAP region and its population. For the 
architects of GAP, rectifying these differences and transforming both GAP region and its 
local population–often radically and in a top-down manner–in accordance with modern 
standards and principles were strong sources of GAP’s rationalization. 
However, rationalization of GAP as such led to certain implications. The outcome 
was that the local population became otherized and infantilized vis-à-vis both the architects 
of the project and people who lived outside GAP region. Also, development interventions 
could be legitimized with more convenience and less opposition. These implications suggest 
that GAP and the manner it was rationalized were far from being neutral. On the contrary, 
they had a significant influence on the reconfiguration of power dynamics between GAP 
region and the rest of Turkey, the local population and the rest of the nation, elites and non-
elites, experts and non-experts, the Turks and Kurds, and the self and the other. The 
perceived differences in the context of GAP, then, were not simply technical and easy-to-
solve problems to be addressed in a sterile manner; they were rather deep-rooted and 
contested problems that were resistant against rational calculations. In the next section, I will 
examine the admiration of the West and Western development trajectory as another rationale 
of GAP and discuss its various implications.   
6.2. The Admiration of the West and Western Development Trajectory 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the condition of being modern and developed has long been 
associated with the West. Underdevelopment was conceived as an inadequacy in the quest to 
become a “complete” Western society in a context where societies were classified as 
underdeveloped, less developed, developing, and developed (DuBois, 1991, p. 2). As 
emphasized in Chapter 4, the founding elites of the modern Turkey wholeheartedly believed 
in the supposed superiority of the West in many domains. In the following years, even though 
the degree of sympathy and antipathy towards the West varied depending on the political and 
ideological leanings of the governments, arguably the West remained as the ideal to reach in 
terms of its science and technology as well as political, social, and economic institutions and 
standards. For this reason, it was not entirely surprising that the initiation of GAP was 
rationalized based on the supposed need to follow and emulate the Western development 
trajectory for the sake of “catching up.” Different forms of this admiration and Western-
centrism in the overall GAP framework will be discussed below.  
Chapter 6: Sources of impetus and rationalization of GAP 
 148 
6.2.1. The Perception of the West in the Overall GAP Framework 
Arguably, Western standards have been guiding for designers and implementers of GAP 
since the early years of the project. This orientation was not without reason, though. To 
briefly explain, Turkey has been under the heavy political, military, economic, social, and 
cultural influence of the West–specifically the US–since the end of the World War II and the 
beginning of development as a political goal. In the words of Keyder (1993, p. 123), “the 
political platform of the period [post-1945] took a very clear anti-communist stance and 
appropriated Americanism as a shallow and mimetic modernization model without any 
critique.” The fact that Süleyman Demirel and Turgut Özal,88 the then top level political 
elites who put immense effort into GAP as technicians and politicians and who would later 
on claim credit for the project, both studied and worked in the US as engineers for limited 
periods of time and internalized a US-oriented way of thinking and policy approach also had 
a decisive impact on the project’s orientation. Also, such bold modernization schemes and 
grand development interventions were often drawn and combined together from an already 
existing accumulated repertoire (Li, 2007, p. 6). The architects of GAP, too, borrowed and 
adopted some components of developmentalist state model that was popular between the 
1950s and 1980s where the state played the primary role in capital accumulation, resource 
allocation, direction of (mainly economic) development, and stimulating industrial growth 
through large engineering and infrastructure projects (Reyes-Gaskin, 2005, p. 70).  
To illustrate this admiration and Western-centrism in the initial stages of GAP, the 
then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel often compared Turkey with Western European 
countries and the US and expressed his vision to elevate Turkey to their level of 
development. For instance, he enthusiastically stated that “[Southeastern Anatolia Region 
was] Turkey’s California. It [would] become Turkey’s Ruhr with its future industrial plants” 
(TBMM, 1975b, p. 418). Demirel made a similar comparison in 1985 and openly expressed 
his admiration to how the US managed to develop its water and land resources. In his words,  
I [was] the first Turkish engineer who was sent to western states in the US by the state 
in 1949 to enhance my knowledge and skills. There, I saw a lot and had the 
opportunity to apply them in my country. When I saw Boulder Dam89 on Colorado 
                                                
88 Just as Demirel, Özal also went to İstanbul Technical University. He received his degree in electrical 
engineering and completed graduate work in economics in the US. Before entering the politics in 1977, he 
served as General Deputy Director of Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration in 
the late 1950s and as Undersecretary of DPT in the 1960s (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991, p. 25). 
89 Boulder Dam is also known as Hoover Dam, named after the 31st President of the US Herbert Hoover. The 
construction of the dam started in 1931 and finished in 1936. According to the Bureau of Reclamation, Hoover 
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River in Nevada with its reservoir capacity of 30 billion cubic meters and power to 
generate 2 million kilowatts of energy, I sat on a rock and watched it for three days. I 
just watched and watched (Turgut, 2000, p. 288).  
Despite the fluctuations in the relationship between Turkey and the West over the 
years, more recent GAP-related legislative and elite discourses also characterized the West as 
an ideal to reach and underlined the need to emulate its development trajectory. To illustrate, 
a coordinator from GAP-BKİ emphasized in 2014 that “since the establishment of the 
republic [in 1923], even during the Ottoman times, [Turkey] ha[s] always faced the West. 
[Turkey] should have never turned [its] face away from the West” and that the goal of GAP 
was, from the beginning, to become like the West in terms of “providing opportunities for all 
people to enjoy the same rights and same economic and social benefits.”90 Similarly, in the 
same year, an MP who represented Şanlıurfa underlined the need to catch up with the West 
and explained GAP’s primary objective as “to elevate the level of the local population to the 
level of the West, Germany, France or more advanced countries there.”91  
It was also common among politicians, bureaucrats, and experts occasionally to 
equate the West with the redundant notion of “the whole world” and use them 
interchangeably. Apparently, they especially conflated these two to justify their policy 
decisions and their consequences through referring to elusive notions such as “conditions of 
the world today,” “necessities of our time,” “requirements of the changing world,” and 
“policy applications worldwide.” To illustrate this tendency, Erkan Alemdaroğlu, the then 
Regional Director of GAP-BKİ in Şanlıurfa, explained the reasons behind the shift(s) in the 
coordination and administration of GAP over the years as follows:  
The particularist approach of the 1960s and 1970s gave way to integrated approach in 
the 1980s. … These approaches were right in their time. But now the approach has 
changed worldwide since the 1990s. This is human-focused approach, approaches 
based solely on growth and integration gave way to human-centered concepts. 
Therefore, we shift our paradigm concurrently with the world. … We are in computer 
and internet age. People can easily access information in this age and these informed 
and interested people can be very well included in decision-making processes (GAP-
BKİ, 2000c, p. 70).  
                                                
Dam is a “testimony to a country’s ability to construct monolithic projects in the midst of adverse conditions 
[the Great Depression]. … It took less than five years, in a harsh and barren land, to build the largest dam of its 
time” (US Bureau of Reclamation, 2005, as cited in Kornfeld, 2007, pp. 7-8).  
90 Personal interview, March 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
91 Personal interview, May 21, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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Similarly, a coordinator from GAP-BKİ more recently justified the implementation of GAP 
on the grounds that “the world was changing. When you look[ed] around the world, regional 
development agencies were founded during that period. … Just like Hokkaido Development 
Agency in Japan or Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the US … to eliminate inter-
regional differences.”92 The establishment of Dicle, Karacadağ, and İpekyolu regional 
development agencies in GAP region in 2008 was also justified on the grounds that  
the process of globalization and socio-economic developments of our time [were] 
reshaping regional development policies and tools. … In order to formulate regional 
policies in coordination with the central units and put them into practice at a local 
level, there emerged a need to establish new and region-specific institutional 
structures (GAP-BKİ, 2014a, pp. 10-11). 
6.2.1.1. “The American dream” and TVA 
The analysis points to a strong tendency to praise especially the development trajectory of the 
US and draw similarities between GAP and TVA. TVA was the US government agency 
established in the 1930s to control the floods, generate energy, and improve the local 
population’s quality of life along the Tennessee River. To show how the US has been 
perceived in the context of GAP, in 2014 a deputy undersecretary from the Ministry of 
Development favored “the US model” and explained the reason as follows:  
The US is larger than Turkey, it is a continent. There, wherever you go, you feel like 
you are in the US. How do they achieve this? With vending machine, with 
McDonalds. … We must also transform Turkey into such a country where no one 
feels different or feels like lacking something.93  
Similarly in the same year, one of the former presidents of GAP-BKİ compared Turkish and 
American experiences in development practice and recounted his observations as follows: 
What I witnessed in GAP is this: if you ensure economic development, socio-cultural 
integration follows itself. … There are countless number of folks there, what is their 
common ground? Think about the American dream. It is based on money. Money is 
based on economy. It is not even an image; it is a dream! But, it still stands. Why? 
Because of economic activity, opportunity, dynamism…94 
Given the admiration of the American way of development, it is hardly surprising that 
TVA has been the most referenced international development project in legislative and elite 
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93 Personal interview, April 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
94 Personal interview, May 16, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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discourses (see Table 9 below for a simplified comparison of TVA and GAP). Turkey was 
not the only country that had the intention to emulate TVA, though. As Bochenski and 
Diamond (1950, p. 55) put decades ago, TVA was not simply a name of an ordinary 
development project in the US, but rather a “symbol of what [could] be done to raise the 
standard of living of an entire region by taming and using water efficiently,” especially 
among the countries in the Middle East. Mitchell (2002, p. 44) similarly notes that TVA 
“epitomize[d] the new possibilities of development and planning, especially in arid regions 
such as the Middle East. Large dams offered a way to build not just irrigation and power 
systems, but nation-states themselves.” In Turkey, TVA inspired politicians, bureaucrats, and 
experts so deeply that there were even explicit calls inside the parliament to adopt its 
administration model which operated “under the US President by a special statute and had 
every kind of authorization and political authority” and to “establish an integrated 
administration that could regulate resource allocation and scheduling by its high authority 
and authorization” (TBMM, 1988a, pp. 626-627).  
Table 9: Comparison of TVA and GAP at a glance 
TVA GAP 
Main purposes 
Control floods Irrigation 
Generate power Generate power 
Rural electrification Rural electrification 
Improve navigation N/A 
Number of dams built or to be built 
23 22 
Power capacity 
Around 2,500 MW Around 7,500 MW 
Main rivers 
Tennessee River Euphrates River 
Cumberland River Tigris River 
Tributaries Tributaries 
Source: Adapted from van Fleet, 1987 & SPO, 1990, as cited in Nestor, 1996, p. 71. 
Eventually, in the words of an expert from GAP-BKİ, GAP-BKİ “was established on 
TVA’s model through the guidance of Turgut Özal on the basis of the need of an authority on 
GAP” in 1989.95 However, while TVA’s model that granted the administration vast authority 
was compatible with the federal structure of the US, it was not fully compatible with the 
highly centralized administrative structure of Turkey. For this reason, GAP-BKİ had a 
hybridized model that was modified in accordance with the administrative structure of 
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Turkey and coordination-based agency models of Europe. The idea of the need to emulate 
TVA remained intact even in the 1990s. For instance, İsmail Cem, an MP who represented 
İstanbul compared “Southern Italy Project, expressed as ‘the key to Italian miracle,’” with 
TVA and asked whether it was possible for Turkey to implement TVA, as it was “the greatest 
example ever in this scale.” For him, “TVA [was] awesome. In less than no time, it 
transform[ed] a large geography from desert into a paradise not just physically, but with 
educational institutions, cultural establishments, and new cities” (TBMM, 1992b, p. 289). It 
should be noted that GAP-BKİ was not the only government institution within GAP 
framework that was modeled upon the US institutions. In the words of one of the former 
heads of GAP Regional Directorate at DSİ in Şanlıurfa, “DSİ [was] an American institution. 
We got our whole system from the US. We did exactly the same as what Bureau of 
Reclamation did. Even the blueprints of our headquarters [were] the same as their building in 
Denver.”96 Idealization of the West was not solely confined to calls for following the 
footsteps of Western countries and emulating their institutions, though. The west of Turkey 
was idealized within Turkey as well, as will be explained below. 
6.2.1.2. The dichotomy of east and west within Turkey  
The examination of legislative and elite discourses indicates that higher socio-economic 
conditions of subregions and provinces that were geographically located in western (and also 
southern) Turkey including Marmara, Aegean, and Mediterranean regions were perceived as 
the ideal level to be reached by Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia regions. As 
explained in Chapter 4, the east-west divide within Turkey was not a recent phenomenon; its 
origins went back to as early as the early years of the republic and even Ottoman times. To 
illustrate, during a visit to Diyarbakır and Elazığ provinces in southeastern and eastern 
Turkey in 1931, Atatürk, as the then President, stated that he wanted to “see factories, 
irrigated farming, roads, electrified villages, houses with healthy dwellers, and evergreen 
forests” there and underlined that “the civilization and life in İstanbul [had to] be brought 
[t]here, too” (GAP-BKİ, 2012b, p. 14).  
It is remarkable that the political elites absorbed almost the same idea more than half 
a century later and put forward that in Turkey “east-west divide should not exist in the 20th 
century anymore. Whatever we [had] in the west also [had to] exist in the east” on the 
grounds that “people living there [were] also our people; services [had to] be brought to 
them, too” (TBMM, 1988e, p. 64). Bureaucrats and experts also employed a similar narrative 
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in this regard. For instance, an expert from GAP-BKİ argued in 2014 that just as “investors 
[made] investment and open[ed] factories in Ankara, İstanbul, and Bursa today, they [would] 
consider doing so in Mardin, Şırnak, Diyarbakır, Batman in the future” and tacitly pointed 
out that western Turkey has always surpassed eastern Turkey in many respects.97 According 
to this vision, western regions and their subregions, provinces, towns, and also people were 
accepted as superior, modern, wealthy, and developed while their counterparts in eastern and 
southeastern Turkey were accepted as inferior, primitive, poor, and underdeveloped. In this 
context, GAP was associated with the Western norms, values, and standards and 
implemented with the expectation to elevate “the rest” to the level of western Turkey.  
The examples suggest that politicians, bureaucrats, and experts have had a tendency 
to perceive the West as if it were a homogenous and overarching entity that was above and 
totally distinct from other countries and cultures. They also suggest that the admiration of the 
West was in the guise not only of the will to follow the development trajectory of certain 
countries in the West and emulate a similar model, but also of a vision that makes a stark 
east-west division within Turkey. Indeed, this vision led to some implications, as will be 
discussed in the following section.  
6.2.2. Implications of Admiring the West and Western Development Trajectory 
6.2.2.1. Otherization of the non-Western 
The admiration of the West and its development experience was based on a sharp and 
oversimplified dichotomy between Western and Eastern geographies, cultures, and 
worldviews. Just as the will to rectify differences led to the otherization of the local 
population in GAP region, the admiration of the West led to the otherization of whoever or 
whatever did not represent Western norms, values, and standards. Being non-Western, then, 
was accepted as an abnormality. The idea that postulated the supposed Western superiority 
contributed to the emergence and consolidation of hierarchies at multiple levels; between 
Western and Eastern civilizations, development practices, behavior patterns, and so on.  
It is noteworthy that the source of the perceived superiority of the West in the overall 
GAP framework has been its science, technology, and material and human capital rather than 
its cultural and moral values. Designers and implementers of GAP were eager to utilize 
Western science and technology without any inquisition, but reluctant and suspicious to 
borrow Western culture arguably for its “dangerous” potential to spoil the national culture, 
values, and identities. In any case, their Western-inspired techno-scientific perspective 
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devalued traditional irrigation methods, traditional production techniques, and traditional 
societal relations of the local population in GAP region and characterized them as inferior, as 
they were alien to the Western interpretation and practice of development. Interestingly, 
however, the perception of the West as the ideal to reach at the same time fueled ethnocentric 
or Turco-centric sentiments, as will be discussed below. 
6.2.2.2. Characterization of GAP as the embodiment of “Turkishness”  
A careful analysis of legislative and elite discourses indicates that the admiration of the West 
and Western development experience ironically engendered the perception that the West was 
a rival to compete with and eventually “beat” in many respects. In this context, GAP was 
widely conceived as the manifestation of Turkey’s level of development vis-à-vis the West 
and the symbol of Turkish nation’s capability and greatness vis-à-vis other nations.  
The relationship between ethnocentrism and dam construction has been long 
acknowledged. Water engineering was closely associated with colonial projects and 
development programs in the 19th and 20th centuries (Aggestam & Sundell, 2016). Especially 
from the 1930s to the mid-1970s, large-scale development projects that attached importance 
to dam construction were highly popular worldwide and perceived positively for their crucial 
role in boosting agricultural production and productivity, producing energy, and irrigating 
agricultural lands (Güler & Savaş, 2011, p. 184). The quality and quantity of dams 
significantly increased in this period thanks to the advancements in science and technology; 
there were around 45,000 large dams–the majority of which were constructed between 1950 
and 1980–worldwide by the end of the 20th century (WCD, 2000, as cited in Öktem, 2002, p. 
311). Dams have been useful for many governments in terms of allowing them to change the 
distribution of resources spatially and temporally among communities and ecosystems. Also, 
in addition to their contribution to agricultural development and technical advancement, 
many governments have considered dams as symbols of their state’s technological and 
economic power (Mitchell, 2002, p. 21). Turkey was no exception in this regard. The analysis 
indicates that having the capability to build and operate dams and other components of GAP 
exclusively by Turkish capital, contractors, engineers, technicians, and labor has been a 
source of national pride. This was especially in line with the claim that specifically Turkish 
engineers aimed at putting their technical abilities into the service of the nation or national 
interests and receiving recognition as the one and only technical labor force instead of foreign 
engineers in the name of “national professionalism” (Göle, 1998, p. 116).  
This sense of pride was expressed in many different ways. For instance, it was telling 
that the name of the largest dam of GAP was changed from Karababa Dam to Atatürk Dam 
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on the basis of the idea that its mammoth size represented the greatness of the Turkish nation 
and its founding father.98 Just as many other similar–especially urban–megaprojects, it was 
an example of an “iconic architecture” that signified the image of development, economic 
growth, regeneration that was presented to the public (Vento, 2017, p. 72). The pride was 
also expressed by top-level political elites at various occasions. To illustrate, in a legislative 
session in 1991, the then President Turgut Özal boasted about how “Turkey [was] 
implementing the huge GAP that cover[ed] an area that equal[ed] the size of Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg combined in a record speed” entirely through its “own Turkish 
finance, contractors, engineers, and labor without any assistance today” (TBMM, 1991b, p. 
5). Similarly, in 1994, the then President Süleyman Demirel also stated in a proud and 
challenging tone that “Turkish nation [was] proving its constructive ability to the whole 
world by implementing this project step by step. GAP became the manifestation of not only 
Turkish engineering, Turkish technicity and labor, but also the determination of our nation” 
(GAP-BKİ, 1994a, p. 3). Bureaucrats and experts, too, widely boasted about the 
“Turkishness” of GAP. To exemplify, when asked about the hydropolitics in the Middle East, 
one of the former heads of GAP Regional Directorate at DSİ in Şanlıurfa explained that Syria 
and Iraq were still “under the influence of feudalism and tribalism.” For this reason, he 
continued, “Turkey does not care about them. We are not a small country. We are Turkey, we 
just do. Our engineers are among the best in the world, we are not behind any other nation.”99 
Similarly, Kenan Mortan, a former consultant to GAP-BKİ, found it shameful that GAP 
Master Plan was formulated “by a handful of [Japanese] people who [had] no idea about our 
local population on the 112th floor of a building in Tokyo” (see Chapter 5) but felt thankful 
that “now [Turkey had] a new way out” for being able to formulate plans without external 
support (GAP-BKİ, 2000c, p. 31). 
In relation to the “Turkishness” of GAP, the analysis illustrates that both individual 
dams and GAP as a whole were often characterized as “monuments” or “monuments of 
triumph.” Just as Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized the significance of large hydrological 
infrastructure projects and described dams as “the temples of modern India” following the 
independence of India (Roy, 1999, p. 56, as cited in Woodhouse, 2002, p. 141), for the then 
President Turgut Özal, GAP was “constituting a magnificent example of the Turkish people’s 
diligence and success, [and] a huge monument displaying the level of Turkey’s development” 
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(Bağış, 1989, p. 3). Indeed, it was obscure what kind of a “battle” was fought against what or 
whom and afterwards a triumph was won. A possible explanation for the employment of this 
metaphor would be that especially military and sports metaphors helped politicians explain 
their positions more easily and establish a bond with their electorate (Howe, 1988, p. 89). 
Another explanation would be that the “battle” was against the advanced Western countries 
and, therefore, indicated a sense of inferiority against the West. To illustrate this sentiment, 
according to Kâmran İnan, the former Minister of State in charge of GAP between 1987 and 
1991, the most significant aspect of GAP was giving confidence to Turkish nation. In his 
words, “in the past it was said, ‘we cannot do it, let foreigners do it. Our technology is 
insufficient, our capital accumulation is insufficient.’ We proved the opposite: We can do it 
and we did it” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası [TCMB], 2000, p. 11). Similarly, a 
former State Minister in charge of GAP in the 1990s explained that “the Europeans were 
telling us that we could not build the dam with our own resources and saying ‘you [were] not 
capable of implementing such a large project.’” However, as he continued and proudly said, 
“we achieved it, as the whole world saw.”100 Arguably, this perceived sense of inferiority and 
mistrust also engendered a national concern regarding how other countries have perceived 
GAP, as will be explained below. 
6.2.2.3. Characterization of GAP as a target of “dark foreign powers” 
The analysis also shows that some of GAP’s architects have long carried the concern that 
“dark foreign powers” supposedly perceived GAP as a threat to their national interests and 
national security and, therefore, directly or indirectly engaged in malevolent activities to 
prevent Turkey from fully implementing the project. To illustrate such concerns, in the initial 
stages of GAP, Recep Orhan Ergun, an MP who represented Kayseri, underlined that “GAP 
attracted others’ ambition, others’ jealousy, other countries’ hostility” and, for this reason, 
“there [would] be intrusions to our political liaisons” (TBMM, 1989, p. 217). In the early 
1990s, Iraq–or the then President Saddam Hussein himself–and Syria were often blamed for 
supporting “terrorists [the PKK] in southeast to prevent GAP” and providing them training 
and refuge (TBMM, 1991c, p. 118). Israel was also widely blamed for “having designs on 
Turkey and [its] water resources” on the grounds that “Turkey [had] the richest water 
resources in the Middle East” and that the Promised Land, mentioned in Torah, covered the 
area between Nile and Euphrates as well as GAP region (TBMM, 1994, p. 436). In addition, 
the West was generally blamed especially for preventing Turkey from finding financial 
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support for dam construction. In the words of a freelance consultant who worked within 
GAP, “whenever Turkey pursue[d] policies that serve[d] Western interests, the West 
generously provide[d] credit. When Turkey [did] not do so, the West start[ed] crying about 
how dams destroy[ed] culture, environment, this and that.”101 Another source of concern was 
the belief that the control of the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin would be transferred to an 
international body as a precondition of Turkey’s accession to the EU. For instance, Mehmet 
Vedat Melik, an MP who represented Şanlıurfa raised his concerns in 2004 on this possibility 
and asked whether the state was waiting for “the decision of an international administration 
that [would control] water resources in GAP region” to open new lands to irrigation, as 
allegedly mentioned in Turkey Progress Report (TBMM, 2004a, p. 216). The similar 
concerns of a former project consultant from GAP-BKİ in 2014 were as follows: 
Euphrates became a lake now. Water is under state’s control. After Ilısu and Cizre 
dams are completed, Tigris will also be under state’s control. But EU Accession 
Partnership Document has four points and the fourth is about putting Euphrates and 
Tigris under international supervision.102 
It is noteworthy that while Syria, Iraq, Greece, Israel, and Western European 
countries were perceived as the most dangerous countries for GAP in the 1990s, Syria, Iraq, 
and Greece were not perceived as serious threats for the project from the 2000s onwards. 
However, the belief that the US, Israel, and the EU countries have aimed to take Turkey’s 
sovereignty rights on water resources remained prevalent and even became more widespread 
in the past decade. Also, the examples suggest that the admiration of the West and its 
development trajectory and adherence to nationalist and Turco-centric sentiments coexisted; 
they were not mutually exclusive. One possible explanation to this situation would be that the 
elites were careful and selective in terms of praising and borrowing only specific aspects of 
the West–science and technology–and denigrating and leaving out its some other aspects–
cultural and moral values. For this reason, the conception of the West concurrently as an 
ideal, a model to emulate, a rival, a menace, and a threat could become possible and effective.  
6.2.3. Summary 
The idea of the West and its development trajectory, norms, values, and standards were 
highly admired in the overall GAP framework. Past policy applications and development 
experiences of the Western countries–specifically the US–were considered as potential 
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models to emulate and apply within GAP. The broad objective in this context was to “catch 
up” with the West and surpass it whenever, wherever, and however possible. In this process, 
politicians, bureaucrats, and experts were often prudent and selective in terms of borrowing 
specifically scientific and technical elements of the West and showing little interest in 
borrowing its culture and values. The West, as a signifier of geographical location, was 
highly admired within Turkey as well. Regions, subregions, provinces, and local populations 
located in western Turkey were considered superior to those located in eastern and 
southeastern Turkey on many fronts. Given these perspectives, the admiration of the West 
and the will to catch up necessitated elevating Turkey to the level of modern, contemporary, 
and advanced Western world at a global level and eastern and southeastern regions to the 
level of western regions at a national level. These bifurcated goals were among the significant 
rationales behind GAP’s design and implementation.  
 Indeed, the admiration of the West and its development experience had certain 
implications. Taking the West as the reference point in a hierarchical manner in a wide range 
of topics contributed to the exclusion and otherization of those who did not fit to norms and 
standards defined in accordance with those of the West. Also, somewhat unexpectedly, the 
admiration of the West led to its conceptualization as a rival and at times even as an enemy. 
For this reason, there emerged–and persisted–a tendency to perceive GAP as the symbol of 
Turkish nation’s strength and proof of Turkey’s level of development vis-à-vis the West. This 
perception was so strong that specific countries were perceived as threats for GAP and 
barriers against its implementation. These implications suggest that in a way GAP was 
initiated “to look at the West, to look like the West, despite the West” and rationalized 
through this discourse. I will examine the pursuit of betterment and development at the 
expense of destruction as another rationale behind GAP in the following section.  
6.3. The Pursuit of Betterment and Development at the Expense of Destruction 
6.3.1. The Perception of Destruction in the Overall GAP Framework 
Arguably, development is based on a commitment to provide betterment in people’s physical, 
material, social, and humanitarian conditions and create a transformed future with less risks, 
unknowns, and uncertainties. As Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010) also put, development 
“involves a promise of improvement, of some kind of progress towards better living 
conditions, higher incomes or longer lives.” In that sense, development is expected to have a 
future orientation and bring about a positive change in people’s lives regardless of time and 
space. However, development practice has also carried the risk of high amount of destruction, 
discrediting, and subordination of localized understandings, techniques, practices, and 
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lifestyles (DuBois, 1991, p. 23). As Rist (2010, p. 23) also underlines, “the general 
transformation and destruction of the natural environment and of social relations in order to 
increase the production of commodities (goods and services) geared, by means of market 
exchange, to effective demand” has been at the core of development. Also, from a 
biopolitical perspective, the power to “make live” cannot be operated without the practice of 
“letting die” (Gambetti, 2011, p. 4). When biopower takes “life” as its primary objective, a 
portion of the population should be taken as a threat to that life. Therefore, those who are 
considered to be outside the norms and abnormal can be qualified as surplus population and 
sacrificed (p. 4). These arguments imply that development has had a Janus-faced character, as 
there have been many occasions and contexts in which betterment and development were 
pursued at the expense of destruction.  
Large-scale development projects and especially dam projects deserve a special focus 
in this regard for not only their huge scale and requirement of large amounts of capital and 
technical expertise, but also their destructive impacts to make way for the dam reservoir 
(Reyes-Gaskin, 2005, p. 70). As mentioned before, while dams have allowed the states to 
control floods, improve agricultural productivity through irrigation networks, and generate 
cheaper energy to be used in electrification and industrialization, they have at the same time 
led to negative impacts on geographies, environment, societies, and cultures (Öktem, 2002, p. 
311). The devastating environmental, social, and humanitarian impacts of dams began to 
come to surface in the mid-1970s and became a source of serious debate and controversy 
especially with the introduction of sustainable development concept in the early 1980s (Güler 
& Savaş, 2011, p. 184). Just as many other development projects that included large dams or 
a large number of dams, GAP also created controversy due to its destructive impacts. Below, 
I will examine different narratives on these impacts to illustrate how the architects of GAP 
perceived destruction and how the pursuit of betterment and development at the expense of 
destruction or any cost was another rationale behind GAP.  
6.3.1.1. Narrative 1: Destruction is targeted and malicious  
According to the first narrative, GAP was strategically initiated to exploit the natural 
resources of GAP region, transfer these resources to western Turkey, destroy GAP region’s 
ecology, annihilate Kurdish culture and history, and assimilate the Kurds (see Chapter 7 for a 
more detailed discussion on this issue). As expected, this narrative was highly prevalent 
among the Kurdish political elites and intellectuals. To illustrate, a Kurdish MP who 
represented Şanlıurfa claimed that the Turkish state intentionally destroyed the cultural and 
historical sites such as Samsat, Halfeti, and Hasankeyf through constructing large dams. 
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According to his explanation, “the state destroy[ed] the whole thing, the history of 
[Hasankeyf] just to produce a few more kilowatts of electricity” but “the losses outweigh[ed] 
the gains of electricity production.”103 Similarly, another Kurdish MP who represented Muş 
considered GAP “as a reflection of the state’s approach to Kurdistan” and explained that the 
state “aim[ed] to render the region inhabitable through building large dams and HPPs and 
killing plant and animal diversity there.”104 
6.3.1.2. Narrative 2: There is a loose trade-off between destruction and 
development  
According to the second narrative, destructive impacts of GAP should not be exaggerated 
because there is a loose trade-off between development and destruction and state and 
government institutions are doing whatever necessary to minimize these impacts. In a way, in 
the words of Doğan Altınbilek, the former General Director of DSİ, dam construction is not a 
matter of “yes” or “no,” but a matter of “wise planning and implementation” (Scheumann et 
al., 2014, p. 132). In this context, potential dangers of misusing water resources were 
occasionally uttered in legislative discourses. For instance, Necati Uzdil, an MP who 
represented Osmaniye and an agricultural engineer by training, explained these dangers as 
follows: “Water is like a double-edged sword. If you use this sword well, you provide many 
benefits. If you cannot use it well or do not know how to use it, you injure yourself … and 
get stuck in a difficult situation” (TBMM, 2006b, p. 489). A former coordinator from GAP-
BKİ attracted attention to the same issue and stated that “development [was] like cortisone” 
because “while it heal[ed] you, it also harm[ed] you.”105 For this reason, as one of the vice 
presidents of GAP-BKİ underlined, even though “each development project [had] negative 
impacts on a certain area and segment of society, tons of precautions [were] being taken and 
… a cost-benefit analysis [was] always made before a project to keep losses at minimum.”106 
6.3.1.3. Narrative 3: Destruction is inevitable and inherent in development  
According to the third narrative, destructive impacts of development interventions–including 
GAP–are inevitable and destruction is an inherent and natural part of development on the 
simple ground that there can be no gain without sacrifice. To demonstrate, when asked about 
the controversies of dams in 2014, an inspector from DSİ emphasized that he was not against 
environmental monitoring, but was in favor of a balanced way to do it. In his words,  
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[e]nvironmentalists are against everything. I mean, come on, give us a break! You see 
Tarkan107 saying “no” to Ilısu Dam and singing about Hasankeyf today. I wonder, has 
he ever forgone his soapy Jacuzzi baths? Has he ever lived without water and 
electricity even for one day? Where does he think the water comes from? Water and 
electricity are not God-given. Therefore, sacrifice is a must in some cases. When you 
cut one tree, you can plant two, cannot you?108 
Apparently, DSİ was not the only institution where sacrifice was perceived as a 
precondition to have gains and destruction was perceived as a reversible condition. A former 
coordinator from GAP-BKİ also acknowledged that “development might be painful and have 
disproportionate impacts on each group. … Some lost their lands, trees, graveyards due to 
submersion. People suffered from depression.” However, she also underlined that “these 
[were] inevitable. This [was] not specific to Turkey, only. Every development project [had] 
similar impacts. … Since the aim was to increase their quality of life, it [was] quite normal to 
lose a generation in similar development projects.”109 Another former coordinator from the 
same institution supported this argument and stated that “whatever humankind [did], it [had] 
a negative impact on environment. Even when you plow[ed] a field, there [was] a negative 
impact because it [was] an intervention, too.”110 Similarly, a freelance consultant explained 
that it was beyond his responsibility to make a judgment on GAP-induced destruction and 
underlined that “some [said] the history [was] gone. Who decide[d]? How [did] you 
measure? What [were] the criteria? … Think about the mighty Euphrates, it [was] 
preposterous to lose its flow rate. It [was] not easy to lose such a resource.”111 The 
implications of these narratives will be discussed in the following section.  
6.3.2. Implications of the Pursuit of Betterment and Development at the Expense of 
Destruction 
6.3.2.1. Normalization of development-induced destruction 
The narratives above indicate that the architects of GAP had the tendency to conceive 
destruction as a “price to be paid” or “requisite” to obtain betterment in the context of GAP. 
This indicates normalization of development-induced destruction. This process is in line with 
the argument that the promise or guarantee of enhancing the lives of “less-developed” 
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populations, eradicating their poverty, and rectifying their “deficiencies” through 
development interventions legitimizes and rationalizes these interventions regardless of their 
nature and yielded outcomes (Ziai, 2016, p. 221). Also, from a different angle, the tendency 
to normalize destruction can be evaluated as avoidance from the contested nature and 
outcomes of destruction and associated with a motion to take a less thorny and risky short-cut 
to offload blame and responsibility. It is also noteworthy that normalization of destruction is 
closely linked to the modernist interpretation of development that claimed the necessity of a 
radical break from the past to create new and perform progress. Accordingly, development 
had to be based on “creative destruction.” Without destroying the old order, a new order 
would not be created; breaking the eggs was necessary to make an omelet (Harvey, 1989, p. 
16). In the context of GAP, the narratives also emphasize the need to destroy old structures 
and even the environment in GAP region for the sake of obtaining a better future. The term 
“better,” however, was widely defined in material terms, as will be explained below. 
6.3.2.2. Materialization of development 
The pursuit of development and betterment at the expense of destruction contributed to 
materialization of development, which I define as reducing development only to an increase 
in material and/or monetary benefits while disregarding its non-material costs, benefits, and 
aspects from a narrow and limited perspective. Accordingly, in a context where development 
is understood from a materialistic perspective, environmental destruction can be legitimized 
on grounds of economic gains out of energy production and irrigation. Cultural and historical 
destruction can be legitimized on grounds of increasing attention/attraction and tourism 
revenues after the semi-submerging of historical sites (e.g., Halfeti). Displacement and 
resettlement can be legitimized on grounds of elevated and modern living standards in new 
resettlement areas (e.g., Yeni Hasankeyf [New Hasankeyf Houses]). Having more cars, more 
luxurious cars, more houses, larger houses, more household appliances, and similar changes 
in consumption levels and patterns of the local population can be considered as indicators or 
proof of development and GAP’s success. To illustrate this tendency, a large landowner in 
Şanlıurfa reduced development to irrigation, irrigation to material gains, and material gains to 
the primary objective of GAP. In his words,  
GAP is irrigation. There would be no life here [Şanlıurfa] without irrigation. … 
Sometimes people say “GAP is not only about electricity and irrigation; it has a social 
aspect.” No, everything is linked to irrigation. … It is the same everywhere in the 
world; you must create a value. ÇATOM, SODES, they are just details. Do they bring 
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money? What is their concrete contribution? Irrigation is a must in that sense. Irrigate 
first, so that you can build factories and people can work and get training there.112  
Similarly, when asked about the historical sites, an expert from GAP-BKİ lamented about the 
“inevitability” of the flooding of Hasankeyf but justified the loss on the ground that “there 
was already some sort of destruction before the dam construction.” For her, “[e]ven if Ilısu 
Dam would not be built, very little in terms of cultural heritage would be left out of 
Hasankeyf anyway. Thanks to the dam, at least there [was] a huge flow of money now.”113 
The conditions in GAP region in pre- and post-GAP periods were widely juxtaposed 
to illustrate how better off the local population became after GAP’s initiation. For instance, 
an MP who represented Şanlıurfa proudly expressed that “GAP increased people’s income 
level and changed their lives in [his] town.” For him, “there [was] an unbelievable difference 
between the old and new” because “they sent their kids to school, bought new cars and new 
tractors, and built modern houses.”114 Similarly, a former head of GAP Regional Directorate 
at DSİ in Şanlıurfa explained that when he served there, “there was not any water, the whole 
city stank. There was not even one restaurant. Now, everywhere [was] as green as grass. … 
There [were] even luxury five-star hotels, everyone [rode] SUVs…”115 An expert from GAP-
BKİ also underlined the magnitude of the change in Şanlıurfa in terms of how people became 
richer and the infrastructure became better after GAP. Accordingly, she explained that when 
she was in Harran in Şanlıurfa in 1995, “[people] had no bread to eat. … They had nothing.” 
But, she continues,  
if you go to Urfa now, you find everything. Everything! You have lake houses. … 
Today a flat costs one million TL116 in Urfa. There used to be horse carts on the 
streets, today there are asphalt roads and double highways everywhere. Until last year, 
streets of Urfa smelled urine, now they are all shiny.117 
The reduction of development to material gains or mainly economic and 
infrastructural development within GAP framework was not always perceived as a positive 
implication, though. As a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ explained, the realities in the 
field were much more complex than the simplistic picture drawn in the light of the increased 
material gains after the initiation of GAP. In his words,  
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in GAP region communication [was] perfect, road network [was] great, irrigation 
[was] somehow going… But something [was] missing. Either we [had] a problem in 
connecting with them or they [had] a problem with connecting us. You [brought] 
everything in technical sense, but [could not] prevent femicides, abuses, child brides. 
Urban poverty [was] as widespread as rural poverty. … This [meant], there [was] 
something we [could not] do well.118   
Similarly, one of the former presidents of GAP-BKİ criticized GAP’s “skewed” development 
understanding that attached more importance to material gains and little importance to 
qualifications and skills that would transform people into self-sufficient and rational human 
beings. He specifically criticized how globalization was interpreted in the overall GAP 
framework and stated that in GAP 
globalization is misunderstood. It has different components. There is globalization on 
top. Then comes regionalization. Then, localization. At the bottom, atomization. At 
the bottom, you must be well-educated, have critical thinking, act rationally and 
consciously. Then, you must take initiative in local administration and actively 
participate in civil society. Following this, you raise your voice in the region and 
engage in competition. Finally, you must have a place at the global level. When you 
don’t have any of these, indeed what you have at the end is skewed development. 
The examples suggest that the pursuit of development and betterment at the expense of 
destruction led to the emergence and/or consolidation of a narrow and one-dimensional 
interpretation of development that focused solely on the material aspect of the development 
process–or on economic and infrastructural development–in GAP region. Thanks to the high 
degree of importance both the elites and local population attached to material gains, 
materialization of development has also concealed numerous imperfections and contestations 
including, but not limited to, questions regarding power dynamics, inequalities, and winners 
and losers of development on the ground.   
6.3.3. Summary 
Development is largely associated with the provision of betterment in people’s future 
conditions. It is concurrently associated with destruction and negative impacts it has 
occasionally and contextually brought. An examination of how destructive environmental, 
social, and humanitarian impacts of GAP were perceived crystallized that obtaining a 
positively transformed and better future at any cost was a strong rationale in the eyes of 
                                                
118 Personal interview, May 5, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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GAP’s architects. Rationalization of GAP as such normalized the idea that sacrifice was an 
absolute necessity for development. In this light, any kind of development-induced 
destruction or controversy was perceived as normal and legitimate. It further contributed to 
materialization of development in the sense that betterment or development was equated to 
and measured solely by material and monetary gains in a narrow and limited perspective.  
6.4. Conclusion 
Indeed, it is very difficult to fully unearth the true motivations and intentions of different elite 
groups who played different roles in the design and implementation process of GAP. Still, a 
careful analysis of legislative and elite discourses indicates that there are three major 
rationales behind GAP–under which almost countless number of individual and separate 
project goals could be subsumed–that created the urge and gave impetus for the initiation of 
the project. Accordingly, GAP had to be initiated on the grounds that the differences of GAP 
region and its local population had to be rectified and both the region and its local population 
had to be “normalized” in accordance with the standards determined by the state elites. In 
relation to this, the project had to be initiated on the grounds that both GAP region and the 
country as a whole had to “look at the West, look like the West, despite the West” and, 
therefore, had to follow and imitate the development trajectory that was once taken by the 
advanced countries in the West. Also, it had to be initiated on the grounds that development 
would always yield to positive outcomes and create a better future and, therefore, had to be 
pursued even at the expense of destruction on many fronts.  
Rationalization of GAP as such was not neutral and led to various implications. The 
analysis indicates that the local population in GAP region–specifically the ones of Kurdish 
origin–have been both otherized and infantilized in the overall GAP framework. In relation to 
this, characterization of GAP region and its local population as such contributed to 
legitimization of GAP or any other development intervention from outside, even though they 
were often implemented in a top-down and insensitive manner. As for the Western-centrism, 
it ironically fuelled intense ethnocentric or Turco-centric sentiments acoording to which GAP 
was a solid proof that Turkey was “as advanced as” or even “more advanced” than the West 
and that the West was actually a rival or even an enemy who was “jealous” of the 
contributions of GAP. Also, legitimization of GAP normalized its destructive impacts. This 
also led to the emergence or ossification of an understanding that limited development with 
economic and infrastructural development and equated development solely with material 
gains. This understanding not only overlooked the drawbacks of the development process, 
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but also excluded the possibilities and opportunities of development in political, social, and 
cultural spheres in addition to economic development.  
Rationalization of GAP on these three major pillars and their implications indicate 
that, despite the flexible character and amorphous structure of the project, modernist 
interpretation of development has remained prevalent and well-ingrained in the overall 
project framework. The project has been operationalized on dichotomies between backward 
and developed, traditional and modern, ignorant and educated, the other and the self, 
abnormal and normal, and the Eastern and the Western. Development has been conceived as 
an evolutionist paradigm and the project has been expected to catalyze the evolution of the 
traditional into modern in a teleological manner. Western development experience has been 
taken as a model to emulate and the West has almost always been praised, even within the 
country. Great importance was attached to the domination of the physical and human nature 
at any cost in accordance with techno-scientific principles and confidence in linear and 
irreversible progress. Also, the project has been highly authoritarian and elite-driven, as the 
local population was often the spectator, not the actor of the development process with their 
limited agency, visibility, and impact. In that sense, it can be argued that no matter how 
certain characteristics and governance of GAP have undergone changes and how multiple, 
amorphous, and loosely-defined GAPs have emerged over the years (see Chapter 5), the 
principles on which the project was built remain to be heavily based on modernist 
interpretation of development and its derivations. Also, the overall approach of the state in 
the design and implementation process of GAP resembled a “development regime” (Ludden, 
1992, as cited in Li, 2007, pp. 15-16) because apparently ensuring development and progress 
was identified as a higher goal, a “people” was designated to improve its conditions, an 
ideology of science was adopted to accelerate and measure progress, and state power was 
used by self-declared leaders/elites to achieve their development aspirations. In addition, the 
three major rationales behind GAP contributed to the sustenance of the “mystique” of GAP 
and its “sanctified” status, as the higher goals of fixing the economic and social life in GAP 
region, bringing standards up to the level of the West, and making sacrifices for a greater 
good allowed (1) the representation of GAP as a vital and noble cause which no one should 
object, (2) its characterization as a neutral undertaking that would supposedly benefit all and 
benefit all equally in all contexts, (3) the justification of both the means and ends of GAP 
without being subjected to public debate or deliberation, and (4) obscuration of the 
problematic and often political aspects of development-cum-GAP while highlighting its 
certain rosy and positive contributions in a highly selective manner.  
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7. THE (POST-)POLITICS OF GAP: SOURCES AND FORMS OF DEPOLITICIZATION IN THE 
OVERALL GAP FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, I discuss how GAP and the concept of depoliticization have related to each 
other and examine what kind of discursive and material practices have constituted the sources 
of depoliticization in the overall GAP framework. As noted in Chapter 2, depoliticization 
does not refer to the total removal of politics from social life or vanishing of political power 
altogether. It does not refer to a one-directional, one-dimensional, and irreversible process, 
either. Therefore, depoliticization in the context of GAP should not be understood simply as a 
terminal stage in which issues, institutions, or people become fully depoliticized and stay as 
such forever. Rather, it should be interpreted as a complex, fluid, and dynamic process in 
which there is also–and always–a room for politicization or repoliticization. In that sense, the 
claim that GAP has had depoliticizing implications does not automatically imply that it 
completely depoliticized “everything it touched” and never played a role in politicization of 
certain issues within the project and Turkish political landscape. It rather implies that GAP 
has contributed to depoliticization of various phenomena in different ways while various 
other politicizing and repoliticizing forces also simultaneously existed in the project 
framework and influenced how the project was governed and development was “done” on the 
ground. Furthermore, just as it was the case with the analyses of the historical trajectory of 
GAP (Chapter 5) and major rationales behind GAP (Chapter 6), in a way depoliticization is 
“in the eye of the beholder;” how one defines, identifies, and interprets depoliticizing 
implications is not absolute but rather subjective. As Anaïs Nin said, “We see things not as 
they are, but as we are” (as cited in Booth, 1997, p. 88). For this reason, even though the 
sources of depoliticization identified here emerged from GAP-related legislative and elite 
discourses, there might also exist different, even opposite interpretations of depoliticization.  
The chapter comprises six sections. In the first five sections, I examine five major 
sources of depoliticization in the overall GAP framework, which I identify as (1) the 
employment of technical language, (2) the dominance of experts and expert knowledge, (3) 
the neoliberalization of GAP and “biopoliticization” of its character, (4) the 
“developmentalization” of the Kurdish question, and (5) the extension of the visibility and 
authority of the state in the guise of GAP. In the final section, I provide a summary of the 
chapter and make a general assessment of the implications of the examined sources.  
7.1. The Employment of Technical Language 
GAP had a purely technical and engineering focus in its initial stages (see Chapter 5). Even 
though the degree of technicity has changed after the widening of GAP’s focus and scope 
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over time, the technical aspect of the project never ceased to exist. In a broad sense, GAP’s 
technical focus referred to its technical, engineering, and so-called non-political components 
such as dam and infrastructure construction, irrigation, and energy production. The analysis 
of legislative and elite discourses indicates that the language employed by the architects of 
GAP to narrate its technicity and recount its size, scope, latest situation, achievements, and 
future prospects was highly technical, too. It was loaded with quantitative data, statistical 
“facts” and figures, technical terms, and professional jargon. While this language was indeed 
comprehensible for experts in a specific field, it was often incomprehensible for laypersons. 
Especially jargon created “artificial barriers to understanding and participation and thus 
generate[d] obscurity rents that the insiders [could] appropriate” (Buiter, 2010, p. 223). To 
put it differently, this language was a typical example of writings on development which, 
according to Crush (1995, p. 4), were “jargon-ridden,” “hackneyed,” “exclusionary,” “highly 
stylized,” “repetitive,” and full of “metaphor, image, allusion, fantasy, and rhetoric.” Still, 
employing a technical language had certain advantages. For instance, in the context of 
Turkish domestic politics, politicians often relied on statistical figures to emphasize their 
political performances and achievements, as numbers allowed them to sound more credible 
and appear more practical and skillful before the electorate. In general, the electorate also 
found it more convenient to hear about their performances in numbers and favored politicians 
“of action.” Technical language was convincing and effective because numbers were 
conceived as neutral, scientific, indisputable, and non-political; there was a wide consensus 
that they reflected “absolute truths” and “true nature” of different phenomena (Pool & 
Grover, 2006, p. 377). In this regard, it is telling that a Turkish politician with an engineering 
background stated in 1988 that “[b]ecause we speak with numbers, it is easy for us to 
persuade the other side. We are not commentators, we belong to a group who speaks with 
numbers. We do not resemble a lawyer, an economist or a bureaucrat (Göle, 1998, p. 15).  
 I argue that technical language had depoliticizing implications because it reduced 
political, economic, social, and cultural processes into technical processes that could 
supposedly be measured and expressed in quantitative terms. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Li 
(2007, p. 7) emphasized that issues that were rendered technical were at the same time 
rendered non-political. Their political, economic, and social nature was often excluded in 
diagnoses and prescriptions. Instead, science, neutrality, and rationality filled the vacuum. 
However, this sterile perspective risked overlooking micro-level, unquantifiable, and 
idiosyncratic problems with complex and multi-dimensional social and humanitarian aspects. 
It further risked reducing complexity into simplicity and heterogeneity into homogeneity. I 
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will demonstrate in what ways employment of technical language in the overall GAP 
framework contributed to depoliticization in the following section. 
7.1.1. Isolation of Social and Human Factors  
The analysis indicates that the employment of technical language led to the overlooking of 
social and human factors in GAP framework and the construction of a reality in which the 
local population did not exist or have any kind of identity or agency. GAP-induced problems 
(see Chapter 4, 5 & 6) were often narrated as if they were totally detached and isolated from 
political, social, humanitarian, and environmental concerns. However, such problems were 
actually far from being managerial problems only; processes such as resettlement involved 
political and transformative acts that could help the creation of a new type of citizens with 
different worldviews, cultures, and ways of life (Reyes-Gaskin, 2005, p. 70). In addition, it 
was impossible to calculate and quantify costs and benefits of such processes, as their 
inherent elements such as psychological trauma and cultural shock were not technical or 
numerical issues as often presented (Pool & Grover, 2006, p. 389). To illustrate how social 
and human factors were isolated by technical language specifically in the initial stages of 
GAP, Süleyman Demirel explained the significance of numbers in the context of 
development projects as follows: 
In engineering projects, three questions must be answered based on numbers. One 
thing needs to be done, because it is useful. One thing needs to be done this way, 
because it is the optimum way to do it. One thing needs to be done now, because loss 
of time brings loss of interest; that thing is required now. … Without knowing these 
points for sure, initiating large-scale projects that require large-scale investments 
might end up with a waste of resources and time (Turgut, 2000, pp. 291-292). 
Similar purely technical, rational, and arguably dehumanized perspectives were also 
prevalent in more recent GAP-related discourses. For instance, in 2014, a planner who 
worked closely with GAP-BKİ evaluated the controversy around Ilısu Dam as follows: 
Water in Tigris is so low during the summer that you can even cross one side to 
another without getting your feet wet. It is a river, yet nothing flows in summer and 
you try to produce energy out of this flow. To produce that energy, you lose vast 
agricultural lands. Is it economical? How valuable are these lost lands? It was not the 
case with Birecik Dam but here your loss is terrible. Is it worth the loss? Nobody talks 
about this aspect. Everybody talks about Hasankeyf, cultural heritage, and stuff.119 
                                                
119 Personal interview, April 3, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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As a further example, the language through which the proof of “concrete and important 
progress in [GAP] region’s development indicators” (GAP-BKİ, 2014a, p. 18) was expressed 
in GAP Action Plan (2014-2018) was also highly technical. To illustrate, the progress or 
“Developments within the context of GAP Action Plan (2008-2012)” was expressed through 
quantitative data obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute in a purely technical and 
homogenizing manner (p. 18). The increase in gross value added per capita in GAP region 
between 2007 and 2011 was explained without any context as to which segment of the 
population was better off, how and why specifically this segment was better off, or at the 
expense of whom this segment was better off. Instead, it was only stated that  
Gross value added per capita in the region was $3,660 in 2007. Even though it 
increased to $4,641 in 2011, the region ranks among the lowest in national gross 
value added distribution. The average gross value added per capita in the region is 
44.3% and 50.2% of Turkey’s average in 2007 and 2011 respectively (p. 21).  
These examples suggest that technical language contributed to the construction of an 
alternative reality in which GAP region was an independent and self-standing entity devoid 
of a population, interactions within population, interaction between population and state, and 
similar power relations. These elements were either reduced to numbers or neglected 
altogether. In this alternative vision, the local population was portrayed as a monolithic and 
homogenized entity despite GAP region was in fact one of the most heterogeneous regions in 
Turkey on many fronts (see Chapter 4). Socio-economic indicators expressed solely in 
quantitative terms provided no or only limited insights regarding their problems on the 
ground. They fell short on explaining why poverty has been widespread specifically in that 
region, who benefited and who lost after the initiation of GAP, how GAP had an impact on 
reducing or worsening intra-regional or intra-provincial inequalities, or how GAP had an 
impact on the reconfiguration of power dynamics and social tensions among ethnically 
Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic population or religiously Sunni and Alevi population. In that sense, 
technical language was narrow, reductionist, and one-dimensional. The examples further 
suggest that isolation of social and human factors and their reduction to numbers allowed the 
designers and implementers of GAP to interpret and redefine political and power-laden 
problems in accordance with their interests and selectively present only rosy aspects of these 
problems or outcomes in a sterile manner. A related issue, the question as to how technical 
language concealed and justified controversy and contestation, is discussed below.   
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7.1.2. Concealment and Justification of Controversial Policy Decisions and Outcomes  
As mentioned above, technical language has the power to convincingly present only one 
specific and often rosy aspect of an inherently political problem and conceal its thorny and 
contested aspects. This power derives from the idea that numbers “do not lie” or “cannot be 
wrong.” Thanks to this functional aspect of the technical language, arguably the designers 
and implementers of GAP could selectively present whatever the local population would be 
content to hear and hide whatever they would be concerned to hear. It also allowed them to 
overemphasize the achievements of GAP while remaining silent on its drawbacks and 
negative impacts or to decide what to make visible and what to render invisible. For instance, 
according to an inspector from DSİ, “dams [were] national resources. You [built] them only 
once, their operation costs [were] low. You [did] not borrow foreign currency. They [were] 
very profitable, very clean, and serving to tourism purposes. They acclimatize[d] and 
help[ed] vegetation.”120 This praise, however, was completely silent on how the very same 
dams carried the risk of bringing about a serious salinization problem and making the lands 
arid, as they actually did in GAP region. Similarly, Mahmut Dündar, the then 16th Regional 
Director at DSİ, praised Ilısu Dam for it would support a 1,200 MW power station, irrigate 
120,000 ha of land, generate 980 million TL121 per year, and create 156,000 jobs (“Ilısu 
Barajı’nda”, 2015). However, apart from mentioning the planned forestation of 278 ha of 
land and plantation of 40,000 almond and 15,000 pistachio trees, he made no reference to 
how it would also “submerge Hasankeyf and at least 289 protected archeological sites” 
(TBMM, 2007b, p. 141) and potentially destroy the livelihoods of up to 78,000 people 
(Ayboğa, 2009). Dündar further explained that “those who [were] affected by dam 
construction [would] be provided a new house with high standards, new settlements with 
higher life standards, technical and social infrastructure” (“GAP’ta hayat”, 2014). However, 
there was again silence on how dams could also decrease resettled people’s income levels, 
disengage them from production systems, disintegrate their community structure, and change 
their cultural identity (Güler & Savaş, 2011, pp. 201-202). As Eguavoen et al. (2013, p. 3) 
argued in the context of adaptation, conceptualizing salinization as a solely environmental 
problem or relocation as a technical issue with a few social challenges on the side of the 
affected communities that could be solved through the application of quick and 
                                                
120 Personal interview, May 22, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
121 980,000,000 TL roughly equals €245,000,000 as of 2017. 
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straightforward technological and managerial fixes concealed the normative and authoritarian 
character of this development discourse. 
Technical language also contributed to justification of controversial policy decisions 
through making references to technical or natural “necessities” and similar obscure and 
abstract phenomena. The objective here was to remain distant from the “messy” or political 
aspect of policy decisions and pass the blame, responsibility, and transaction costs to other 
groups, organizations, and/or abstract phenomena to reduce risks (Foster, Kerr, & Byrne, 
2014, p. 3). To exemplify this mechanism, in a discussion regarding the negative impacts of 
GAP, one of the vice presidents of GAP-BKİ confessed that he “had some regrets in the 
past.” However, he also underlined that “when [we] look[ed] at the bigger picture, [dams had 
to] be built. Turkey [was] an energy-dependent country. There [were] also people who 
contacted [them] and [said] the water [was] flowing in vain.”122 In other words, he justified 
GAP-induced problems through placing the responsibility to phenomena which neither he nor 
his institutions had control over such as the ambiguous notion of “the bigger picture,” 
Turkey’s energy dependency, and demands and calls of a group of anonymous people. 
Similarly, an inspector from DSİ confidently stated that they “must absolutely build large 
dams” based on the following technical explanation: 
Water flows incessantly from the Alps in France. Climactic conditions in Europe and 
the Middle East are different. Their precautions and our precautions are different. It is 
very important to ensure water security and secure water supply in semi-arid climate. 
Rain is also an important factor, but rainwater should not flow to the sea in vain.123  
It is also noteworthy that, when asked about the alleged role of irrigation associations 
in worsening inequality (see Chapter 5), the same inspector from DSİ underlined that as long 
as associations functioned well and helped them collect the fees efficiently, he did not care 
about how they worked. In his words, “I cannot complain about conformism in this matter. I 
don’t care about human rights and democracy. It is not our job to do something about it.”124 
This “conscious indifference” of the responsible institutions, their reluctance to engage in 
political struggles, and inclination to transfer responsibility were further explained by a 
former coordinator from GAP-BKİ as follows: 
At first sight, GAP runs successfully. But nobody looks at what is going on behind the 
scenes. Yes, you carry out land consolidation, but do you pay attention to ecological 
                                                
122 Personal interview, May 29, 2014, Şanlıurfa, Turkey. 
123 Personal interview, May 22, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
124 Personal interview, May 22, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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corridors? To women’s land ownership? They are losing their rights. Land 
consolidation ruins land heritage everywhere. GAP-BKİ knows these very well but 
remains aloof. The reason is, these are difficult issues, you must engage in conflict. 
You must be present in the field and fight. Instead, they give away free seeds. DSİ’s 
works are great, but only in terms of engineering. What about their social aspects?125  
The examples suggest that technical language not only concealed and justified 
controversial policy decisions and their outcomes, but also helped the architects of the project 
take a neutral position amidst controversy and keep their distance to political contestation. In 
addition, justification through technical language engendered and/or reinforced the idea that 
the techno-scientific interpretation of development was the only right way of practicing 
development, as will be briefly discussed below.    
7.1.3. Characterization of Techno-Scientific Development as “the Only Game in Town”  
Technical language characterized the techno-scientific interpretation of development as 
indisputable. Because development defined as such was supposedly the right way to follow 
and emulate, it had to be “the only game in town.” As Vento (2017, p. 80) also argued, such 
projects or megaprojects “played a crucial role in the establishment of a consensual post-
democracy by turning the focus from ideological struggle to technocracy and by being the 
centre of a populist discourse that foreclosed ideological debate” and distracted attention 
“from social antagonism and contributing to mentally blocking the possibility of alternatives 
for entrepreneurialism.” In that sense, techno-science not only overshadowed and discredited 
alternative, homegrown, and grassroots development strategies and practices, but also 
nurtured the emergence of a homogenizing one-size-fits-all development approach in the 
overall GAP framework. To illustrate, the development trajectory of the West was taken as a 
model on the grounds that only the West possessed the science, technology, and skills 
required for development (see Chapter 6). For this reason, the past approaches and practices 
of the West were borrowed with no or only little modification to apply in GAP’s context. 
However, this approach missed the fact that, for instance, TVA, Tennessee, and the US bore 
little resemblance to GAP, Southeastern Anatolia, and Turkey respectively. In contrast with 
the ethnic difference of the local population in GAP region from the majority of the 
population in the country, “the citizens of the Tennessee Valley were conformed American 
citizens who spoke English and had basically the same customs and culture as the rest of the 
country” (Nestor, 1996, p. 75). It further missed the fact that taking the regional development 
                                                
125 Personal interview, May 5, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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agency model in the UK as a basis to design agencies in GAP region (Karasu, 2015, p. 275) 
or taking irrigation systems in France as a model for irrigation networks126 would not yield 
the best and expected results. Even though these were legitimate questions, characterization 
of the idea and practice of techno-scientific development as indisputable and unrivaled left 
little or no room for debate and contestation. For this reason, the viability, practicality, and 
productivity of such approaches often remained unquestioned and unchallenged.  
7.1.4. Summary 
Even though its degree changed contextually, GAP has always had a technical focus. The 
language employed to narrate the components of this focus was dominantly technical as well. 
I argue that the employment and at times overuse of technical language contributed to 
depoliticization in term of reducing contestation and essentially political problems into 
simple and easy-to-solve technical processes and problems that could be addressed through 
replicable techno-scientific formulas. It further contributed to depoliticization in terms of 
concealing the negative aspects of controversial policy decisions and their outcomes and 
justifying them on the grounds of the supposed indisputability and reliability of technicity 
and numbers. The so-called indisputability of techno-science was also depoliticizing in terms 
of presenting only one “right” way of development and closing off the debate regarding 
alternative approaches. I will discuss how the dominance of experts and expert knowledge in 
GAP’s context contributed to depoliticization in a similar manner in the following section.  
7.2. The Dominance of Experts and Expert Knowledge 
As it has also been the case with many other elite-driven development projects that were 
heavily shaped by the tenets of modernization theories, experts had the upper hand in steering 
GAP’s pace and direction with their knowledge and skills. As Bağış (1989, p. 217) 
underlined, “no matter how perfect the plans [were], their success depend[ed] on the success 
of the people who put them into practice” and well-educated and skilled technical and 
managerial personnel would “have a more important role in development efforts of [GAP] 
region than do very high fixed asset investments.” In line with this statement, the analysis of 
legislative and elite discourses indicated that the idea that experts were superior to non-
experts and expert knowledge was more reliable than local and indigenous knowledge was 
highly prevalent in the design and implementation process of GAP. The spread and 
consolidation of this idea over time arguably led to the widening of the existing gaps between 
experts and non-experts, elites and the local population, and those who produced and 
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consumed knowledge. This situation elevated experts to a dominant position and provided 
them with an unquestionable authority. Before elaborating on how this dominance had 
depoliticizing implications, some of the significant characteristics of experts will be 
discussed below.  
7.2.1. Distinct Characteristics of Experts vis-à-vis Non-Experts 
As Crewe and Harrison (1998, p. 92) emphasized, experts and non-experts were not 
considered equal because the former was by definition assumed to be better than the latter in 
at least one respect, which was having greater expertise. Parpart (1995, p. 223, as cited in 
Kothari, 2002) also indicated that 
Western scientific knowledge was presented as universally valid and consequently 
applicable to all, but not everyone qualified as an expert. Increasingly, only the 
“properly” initiated could claim this title, and it is these “experts” who came to play a 
pivotal role in the process of collecting, controlling and transferring scientific 
knowledge between North and South (pp. 47-48). 
In other words, it required a certain level of education, training, or expertise for non-experts 
to penetrate into the mental and intellectual world of the experts and make sense of their 
ideas, unless experts made an extra effort to express their ideas in an adjusted and 
comprehensible form for non-experts. For this reason, expert knowledge–which was 
occasionally used interchangeably with technical knowledge–arguably elevated the experts to 
a supposedly higher and privileged position on the grounds that they, with their skills and 
expertise, had to be the ones who were authorized to have a say on others’ lives and 
formulate and implement policies on their behalf. Their primary goal in this matter was to 
improve and steer the capacity of lives for action (Li, 2007, pp. 4-5). Anecdotes below 
illustrate this hierarchical relationship between experts and the local population and how they 
at times spoke past each other in the context of GAP. For instance, a head of a department 
from the Ministry of Development provided the following example regarding the working 
principles of experts in his institution: 
When we go to the region, we want to implement some projects. For instance, 
projects about tourism infrastructure. We always make our evaluations from the 
perspective of tourists. I say there are no good hotels in Şanlıurfa, think of what 
tourists would like to do, say let’s improve the front façade of the streets or let’s 
renovate the castle… But in fact the residents of Şanlıurfa do not have any other place 
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to spend their leisure time except Balıklıgöl. We do not see these things with this 
perspective.127 
In another occasion, when asked about her encounters with the local population in GAP 
region, a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ recounted the following conversation:  
When I first went to Urfa, I saw women having their healthy teeth pulled and replaced 
by golden teeth. One day, I asked one of them: “For God’s sake, why do you do this 
to yourself?” She turned to me and said: “Why do you wear earrings?” I said, “it is 
fashion.” She replied back: “If yours is fashion, this is also fashion. Here’s 
fashion.”128  
Especially the last example suggests that the hierarchy between experts and the local 
population gave the former the idea that it was their job to meddle and correct the supposedly 
wrong and unacceptable behavior of the latter, even at the level of everyday life. This 
perspective was self-centric and otherizing as much as it was hierarchical. At the expense of 
generalization, the examples further suggest that experts and non-experts hardly understood 
each other’s habits and worldviews despite the effort and good intentions. They also indicate 
that the roles and duties of experts were not given, but rather constructed and self-assumed.  
In addition to enjoying privileged positions, the analysis further indicates that 
experts–specifically the ones with an engineering background–have always had high self-
confidence and self-awareness of their expertise and skills. Especially civil engineers often 
reinforced the technical development discourse and dominated the water sector and 
authorities (Aggestam & Sundell, 2016). Given their privileged and powerful positions that 
enabled them to wield political power, “it [was] no coincidence that leading politicians and in 
some cases presidents have been drawn from the ranks of civil engineers” (Laurie, 2005, p. 
540, as cited in Aggestam & Sundell, 2016). As Göle (1998, p. 9) also noted, engineers have 
moved beyond their roles in the production processes and championed models for social 
development and change on the grounds that engineering could be applied to address social 
issues and rationality could be extended at the level of the whole population, which 
corresponded to “social engineering.” Especially the “obsession” of non-Western societies 
with development has given engineers in these societies larger missions compared to their 
counterparts in the West and allowed them to position themselves as the spokespersons and 
representatives of industrialization against capitalism, rationality and positivism against 
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traditions, and social engineering against liberal thought (p. 13). To illustrate these 
phenomena in the context of GAP, in a conference on “Large Investment Projects” organized 
by TMMOB in 1986, Süleyman Demirel, as a civil engineer by training stated that 
Turkey’s current engineers, technicians, development experts … face[d] the duty of 
preventing the disasters caused by rivers and utilizing their prosperity for Turkey. At 
times, the engineer [had to] put golden handcuffs on [Euphrates and Tigris]. The goal 
of all these [was] to ... irrigate the land and extract abundance … create job 
opportunities … protect nature, embellish the country (Turgut, 2000, p. 329). 
Similarly, in TMMOB’s “Symposium on Technical Services in GAP” in 1993, Olcay Ünver, 
the then President of GAP-BKİ and also a civil engineer by training expressed that 
whatever the definition and scope of development, in historical perspective it always 
concerned itself with engineering as a principle element, and most of the time the 
largest element. For this reason, we, the engineers, as people who typically prepare[d] 
decisions on development, specif[ied] alternatives, and sometimes directly [made] 
decisions, assumed the most important roles in development projects and activities 
(TMMOB, 1993, p. 11). 
Also, apparently experts used their knowledge, skills, and expertise as a leverage to 
retain their privileged positions in the overall GAP framework. For instance, a former deputy 
undersecretary from DPT acknowledged the dominant role the experts from DPT played in 
the initial stages of the project, but at the same time criticized the fact that 
DPT experts were acquiring knowledge and expertise to the extent possible by their 
own efforts and initiatives. The more they knew, the more respected and in demand 
they were as sectoral experts in Planning and Budget Committee at TBMM. For this 
reason, they were keeping their knowledge for themselves and not sharing with the 
others, just to make others dependent on themselves. The “expert” title was very vital. 
This was one of the reasons why so many people with DPT background became MPs 
and ministers in Özal’s cabinet in the 1980s.129  
It should be noted that experts have also engaged in self-criticism about their 
privileged positions and “patronizing attitudes” in certain contexts. To exemplify, also in 
TMMOB’s “Symposium on Technical Services in GAP,” an expert openly discussed their 
positions in GAP and stated that they “as ‘the educated’ people, [were] not above people and 
[did] not know more. [They] need[ed] to acknowledge this and abandon elitist approaches” 
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(TMMOB, 1993, p. 361). Similarly, Kâmran İnan, the former Minister of State in charge of 
GAP between 1987 and 1991 underlined in 2000 that “Turkey [was] the worst administered 
country in the world” on the grounds that it “[was] an empire of bureaucracy” and 
“bureaucracy perceive[d] itself superior to people” (TCMB, 2000, p. 13). Also in 2000, 
Ahmet Saltık, the then Group Administrator of Social Planning at GAP-BKİ criticized his 
own position in GAP’s implementation process on the following grounds:  
Generally we bureaucrats, I am also a bureaucrat, know better and look down on 
people. Unfortunately this is becoming more obvious when you go to east from west. 
GAP-BKİ’s plans, programs, attitude and behavior should be softer and more 
inclusive. When we fail to do this and continue to look down on people, people listen 
to us, thank us, and then go on their own ways as we leave (GAP-BKİ, 2000b, p. 22). 
The examples suggest that distinct characteristics of experts in the forms of having 
greater expertise and self-perceived superiority normalized the hierarchy between experts and 
non-experts and tipped the power balance in favor of experts. In the context of GAP, this 
imbalance designated which actors could/could not speak, what topics could/could not be 
spoken about, how topics could/could not be spoken about, and so on. This last point on the 
speaker position and how it had depoliticizing implications will be explained below.   
7.2.2. Exclusion and Silencing of Non-Experts in the Overall GAP Framework 
The analysis revealed that there were many instances where experts and non-experts could 
neither speak the same language nor cooperate in an equal footing. The dominance of the 
experts allowed them to express themselves without much difficulty and have the upper hand 
in decision-making process, but prevented non-experts from raising their voices and concerns 
without restraints. Non-experts often faced difficulties in participating in debates and 
decision-making processes as well as negotiating their demands in these processes due to the 
barrier constructed by the incomprehensibility, complexity, and “elitism” of expert 
knowledge. Their lack of capacity, skills, and expertise led to the limitation of their channels 
of expression and negotiation or even their total exclusion from the process altogether. This 
imbalanced situation also justified the top-down and one-sided character of development 
interventions regardless of how human-focused or participatory GAP has allegedly become 
over time. Even though partnerships were often acknowledged as more flexible, bottom-up, 
and participatory and less hierarchical models, in practice generally a limited number of 
experts or similar elite groups retained the upper hand in decision-making process and non-
experts were included in the process at the very late stages or even after the decisions were 
already made (Vento, 2017, p. 71). To illustrate how this dominance constituted a barrier for 
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the local population, in a meeting where GAP-BKİ representatives and the local population 
discussed the shift from central planning to participatory planning, the statement of Nezir 
Gürcan, the then Mayor of the town of Kurtalan in Siirt in 2000, was as follows:  
With all due respect for honorable administrators here, I want to say something. They 
prepared a truly perfect program. It is scientific, it is contemporary but only 10% or 
15% of the audience can understand this language. We invited our mukhtars,130 too, 
and 75-80% of them did not understand even the word “sustainable development.” If 
we are organizing this meeting for mukhtars and other representatives, we better make 
it more understandable (GAP-BKİ, 2000d, p. 24).  
Similarly, an MP who represented Şanlıurfa underlined that formal meetings under the 
banners of “symposia,” “seminar” or “workshop” were counterproductive due to 
discouraging the local population to attend these occasions and share their ideas and 
experiences. On this point, he regretfully and critically stated that “when we were in 
symposia, no real addressee was present. Who [was] the real addressee? The farmer. Farmers 
were not the ones who listened to us. Instead we, the ones who wore suit and ties, lectured 
each other.”131 In this regard, Nestor (1996, p. 42) also notes that DSİ created the 
Management, Operation, and Maintenance Branch to provide local farmers with instructions, 
guidance, and consultancy regarding irrigation techniques and crop planting in 1993. 
However, the outcomes in Diyarbakır were disappointing because, in the words of an 
engineer, “We give seminars, but no one comes.” In relation to the exclusion of non-experts 
from debates and negotiations, another outcome of this dominance was their “scapegoating” 
for various destructive impacts of GAP, as will be explained below.  
7.2.3. Scapegoating Non-Experts Through Transferring Blame and Responsibility  
Simplistic binaries between experts and non-experts, modern and traditional, or developed 
and underdeveloped always helped the former groups in these binaries conceal social 
processes, simplify complexities to technical issues, and formulate straightforward 
explanations for failure (Crewe & Harrison, 1998, p. 46). As mentioned before, 
depoliticization was also concerned with formulating an explanation for failure and 
transferring of blame and responsibility. The analysis shows that the dominance of experts 
and expert knowledge also contributed to depoliticization in terms of transferring the blame 
on non-experts and insulating politicians, bureaucrats, and experts from policy failures and 
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unforeseen and often negative consequences of GAP. Specifically local farmers and villagers 
were widely blamed for their so-called incompetency and incapability of following the 
“correct,” scientific, and modern guidelines for agriculture. They were often held responsible 
for destructive ecological impacts of GAP such as waterlogging and soil salinization. To 
illustrate, a freelance civil engineer who worked in GAP region complained about villagers 
and “uninformed” farmers due to the fact that “they could not internalize technological 
irrigation. They thought that the more they irrigated the land, the more they would produce. 
Thus, they brought about salinization.”132 Similarly, when asked about the flooding of 
Hasankeyf due to the construction of Ilısu Dam, an expert from GAP-BKİ explained that 
except a few natural caves, Hasankeyf would be “gone anyway” in terms of cultural assets 
because “the nature was causing destruction, but also the villagers were destroying the 
historical artifacts, removing stones to demarcate their fields, using columns in the 
foundations of their houses in accordance with their low level of consciousness.”133 It is 
noteworthy that such accusatory and sterile approaches towards non-experts were criticized 
in GAP region. For instance, the critique of a wealthy landowner in Şanlıurfa towards DSİ on 
this matter was as follows: 
There are grave mistakes in irrigation. … DSİ employees attribute everything to 
excessive irrigation of farmers but it is not the only reason for the rise in groundwater 
and salinization. … Many fields still lack drainage systems. Plus, open canal system. 
… It is a disaster, a huge waste of water. DSİ knows these [problems] very well. At 
the end of the day, it is not the locals or farmers who designed this project.134 
The examples suggest that the expert knowledge allowed experts to not only transfer 
blame and responsibility to non-experts for their supposed incapability, but also provide a 
simple and short-cut explanation for failure without being obliged to deal with their root 
causes. This requires engaging in political struggle and distorting power dynamics and, 
therefore, is often highly unfavorable and challenging in the eyes of the experts.  
7.2.4. Summary 
Experts have played crucial roles in GAP’s design and implementation process. They were 
considered different from non-experts for their greater expertise and knowledge, privileged 
positions, high self-confidence, and self-awareness of their skills. The hierarchy between 
experts and non-experts, however, had depoliticizing implications. The dominating role of 
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the experts in this hierarchy reconfigured the power dynamics in their favor and lowered the 
chances of non-experts to raise their concerns and negotiate their (often political) demands 
through conventional channels. It also facilitated the insulation of experts from blame and 
responsibility of policy failures and GAP-induced destructive impacts. The question as to 
how the neoliberalization of GAP and “biopoliticization” of its character contributed to 
depoliticization in the context of GAP will be discussed in the next section.  
7.3. The Neoliberalization of GAP and “Biopoliticization” of its Character 
7.3.1. Neoliberal Transformation of the Turkish Economy and Neoliberal Face of GAP 
GAP has never been totally exempt from the influence of neoliberalism (see Chapter 4 & 5). 
The neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy was initiated in the early 1980s by 
Turgut Özal, who was the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Economy and responsible for 
implementing IMF’s SAP between 1980 and 1982, Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989, 
and President between 1989 and 1993 until his sudden death (Scheumann et al., 2014, p. 
135). Özal was often referred to as the “Turkey branch” of Thatcherism, Reaganomics, or 
New Deal. There is little question as to how his vision and initiatives facilitated and gave 
impetus to the opening and market orientation of the Turkish economy. However, his 
leadership also had negative impacts on social welfare, income inequality, and rule of law. In 
the words of Pamuk (2008, p. 288), Özal had a tendency to “govern by personal decisions 
and decrees” and “underestimate the importance of rule of law and a strong legal 
infrastructure for the effective operation of a market economy. His rather relaxed attitude 
towards the rule of law had devastating long-term consequences” including the increasing 
level of corruption since the 1990s. Neoliberalization had significant impacts on the 
management of energy markets and formulation of water policy. Some notable changes were 
liberalization and deregulation of energy sector to deal with the financial bottlenecks and 
attract foreign investment (Scheumann et al., 2014, pp. 134-135) and, as mentioned in 
Chapter 5, privatization of irrigation water management in the early 1990s through the 
establishment of irrigation associations with the guidance and financial support of the World 
Bank (Kibaroğlu, Başkan, & Alp, 2009, p. 287). Also, BOT model was introduced to the 
energy sector and later on modified also to include other sectors. It allowed private sector to 
generate, transmit, and distribute energy or construct, operate, and manage infrastructure 
projects such as large dams, HPPs, and irrigations networks (p. 289). The country’s 
neoliberal transformation gained momentum in the 1990s and 2000s after the intensified 
interaction between Turkey and international institutions such as IMF, the World Bank, 
OECD, the EU, and private national and international corporations. The single party rule of 
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AKP since 2002 under the strong leadership and control of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was 
the Prime Minister between 2003 and 2014 and has been the current President since 2014, 
has been the continuation of this decades-long process, which was not at all surprising given 
AKP’s–or Erdoğan’s–political ideology, political agenda, and economic, social, and cultural 
policies heavily influenced by neoliberal principles (see Balkan, Balkan, & Öncü, 2015 and 
Özden, Akça, & Bekmen, 2017 for detailed analyses in regard to AKP’s neoliberal policies). 
Turkey’s neoliberal transformation heavily influenced the governance of GAP, too. 
Even though numerous concepts associated with neoliberalism such as public-private 
partnership, entrepreneurship, competitiveness, foreign investment, and market integration 
were embedded–but dormant–in GAP, the degree of their significance increased over time 
and they became the leitmotif of the project. To illustrate, GAP was presented as a private 
sector-oriented and investor-friendly project as early as 1989. In his book, which was 
sponsored by a private bank named İnterbank, Bağış (1989) described the prospects of GAP 
as follows: 
There will be surely lucrative investment opportunities in agriculture and animal 
husbandry, in manufacturing industry, tourism and banking, alongside construction 
operations that will turn the region into a building site over the next 15 years. … 
Demand for banking and financial services will no doubt increase in line with the 
booming economic activity in the region. Therefore, the present financial structure, 
dominated by state banks, is expected to be replaced with a new one characterized by 
a greater presence of private financial institutions. The region will gradually attract 
private investments in education and medical services with its expanding towns and 
growing per capita income (p. 222). 
The injection of sustainability, participation, social and human development into GAP 
in the 1990s was also partially linked to the neoliberalization of the project. According to 
Özok-Gündoğan (2005, pp. 100-101), especially the studies conducted on the social 
dimension of GAP (see Chapter 5) deserved a special focus for providing the architects of the 
project with ample opportunities to collect detailed information about the local population 
and problematize the processes they went through such as settlement, migration, population 
growth, education, health, and hygiene. Problematization at this large scale was an indicator 
of the state’s will to intervene and administer life at the level of populations. In other words, 
it indicated that GAP was given a biopolitical character, as it came to be concerned with how 
lives of individuals and populations could be supported, maintained, and enhanced as well as 
how they could be indexed, sorted, and arranged (Clark, 2013, p. 839). In addition, neoliberal 
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transformation of the economy changed the means of how social services were provided to 
the local population; NGOs, professional associations, and community centers began to take 
significant roles in addition to government institutions. This change increased the gravity of 
market orientation over bureaucracy (Özok-Gündoğan, 2005, p. 104). 
The analysis indicates that the degree of GAP’s neoliberal character significantly 
increased from the 2000s onwards. In this period, it was common among the political elites to 
emphasize the importance of foreign capital flow to make GAP the “power engine” of 
Turkey’s development, especially at a time when Turkey became a “foreign capital paradise” 
(TBMM, 2007a, p. 76). It was also common to underline the necessity of public-private 
investments supported with economic incentives in order for GAP region to “take off” 
(TBMM, 2012a, p. 60). Similarly, from the perspective of an MP who represented 
Diyarbakır, it was envisioned that GAP region would “become the most important textile 
center in the world” with its labor-intensive production with low wages, as “China and 
Southeast Asia [were] losing their advantage of cheap labor.”135 Also, in the form of a 
critique, an MP who represented Hakkâri explained that 
GAP brought irrigation to Urfa and everybody cultivated cotton, fruits, vegetables, 
the region became an export base, then the products were appreciated in value and 
people became richer… There [was] no such thing. Land values in some cities were 
intentionally increased through planning and zoning. That was the case in Urfa, too. 
Today, there [were] streets where the poor [could not] enter. That [was] an intentional 
state policy, introduction of wild capitalism into the region. This [was] a skewed 
development policy and social engineering, an attempt to shape a new identity.136  
 It was also telling that many large private companies began to engage in various 
projects to ensure corporate social responsibility since the early 2000s. For instance, as the 
Turkey branch of Ronald McDonald’s House Charities, McDonald’s Children’s Foundation 
(McDonald’s Çocuk Vakfı) funded “Healthy Eye and Success in Education Project” between 
2003 and 2016 (GAP-BKİ, 2017b, p. 95), PepsiCo provided financial support to “GAP-
Cheetos Children Development Centres Project” between 2006 and 2016 (p. 60), Philips 
supported “Little Hearts Project” in 2015 (p. 95), and more recently Unilever–along with the 
Government of Kuwait–funded the project entitled “Support to Adaptation of Syrian Women 
Living in Southeast Anatolia to Social and Economic Life” between 2015 and 2017 (p. 95). 
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The examples above suggest that the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish political 
economy since the 1980s and the neoliberalization of GAP went hand in hand. One of the 
outcomes of the neoliberalization of GAP and “biopoliticization” of its character was also the 
redefinition of how an ideal citizen had to think and behave like. More emphasis was put on 
the need for this ideal citizen to embrace a rational, self-sufficient, and entrepreneurial 
attitude to adapt to the changed conditions of GAP region, as will be discussed below. 
7.3.2. Mentality Change Towards Becoming “Homo Economicus”  
As Pınarcıoğlu and Işık (2004, p. 30) noted, “the human model” that was previously shaped 
by the bureaucratic organizational structures in developmentalism period gradually changed 
and gave its way to a human model that was shaped by entrepreneurship, risk-taking, 
innovativeness, adaptiveness, and self-reliance in post-developmentalism period. According 
to neoliberal formulation, poor people were expected and also encouraged to take on the 
responsibility of their own advancement through “engaging with markets, learning how to 
conduct themselves in competitive arenas, and making appropriate choices” (Ferguson, 1994, 
p. 234). In this context, the neoliberalization of GAP also brought about a “mentality 
change,” which I interpreted as a form of irreversible and radical change in the mindset and 
vision of individuals and populations towards acting more rationally and reasonably. In 
relation to this mentality change, the ideal citizen was redefined as a rational, self-sufficient, 
and docile “homo economicus” instead of intrusive, inquisitive, and critical “homo politicus” 
who could lead to commotion and create tension. “Homo economicus” was at a central 
position in neoliberal thought, as cost-benefit analyses and market rules could be applied to 
decision-making processes regarding life in the social domain redefined as a form of 
economic domain (Lemke, 2001, p. 200). To exemplify this change, an anecdote from the 
1990s recounted by a former project consultant from GAP-BKİ was as follows: 
I met a farmer in Harran. I was surprised to see he had only two children. I jokingly 
asked, “What’s wrong? Why few children?” He explained that water was coming, he 
inherited this amount of land from his father but he had that number of brothers, he 
would produce a lot from this small land now, and his children would be starved if he 
has more children. I was astonished. GAP brought such a mentality change.137    
Similarly, a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ compared the mindset and vision of mayors 
in GAP region in the pre- and post-GAP periods. His observations were as follows:  
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Municipality of Urfa, for example. Former presidents did not have any vision. They 
were interested only in zoning. Now it is different. They care about irrigation, 
commerce, planning; their vision changed. When I was there in the 1980s, Karaköprü 
district was developing. In 20 years the place would be overpopulated and, therefore, 
needed to be planned well. But they could not see it. Current mayors can see it. This 
is a vision change. Circumstances after GAP forced people to think that way.138   
In a parallel manner, when comparing the conditions in GAP region in the pre- and post-GAP 
periods, one of the vice presidents of GAP-BKİ underlined that 
GAP made the most impact in starting NGOs and changing perspectives. We [did not] 
see such establishments in, for instance, Eastern Black Sea Region. … EU projects, 
trainings on how to prepare such projects, analyses on the region, application of the 
projects…etc, they all changed the perspective of the local population. The 
perspectives of chambers of industry, farmers’ organizations, and different 
organizations really changed. It [was] a positive change.139  
Along with this shift towards acting more rationally and reasonably, the 
neoliberalization of GAP and “biopoliticization” of its character also prompted the 
transformation of people into socially and economically self-sufficient citizens, as will be 
discussed below.   
7.3.3. Investment in Social and Human Capital to Achieve Self-Sufficiency 
According to Tuğrul and Fazlıoğlu (1999, p. 303), who were the then GAP-BKİ employees 
as sociologists by training, those who lacked self-sufficiency or were disadvantaged (1) 
generally faced obstacles in benefiting from development, (2) were less educated and 
organized compared to powerful interest groups, (3) were difficult to reach, (4) were weak 
and ineffective in accessibility to services, (5) had weak social networks, and (6) were poor 
and deprived. The analysis demonstrates that in GAP’s context self-sufficiency can also be 
interpreted as the elevated level a person reached after s/he developed adequate skills and 
capacities to survive without any further need for a push or intervention from outside. 
Accordingly, it refers to a level where s/he cannot be perceived as an infant in need of 
constant care, but instead as a grownup who can use his/her own rationale and judgments as 
well as take responsibility for his/her own actions. Ensuring self-sufficiency is biopolitical in 
terms of involving shaping and reshaping of bodies and selves in accordance with a grand 
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scheme and management and control of risks and dangers that are supposedly emerging from 
the underdeveloped life (Duffield, 2010, p. 63).  
Thanks to the neoliberalization of GAP and “biopoliticization” of its character, 
elevating the local population to the level of self-sufficiency and “investing in social and 
human capital” in GAP region have become crucial project objectives. To demonstrate this 
phenomenon with various examples from different periods, Kut (1999, p. 28) underlined the 
need to “enhance the capacity of people and equip people with the equipment needed in the 
conditions of the world we live[d] or modernization process.” She further underlined that 
people had to be developed in such a way that they had to criticize the services provided to 
them, show discontent with their quality, and eventually work towards improving their level 
of quality. A similar comment was made by the then President Süleyman Demirel in 1999: 
How can we change people’s–especially those who live in rural areas–houses, 
locations, lifestyles, how can we make them part of the contemporary world? Muddy 
villages, people in need of a cup of water, people who survive but remain silent about 
their problems must be transformed into strong people who look to the future in 
confidence, who gain strength to live and joy of life (Turgut, 2000, pp. 441-442). 
Also, according to a report published by GAP-BKİ and İstanbul Chamber of Industry on the 
investment potentials in GAP region in the 1990s, irrigation and increased productivity 
“[would] revolutionize the way people [thought],” as the local population  
who had been highly dependent on the natural conditions in dry agriculture and thus 
had a fatalist and passive mentality [would] reach consciousness regarding the human 
will and activity to be able to change the nature for their own interests and create a 
more combatant and entrepreneur mentality (GAP-BKİ, 1996, p. 6).   
In addition, a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ compared the pre- and post-GAP periods in 
GAP region on the basis of self-sufficiency in 2014 and highlighted that 
GAP changed people’s view of life. When we were in the field before GAP, families 
were saying, “we [did not] want anything but to see our children going to school.” 
Now, they started to demand for themselves. In the past, women were interested in 
handicraft courses, now they demand[ed] computers, sociologists, psychologists. 
They want[ed] to go to university. … The number of entrepreneur, self-employed 
women increased. Most importantly, women started to do something for themselves. 
A father told me, for instance, that his daughter [was] not approving him anymore.140  
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Also in 2014, an MP who represented Diyarbakır explained that before GAP “villagers were 
cultivating wheat once a year and doing nothing else. This was what they saw and learned 
from their parents.” After the initiation of GAP, however, the same villagers would have to 
cultivate three times a year, learn what to cultivate, when to cultivate, profitability of 
the product in stock market, how to transport the product, and stuff like these. They 
[would] acquire this culture. They [would] have difficulty for maybe two, maybe five 
years but they [would] eventually become self-sufficient people.141 
The examples above suggest that the neoliberalization of GAP and “biopoliticization” 
of its character contributed to the redefinition of the ideal citizen in GAP region as “homo 
economicus” who had to leave his/her previous habits and behavior behind and act in 
accordance with rationality, self-sufficiency, entrepreneurship, and similar (neoliberal) 
principles. Norms, beliefs, standards, and values of “the self,” but not “the other” formed the 
basis of this redefinition. In that sense, the redefinition was highly self-centered and top-
down. Also, since the redefinition was made along the lines of economics but not politics, it 
was highly sterile and almost blind to people’s political aspirations and motivations.  
7.3.4. Summary 
Neoliberal principles played a significant role in the steering of GAP since its early stages. 
The weight and impact of these principles increased with the injection of sustainability, 
participation, human and social development into the overall GAP framework in the 1990s. 
They facilitated the shift from predominantly state-led development to market-led 
development. They also allowed the architects of GAP to problematize almost every aspect 
of life and intervene to manage life at the level of population more conveniently. With the 
reinforcement of market logic within the project from the early 2000s onwards, the project’s 
neoliberal and biopolitical character was further strengthened. The project’s neoliberal and 
biopolitical character had depoliticizing implications in terms of redefining the ideal citizen 
as a rational, self-sufficient, entrepreneur, and neutral “homo economicus” along the sole 
lines of economics and concealing his/her political positions, identities, aspirations for the 
sake of attaining and maintaining a non-conflictual and consensual condition. Due to its close 
relation to this phenomenon, I will discuss how the “developmentalization” of the Kurdish 
question contributed to depoliticization in the next section.  
7.4. The “Developmentalization” of the Kurdish Question 
Over time, the concepts of security and development have been linked to each other in both 
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theoretical and practical levels, leading to the emergence of the elusive notion of security-
development nexus (Bilgen, in press; Buur, Jensen, & Stepputat, 2007; Hettne, 2010; Spear 
& Williams, 2012). Not only influential economic, financial, and political institutions such as 
the EU, African Union, the World Bank, and the UN, but also the majority of countries 
followed the calls to fuse security and development perspectives and policies and 
conceptualized them as interrelated and interconnected (Tschirgi, 2006, pp. 41-42). Arguably, 
the Turkish state was no exception in this regard, as the analysis indicated that security and 
development as well as the Kurdish question and GAP were widely perceived as interrelated. 
This perception led to the “securitization” of GAP and “developmentalization” of the Kurdish 
question, which was essentially a political issue. Before elaborating on how 
“developmentalization” of the Kurdish question had depoliticizing implications, presenting 
the major narratives on the relationship between GAP and the Kurdish question would 
provide a better perspective on the issue. 
7.4.1. Narrative 1: GAP is a Strategic “Anti-Kurdish” Plot 
According to the first narrative, which was prevalent specifically among the Kurdish political 
elites from the Kurdish political movement, GAP was initiated to intentionally and 
strategically inflict harm on the Kurdish population and the PKK. Accordingly, GAP was a 
project of exploitation, assimilation, destruction, and repression in relation to the Kurdish 
question. To elaborate briefly on each, from this perspective, GAP was essentially anti-
Kurdish on the grounds that it has systematically transferred natural and human resources of 
GAP region–or Kurdistan in the lexicon of many Kurdish elites–to western Turkey (see 
Mutlu, 2001 for an assessment of these claims and counterarguments in this matter). The 
claim that there was a one-way flow of resources from eastern and southeastern Turkey to the 
center–western Turkey–existed before the initiation of GAP though; it has long been 
emphasized that transportation, communication, trade, and banking systems in the region 
enabled and facilitated the natural and human resources flow out of the region (Jafar, 1976, p. 
80). To illustrate these claims, an MP who represented Hakkâri underlined that 
the approach and strategy of the state [was] entirely on energy production. … The 
state got what it wanted. GAP paid for itself. It even made profit. … [However], only 
20% of irrigation projects [were] realized. Because the state’s strategy [was] to extract 
from there, we describe[d] it as an exploitation project. They extract[ed] the resources 
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there and use[d] them in western parts of Turkey. For this reason, GAP’s contribution 
to the local population [was] almost zero.142  
GAP was found essentially anti-Kurdish also on the grounds that it has contributed to 
“Turkification” or “de-Kurdification” of the local population. In this regard, the PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan (2015, p. 357) underlined that when “the background of HPPs and projects 
in Kurdistan” and capital behind them were examined, one could realize that “[Kurds] face[d] 
a serious de-Kurdification policy.” Similarly, an MP who represented Diyarbakır underlined 
that “GAP [was] a political and social transformation project,” as an important statesman 
[sic] from the State Security Court once told him in the 1990s that “whenever Kurdish 
women [would] start dying their hair blonde, Kurdish problem [would] be solved.”143  
In relation to these, GAP was found to be against the “existence” of Kurds for it 
destroyed Kurdish culture, history, and ecology in GAP region or Kurdistan. For Öcalan 
(2015, p. 266), implementation of GAP and similar development projects were “similar to 
how ultra-nationalists kill[ed] leftists,” as “HPPs kill[ed] the nature. Here, there [was] an 
ecological massacre. … See Botan, Dersim; every corner [was] flooded. They buil[t] HPPs 
everywhere on Tigris. [Yet,] there [was] no electricity in Urfa.” Similarly, Hasip Kaplan, an 
MP who represented Şırnak, accused the government for flooding historical heritages for the 
sake of electricity and stated that “this destruction and pillage whet[ted] your appetite but 
increase[d] our people’s anger. … You [did not] irrigate, you [did not] bring water, you [did 
not] renew GAP, you [did not] complete it, but you insist[ed] on flooding the history, 
culture” (TBMM, 2011, pp. 242-243). Also, in the words of İbrahim Binici, an MP who 
represented Şanlıurfa, the focus of GAP “lack[ed] good intention, solution, nature, humanity, 
and most importantly the Kurds, as inhabitants of this land” (TBMM, 2012b, p. 815).  
Finally, GAP was found anti-Kurdish on the grounds that damming Euphrates and 
Tigris aimed to limit Kurds’ freedom of movement, prevent the maneuver capabilities of the 
PKK, and block the passageways of the insurgents. In this regard, an MP who represented 
Muş underlined that “dozens of dams between Hakkâri and Şırnak [were] incapable of 
producing energy. In appearance they [were] built for energy production and irrigation. 
Karakaya, Atatürk, Keban dams… The reason they [were] there [was] to challenge guerrilla’s 
presence and prevent their passage.”144 A researcher on water politics confirmed this claim 
and stated that “the army admitted that dams were constructed on the passage ways of 
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terrorists. This was exposed on Vatan Newspaper two years ago. … They especially fill[ed] 
the caves with water and prevent[ed] terrorists from passing from east to west.”145  
7.4.2. Narrative 2: GAP is a Remedy for the Conflict 
According to the second narrative, which was prevalent specifically among the Turkish 
political elites from the right-wing and nationalist parties, initiation of GAP would address 
the root causes of the Kurdish question. From this perspective, GAP could either end the 
conflict by itself or complement the military solutions towards this goal on the grounds that 
there was a direct and causal link between the underdevelopment of GAP region and the 
emergence, continuation, and intractability of the Kurdish question. The logic was: GAP 
would develop GAP region, development of GAP region would improve the socio-economic 
conditions of the local population, the local population in better conditions would feel loyal 
and sympathetic to the state and stop supporting the PKK, the PKK would lose its 
recruitment base and support from the bottom, and the Kurdish question would eventually be 
solved. To put it differently, GAP would introduce a modern and irrigation-based agriculture 
in GAP region, facilitate its integration to the markets, bring a new and modern lifestyle, 
eliminate feudal and tribal relations, increase income and living standards, remove regional 
disparities, and, thus, create an atmosphere that would prevent future secessionist movements 
(Jongerden, 2010, p. 141). Accordingly, GAP would not only “win the hearts and minds” of 
the local population through providing development, but also rid the PKK of its propaganda 
material to exploit poverty to attract new recruits to join its ranks.  
It should be noted that, though, the idea of reversing the harsh policies towards the 
Kurds and instead serving the Kurds “well and with affection” was not entirely novel and 
dated back to as early as the 1930s (Heper, 2007, p. 132). For instance, in the report entitled 
“Eastern Problem,” Celâl Bayar, the then Minister of Economy between 1932 and 1937, 
underlined the need to complement the efforts of the army and gendarmerie with “a capable 
and regularly functioning civil service” so that people would “think that they [were] not left 
to their own devices and that the state cared for them” and “feel that they were not perceived 
as an alien element in the social body and … think that they, too, constituted an integral 
element of the nation” (p. 132). To provide more recent examples of this narrative, in the 
relatively early stages of GAP in 1988, Güneş Müftüoğlu, an MP who represented 
Zonguldak, made a straightforward link between socio-economic development and terrorism 
and underlined that “the remedy of preventing anarchy and terror in [GAP] region [was] to 
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complete crucial investments … and ensure local populations’ economic and social 
development” because “when [their] social, economic, and cultural development [was] 
ensured, both anarchy and terror [would] be eliminated” (TBMM, 1988c, p. 338). In the early 
1990s, İsmet Sezgin, the then Minister of Interior, made a similar connection between 
underdevelopment and terrorism. His statement was as follows:  
We don’t see counterterrorism only as security measures; we give equal importance to 
its social and economic dimensions. … With this approach, within the framework of 
GAP, we continue to use all resources allocated by our state and work hard towards 
developing the local population. … Thus, the claim of interregional growth inequality 
and regional underdevelopment, which is used to cloak the real objective of terror, 
will be debunked (TBMM, 1993, p. 470).  
Even though the dynamics and trajectory of the Kurdish question significantly 
changed after the capture and imprisonment of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 (see Chapter 4), 
apparently the perception of development or GAP as a silver bullet in the Kurdish question 
remained intact during this period. In 2000, for instance, Necati Çetinkaya, an MP who 
represented Manisa, repeated the same formula and explained that “the completion of GAP 
[meant] the realization of the greatest development move in Southeastern Anatolia and … 
draining of the source of terrorism. We must not kill the mosquitoes but drain the source, the 
swamp in which they reproduce[d]” (TBMM, 2000, p. 348). Also, despite the initiation of the 
“Kurdish Opening” in 2009, politicians continued to employ similar discourses. In 2009, for 
instance, Cemil Çiçek, the then Deputy Prime Minister, stated that “they always sa[id] 
security measures [were] not enough to prevent terror, economic package [was] also needed 
… GAP [was] the economic package of the [Kurdish] Opening” (TBMM, 2009b, p. 69). 
İbrahim Binici, an MP who represented Şanlıurfa, summarized the position of GAP after the 
failure of this democracy initiative as follows:  
Turgut Özal had clearly emphasized the relationship between the Kurds and GAP by 
saying, “If the region develops and the local population becomes rich, political 
reactions and conflict come to an end.” This skewed perspective, which envisages the 
substitution of Kurds’ demands for collective rights with economic bribes, has given 
GAP this mission from the beginning (TBMM, 2013). 
The analysis further indicates that bureaucrats and experts also widely characterized 
GAP as a project to provide security through development. For instance, a former project 
consultant from GAP-BKİ explained how TAF perceived GAP as a way out of the Kurdish 
question and cooperated with civil bureaucracy to this end. Accordingly, in a National 
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Security Council meeting in the mid-1990s, one military official told her that TAF did its job 
and, from then on, it was the job of bureaucracy to get TAF out of the region.146 Similarly in 
the 2000s, Muammer Yaşar Özgül, the former president of GAP-BKİ linked GAP and the 
Kurdish question and stated that  
[a]s people has more income and a better social life, they stay away from terrorism. In 
other words, unemployment and underdevelopment in the region are sources that feed 
terrorism. As GAP will advance, people’s social life, income level, and quality of life 
will change. Why would a person whose quality of life and lifestyle improve be 
interested in terrorism? (GAP-BKİ, 2012b, p. 131). 
It is remarkable that an expert from the same institution established almost the same links, 
gave almost the same explanation regarding the causes of the Kurdish question, and proposed 
almost the same solutions to the problem in 2014. Her statement was as follows:  
If you fail to develop a region’s economy and attract sufficient investment, some may 
engage in provocation. That was the reason behind terrorism. … The more you 
develop, the more you reduce interregional development disparities. The more you 
increase their welfare level, the more they see themselves as part of the state.147   
The “developmentalization” of the Kurdish question was observable in policy 
documents, too. To illustrate in chronological order, in the annual General Broadcasting Plan 
of TRT, it was stated in 1991 that programs to be broadcasted in Priority Localities in 
Development aimed at “teaching the consciousness of national unity and brotherhood, 
spreading Turkish language, culture, and art” and “reinforcing the trust and respect of people 
to the state through the presentation of the services brought by the state to these regions” 
(MGK, 1993, p. 379). Similarly, some of TRT GAP’s–or GAP TV’s–goals were stated as 
“creating a social, cultural, and psychological atmosphere required to build a rational basis 
for GAP” (p. 382) and “strengthening the national unity through informing the public about 
different aspects of social life in provinces under GAP TV’s coverage and GAP’s stages of 
development” (p. 384). Also in the 1990s, it was noted in GAP Social Action Plan that the 
realization of GAP would “accelerate the whole economy of the region, greatly contribute to 
the solution of the backwardness and unemployment problems of the region, and in turn 
[would] dry up economic and social sources of terrorist activities” (GAP-RDA, 1995, p. 3). 
Similarly in the 2000s, the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan underlined in GAP 
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Action Plan (2008-2012) that “the regional development applications initiated during our 
government [within GAP framework] were based on strengthening our national unity and 
brotherhood, spreading development opportunities to all over the country, and transition to 
production culture on the whole” (GAP-BKİ, 2008a, p. i). In the 2010s, it was noted in GAP 
Action Plan (2014-2018) that GAP was “an indicator of our country’s determination to march 
in unity and brotherhood, its openness to development” and the goal of the state was to 
“make our completed projects lasting, sustain the peaceful environment by increasing welfare 
level, and strengthening the brotherhood” (GAP-BKİ, 2014a, p. 3). 
7.4.3. Narrative 3: GAP is a Neutral Project 
According to the third narrative, which was prevalent specifically among the experts, the link 
between GAP and the Kurdish question was weak and even spurious, as GAP has always 
been a totally neutral project and completely detached from security considerations and 
political calculations. Therefore, the Kurdish question was not one of the factors that 
triggered the initiation of GAP. A detailed examination of the discourses illustrated that there 
were three main arguments that supported this narrative. According to the first argument, 
only scientific and technical, not political reasons played the dominant role in GAP’s design 
and implementation process. To illustrate, one of the former heads of GAP Regional 
Directorate at DSİ in Şanlıurfa made a clear distinction between the project’s technical and 
political aspects. His explanation was as follows: 
Politicians cannot have any influence on engineering projects. … Hydraulic system 
determines everything. You make your calculations according to water criteria. Dams 
cannot be built for security; they are built to provide drinking water, prevent floods, 
generate energy, and irrigate lands. It is naïve to think of dams as security providers 
or blockages against someone.148  
Similarly, an expert from GAP-BKİ emphasized that “GAP [was] a regional development 
project, so naturally nine provinces were chosen to this end. The project [was] implemented 
in Southeastern Anatolia not because Kurds live[d] there, but because of physical and 
technical concerns.”149 In other words, GAP was falling under the category of plans that were 
prepared for resource-rich regions to mobilize these underused resources and prompt regional 
development (MGK, 1993, p. 45). One of the former presidents of GAP-BKİ also confirmed 
that “security was not a main factor” in the overall GAP framework and underlined that  
                                                
148 Personal interview, May 20, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
149 Personal interview, March 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
Chapter 7: Sources and forms of depoliticization in the overall GAP framework 
 194 
controlling the basins, implementing the project for security, etc… There was no such 
thing. People later on claimed that GAP was initiated to limit terrorists’ mobilization 
but I still [did not] think the claim [was] valid. There [were] millions of terrible things 
terrorists [could] do, how [could] they be stopped by a few dams?150  
According to the second argument, GAP could not be characterized as an “anti-
Kurdish” project because, ethnically speaking, not only Turks and Arabs, but also Kurds 
benefited from the project. In this regard, a large landowner in Şanlıurfa stated that “GAP 
was not initiated against the Kurds” because “a large portion of agricultural lands in GAP 
region belong[ed] to the Kurds anyway. They [were] the ones who [would] be better off 
when the irrigation system [was] built.”151 Similarly, a former expert from GAP-BKİ 
underlined that there was no discrimination against the Kurds because “the Kurds [would] 
reap GAP’s benefits as much as Turks [would] do. True, there [were] instances where they 
[would] suffer as in Hasankeyf, but there [were] also instances where they receive[d] a lot of 
money from the state. They [would] be richer.”152 An expert from the same institution also 
indicated that the Kurds [were] the real beneficiaries of GAP and stated that “if there were 
discrimination between Turks and Kurds, [he] would not try to increase the local population’s 
quality of life and they would live a shorter life in poorer quality.”153  
According to the third argument, ethnic, religious, or linguistic identity of the local 
population played no role in determining whom to include or exclude in the development 
process. To exemplify, a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ emphasized that they did not 
discriminate against the Kurds and Arabs and only conducted “sociological studies to 
formulate projects according to their different water consumption patterns, social structures, 
and stuff.”154 Similarly, another former coordinator from GAP-BKİ underlined that 
We did not care about people’s ethnicity, religious sect, or belief. It did not matter 
whether they were Yazidi, Assyrian, Laz, Kurdish, or Arabic. The only criteria were: 
[Were] they poor? From a gender equality perspective, [were] they women, men, 
children, or youth? [Did] they have access to services?155  
A researcher on water politics also found the claims on ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
discrimination in the overall GAP framework exaggerated and stated that 
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GAP [was] not an assimilation project. Not only Kurds live[d] in Southeastern 
Anatolia Region. Everyone [was] resettled in every dam project. It happened in 
Keban, it also happened when a dam was constructed on Kızılırmak156 and people of 
Çorum157 had to leave their lands. [Did] this mean that we assimilated people of two 
Sunni villages and one Alevi village there? Of course not.  
7.4.4. Discussion on the Position of GAP in the Kurdish Question  
The narratives above indicate that the security dimension of GAP is constructed, not given. 
The examination of legislative and elite discourses as well as the historical trajectory of GAP 
illustrate that security considerations were hardly significant in the initial stages of the 
project. However, later in the 1990s, possibly in parallel with the intensification of the PKK 
activities, GAP was constructed also as a security project and considered as another and/or 
complementary means to address the Kurdish question. In other words, while GAP was 
gradually securitized in the course of the project, the Kurdish question was also gradually and 
simultaneously “developmentalized” over time. However, it is fair to argue that security 
never became the leitmotif of GAP; it has never been the reason or a major reason, but at best 
one of the minor reasons behind the project’s initiation. Considering that development has 
never been a practice that was completely isolated from politics and power dynamics, indeed 
GAP led to various security-related outcomes that also concerned the Kurdish question. To 
illustrate the interaction between development and security, a head of a department from the 
Ministry of Development explained that whenever, wherever, and on whatever the state 
establishment spent public funds, the state “calculate[d] every single return” including 
“citizens’ sense of belongingness, loyalty to the state.” He further explained that whenever 
they aimed to  
fix the economy of [GAP] region, [they] never ignored the political agenda there. 
[Was] there any social engineering or doctrinization? This absolutely exist[ed] as a 
side effect… Inclusion of the citizens, changing their perceptions, these long existed 
not only within GAP, but also in many projects that were implemented in the 
region.158 
Despite the intertwinement of development and security gains, it would be simplistic 
and reductionist to characterize GAP solely as a security project for several reasons. First, the 
claim that social policies under GAP were actually social control and assimilation 
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mechanisms was often overstated. To explain why, in the words of a former coordinator from 
GAP-BKİ, “the world is not the world of the 1960s, 1970s. It is impossible to assimilate 
population with such means anymore, especially in such a politicized region. We are in 
Information Age, everyone can reach any kind of information.”159 For this reason, it was 
naïve to claim that a population over eight million was being assimilated only through 
programs and activities carried out at nine Youth and Culture Centers, nine Child 
Development Centers, and 44 ÇATOM in GAP region.  
Second, social policies pursued in GAP region were only slightly different than social 
policies pursued in other regions in Turkey. They were not specifically designed for or 
against the Kurdish population in GAP region. As the above-mentioned coordinator from 
GAP-BKİ also stated, for instance, social welfare funds were distributed not only in GAP 
region, but also in other regions. In addition, GAP region received the largest share of funds 
in this regard (“En fazla sosyal yardım”, 2008; “Seçim öncesi 63 milyon”, 2015). ÇATOM-
like community centers were not established exclusively there, either; hundreds of 
community centers were established all over Turkey over the years.160  
Third, social policies pursued under the umbrella of GAP were formulated to replace 
the traditional with the modern and accelerate the modernization of GAP region. Considering 
that nationalism was a phenomenon highly associated with–or even a product of–modernity 
(see Gellner, 1997) and that social policies have been effective in terms of modernizing the 
region so far, it can be argued that social policies actually played a significant role in 
increasing the political awareness of the Kurds and fueling Kurdish nationalism rather than 
they repressed their national consciousness and assimilated the population.   
Finally, at the expense of speculation, if GAP were solely a security project, priority 
would have been given to irrigation and socio-economic projects that would directly benefit 
the local population and change their perception of the state. Instead, energy projects that 
provided large returns to the state but little returns to the local population were prioritized. 
This problem of limited trickle-down effect of GAP further estranged the local population 
from both the state and the project and confirmed the claim regarding being “neglected” and 
“forgotten” for decades in their eyes. For such reasons, characterizing GAP as a development 
project with a potential to have a minor and indirect impact on the resolution of the conflict 
as an externality is more reasonable than reaching the quick conclusion that GAP was solely 
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a security project. The question as to how the position of GAP in the context of the Kurdish 
conflict contributed to depoliticization will be addressed below.  
7.4.5. The “Developmentalization” of the Kurdish Question and Depoliticization 
Indeed, the “developmentalization” of the Kurdish question had depoliticizating implications. 
Just as neoliberalism redefined the ideal citizen in GAP region along the sole lines of 
economics and economic competition, the idea of addressing the Kurdish question through 
GAP also redefined an ethno-political confrontation along socio-economic lines. Therefore, 
the “developmentalization” of the Kurdish question enabled various elite groups to redefine 
an antagonistic relation and recast it into a milder, more negotiable, and more manageable 
form. In the context of the Kurdish question and the conflict-ridden environment of GAP 
region, ideally speaking the confrontation or antagonism had to take place between the 
Turkish and Kurdish, TAF and the PKK, the oppressor and the oppressed, right-wing and 
left-wing ideologies, or ultra-nationalist Turkish and Kurdish political parties and 
movements. However, due to the idea that socio-economic problems were actually at the 
heart of the conflict, confrontation was no longer defined in such forms, but instead defined 
in economic terms as if they were between developed and underdeveloped, modern and 
traditional, wealthy and poor, or contented and discontented. Also, following the increased 
influence of neoliberalism on the project, confrontation took other forms that were defined 
between self-reliant and dependent, entrepreneur and lazy, competitive and noncompetitive, 
or adaptive and maladaptive in accordance with market principles. Such a redefinition would 
be considered desirable from the perspective of the state because addressing the structural, 
administrative, and ethno-political issues regarding the Kurdish question such as ending the 
armed conflict, decentralizing the governance of the state, normalizing Turkish-Kurdish 
relations at societal level, or providing education in mother tongue has always been more 
burdensome and challenging compared to addressing socio-economic development issues 
that required a less political or non-political solution toolset for the state.  
In addition, the redefinition of the dynamics of the Kurdish question as such 
evaporated the “Turkishness,” “Kurdishness,” religious identities, and political leanings of 
the local population. The local population was stripped out of their ethnic and political 
identities and presented as dehumanized and neutral subjects in a sterile manner. In other 
words, as in the case of the “moralization” of politics, political contestations and identities 
were concealed through the “developmentalization.” To exemplify this concealment, in 2000, 
Emin Uluğ, the then Head of Chamber of Doctors in Diyarbakır underlined that 
“Southeastern Anatolia [was] not just any region. It [had] certain characteristics” and 
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complained that he could not find a single detail about the ethnicity of this region in the study 
on population movements in GAP region (GAP-BKİ, 2000e, pp. 14-15). It is also noteworthy 
that the local population were widely referred to as “them, locals, local people, people of the 
region, our people, our brothers there” in legislative and elite discourses without references 
given to their identities and ethno-political characteristics. The “developmentalization” of the 
Kurdish question, then, apparently negated the political or antagonistic confrontation and 
diffused it into economics and at times ethics while in fact the political nature of the question 
remained intact and arguably became even more explicit in recent years.  
7.4.6. Summary 
Since the 1990s, there has been a growing tendency to assume that security and development 
went hand in hand and there would be no security without development and no development 
without security. Arguably, the architects of GAP were also influenced by this perception, as 
GAP and the Kurdish question were somehow linked to each other over time. This led to the 
securitization of GAP and “developmentalization” of the Kurdish question. The narratives 
regarding the position of GAP in the context of the Kurdish question were quite diverse. 
Accordingly, in different times and by different elite groups, GAP was characterized as a 
project that was initiated (1) against the Kurdish population with malevolent intentions, (2) as 
a remedy for the Kurdish question due to its potential to eradicate the root causes of the 
conflict which were allegedly related to the “underdevelopment” of GAP region, and (3) as 
nothing but a development project in an objective and neutral fashion in the sole guidance of 
science and technicity.  
A critical analysis of these narratives indicates that the interrelation between GAP and 
the Kurdish question has been a construct, not a given. Given this, it is more reasonable to 
characterize GAP not as a security project primarily concerned with the Kurdish question, but 
as a development project that had minor and indirect impacts on the trajectory of the conflict 
due to the intertwined nature of development, security, politics, and the Kurdish question. 
Also, regardless of how it was conceived, the position of GAP in the conflict had 
depoliticizing implications in terms of redefining ethno-political confrontations and 
antagonisms along socio-economic lines and concealing political contestation and identities, 
which would enable the formulation of less controversial and less contested solutions to the 
highly contested and essentially political problem. I will discuss how the extension of the 
visibility and authority of the state in the guise of GAP contributed to depoliticization in the 
following section.  
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7.5. The Extension of the Visibility and Authority of the State in the Guise of GAP 
7.5.1. GAP and the Visibility and Authority of the State 
When development problems are conceived as technical problems in a depoliticized manner, 
their solutions require the heavy use of expert knowledge and extension of government 
services, which carries the risk of the extension of state power as an unforeseen consequence 
(see Chapter 2). In line with this claim, it can be argued that GAP also contributed to the 
extension of the visibility and authority of the state apparatus in the guise of GAP in GAP 
region. As expected, GAP’s long span, wide focus and scope, and multiple goals and 
objectives necessitated the involvement and cooperation of various government institutions 
that focused on different aspects of the project in accordance with their duties and missions. 
However, in the overall GAP framework, the range of involved institutions was so extensive 
that almost all ministries in the country played significant and diverse roles in the project’s 
implementation process. The Ministry of Development; the Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Livestock; the Ministry of National Defense; the Ministry of Science, Industry and 
Technology; the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning; the Ministry of Economy; the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism; the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs; the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources; the Ministry of National Education; the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Customs and 
Trade; the Ministry of Family and Social Policies; and the Ministry of Youth and Sports were 
among some of these government institutions (GAP-BKİ, 2014a). Similarly, GAP was 
associated with a wide range of social, economic, and cultural problems which various 
government institutions were given the responsibility to design and implement development 
plans, programs, and activities for their solution. For instance, the jurisdiction of GAP-BKİ 
covered activities in the fields of agriculture, mining, manufacturing, industry, energy, 
transportation, communication, construction, and tourism in the broader fields of human 
resources, sociology, economics, development and technology, environment and urban 
planning, regional development, and culture (Pool & Grover, 2006, p. 378). While the 
involvement of that many governmental actors increased GAP’s sphere of influence, this 
increase in return allowed these actors to become more involved and visible both in the 
overall project framework and GAP region in varying degrees. Indeed, the increase of state 
visibility contributed to the restoration and increase of the state authority in GAP region. 
According to Özok-Gündoğan (2005, p. 95), the restoration of the state authority was 
especially sought to win the trust and loyalty of the local population and facilitate control 
over them (see previous section for more details). Below, two highly similar texts that were 
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produced in different decades illustrate how the perceived role of GAP in increasing the state 
visibility and authority–specifically to win the hearts and minds–remained intact in years. 
Accordingly, İsmail Köse, an MP who represented Erzurum, proudly stated in 1998 that  
[l]ast month, during one of our trips to Şanlıurfa … from Akçakale to Bozova, I saw 
the excitement of our people, our citizens who lived in Şanlıurfa and benefited from 
this national project, I saw their loyalty to their state. They really expressed their pride 
in living under the flag of crescent and star161 (TBMM, 1998, p. 306).   
More than a decade later, Ramazan Başak, an MP who represented Şanlıurfa, stated that 
[a]bout ten days ago, we went to Şanlıurfa, the capital of GAP … to investigate 
investments in its place. … I wish you could see those huge machines, machines that 
work day and night, main canals that lie until the horizon. There was another thing I 
wanted you to see, honorable members: I wish you could see the light in the eyes of 
the local population, I wish you could see their loyalty to this country, this state, this 
flag … [and] that hope in their eyes (TBMM, 2009, p. 12). 
A former coordinator from GAP-BKİ also emphasized that “GAP was a hope” for the local 
population in GAP region and explained that “during [the 1990s], I told the President 
Süleyman Demirel, ‘Sir, whichever village or town you [went] there, you [could] see a sign 
that [was] related to GAP.’ GAP was indeed a hope, but now Apo162 became the hope.”163  
Arguably, the establishment of regional development agencies and relocation of GAP-
BKİ’s headquarters from Ankara to Şanlıurfa (see Chapter 5) also contributed to the 
extension of state’s visibility and reach in the guise of GAP. To elaborate, Turkey has had a 
strong centralized political and administrative structure. For this reason, one may argue that 
both policy decisions would accelerate the shift from centralism to decentralization and 
contribute to strengthening of the local administrations. However, a careful examination of 
the process in the aftermath of these decisions indicates that the outcome was the roll 
forward, not roll back of the state; these decisions did not prompt a shift towards a more 
decentralized governance structure (see Karasu, 2015 for a detailed discussion on this 
matter). Neither regional development agencies nor GAP-BKİ became more autonomous at 
the end of the process. They could not perform their duties and functions at full capacity, 
either. Arguably, there were two major reasons for this drawback and unforeseen 
consequence. First, development agencies and the administration were not granted the 
                                                
161 “The (red) flag of crescent and star” is often used to refer to the Turkish flag.  
162 The imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan is also widely referred to as Apo.  
163 Personal interview, May 5, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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authority of the central government adequately; they especially lacked the authority to engage 
in planning activities. Second, they were not granted the authority of the central government 
to control financial resources and make financial allocation to be used in planning activities. 
To illustrate both points, in 2014, a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ evaluated the 
strengths and weaknesses of GAP-BKİ’s relocation and explained that  
[d]ecentralization [was] just a myth. It [did] not matter whether you [were] in Urfa or 
Ankara if you [did] not have the authority. Decisions [were] made here [Ankara]. A 
regional development administration [had to] make financial allocation in accordance 
with the plans within its jurisdiction. For integration purposes, it [had to] have the 
authority to allocate the resources in accordance with the stakeholder organizations’ 
roles in the designated projects. … In their current forms, they [were] nothing but the 
extension of the central authority.164 
Similarly, another former coordinator from GAP-BKİ emphasized in the same year that 
[i]t was a mistake to relocate GAP-BKİ before redesigning the planning system in 
Turkey in general. … Authorities of the central government [had to] be transferred to 
local authorities. You transfer[ed] many things, but the center still [had] all the 
authority. You [held] meetings again and again, you [made] plans again and again, 
but Ankara [gave] the final decision. Therefore, it [was] meaningless. The center 
[was] still strong, it [had] the resources, the authority; the rest [was] only for show. 
Now no one [took] GAP-BKİ seriously because it [had] no authority.165  
Regional development agencies were in the same position as regional development 
administrations in terms of their impotency. On this point, a head of a department at the 
Ministry of Development acknowledged that “there [was] always a need for a localized 
expertise capacity.” However, he also underlined that since “projects [were] dominantly 
investment projects, they need[ed] to have an Ankara connection for bargaining and tracking 
policies day by day. … The center [was] here [Ankara].”166 He further underlined that  
agencies played an active role in carrying local contributions to the process. … Even 
the man [sic] in the remotest town [said] the agency came and asked our opinion. This 
[was] also an important public relations activity for the region. We would not have 
gone as deep in another region, but here [GAP region] there was such a need. People 
were glad to be heard. They thought like, “the state came here.” 
                                                
164 Personal interview, April 9, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
165 Personal interview, April 25, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
166 Personal interview, April 30, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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In other words, in their current form, regional development agencies functioned as the 
extensions of central government in general and the Ministry of Development in particular. 
Another sign that they were the extensions of the central government was that the heads of 
administrative boards of the agencies were appointed by the central government. The 
appointed persons were governors. In the words of an MP who represented Aksaray, 
“governors [were] the top-level administrators. Secretary-general [could not] be superior over 
governors. For this reason, secretary-generals [were] always in a secondary position”167 in 
administrative boards. Similarly, a former coordinator from GAP-BKİ lamented that  
[t]he board of directors comprise[d] governors, mayors, provincial heads, and 
presidents of chambers of commerce and industry. According to regulations, the 
board chairperson [was] the governor. … Therefore, agencies [were] established at a 
local level, but administered by governors who reside[d] in these cities just for a 
limited time, and [knew] little about the local dynamics except their bureaucratic 
services. … Agencies [were] like the branch offices of DPT in the region, because 
everything [was] approved and investment priorities [were] determined by DPT in 
Ankara after all. This [was] not decentralization, but rather localization.168 
 The examples suggest that the state apparatus has intentionally or unintentionally used 
GAP and regional development agencies in GAP region as a means to extend the state’s 
visibility and fill the authority vacuum that long reincforced the sense that the region was not 
a fully governed space and given adequate attention and resources for years. However, the 
extension of the visibility and authority of the state through GAP and GAP-related policy 
decisions was not without implications and risks, as will be briefly discussed below.  
7.5.2. The Omnipresence of GAP and Infiltration of State Power 
Partly due to GAP’s amorphous structure and partly due to the extension of the visibility and 
authority of the state, over time GAP came to be conceived as an omnipresent project and a 
perpetual process in the eyes of both its designers and implementers and the local population. 
The project was often used even synonymously with broad processes such as development, 
growth, progress, and change. In line with this, it was also considered as ahistorical, infinite, 
and exempt from contextual influences. To illustrate this tendency with different examples, a 
former coordinator from GAP-BKİ conceived the project in 2014 as follows: “GAP does not 
ever finish… It is a process; it will always exist. New technologies will replace the old ones. 
                                                
167 Personal interview, May 13, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
168 Personal interview, March 27, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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New lands will be irrigated, agro-industries will flourish, trade will expand. Therefore, GAP 
does not ever finish.”169 In a parallel manner, according to another coordinator from GAP-
BKİ,  
GAP does not ever finish. Completion of GAP means the end of development… Only 
fundamental infrastructure investments can be completed. When these are completed, 
it is private sector and industrial investments that will increase economic development 
and foster take-off in GAP. After that stage, GAP continues to exist in accordance 
with the other developments in the world. Just as you cannot stop growth in a country 
or in a society, you cannot stop growth in the region. Due to the region’s 
underdevelopment, there will always be a need for intervention.170 
Similarly, from the perspective of a head of a department at the Ministry of Development,   
GAP finishes only if it is conceived as a project. But when to leave the field, what is 
the point of exit? The solidity of the criteria set in hand is open to debate on this point. 
“We intervened, elevated this and that social and economic parameters to this and that 
level, it will be complete when we reach that level…” This message is not clear.171  
Combined with the conception of GAP as an eternal process, the large extension of 
the visibility and authority of the state carries the risk that the state apparatus can eventually 
infiltrate and shape every aspect of life in GAP region. At the expense of generalization, in 
this situation, the field of possible actions in all spheres of life is structured in such a way that 
the agency of the local population becomes eroded (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion). 
Due to this extension, the ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying can be defined in 
such a way that the–already infantilized–local population becomes even weaker to utter their 
interests, demands, and needs in such an asymmetrical power configuration. This leads to the 
exclusion of the local population from the overall GAP framework, the closure of public 
debate, and consideration of certain arguments, voices, and concerns as illegitimate and 
unacceptable, which are all associated with depoliticization. The extension of the visibility 
and authority of the state and omnipresence of GAP do not involve any brute force or 
coercive power in shaping the conduct of the local population. Instead, they define and limit 
the local population’s choices, preferences, and maneuver capabilities in such a way that 
individuals are left with no option but to behave in accordance within the limits of 
“acceptable” standards. This is also problematic and depoliticizing in the sense that such all-
                                                
169 Personal interview, April 2, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
170 Personal interview, March 24, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
171 Personal interview, April 30, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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encompassing and ubiquitous structures that favor univocalism and portray society as a 
harmonious monoblock often leave no space for political contestation and debate. They 
neutralize the political, dehumanize the local population, and redefine an order that is devoid 
of power dynamics, opposition, and contestation. In that sense, the extended visibility and 
authority of the state has depoliticizing as much as it has authoritarian implications.  
7.5.3. Summary  
With its size, scope, significance, historical trajectory, and the amorphous form it ultimately 
took, GAP enabled the state to extend its visibility and authority in the guise of the project in 
GAP region. Even administrative policies pursued in the name of decentralization led to 
further centralization of state power. This extension had two major implications. First, it led 
to the characterization of GAP as a colossal and omnipresent project and a perpetual process. 
Second, in relation to the so-called omnipresence of GAP, it led to the risk that the state 
power would permeate all aspects of social and economic life in GAP region. This would 
have depoliticizing implications in terms of eroding the agency of the local population; 
further limiting their already limited choices, preferences, and maneuver capabilities; and 
leaving no room for alternatives, contestation, and debate with its all-encompassing and 
ubiquitous structure. 
7.6. Conclusion 
A meticulous examination of legislative and elite discourses indicates that there has been 
more than one source of depoliticization in the overall GAP framework. Also, 
depoliticization took more than one form in the historical trajectory of the project. The 
employment of technical language, the dominance of experts and expert knowledge, the 
neoliberalization of GAP and “biopoliticization” of its character, the “developmentalization” 
of the Kurdish question, and the extension of the visibility and authority of the state in the 
guise of GAP contributed to depoliticization in multiple ways during the course of the 
project. These ways included, but not limited to, the negation of stark antagonisms; rendering 
the political technical; redefinition of ethno-political conflicts along the lines of economics, 
economic competition, and ethics; erosion of agency; transferring of blame, responsibility, 
and costs to other people, bodies and institutions, or phenomena that are believed to be 
beyond human agency and control.  
Neither the sources nor the ways of depoliticization were fixed. They were rather 
dynamic and flexible phenomena that rose to prominence or lost their relevance depending on 
the context of how, when, and by which major actors GAP has been governed. They were not 
free-standing and independent from each other, either. A discerning eye can recognize that 
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they were actually interrelated and even overlapping to some extent. For instance, there were 
strong links between the heavy use of technical language and the dominance of experts; the 
“biopoliticization” of GAP and the omnipresence of the project; the neoliberalization of GAP 
and the “developmentalization” of the Kurdish question; the dominance of expert knowledge 
and the extension of the visibility and authority of the state; and the “developmentalization” 
of the Kurdish question and the extension of the visibility and authority of the state.  
Considering this complex web of interconnection among these sources, it is fair to 
argue that the idea, design, and implementation of GAP steadily and continuously led to 
depoliticization of objects, subjects, people, ideas, and issues through various means in 
various arenas throughout the years. The governance of GAP in a depoliticized mode and 
contribution of the project to technicization and neutralization of political phenomena also 
nurtured the “mystique” of GAP and strengthened its “untouchable” status, as these factors 
enabled (1) the introduction and spread of the idea that GAP was “above” and “beyond” 
politics and, thus, incontestable, (2) the concentration of power and authority in the hands of 
the elites and placement of responsibility and burdens to the non-elites, (3) the construction 
of a reality in which it was almost a moral imperative to provide automatic and unconditional 
support to the project and everything it would bring, while remaining silent about anything it 
would take away, and (4) the circulation of regulatory power defined in a Foucaldian manner 
to achieve people’s voluntary participation to the development process. Still, considering that 
contestation and power dynamics cannot be eradicated but only be repressed, sublimated, or 
obscured, GAP and its sources of depoliticization defined in a neutral domain might also lose 
their depoliticizing characters and become contested and repoliticized in the later stages of 
the project. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter, I synthesize what has been discussed in the previous seven chapters and 
make the concluding remarks of the study. The chapter comprises four sections. In the first 
section, I provide a brief summary of the study and highlight some of its significant and 
unique findings. In the second section, I identify and discuss the major inferences about both 
the concept of development and GAP and “take-home messages” based on the 
demystification of the project. In the third section, I explain the implications of the study on 
GAP in particular and development practice in general. In the fourth and final section, I 
discuss the future research directions that might complement and strengthen the study and 
open new research avenues in GAP- and development-related studies.    
8.1. A Brief Summary of the Study 
Turkey’s modernization process has been heavily influenced and shaped by the strong will 
and idealistic ambition of the state to ensure progress and development since the inception of 
the country in 1923, or even earlier, since the modernization efforts of the Ottoman Empire in 
the 19th century. Elevating the nation to the level of “contemporary civilizations”–also 
perceived and interpreted as the standards of the West–and ensuring integration and 
homogenization in political, economic, social, and cultural spheres at the national level have 
been prevalent and indispensable principles of this process. For this reason, dispersing the 
population and services throughout the whole country and reducing the long-standing and 
inherited disparities between the coastal and inner regions as well as western and eastern 
Turkey have also been of utmost importance for the Turkish state in terms of achieving its 
regional policy as well as modernization goals and objectives.  
A vast number of development plans were formulated and development policies were 
implemented to this end since the 1920s. Designed and implemented in the 1970s, GAP has 
been possibly the most ambitious, sensational, and controversial project among these plans 
and projects that varied in size and significance. It can even be qualified as a utopian project 
due to its colossal scale, ever expanding focus and scope, almost never-ending schedule, and 
comprehensive and rigorous goals and objectives. Put simply, initially GAP was initiated to 
produce hydroelectric energy and irrigate vast arid lands through constructing dozens of 
dams and HPPs on Euphrates and Tigris rivers and extensive irrigation networks in long 
“underdeveloped” and conflict-ridden Southeastern Anatolia Region. Over time, the project 
was given the mission to completely transform the political, social, economic, and cultural 
landscape of the whole GAP region–which corresponded to around 10% of Turkey’s surface 
area–and reshape the mindset and behaviors of its local population–which corresponded to 
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around 10% of Turkey’s population. It has gradually become influential on GAP region and 
infiltrated the lives of the local population not only through development discourses and 
concepts prevalent in master plans, reports, surveys, policy papers, action plans, and 
parliamentary speeches, but also through a wide range of development practices on the 
ground.  
The project was, however, as controversial as it was ambitious and sensational. It 
created not only regional and international controversies such as exacerbating the water 
sharing dispute among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, but also domestic controversies such as 
causing various ecological, social, and humanitarian drawbacks including, but not limited to, 
soil salinization, soil erosion, flooding of historical and cultural sites, and forced internal 
displacement. The supposed role the project was playing in the context of the Kurdish 
question was a source of controversy as well. Also, the project was subjected to criticism 
over time for being overly technical and economic and/or infrastructural development-
focused, turning a blind eye to the genuine and bottom-up needs and demands of its target 
groups, or prioritizing the interests of the state rather than the interests of the local 
population. Despite such undesirable consequences and disappointments, GAP was not 
discredited or abandoned in toto. On the contrary, numerous times the project has been 
redefined, repackaged, and eventually reintroduced as a solution to various socio-economic 
and socio-political problems of GAP region and Turkey.  
This situation was puzzling for several reasons. It was unclear–almost mysterious–
how and why GAP was given a “special,” “untouchable,” and almost “sanctified” status that 
limited debate and deliberation on its usefulness, consequences, and alternatives and 
prevented challenges to its foundations. It was also unclear how every drawback, unintended 
outcome, or “clear” failure could be somehow justified and the project could advance without 
interruption, as if such issues of crucial importance were trivial and irrelevant matters. It was 
both unclear and striking why GAP was perceived and characterized as an objective and 
neutral design while it was leading to political consequences that involved changing power 
dynamics, contestation, dissensus, and similar “thorny” issues. Furthermore, it was unclear 
how and why the unfavorable aspects of GAP or destructive GAP-induced problems never or 
rarely led to the questioning of the project’s rationales, development vision embedded in the 
overall project framework, or the concept of development itself. Combined together, it was 
puzzling how GAP could remain rarely problematized both within policy-making circles and 
in the literature and proceed without its politics, rationales, raison d’etre, modus operandi, 
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and similar crucial, profound, and often overlooked aspects being adequately questioned and 
challenged. 
In order to demystify and untangle this “mystique” around GAP as well as 
development, in this study I aimed my attention primarily at the texts of GAP and 
development. I focused on how both GAP and development were written and narrated in 
legislative documents, policy papers, action plans, reports, surveys, etudes, formal and 
informal discussions, parliamentary debates, speeches, and similar texts that were produced 
by political, bureaucratic, expert, and intellectual elites in various sectors. I concentrated on 
the project’s rationale, vocabulary, assumptions, constructions, and mechanisms. Indeed, 
various aspects of GAP were subjected to evaluation and analysis through different 
approaches in different disciplines in the past. However, studies that examined the project in 
the theoretical guidance of critical development approaches and especially depoliticization– 
both of which questioned the supposed neutrality and universality of development and 
focused on contestation and power relations created or altered by development discourses and 
practices–were very rare. Studies that concentrated on discursive constructions and discursive 
practices in the overall GAP framework together with their multiple ramifications on multiple 
fronts were rare as well. In that sense, GAP remained largely unpacked and uncontested. 
In order to fill this important research gap and introduce a fresh, original, and 
alternative perspective on GAP, in this study I primarily asked the broad question of through 
what kind of discursive and material practices politicians, bureaucrats, experts, and other elite 
groups as the architects of GAP have shaped the design and implementation of the project. I 
also asked the broad question as to how state practices have contributed to depoliticization of 
issues, institutions, and processes in the overall GAP framework. I drew on the 
methodological guidance of qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis methods to 
provide answers to these broad questions as well as related minor questions. In order to make 
a rigorous examination possible and cover every important detail in written and spoken texts 
to the extent possible, I asked what and why questions in addition to how questions regarding 
GAP based on the assumption that they were interlinked and “interstitial.” Since the final 
interpretation and reordering of findings well reflected the what, why, and how of GAP and 
the operation of development–or the development apparatus–in Turkey, I chose to present 
them in the same order. For this reason, in simpler terms, I discussed what GAP used to be in 
the past, has recently become, and would look like in the future; why GAP was initiated; and 
how GAP was designed and implemented in this study. 
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In my empirical analysis, I first examined the historical trajectory of GAP from its 
inception until 2015 as well as oscillations in the modes of its governance over time. I 
demonstrated that GAP has passed through different periods in which GAP was (1) a water 
and land resources development project, (2) a multi-sectoral and integrated project, (3) in 
limbo, (4) a sustainable human development project, (5) a market-based project, and (6) “new 
GAP,” and finally provided a more systematic and accurate analysis of what the project has 
become as of 2015 and what it might look like in the future. My main argument was that 
GAP’s gradual shift from its state-led, technical, engineering, infrastructure-based, 
“economist” or economic development-oriented character to its market-friendly, sustainable, 
participatory, human-centered, social development-oriented character could not be separated 
from the process of how the theory and practice of development have also undergone 
significant changes since the modernization theories of the 1950s to post-development 
approach in the 1990s and 2000s. Global development discourse and its prescribed concepts, 
norms, values, and standards have had a major influence on how the elites as the architects of 
GAP conceived and interpreted development. Just like a cascade or a chain reaction, the way 
they conceived and interpreted development influenced how they “did” development and 
shaped the trajectory of the project. I also demonstrated that GAP, with its current form, 
resembled a flexible and adaptive structure that was constantly redefined, redesigned, and 
rebranded in accordance with contextual necessities, changing conditions, and personal, 
institutional, and national interests. Over time, it has become an empty signifier-like 
container, into which different–even opposite–meanings could be placed in different 
contexts. In this light, I suggested that while GAP was once a concrete project, in its later 
stages it has spawned multiple, amorphous, and loosely-defined GAPs that permeated almost 
every aspect of social life in the whole GAP region, like an omnipresent and ubiquitous 
project. As a final remark, I argued that this fluid structure has played a crucial role in 
bolstering and sustaining the “mystique” of GAP for enabling (1) the justification of 
drawbacks and imperfections of the project at all times and in all contexts, (2) the 
concealment of the project-related imperfections and drawbacks and their implications which 
were in fact political in nature, and (3) the insulation of the project from criticism, 
problematization, and investigation to the extent possible and, thus, maintenance of its 
“special,” “untouchable,” and “sanctified” status. Thus, I provided answers to what GAP 
used to be in the past, has recently become, and would look like in the future. 
Following this, I examined the sources that gave impetus to GAP’s design and 
implementation and rationalized both processes. I demonstrated that even though GAP 
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included a wide range of connected and independent project goals and objectives in a wide 
range of fields, the major impetus and rationalization of GAP originated from broader and 
more complex sources, which were (1) the rectification of differences of GAP region, (2) the 
admiration of the West and Western development trajectory, and (3) the pursuit of 
development and betterment at the expense of destruction. I also demonstrated that 
rationalizing GAP on these grounds was not without implications. My main argument was 
that the perception of GAP region as different from the rest of the country due primarily to 
the so-called ignorance and traditional lifestyle of its local population was a strong 
motivation for the architects of GAP to normalize the differences and “fix the abnormalities.” 
The outcome of this was not only the otherization and infantilization of the local population, 
but also the legitimization of development interventions exogenously imposed in a top-down 
manner without adequately taking the needs, demands, and concerns of the local population 
into account. I also argued that the aspiration to “look at the West, look like the West, despite 
the West” and the belief that emulating the development experience of the West was 
imperative to achieve this aspiration deeply motivated the architects of GAP to initiate the 
project. This, however, led to the otherization of whatever and whoever deemed as “non-
Western” and the emergence of a nationalist and ethnocentric–or Turco-centric–tendency to 
imagine GAP as the embodiment of “Turkishness” and concrete proof of Turkey’s level of 
development and “greatness” vis-à-vis the West. I further argued that the will and ambition to 
ensure progress and development–or betterment in a broader sense–at the expense of 
counterproductive and even destructive consequences also contributed to the rationalization 
of GAP’s initiation. The implications of this were the normalization of development-induced 
destruction on many fronts and reinforcement of the narrow and “economist” idea that 
development was solely about material and financial gains. These sources and their 
implications indicated that even though GAP has undergone significant changes through the 
course of the project, the modernist interpretation of development and many features of 
modernization theories remained embedded and largely unchanged in the overall GAP 
framework. My final argument was that the three major rationales behind GAP helped the 
preservation of the “mystique” of GAP and its “sanctified” status, as the higher goals these 
rationales prescribed allowed (1) the representation of GAP as a vital and noble cause which 
no one should object, (2) its characterization as a neutral undertaking that would supposedly 
benefit all and benefit all equally in all contexts, (3) the justification of both the means and 
ends of GAP without being subjected to public debate or deliberation, and (4) obscuration of 
the problematic and often political aspects of development-cum-GAP while highlighting its 
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certain rosy and positive contributions in a highly selective manner. Thus, I provided answers 
to the question as to why GAP was initiated. 
Finally, I identified and examined the sources that contributed to the governance of 
GAP in a depoliticized mode and formed the basis of depoliticizing implications of the 
project. Accordingly, I illustrated that there was not only one, single, and simple source of 
depoliticization in the overall project framework. Instead, depoliticization originated from 
various complex and interrelated sources, which I identified as (1) the employment of 
technical language, (2) the dominance of experts and expert knowledge, (3) the 
neoliberalization of GAP and “biopoliticization” of its character, (4) the 
“developmentalization” of the Kurdish question, and (5) the extension of the visibility and 
authority of the state in the guise of GAP. I also illustrated that there was not only one, 
uniform type of depoliticization in GAP’s context. It rather took different forms such as the 
negation of antagonisms (e.g., replacing dissensus-based discourses on conflict with 
consensus-based discourses on development), redefinition of political issues and conflicts 
along the lines of economics and morality (e.g., perceiving the Kurdish question as an 
“underdevelopment” problem), erosion of agency (e.g., extending the project to infiltrate all 
aspects of life and perceiving it as a perpetual process), and transferring of blame, 
responsibility, and costs to other people, institutions, or phenomena that were considered to 
be beyond human agency and control (e.g., placing the responsibility and burdens of GAP-
induced drawbacks to farmers or policy changes in the project to globalization). Indeed, both 
the sources and types of depoliticization were not constant and fixed; they were rather 
flexible and dynamic. For this reason, I argued that depoliticization could be better 
interpreted not as a conclusive and terminal stage in which issues, institutions, and people 
stayed depoliticized forever, but instead as a continuous and fluid process in which 
depoliticizing, politicizing, and repoliticizing forces competed, conflicted, and balanced each 
other. In the guidance of the argument above and also the strong and accurate claim that in 
any setting contestation or power dynamics could not be completely eradicated but could 
only be obscured or repressed at best, I suggested that GAP and the depoliticized issues under 
its umbrella would also be pushed out from the supposedly neutral domain they were in and 
become contested and repoliticized in the later stages of the project. In the end, I argued that 
the governance of GAP in a depoliticized mode and contribution of the project to 
technicization and neutralization of political phenomena also nurtured the “mystique” of 
GAP and strengthened its “untouchable” status, as these factors facilitated (1) the spread and 
consolidation of the idea that GAP was “above” and “beyond” politics and therefore 
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incontestable, (2) the concentration of power and authority in the hands of the elites and 
placement of responsibility and burdens to the non-elites, (3) the construction of a reality in 
which it was almost a moral imperative to provide automatic and unconditional support to the 
project and everything it would bring while remaining silent about anything it would take 
away, and (4) the circulation of regulatory power in a Foucaldian manner to achieve people’s 
voluntary participation to the development process. Thus, I provided answers to the question 
as to how GAP was designed and implemented. Both the demystification of the “mystique” 
of GAP especially regarding how the project could remain unproblematized and uncontested 
and examination of the project from an alternative perspective provided a number of 
important and illuminating inferences on the idea, discourse, and practice of development as 
well as GAP, as will be discussed below.  
8.2. Main Inferences About the Concept of Development and GAP 
Needless to say, the inferences below about development and GAP were formulated on the 
basis of my own interpretation and examination of the collected data as well as previous 
literature on development and GAP. They are by no means absolute truths; their number, 
content, and focus might indeed change depending on the context in which–and by whom–
they are reinterpreted and reexamined. Also, it is important to note that these inferences do 
not automatically and necessarily suggest that development has been nothing but a “devilish” 
conspiracy planned in the meeting rooms of international development institutions, aid 
agencies, or government institutions to inflict deliberate harm on certain people in certain 
geographies. They do not suggest that development unconditionally and irrevocably “fails” 
whenever, wherever, and however implemented and leads to catastrophe at all times. Neither 
they overshadow successful cases in which development actually worked and changed the 
lives of the poor and powerless people all around the world. They rather suggest that it would 
be misleading and inadequate to conceptualize development as a neutral, apolitical, 
indisputable, and almost sacrosanct phenomenon that should have a universal meaning, 
always lead to a positive and favorable change, and always bring equal benefits to all 
stakeholders and beneficiaries or everyone in a society. In contrast to this conceptualization, 
they indicate that development has been value-laden and power-loaded and its impacts and 
outcomes have varied depending on historical, geographical, and contextual specificities and 
conditions, as will be discussed in greater detail below. 
8.2.1. Inference 1: Development Lacks a Conceptual Precision and Fixed Content  
An important inference drawn from the study is that how states, governmental and non-
governmental institutions, and local communities perceived and interpreted development has 
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become so diverse that development came to mean anything and everything at the same time 
over time (see Chapter 5). Just as an empty signifier signified a totality or a universality, 
development came to signify the utilization of water resources, construction of infrastructure, 
increase in agricultural production and productivity, increase in income level, improvement 
in socio-economic indicators, transformation of the traditional into modern, sustainability, 
social inclusion, self-sufficiency, entrepreneurship, security, good governance, freedom, 
democracy, and an infinite number of similar–and also dissimilar–concepts and processes 
simultaneously in different contexts. Apparently, while development has always remained 
intact as a signifier, different concepts or processes were included into, reinterpreted within, 
or excluded from the pool of signifieds in different periods in accordance with the 
continuities and discontinuities in the theory and practice of development. However, it can be 
argued that it was to a certain extent this imprecise and umbrella-like character that made the 
constant redefinition and reproduction of development possible and, thus, allowed 
development to proceed anywhere and anytime without much contestation and resistance. 
The vagueness and ambiguity of development-related mobilizing concepts such as 
participation, partnership, and governance facilitated the concealment of ideological 
differences and compromise of many different interests (Mosse, 2005, p. 230). Development 
was “in the eye of the beholder” and could be filled with any content whatsoever depending 
on the context. In the words of Eade (2010), development, or “developmentspeak,” has been 
simultaneously  
descriptive and normative, concrete and yet aspirational, intuitive and clunkily 
pedestrian, capable of expressing the most deeply held convictions or of being simply 
“full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” This very elasticity makes it almost the 
ideal post-modern medium, even as it embodies a modernizing agenda (pp. viii-ix). 
 It can also be inferred that GAP in its latest form is devoid of well-defined limits and 
a fixed content. Indeed, the project was not monolithic and comprised a large number of 
different subprojects in a wide range of spheres from the beginning. Still, widening of its 
focus and scope as well as its redefinition(s) gradually blurred the line between what the 
project covered and what it excluded. In line with their international, national, institutional, 
and even personal interests, involved development actors and institutions that operated at the 
global, national, regional, and local levels attached different meanings to both GAP and 
development to reap different benefits out of their subjective characterization, such as 
legitimacy in international relations (e.g., water sharing dispute among Turkey, Syria, and 
Iraq), flow of resources (e.g., different amounts of budget allocated to DSİ, DPT, and GAP-
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BKİ), political support (e.g., attraction of votes), or bureaucratic influence (e.g., turf wars 
among institutions to have the upper hand in the steering of the project). The projects could 
have as well been separately and independently signified and handled by their own merits 
without being subsumed under the banner of GAP. Had this been the case, however, quite 
possibly GAP would not have attracted a vast amount of material and human resources and 
retained its promising and alluring image over decades. In that sense, the imprecise and fickle 
character of GAP has actually allowed the project to continue incessantly by constantly 
reproducing the project and maintaining its legitimacy and powerful image. 
8.2.2. Inference 2: Development Tends to Simplify and Homogenize 
Another inference about development is that development has generally tended to simplify 
and homogenize for a more convenient and straightforward operationalization process (see 
Chapter 6). It often took a shortcut and viewed continents, countries, regions, and populations 
as single units. For instance, development recipes were prescribed mostly to “save” a whole 
continent (e.g., Africa), “reconstruct” a group of countries (e.g., Western European countries 
as in Marshall Plan), “promote the development” of a whole region (e.g., Hokkaido in Japan), 
“rapidly transform” a whole society (e.g., Great Leap Forward in China) without necessarily 
breaking these large units into smaller units. Even when it was done and more specific 
recipes were prescribed to develop “the local communities,” “the powerless,” “the poor,” “the 
disadvantaged,” or “the backward,” it was not clearly specified who exactly was meant by 
these easy labels. Such simplifications were often based on documentary, static, personal 
(e.g., migration patterns) or impersonal (e.g., the length of highways built each year) 
aggregate facts and observations of only specific aspects of social life that would serve the 
official interests and benefit “officials … to group citizens in ways that permit them to make 
a collective assessment” (Scott, 1998, p. 80). However, regardless of how functional and 
operational such simplified and homogenized “snapshots” of beneficiaries and target groups 
of development projects might be, the questions that concerned their lives had to be as 
detailed, differentiated, and sensitive as possible. As Ferguson (1994) underlined in his work 
on Lesotho (see Chapter 2 for more details), for instance, “they” in the often-asked question 
of “what should they do?” did not say much because  
[t]he inhabitants of Lesotho [did] not share the same interests or the same 
circumstances, and they [did] not act as a single unit. … When the “developers” 
spoke of such a collectivity (“they,” “the Basotho,” “Lesotho”) what they meant was 
usually the government. But the government of Lesotho [was] of course not identical 
with the people who live[d] in Lesotho, nor [was] it in any of the established senses 
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“representative” of that collectivity. … [T]he interests represented by governmental 
elites in a country like Lesotho [were] not congruent with those of the governed … 
“The people” [were] not an undifferentiated mass. Rich and poor, women and men, 
city dwellers and villagers, workers and dependents, old and young; all confront[ed] 
different problems and devise[d] different strategies for dealing with them (pp. 280-
281). 
It is possible to infer that GAP has not been free from the homogenizing and 
simplifying implications of development, either. As emphasized before, GAP region was far 
from being monolithic; there were significant political, economic, social, and cultural 
divergences among nine provinces in the region, townships in each province, villages under 
each township, the local population in each locality, and men, women, children, disabled, 
poor, rich, Turkish, and Kurdish in each community (see Chapter 4). Indeed, it would be 
unfair to claim that there was absolutely no effort to differentiate among different subregions 
in GAP region and different subgroups of the local population in the overall project 
framework. Still, it is difficult to assert that the multiplicity of identities, interests, needs, and 
worldviews of the local population was acknowledged to an extent that policies were 
specifically tailored according to subgroups and individuals. In other words, an approach that 
would pay the utmost attention to what kind of challenges, risks, potentials, and prospects 
development-cum-GAP would create for different groups, subgroups, and individuals and 
take into consideration how development-cum-GAP would create and alter power dynamics 
among these groups was missing or weak at best within GAP framework. 
8.2.3. Inference 3: Development Tends to be Authoritarian 
Another significant inference about development is that development has had authoritarian 
implications, as it has often been a design or process in which there was one side who 
instructed the other side on what to do, what not to do, and how to or how not to do whatever 
it was deemed necessary to be done (see Chapter 7). This power imbalance took multiple 
forms within which international development institutions provided prescriptions for 
governments (e.g., SAP and austerity measures imposed by IMF), governments provided 
prescriptions for their domestic institutions (e.g., the neoliberal restructuring of education, 
health, and security sectors), and domestic institutions provided prescriptions for the target 
groups of development (e.g., development programs based on PRA or microcredit schemes). 
Similar hierarchical power relations between the West and the East, Global North and Global 
South, developed countries and developing countries, or experts and non-experts persisted as 
well. It has almost always been the case that development concepts, norms, standards, and 
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even the concept itself originated from one or a few centers and dispersed in a unidirectional 
manner. They were either borrowed and put into practice as they were or borrowed and 
adapted to national, regional, or local conditions to a certain extent, while the core philosophy 
and objectives behind them often remained intact and unchallenged.  
In addition, development has involved intervening in people’s lives and shaping their 
preferences regardless of whether they agreed or disagreed with the instructions and 
prescriptions provided to them (see Chapter 6). Despite the entrance of participatory 
development, bottom-up development, “farmers first” approach, and similar notions into the 
lexicon of development actors and institutions long time ago, the hierarchy between “the top” 
and “the bottom” has remained relatively constant. Even when the needs, demands, and 
concerns of stakeholders and beneficiaries were taken into consideration and negotiated, it 
has always been “the top” who set the rules and limits of this negotiation process and “the 
bottom” who had to abide by these rules. In other words, the relationship in which one side 
assumed the active role of “the developer” and made the “push” for change from outside and 
the other side was given the passive role of “to be developed” and dependent on an external 
force for change continued to exist.  
Authoritarian implications of development were discernable in the overall GAP 
framework as well. Despite the significant shifts in the project’s governance and intensified 
efforts to include both disadvantaged and powerless groups into the development process and 
local voices and perspectives into the planning process, the power has remained concentrated 
in the elites as the architects of the project (see Chapter 7). From the beginning of the project 
until its current stage, they have wielded the power and authority to formulate and implement 
policies on behalf of the local population; control the pace, direction, and resources of the 
project; and decide on “what is to be done” or “what ‘they’ should do” in a normative 
manner. As it has been the case with many other recent development or urban renewal 
projects in Turkey, generally participation was either only on paper; done at a very late stage 
of projects after almost all decisions were made without consulting to public; or done with a 
very limited number of people whose representativeness was questionable. It has been mostly 
the case that projects were not adapted to priorities of people, but instead people adapted 
themselves to the consequences of projects even involuntarily, as witnessed in flooding, 
displacement, and planned resettlement cases.    
8.2.4. Inference 4: Development Tends to Depoliticize 
One notable inference drawn from the study is that development has had depoliticizing 
implications due to a number of reasons. Without repeating what has already been discussed 
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on the relationship between development and depoliticization (see Chapter 2 & 7), suffice it 
to say that development has been largely conceptualized and implemented as a neutral and 
technical enterprise which would eventually lead to a process or condition without 
contestation and confrontation. Even though many development-related concepts were 
considered “essentially contested”–which roughly implied that there was an agreement on 
what they meant in theory, but at the same time an endless disagreement on what they meant 
in practice–their contestability in the development lexicon was often flattened and obscured 
(Cornwall, 2010, p. 2). In a sense, development has often banished politics and turned a blind 
eye to the political and/or conflictual aspects of issues, processes, and power dynamics in the 
process of development. The fresh, transformed condition to be attained after the successful 
implementation of development practices had to be devoid of chaos, disorder, friction, and 
similar “inconveniences” that would harm its orderliness and sterility. The incongruities and 
inconsistencies had to be smoothed and oppositional voices and spaces of dissent had to be 
erased (Crush, 1995, p. 2). However, attaining development in such a smooth and 
straightforward mode has been almost impossible; every intervention led to the distortion of 
power relations. It produced winners and losers and provides benefits–if any at all–to “haves” 
and “have-nots” in different ways. In a zero-sum fashion, someone’s gain might be someone 
else’s loss, or vice versa. Such processes have inevitably involved conflict, disagreement, 
dispute, clash of interests, discursive battles, and similar struggles in varying degrees. In 
other words, the notions of power and contestation occupied a central position in the 
development process and conflictual relations and could not be easily and totally removed. 
Still, politicization or repoliticization of development was always possible and even 
necessary in order for development to genuinely “work” and endure. Any development 
intervention in which “who gets what, when, how” was not adequately taken into 
consideration and political antagonism was neutralized or suppressed was less likely to bring 
the expected benefits and lead to the expected outcomes, if not completely end up in 
catastrophe. Therefore, even though it has been widely accepted that science, technicity, 
rationality, expert knowledge, and similar elements constituted the grounds of development’s 
so-called neutrality and gave little or no room for the political to emerge, alternative routes 
such as traditional practices, local knowledge-based approaches, homegrown initiatives, 
grassroots alternatives, and solidarity movements can pose a challenge to these elements and 
promote the repoliticization of development.  
As discussed in Chapter 7, it can be inferred that GAP was also narrated and 
implemented largely in a depoliticized mode. The interpretation of development in the overall 
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project framework has been mostly technical and at times biopolitical; contestation was 
therefore minimized to the extent possible. The idea that development was a neutral and a 
positive process that brought equal benefits to everyone without causing any friction has 
occupied a dominant position throughout the project. Arguably, the primary aim of GAP has 
not been to converge and eventually equalize wealth and power of the “haves” and “have-
nots” at the expense of engaging in politics and distorting power relations. Rather, it was 
aimed to ensure the development of each group without necessarily interfering in contested 
and thorny matters such as who actually reaped the benefits of the project, how they 
benefited from the project, how just or unjust development process was, or what kind of 
unintended and undesirable consequences the project led to. The viewpoint of an expert from 
GAP-BKİ on the problem of income and land ownership inequality in GAP region succinctly 
sums up this claim, as she explains that 
You don’t have the right to intervene. Large landowners, landlords, tribes… Look, I 
don’t like the hatred against the rich. God gave him plenty. He gave me little. You 
don’t have to turn against the rich for this. What can I do if that wealth is acquired not 
by theft, falsification, and illicit [haram] activities but in lawful [helal] ways? … For 
instance, I am completely against land reform. The state cannot confiscate anyone’s 
property. My property is mine. Your property is yours. I am absolutely against it.172  
8.2.5. Inference 5: Development Tends to Legitimize 
It can also be inferred from the study that development has been a “legitimization machine” 
as much as it has been an “anti-politics” machine. Development has had an immense power 
to legitimize interventions imposed from outside, controversial and risky policy decisions, 
destructive outcomes that might arise during or at the end of the development process, and 
similar undesired situations (see Chapter 6). Even the word development itself–along with 
progress, growth, and improvement–tended to have positive, optimistic, and rosy 
connotations and was often associated with a better and improved future. For this reason, 
development has evolved into an almost magical and mythical concept no one should 
challenge and oppose, as it would be simply preposterous and even vicious to question such a 
neutral, benevolent, and idealistic enterprise. Thanks to this “shield from criticism” and 
legitimizing power, severe environmental, social, and cultural problems induced by 
development interventions were often normalized as the “inevitable” side effect or “natural” 
                                                
172 Personal interview, April 22, 2014, Ankara, Turkey. 
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cost of development and change. Even though they were serious problems with serious 
consequences, the tendency was to tolerate them on the grounds that they resembled “labor 
pain,” “treatment,” “breaking the eggs,” “sacrifice for a greater good,” and similar situations 
in which supposedly one had to suffer first to attain a brighter future. In that sense, 
legitimizing power of development has not only masked the other, dark, untold, and maybe 
the “real” side of development, but also functioned as a motor of the process through 
reframing even the catastrophic failures as a price to be paid and shifting blame on some 
other sources, but never on the idea and practice of development itself despite its impacts and 
consequences.  
Many controversial policies and the discontent of the local population were also 
legitimized through similar mechanisms in the overall GAP framework. Even though the 
problems of soil salinization, soil erosion, waterlogging, deforestation, internal displacement, 
flooding of historical sites, and changing land ownership patterns were acknowledged and 
addressed to a certain extent, the general tendency at the state, government, and institutional 
level has been to consider such destructive outcomes as inherent in and necessary for 
development. Since they were normalized and legitimized as such, GAP could maintain its 
legitimacy in the eyes of both its architects and the local population and run on for decades 
despite all its drawbacks and limited trickle-down effects. Development could remain 
unquestioned and unchallenged through the same mechanism as well. In other words, while a 
myriad of GAP-related problems were highlighted and different sets of recommendations 
were proposed for the better design and implementation of the project in the past, the 
possibility that the genuine problem might lie not in how development was practiced, but 
how it was interpreted was often overlooked due to the legitimizing power of development.  
8.2.6. Inference 6: Development is Better Interpreted in Relative, not Absolute Terms 
The final inference from the study is that it would be more accurate and elucidative to 
consider success, failure, strength, weakness, impact, influence, and similar notions 
employed to assess whether development “worked” or development projects were “effective” 
as relative, not absolute terms. Arguably, the discrepancies between development theory and 
practice, development planning and implementation, development expectations and outcomes 
have gradually widened since the inception of the development concept. Part of these gaps 
stemmed from the assumption that indicators and criteria of the notions of success, failure, or 
impact were well-defined and universally agreed upon. Understood this way, when 
development projects–often standardized and selected from an existing repertoire of past 
development projects and experiences–fell short of fulfilling a long list of prescribed norms, 
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they were automatically denigrated and stigmatized as failure. However, it was often 
overlooked that the verdict of success or failure would be different in case the very same 
project would be assessed in the light of another set of criteria in accordance with contextual 
realities and more personalized, micro-level challenges. It was also often overlooked that 
where one sat determines what one saw; the perception of success and failure in the eyes of 
those who initiated development and those who were selected “to be developed” might 
completely differ. In this context, the questions as to whose perspective constituted the basis 
of the assessment–and why–had to also be asked and satisfactorily answered. It is noteworthy 
that Mosse (2005) also viewed the matter from a different perspective and argued that 
development projects  
[were] “successful” not because they turn[ed] design into reality, but because they 
sustain[ed] policy models offering a significant interpretation of events. … 
Development proceed[ed] not only (or primarily) from policy to practice, but also 
from practice to policy. Correspondingly, project failure [was] not the failure to turn 
designs into reality; but the consequence of a certain disarticulation between 
practices, their rationalizing models and overarching policy frameworks. Failure 
[was] not a failure to implement the plan, but a failure of interpretation (pp. 181-182). 
Therefore, taking according to whose perspective and interests development was 
interpreted and practiced into consideration might contribute to the redefinition of some 
subjective development-related concepts. This might also manage expectations about the 
“successful” practice of development and reduce disappointments for the “failures” that were 
maybe not failures at all. Thus, the constructed discrepancies or gaps between different 
phenomena would also be diminished.  
GAP, too, is better interpreted in relative, not absolute terms. The assessment of the 
project as such might provide a fresh and different picture of the project and illustrate how 
interpretations can vary depending on the position of the speaker and context in which the 
project is assessed. For instance, when the impacts of GAP were subjected to debate, it is by 
and large the case that these impacts were expressed in binary terms–negative and positive 
(see Chapter 6). However, it often goes untold from whose perspective these impacts were 
concluded as negative or positive. The assessments of the project impacts by a farmer who 
quadrupled his/her income after the extension of irrigation systems, a family who had to 
leave their village due to the impoundment of dam reservoirs, a pregnant woman who had a 
chance to see a doctor for the first time in her entire life, a seasonal worker who lost his/her 
job opportunity after increased agricultural mechanization, a civil engineer at DSİ, a 
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sociologist at GAP-BKİ, an economist at the Ministry of Development, and a foreign service 
officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all differ. So does the “negativity” and “positivity” 
degrees of these impacts. Given this, the debate can take a new form and binary terms can 
lose their meaning if the very same impacts are reinterpreted from different perspectives and 
under different circumstances. Similarly, the question as to whether GAP has been a success 
story or a failure–which resembles the question whether the glass is half empty or half full–
can also be answered in relative terms. Rigid definitions of and generic claims on success and 
failure might be misleading. For instance, according to Scott (1998, pp. 4-5), there were four 
elements whose combination would turn state-led social engineering into a tragedy: 
administrative ordering of nature and society, high-modernist ideology, an authoritarian state 
with a will to use coercion to realize its high-modernist goals, and a weak civil society with 
inadequate capacity to show resistance against these plans and designs. Even though GAP 
more or less fits to this description, it would be unfair to qualify the project as a tragedy or a 
complete failure. Also, ironically, in the absence of an ideal to reorder nature and society, a 
strong state tradition, and a society that lacked self-sufficiency, a project of GAP’s scale 
would not/could not be initiated anyway. In this case, the elements of tragedy or failure are 
actually raison d’etre of the project, which once again illustrates the subjective nature of both 
development and metrics to assess success and failure. Indeed, all of these inferences also 
had a number of practical implications concerning GAP and other similar development 
projects worldwide, as will be discussed below.  
8.3. Implications for GAP and Development Practice  
To reiterate, the main concern of the study is not to franchise the idea that development 
“stinks” (Esteva, 1985, p. 78, as cited in Pieterse, 2000, p. 176). It does not conceptualize 
development as a “malignant myth” whose pursuit has become threatening for people. 
Neither does it argue that development “failed miserably” all around the world (p. 176) and 
that “[t]he time is ripe to write its obituary” (Sachs, 2010, p. xv). In other words, the study 
does not advocate anti-development; it rather emphasizes the possibility and necessity of 
imagining and practicing development–or any endeavor to improve human conditions–in 
more critical, different, and alternative ways. Based on these premises, the study also 
provides practical insights on how to–or how not to–think of development and execute it. 
To elaborate on the practical implications of this study in specific relation to GAP, 
one of the main concerns of the state elites who were involved in the design and 
implementation process of GAP has been to accomplish the project goals and objectives as 
quickly and efficiently as possible. To this end, a considerable number of master plans, action 
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plans, reports, surveys, studies, and similar policy-oriented documents were produced and a 
considerable number of changes were made in terms of how the project could be better 
administered and implemented (see Chapter 5). However, a critical look at written texts on 
GAP–especially policy documents–reveals that over time each text has become some sort of 
a repetition or extended version of the previous texts. Almost all the texts that were 
enthusiastically reintroduced as  “latest” or “novel” and in which GAP was referred to as 
“new” and “different” were actually not as original as they were presented. In that sense, the 
constant renewal, redefinition, and rebranding of GAP resembled “an institutional 
Groundhog day in which every decade or two similar pronouncements [were] repackaged by 
a new generation of aid administrators and presented afresh as the way forward” (Duffield, 
2007, p. 227, as cited in Ziai, 2016, p. 222). To put it differently, the efforts to accomplish the 
project goals and objectives were concentrated not on changing the imagination and practice 
of development, but on changing the means of attaining “development as usual,” imagined 
and practiced in mainstream and “classical” terms. For this reason, neither alternatives of 
development nor alternatives to development were genuinely sought and found. While the 
means of development were challenged and questioned to a certain extent, the end of 
development remained largely uncontested and intact. It is also noteworthy that over time 
both the architects of GAP and the local population in GAP region have become aware of the 
limits of the project and the difficulty of reaping its benefits in the short term. The ambitions 
of the people–both stakeholders and beneficiaries–and the fate of the project became 
disconnected and the project came to have “fewer and fewer pots and pans tied to its tail, 
[made] a smaller noise and awaken[ed] fewer people of less importance (Latour, 1996, p. 
137, as cited in Mosse, 2005, p. 184). The once almost magical allure of the project was 
replaced by monotony and the hopes and excitement of the local population were replaced by 
disappointment and discontent over the years, leading to a “development fatigue.” Given this 
context, this study suggests that it is futile to allocate more time, effort, and resources for the 
sake of attaining “more” and “better” development within the limits of the current 
interpretation of development embedded in the overall GAP framework. Therefore, from an 
optimistic perspective, first and foremost the study exemplifies a challenge to the ossified 
beliefs about development and encourages the acknowledgement of the concept not as a 
purely neutral, technical, and apolitical enterprise and process within GAP and similar large-
scale development projects worldwide.  
The study also reinforces the idea that the added value of describing every endeavor 
to improve human conditions under the banner of development and carrying out these 
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activities in the name of development is questionable and limited. For this reason, it might 
contribute to the construction of a new language to reframe GAP and its different 
components and rescale its focus and scope. GAP as a label can be abandoned and GAP as a 
project can be dismantled so that many different projects that were designed to irrigate lands, 
raise the quality of life, or encourage entrepreneurship can be carried out autonomously and 
liberated from the overly bureaucratic and hegemonic development-cum-GAP apparatus. 
After all, many would agree that GAP has been overused and lost its functional meaning to a 
great extent. Channeling efforts and redirecting resources to carry out the existing schemes in 
the proposed manner would give a fresh impetus to the processes of change and improvement 
in the region. Such a profound change would by no means mark the end of development, 
change, progress, and similar processes. On the contrary, it would rather mark the end of the 
homogenizing, authoritarian, depoliticizing, and legitimizing implications of both 
development and GAP or at least reduce their impacts. It would also mark the abandonment 
of the techno-scientific development paradigm that provides generous benefits to states, 
governments, and already powerful groups but only limited benefits to people who must be 
the actual target of improvement schemes for their limited power and agency.  
 In addition, the study highlights that the role power plays before, during, and after the 
initiation of GAP or similar projects in different geographies in the world is generally 
overlooked. This awareness might lead to the placement of power dynamics at the crux of 
improvement schemes and prevent their concealment through various means. For instance, in 
future policy implementations different identities might not be concealed through vague 
terms such as “the local communities” or “the people of the region,” but instead openly 
expressed as Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Sunni, Alevi, and Assyrian. Positive and negative changes 
or betterments and deteriorations might not be reduced to numbers, percentages, statistics, 
charts, and graphs, but instead narrated more qualitatively and more comprehensively to 
provide a multidimensional picture of how people are better or worse off after interventions. 
Beneficiaries might not be concealed through generic terms such as “farmers,” “villagers,” or 
“women,” but instead examined more closely and broken down into smaller groups. Such 
critical questions might be asked: Can large landowners, sharecroppers, and landless people 
all be grouped as farmers, while they greatly differ in power and influence? Can Turkish, 
Kurdish, and Arabic villagers all be grouped as villagers, while there are stark differences 
among their traditions, values, and interests? Can a child bride in a remote village, an 
illiterate woman in a town, and a businesswoman in a city all be grouped as women, while 
they all face different challenges in different settings? Taking such power dynamics into 
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consideration and unpacking concepts and terms to the extent possible might contribute to the 
distribution of power among different groups more evenly and mitigate the turbulent effects 
of the processes of development and change.     
Finally, the study suggests that prescribing techno-scientific and techno-managerial 
solutions to problems–or issues that are framed as problems from a technical perspective–that 
actually embody complex political, social, psychological factors has been counterproductive 
in the context of GAP and arguably similar development projects. As mentioned above, such 
solutions often provide more and mainly economic benefits to states and governments than 
they do to people despite the widespread claim that the former carries out development 
activities for the prosperity and happiness of the latter. Even if they provide benefits to 
people, their impacts are not often long-term due to the mismatch between the technical lens 
at the supply side and the non-technical lens at the demand side. This mismatch can also be 
viewed as a clash between rational and emotion-based perspectives, scientific and traditional 
practices, “textbook” definitions and real life possibilities, and construction and reality. In 
this context, the study might help the acknowledgement of this mismatch as one of the key 
challenges to be addressed and overcome for the successful and legitimate implementation of 
GAP and similar projects. It might also contribute to the abandonment of technicity as a point 
of departure to address problems that are loaded with complex and intertwined socio-political 
factors that defy easy and straightforward solutions. The question as to how the theoretical 
contributions and practical implications of the study can be expanded further in the future 
will be discussed below.  
8.4. Future Research 
With its emphasis on the need to take a critical stance against the taken-for-granted and 
sterile conceptions regarding GAP and neutralized, technicized, and power-free 
interpretations of development, the study makes an original contribution to development 
studies literature as well as the literature on Turkish studies and GAP. However, the findings 
indicate that the limitations of the current research can be strengthened through future 
research in four major areas. Concentrating on these areas would not only complete the 
“puzzle” regarding the examination of GAP in the guidance of critical development 
approaches, but also contribute to the formulation of a larger framework that can be 
employed to examine other similar large-scale development projects in Turkey and also other 
geographies in the world.  
First, more research that combines empirical data and valuable insights and 
experiences of experts, consultants, specialists, researchers, and project team members who 
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served their institutions for years and contributed to the initiation of GAP in their own or 
institutions’ capacity should be conducted directly by these practitioners. It is disappointing–
but also understandable given the circumstances and conditions under which they work–to 
see that a limited number of scholarly and/or critical works were produced by practitioners 
who were engaged in GAP under DSİ, DPT, GAP-BKİ, or similar institutions. In the 
meantime, however, their counterparts who were affiliated with various development-related 
institutions such as Oxfam, DFID, United States Agency for International Development, the 
World Bank, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of dominantly Western European 
countries have conducted groundbreaking ethnographic and anthropological studies 
especially after the 1990s. Especially the ethnography of GAP should be examined by 
practitioners who know the bureaucracy and state mechanisms very well and can provide 
perspectives “from inside” regarding how development has been practiced and the Turkish 
development apparatus has operated. Such qualitative studies would better illustrate the 
similarities and mismatches between not only development theory and practice, but also 
project designs made behind the walls of governmental buildings and the “realities,” 
prospects, and challenges on the ground. After all, for some “the most important political 
effects of a planned intervention may occur unconsciously, behind the backs or against the 
wills of the ‘planners’ who may seem to be running the show” (Ferguson, 1994, p. 20). Such 
studies would also better reveal what kind of inter- and intra-institutional and inter- and intra-
elite dynamics have existed within GAP and what kind of functions they had in the 
negotiation process of the project since its inception. 
 The second area to concentrate would be the inclusion of local voices and 
perspectives to a larger extent into studies similar to the current one. This can be achieved in 
two ways. First, considering that the elites vary in power and type, future studies should 
focus more on local, “mid-range” elites such as local politicians, local bureaucrats, local 
journalists, or civil society representatives and examine their perceptions of development-
cum-GAP as well as interactions with “high-level” elites and the local population. While 
discourses of politicians and bureaucrats at the ministry, parliamentary, or undersecretary 
level without a doubt provide credible and valuable insights, incorporating less official and 
locally more influential voices and perspectives into the analysis would add a different 
dimension to the study and better reflect the local understandings and experiences regarding 
GAP and development. Second, future studies should focus more on through what kind of 
discursive practices the local population or laypeople–differentiated among different groups 
and subgroups–have narrated the project. This would be illuminating in terms of exploring 
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their subjective understandings and perceptions of the project in particular and development 
in general; examining whether or how especially global development discourses trickle down 
from the “top” to the “bottom;” revealing what kind of mismatches exist between the 
perceptions, expectations, and realities of “the developers” and “to be developed;” and 
discussing the reasons behind “the lack of emancipation of large groups of people” and their 
structural causes (Schuurman, 2009, p. 836). Thus, more accurate explanations to the 
questions as to how development is put into effect from project to practice and how it creates 
beneficiaries and losers can be provided.  
Third, just as this study focused on depoliticizing implications of development and 
GAP, a follow-up study should be conducted to examine politicizing implications of the 
project and its politicization process. As noted before, politicization and depoliticization are 
not static conditions; they are rather dynamic and fluid processes. Given this, the focus on the 
depoliticization side of the continuum should be complemented with research that focuses on 
the politicization side as well as past and rare repoliticization attempts in the overall project 
framework. This would provide a complete picture of how GAP has been influenced by 
politicizing and depoliticizing forces and swayed from one end to another–or not–over the 
years. This would also provide an opportunity to compare and contrast both politicized and 
depoliticized modes of governance in terms of their functionality and efficiency in 
development practice and prevent waste of resources through reducing the number of “trial 
and error” type of development interventions.  
 Finally, similar theoretical framework, methodology, and research questions can be 
employed to examine other large-scale development projects within Turkey such as Eastern 
Anatolia Project, Eastern Black Sea Project, and Konya Plains Project. Projects of smaller 
scale in Turkey or similar large-scale projects all around the world such as Narmada Valley 
Project in India, Three Gorges Dam in China, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in Pakistan, 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia, or the Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia 
Transport Corridor in Kenya can also be examined through the same guiding principles. Such 
works would not only reveal a more complete picture of the development vision, aspirations, 
and practices of the Turkish state, but also provide an opportunity to make comparisons 
across different development experiences worldwide and draw conclusions out of convergent 
and divergent patterns. 
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173 See Chapter 3 for the criteria used to select these proceedings. Proceedings are sorted in chronological order. 
Bold indicates proceedings that were included in the analysis. 
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148  19 6 1 49 13/3/1992 148 
149  19 6 1 51 15/3/1992 210 
150  19 6 1 52 16/3/1992 168 
151  19 7 1 53 17/3/1992 168 
152  19 7 1 54 18/3/1992 170 
153  19 7 1 56 20/3/1992 270 
154  19 8 1 57 21/3/1992 124 
155  19 8 1 59 23/3/1992 154 
156  19 8 1 61 25/3/1992 180 
157  19 9 1 66 21/4/1992 98 
158  19 14 1 89 26/6/1992 146 
159  19 14 1 92 2/7/1992 266 
160  19 16 1 97 28/8/1992 198 
161  19 17 2 1 1/9/1992 220 
162  19 17 2 6 23/9/1992 126 
163  19 19 2 17 20/10/1992 124 
164  19 20 2 22 4/11/1992 72 
165  19 20 2 25 11/11/1992 132 
166  19 23 2 38 10/12/1992 760 
167  19 24 2 39 11/12/1992 174 
168  19 24 2 41 13/12/1992 132 
169  19 25 2 44 16/12/1992 162 
170  19 25 2 45 17/12/1992 160 
171  19 25 2 46 18/12/1992 118 
172  19 25 2 47 20/12/1992 164 
173  19 31 2 78 9/3/1193 222 
174  19 32 2 82 17/3/1993 102 
175  19 33 2 89 8/4/1993 122 
176  19 37 2 118 29/6/1993 140 
177  19 37 2 119 30/6/1993 96 
178  19 38 2 128 15/7/1993 84 
179  19 39 3 1 1/9/1993 692 
180  19 42 3 20 26/10/1993 230 
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186  19 48 3 49 19/12/1993 158 
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189  19 53 3 70 10/2/1994 138 
190  19 54 3 79 3/3/1994 214 
191  19 63 3 123 24/6/1994 250 
192  19 68 4 20 18/10/1994 156 
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193  19 71 4 31 9/11/1994 96 
194  19 71 4 32 10/11/1994 162 
195  19 71 4 35 15/11/1994 158 
196  19 71 4 36 16/11/1994 212 
197  19 71 4 37 17/11/1994 118 
198  19 75 4 51 13/12/1994 204 
199  19 75 4 53 15/12/1994 188 
200  19 75 4 55 17/12/1994 190 
201  19 75 4 56 18/12/1994 182 
202  19 76 4 57 19/12/1994 184 
203  19 76 4 59 21/12/1994 212 
204  19 76 4 61 23/12/1994 128 
205  19 77 4 65 10/1/1995 168 
206  19 77 4 66 11/1/1995 122 
207  19 81 4 84 9/3/1995 272 
208  19 83 4 94 4/4/1995 276 
209  19 84 4 100 18/4/1995 210 
210  19 86 4 112 18/5/1995 116 
211  19 87 4 117 31/5/1995 196 
212  19 88 4 120 7/6/1995 196 
213  19 90 4 133 4/7/1995 230 
214  19 91 4 137 8/7/1995 98 
215  19 91 4 139 12/7/1995 452 
216  19 92 4 140 13/7/1995 146 
217  19 92 4 142 18/7/1995 196 
218  19 93 4 144 20/7/1995 140 
219  19 94 5 1 1/10/1995 284 
220  19 94 5 8 13/10/1995 104 
221  19 96 5 22 3/11/1995 134 
222  19 96 5 25 7/11/1995 198 
223  20 1 1 1 8/1/1996 428 
224  20 1 1 9 6/2/1996 33 
225  20 2 1 20 7/3/1996 34 
226  20 2 1 21 10/3/1996 117 
227  20 2 1 24 14/3/1996 65 
228  20 2 1 32 3/4/1996 50 
229  20 3 1 35 10/4/1996 107 
230  20 3 1 38 17/4/1996 675 
231  20 3 1 39 18/4/1996 177 
232  20 3 1 40 19/4/1996 191 
233  20 4 1 41 20/4/1996 220 
234  20 4 1 43 22/4/1996 89 
235  20 5 1 49 8/5/1996 137 
236  20 6 1 60 11/6/1996 147 
237  20 7 1 63 18/6/1996 151 
238  20 7 1 66 25/6/1996 83 
239  20 8 1 72 6/7/1996 117 
240  20 8 1 77 16/7/1996 118 
241  20 8 1 82 24/7/1996 66 
242  20 9 1 84 30/7/1996 164 
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243  20 11 2 1 1/10/1996 299 
244  20 13 2 17 13/11/1996 210 
245  20 16 2 33 14/12/1996 184 
246  20 17 2 37 18/12/1996 154 
247  20 22 2 66 11/3/1997 298 
248  20 24 2 73 26/3/1997 84 
249  20 25 2 83 22/4/1997 106 
250  20 26 2 89 6/5/1997 136 
251  20 28 2 101 3/6/1997 188 
252  20 30 2 112 26/6/1997 92 
253  20 34 3 1 1/10/1997 482 
254  20 34 3 2 2/10/1997 40 
255  20 34 3 5 21/10/1997 66 
256  20 38 3 24 8/12/1997 92 
257  20 38 3 26 10/12/1997 84 
258  20 38 3 27 11/12/1997 224 
259  20 40 3 30 18/12/1997 198 
260  20 40 3 31 19/12/1997 164 
261  20 40 3 33 21/12/1997 142 
262  20 41 3 35 23/12/1997 148 
263  20 43 3 44 20/1/1998 204 
264  20 43 3 45 21/1/1998 926 
265  20 45 3 53 11/1/1998 232 
266  20 45 3 54 12/2/1998 100 
267  20 46 3 60 26/2/1998 314 
268  20 46 3 61 3/3/1998 292 
269  20 48 3 70 24/3/1998 198 
270  20 50 3 76 14/4/1998 252 
271  20 52 3 91 20/5/1998 118 
272  20 53 3 96 2/6/1998 388 
273  20 57 3 114 2/7/1998 182 
274  20 58 3 120 13/7/1998 184 
275  20 59 3 124 20/7/1998 164 
276  20 60 3 128 27/7/1998 72 
277  20 62 4 1 1/10/1998 1262 
278  20 64 4 9 20/10/1998 180 
279  20 65 4 20 18/11/1998 130 
280  20 66 4 23 24/11/1998 158 
281  20 68 4 34 17/12/1998 62 
282  20 68 4 37 24/12/1998 76 
283  20 70 4 51 9/2/1999 172 
284  20 70 4 52 10/2/1999 322 
285  20 71 4 54 13/3/1999 272 
286  21 2 1 19 22/6/1999 1975 
287  21 3 1 20 23/6/1999 117 
288  24 4 1 24 27/6/1999 239 
289  21 5 1 28 1/7/1999 151 
290  21 6 1 32 13/7/1999 130 
291  21 6 1 35 20/7/1999 186 
292  21 8 1 42 30/7/1999 512 
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293  21 9 1 46 10/8/1999 226 
294  21 12 1 58 26/8/1999 312 
295  21 13 2 1 1/10/1999 282 
296  21 13 2 6 13/10/1999 98 
297  21 14 2 7 14/10/1999 134 
298  21 14 2 8 19/10/1999 106 
299  21 14 2 11 26/10/1999 128 
300  21 14 2 12 27/10/1999 384 
301  21 16 2 16 9/11/1999 160 
302  21 16 2 20 16/11/1999 104 
303  21 17 2 23 23/11/1999 168 
304  21 18 2 26 30/11/1999 222 
305  21 20 2 36 17/12/1999 363 
306  21 21 2 39 21/12/1999 202 
307  21 21 2 40 22/12/1999 170 
308  21 21 2 41 23/12/1999 172 
309  21 21 2 42 24/12/1999 162 
310  21 22 2 44 26/12/1999 190 
311  21 22 2 46 28/12/1999 422 
312  21 23 2 48 18/1/2000 356 
313  21 26 2 57 15/2/2000 280 
314  21 27 2 63 29/2/2000 208 
315  21 27 2 64 1/3/2000 182 
316  21 28 2 67 8/3/2000 162 
317  21 29 2 72 28/3/2000 174 
318  21 29 2 74 30/3/2000 76 
319  21 30 2 78 11/4/2000 274 
320  21 30 2 79 12/4/2000 138 
321  21 31 2 82 18/4/2000 246 
322  21 33 2 98 24/5/2000 120 
323  21 34 2 103 1/6/2000 198 
324  21 34 2 104 2/6/2000 146 
325  21 38 2 121 28/6/2000 234 
326  21 43 3 13 8/11/2000 156 
327  21 43 3 14 9/11/2000 94 
328  21 45 3 18 21/11/2000 185 
329  21 49 3 30 13/12/2000 144 
330  21 49 3 32 15/12/2000 136 
331  21 50 3 35 18/12/2000 180 
332  21 54 3 56 8/2/2001 162 
333  21 54 3 57 13/2/2001 218 
334  21 58 3 79 5/4/2001 248 
335  21 59 3 81 10/4/2001 220 
336  21 61 3 91 25/4/2001 192 
337  21 62 3 96 3/5/2001 162 
338  21 63 3 98 9/5/2001 156 
339  21 64 3 105 17/5/2001 120 
340  21 65 3 112 5/6/2001 255 
341  21 68 3 124 25/6/2001 178 
342  21 68 3 128 29/6/2001 328 
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343  21 71 4 1 1/10/2001 28 
344  21 71 4 7 16/10/2001 225 
345  21 72 4 8 17/10/2001 270 
346  21 76 4 26 27/11/2001 116 
347  21 79 4 34 8/12/2001 214 
348  21 97 4 108 4/6/2002 342 
349  21 99 4 119 27/6/2002 271 
350  22 1 1 4 26/11/2002 50 
351  22 1 1 11 17/12/2002 50 
352  22 1 1 12 18/12/2002 29 
353  22 2 1 15 25/12/2002 52 
354  22 4 1 29 30/1/2003 486 
355  22 4 1 30 4/2/2003 136 
356  22 5 1 37 26/2/2003 520 
357  22 10 1 54 24/3/2003 146 
358  22 10 1 55 25/3/2003 168 
359  22 14 1 77 8/5/2003 168 
360  22 15 1 85 27/5/2003 286 
361  22 21 1 104 9/7/2003 334 
362  22 26 2 1 1/10/2003 956 
363  22 27 2 4 8/10/2003 130 
364  22 35 2 32 20/12/2003 234 
365  22 37 2 40 8/1/2004 216 
366  22 38 2 42 14/1/2004 1166 
367  22 42 2 57 25/2/2004 146 
368  22 45 2 70 7/4/2004 557 
369  22 48 2 84 5/5/2004 264 
370  22 53 2 104 22/6/2004 262 
371  22 56 2 114 13/7/2004 1370 
372  22 58 2 118 4/8/2004 486 
373  22 61 3 1 1/10/2004 77 
374  22 62 3 11 27/10/2004 146 
375  22 63 3 14 4/11/2004 231 
376  22 63 3 15 9/11/2004 611 
377  22 64 3 17 11/11/2004 63 
378  22 70 3 36 21/12/2004 165 
379  22 70 3 37 22/12/2004 119 
380  22 70 3 39 24/12/2004 114 
381  22 71 3 43 28/12/2004 163 
382  22 72 3 49 11/1/2005 415 
383  22 72 3 51 13/1/2005 164 
384  22 75 3 59 16/2/2005 246 
385  22 78 3 72 17/3/2005 105 
386  22 79 3 76 29/3/2005 677 
387  22 83 3 95 5/5/2005 222 
388  22 86 3 107 2/6/2005 114 
389  22 87 3 111 14/6/2005 418 
390  22 89 3 117 24/6/2005 166 
391  22 92 3 126 13/7/2005 614 
392  22 93 3 127 19/9/2005 2903 
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393  22 94 4 1 1/10/2005 460 
394  22 94 4 2 4/10/2005 248 
395  22 97 4 14 28/10/2005 454 
396  22 104 4 34 17/12/2005 179 
397  22 106 4 42 25/12/2005 176 
398  22 106 4 43 26/12/2005 356 
399  22 107 4 45 28/12/2005 314 
400  22 107 4 46 29/12/2005 652 
401  22 109 4 53 24/1/2006 255 
402  22 109 4 54 25/1/2006 243 
403  22 112 4 69 1/3/2006 210 
404  22 113 4 72 8/3/2006 194 
405  22 114 4 78 22/3/2006 196 
406  22 114 4 79 23/3/2006 146 
407  22 114 4 80 28/3/2006 496 
408  22 115 4 83 4/4/2006 372 
409  22 116 4 86 11/4/2006 522 
410  22 118 4 96 2/5/2006 242 
411  22 119 4 97 3/5/2006 198 
412  22 124 4 117 20/6/2006 481 
413  22 125 4 121 28/6/2006 435 
414  22 126 4 122 29/6/2006 336 
415  22 130 5 1 1/10/2006 73 
416  22 137 5 25 29/11/2006 327 
417  22 139 5 31 13/12/2006 192 
418  22 140 5 33 15/12/2006 1361 
419  22 141 5 35 17/12/2006 143 
420  22 141 5 37 19/12/2006 196 
421  22 142 5 42 24/12/2006 416 
422  22 149 5 74 13/3/2007 386 
423  22 150 5 75 14/3/2007 169 
424  22 159 5 112 25/5/2007 203 
425  23 1 1 6 28/8/2007 15 
426  23 1 1 9 3/9/2007 58 
427  23 2 2 1 1/10/2007 199 
428  23 2 2 8 17/10/2007 65 
429  23 4 2 19 13/11/2007 325 
430  23 5 2 25 27/11/2007 237 
431  23 7 2 29 4/12/2007 3481 
432  23 8 2 30 5/12/2007 164 
433  23 8 2 31 6/12/2007 143 
434  23 8 2 32 7/12/2007 160 
435  23 8 2 33 8/12/2007 139 
436  23 9 2 37 12/12/2007 311 
437  23 9 2 38 13/12/2007 156 
438  23 10 2 39 14/12/2007 414 
439  23 11 2 47 9/1/2008 131 
440  23 12 2 50 16/1/2008 139 
441  23 13 2 54 24/1/2008 175 
442  23 16 2 79 19/3/2008 126 
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443  23 17 2 83 27/3/2008 415 
444  23 19 2 96 29/4/2008 361 
445  23 20 2 100 7/5/2008 232 
446  23 20 2 101 8/5/2008 149 
447  23 20 2 103 13/5/2008 268 
448  23 20 2 104 14/5/2008 137 
449  23 20 2 105 15/5/2008 305 
450  23 21 2 107 21/5/2008 514 
451  23 21 2 109 27/5/2008 217 
452  23 21 2 110 28/5/2008 156 
453  23 21 2 111 29/5/2008 200 
454  23 22 2 113 4/6/2008 265 
455  23 22 2 114 5/6/2008 142 
456  23 22 2 115 10/6/2008 339 
457  23 22 2 116 11/6/2008 380 
458  23 22 2 117 12/6/2008 212 
459  23 25 2 131 16/7/2008 233 
460  23 26 2 135 24/7/2008 157 
461  23 26 2 136 29/7/2008 195 
462  23 26 2 137 30/7/2008 176 
463  23 29 3 4 9/10/2008 104 
464  23 29 3 8 21/10/2008 677 
465  23 32 3 22 26/11/2008 1503 
466  23 33 3 24 2/12/2008 324 
467  23 34 3 28 16/12/2008 2122 
468  23 35 3 29 17/12/2008 272 
469  23 35 3 30 18/12/2008 276 
470  23 35 3 32 20/12/2008 148 
471  23 36 3 34 22/12/2008 332 
472  23 36 3 37 25/12/2008 267 
473  23 37 3 39 27/12/2008 92 
474  23 38 3 52 3/2/2009 236 
475  23 39 3 59 18/2/2009 166 
476  23 44 3 88 12/5/2009 208 
477  23 45 3 89 13/5/2009 95 
478  23 45 3 91 20/5/2009 266 
479  23 45 3 92 21/5/2009 112 
480  23 46 3 98 3/6/2009 223 
481  23 46 3 99 4/6/2009 201 
482  23 50 4 2 6/10/2009 380 
483  23 51 4 12 3/11/2009 464 
484  23 52 4 13 4/11/2009 222 
485  23 53 4 18 13/11/2009 93 
486  23 54 4 27 8/12/2009 509 
487  23 56 4 33 16/12/2009 219 
488  23 57 4 39 22/12/2009 295 
489  23 57 4 40 23/12/2009 141 
490  23 57 4 41 24/12/2009 221 
491  23 58 4 42 25/12/2009 118 
492  23 59 4 53 27/1/2010 204 
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493  23 60 4 60 11/2/2010 152 
494  23 61 4 64 23/2/2010 1321 
495  23 62 4 67 2/3/2010 546 
496  23 63 4 70 9/3/2010 375 
497  23 63 4 73 16/3/2010 609 
498  23 66 4 84 8/4/2010 203 
499  23 66 4 85 13/4/2010 436 
500  23 67 4 89 20/4/2010 227 
501  23 75 4 134 14/7/2010 393 
502  23 75 4 135 15/7/2010 392 
503  23 75 4 136 16/7/2010 153 
504  23 76 4 137 20/7/2010 419 
505  23 77 5 1 1/10/2010 1447 
506  23 79 5 8 19/10/2010 302 
507  33 79 5 10 21/10/2010 168 
508  23 85 5 31 13/12/2010 1986 
509  23 86 5 33 15/12/2010 183 
510  23 88 5 46 4/1/2011 343 
511  23 92 5 61 8/2/2011 252 
512  23 92 5 63 10/2/2011 275 
513  23 93 5 69 22/2/2011 678 
514  23 95 5 72 2/3/2011 256 
515  24 7 2 31 8/12/2011 2090 
516  24 8 2 35 12/12/2011 231 
517  24 8 2 36 13/12/2011 198 
518  24 9 2 37 14/12/2011 192 
519  24 9 2 42 19/12/2011 200 
520  24 12 2 56 25/1/2012 146 
521  24 13 2 60 2/2/2012 190 
522  24 16 2 82 22/3/2012 134 
523  24 19 2 95 17/4/2012 368 
524  24 20 2 102 3/5/2012 174 
525  24 22 2 114 31/5/2012 284 
526  24 24 2 121 19/6/2012 494 
527  24 25 2 126 28/6/2012 262 
528  24 27 2 131 3/7/2012 495 
529  24 34 3 23 13/11/2012 313 
530  24 34 3 25 15/11/2012 162 
531  24 36 3 36 10/12/2012 1695 
532  24 37 3 40 14/12/2012 243 
533  24 38 3 43 17/12/2012 224 
534  24 38 3 45 19/12/2012 162 
535  24 40 3 52 15/1/2013 685 
536  24 40 3 54 17/1/2013 532 
537  24 41 3 55 22/1/2013 548 
538  24 42 3 60 31/1/2013 206 
539  24 43 3 65 13/2/2013 750 
540  24 43 3 66 14/2/2013 232 
541  24 45 3 74 6/3/2013 363 
542  24 48 3 87 3/4/2013 205 
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543  24 48 3 89 9/4/2013 406 
544  24 49 3 93 17/4/2013 168 
545  24 50 3 100 7/5/2013 593 
546  24 51 3 107 21/5/2013 377 
547  24 53 3 116 5/6/2013 181 
548  24 54 3 127 1/7/2013 736 
549  24 56 3 135 9/7/2013 185 
550  24 62 4 21 26/11/2013 N/A 
551  24 66 4 31 14/12/2013 N/A 
552  24 67 4 35 18/12/2013 N/A 
553  24 72 4 63 18/2/2014 N/A 
554  24 72 4 64 19/2/2014 N/A 
555  24 N/A 4 70 28/2/2014 N/A 
556  24 N/A 4 82 29/4/2014 N/A 
557  24 N/A 4 83 30/4/2014 N/A 
558  24 N/A 4 96 3/6/2014 N/A 
559  24 N/A 4 111 2/7/2014 N/A 
560  24 N/A 4 113 8/7/2014 N/A 
561  24 N/A 4 120 19/7/2014 N/A 
562  24 N/A 4 126 25/7/2014 N/A 
563  24 N/A 4 130 6/8/2014 N/A 
564  24 N/A 4 131 12/8/2014 N/A 
565  24 N/A 4 134 1/9/2014 N/A 
566  24 N/A 4 138 9/9/2014 N/A 
567  24 N/A 4 139 10/10/2014 N/A 
568  24 N/A 5 29 14/12/2014 N/A 
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B. THE LIST OF EXAMINED DOCUMENTS FROM THE ARCHIVES OF GAP-BKİ174 
# Publication Year 
1  The Southeastern Anatolia Project Master Plan Study: Final Master Plan report: Master Plan (Vol. 2) 1989 
2  The Southeastern Anatolia Project Master Plan Study: Final Master Plan report: Appendices A, B, C (Vol. 3) 1989 
3  The Southeastern Anatolia Project Master Plan Study: Final Master Plan report: Appendices D, E, F, G (Vol. 4) 1989 
4  The Southeastern Anatolia Project Master Plan Study: Final Master Plan report: Executive summary (2nd ed., Vol. 1) 1990 
5  Agricultural commodities marketing survey, planning of crop pattern, and integration of marketing and crop pattern studies 1992 
6  Entegre planlama ve GAP [Integrated planning and GAP] 1993 
7  GAP Bölgesi Hareket Planı (1993-1997) [GAP Region Action Plan (1993-1997)] 1993 
8  GAP Bölgesi’nde göç hareketleri [Migration movements in GAP Region] 1993 
9  GAP Bölgesi’nde nüfusun demografik özellikleri [Demographic features of population in GAP Region] 1993 
10  GAP bölgesinde toplumsal değişme eğilimleri araştırması [Survey on the trends of social change in the GAP Region] 1993 
11  GAP Dergisi Cilt 1 [GAP Review Volume 1]  1993-1997 
12  GAP region environment study Dicle Basin (Environmental study for Diyarbakır and surroundings): Executive summary 1993 
13  GAP regional transportation and infrastructure development study final report: Executive summary 1993 
14  Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi’nin mekânsal yapısı ve kentleşme [Spatial structure of Southeastern Anatolia Region and urbanization] 1993 
15  
GAP bölgesi baraj göl aynasında kalacak yörelerde istihdam ve yeniden yerleştirme sorunları 
araştırması [Survey on the problems of employment and resettlement in areas affected by dam lakes in 
GAP region] 
1994 
16  GAP ve çevre [GAP and environment] 1994 
17  Population movements in the Southeastern Anatolia Project region 1994 
18  Survey on the problems of employment and resettlement in areas which will be affected by dammed lakes in GAP region: Executive summary 1994 
19  Women’s status in the GAP region and their integration to the process of development: Executive summary 1994 
20  Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) dış kaynak kullanımı [The use of external funding in Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)] 1995 
21  Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) Action Plan 1995 
22  Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Semineri Raporu [Sustainable Development and Southeastern Anatolia Project Seminar Report] 1995 
23  GAP bölgesinde tarımsal mekanizasyon gereksinimleri etüdü projesi [The project of the study on agricultural mechanization needs in GAP region] 1996 
24  GAP: Az gelişmiş bölgelerin potansiyel araştırma toplantısı: İstanbul Sanayi Odası [GAP: Meeting on the survey for potentials in underdeveloped regions: İstanbul Chamber of Industry] 1996 
25  Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi su kaynakları [Water resources of Southeastern Anatolia Project] 1997 
                                                
174 Documents are sorted in chronological order.  
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26  
Birecik Barajı’ndan etkilenen nüfusun yeniden yerleşimi, istihdamı ve ekonomik yatırımları için 
planlama ve uygulama projesi [Planning and implementation project for the resettlement, employment, 
and economic investments of the population affected by Birecik Dam] 
1998 
27  GAP Dergisi Cilt 2 [GAP Review Volume 2]  1998-1999 
28  Birecik, Halfeti, Suruç, Bozova ilçeleri ile Rumkale’deki taşınmaz kültür varlıkları [The cultural heritage in the towns Birecik, Halfeti, Suruç, Bozova and Rumkale] 1999 
29  Southeastern Anatolia Project Social Action Plan 1999 
30  
Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi’nde kültürel mirasın korunması, ve değerlendirilmesi üzerine öneriler 
[Recommendations on the conservation and utilization of cultural heritage in Southeastern Anatolia 
Region] 
2000 
31  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Diyarbakır bilgilendirme 
toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Contact meeting of GAP Regional 
Development Plan in Diyarbakır] (Çalışma raporu No. 1) 
2000 
32  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Gaziantep bilgilendirme 
toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Contact meeting of GAP Regional 
Development Plan in Gaziantep] (Çalışma raporu No. 2) 
2000 
33  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Şanlıurfa bilgilendirme 
toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Contact meeting of GAP Regional 
Development Plan in Şanlıurfa] (Çalışma raporu No. 3) 
2000 
34  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Şırnak bilgilendirme 
toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Contact meeting of GAP Regional 
Development Plan in Şırnak] (Çalışma raporu No. 4) 
2000 
35  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Mardin bilgilendirme 
toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Contact meeting of GAP Regional 
Development Plan in Mardin] (Çalışma raporu No. 5) 
2000 
36  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Batman bilgilendirme 
toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Contact meeting of GAP Regional 
Development Plan in Batman] (Çalışma raporu No. 6) 
2000 
37  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Siirt bilgilendirme toplantısı 
[From central planning to participatory planning: Contact meeting of GAP Regional Development 
Plan in Siirt] (Çalışma raporu No. 7) 
2000 
38  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Kilis bilgilendirme toplantısı 
[From central planning to participatory planning: Contact meeting of GAP Regional Development 
Plan in Kilis] (Çalışma raporu No. 8) 
2000 
39  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Adıyaman bilgilendirme 
toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Contact meeting of GAP Regional 
Development Plan in Adıyaman] (Çalışma raporu No. 9) 
2000 
40  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Vizyon, amaç, hedefler ve 
politikalar dokümanı hazırlık çalışmaları: Kamu kurumları ile arama toplantısı, Ankara [From central 
planning to participatory planning: GAP Regional Development Plan: Preparation studies of the 
vision, goal, aim, and policies document: Stakeholder meeting with public institutions, Ankara] 
(Çalışma raporu No. 10) 
2000 
41  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Vizyon, amaç, hedefler ve 
politikalar dokümanı hazırlık çalışmaları: Kamu kurumları ile arama toplantısı, Diyarbakır [From 
central planning to participatory planning: GAP Regional Development Plan: Preparation studies of 
the vision, goal, aim, and policies document: Stakeholder meeting with public institutions, Diyarbakır] 
(Çalışma raporu No. 11) 
2000 
42  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Kilis vizyon, amaç, hedef ve 
politikalar değerlendirme toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Assessment 
meeting of vision, goal, aim, and policies of GAP Regional Development Plan in Kilis] (Çalışma 
raporu No. 12) 
2000 
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43  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Gaziantep vizyon, amaç, 
hedef ve politikalar değerlendirme toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: 
Assessment meeting of vision, goal, aim, and policies of GAP Regional Development Plan in 
Gaziantep] (Çalışma raporu No. 13) 
2000 
44  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Batman vizyon, amaç, hedef 
ve politikalar değerlendirme toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Assessment 
meeting of vision, goal, aim, and policies of GAP Regional Development Plan in Batman] (Çalışma 
raporu No. 14) 
2000 
45  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Adıyaman vizyon, amaç, 
hedef ve politikalar değerlendirme toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: 
Assessment meeting of vision, goal, aim, and policies of GAP Regional Development Plan in 
Adıyaman] (Çalışma raporu No. 15) 
2000 
46  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Şanlıurfa vizyon, amaç, 
hedef ve politikalar değerlendirme toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: 
Assessment meeting of vision, goal, aim, and policies of GAP Regional Development Plan in 
Şanlıurfa] (Çalışma raporu No. 16) 
2000 
47  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Şırnak vizyon, amaç, hedef 
ve politikalar değerlendirme toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Assessment 
meeting of vision, goal, aim, and policies of GAP Regional Development Plan in Şırnak] (Çalışma 
raporu No. 17) 
2000 
48  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Siirt vizyon, amaç, hedef ve 
politikalar değerlendirme toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Assessment 
meeting of vision, goal, aim, and policies of GAP Regional Development Plan in Siirt] (Çalışma 
raporu No. 18) 
2000 
49  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Mardin vizyon, amaç, hedef 
ve politikalar değerlendirme toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: Assessment 
meeting of vision, goal, aim, and policies of GAP Regional Development Plan in Mardin] (Çalışma 
raporu No. 19) 
2000 
50  
Merkezi planlamadan katılımcı planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Diyarbakır vizyon, amaç, 
hedef ve politikalar değerlendirme toplantısı [From central planning to participatory planning: 
Assessment meeting of vision, goal, aim, and policies of GAP Regional Development Plan in 
Diyarbakır] (Çalışma raporu No. 20) 
2000 
51  GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı sağlık sektörü raporu [GAP Regional Development Plan health sector report] 2001 
52  GAP Bölgesi’nin jeolojisi: Maden ve enerji kaynakları [Geology of GAP region: Mining and energy resources] 2001 
53  “Kadınlar geleceğe bakıyor” 1. toplantı: “Kadın girişimciliği” [First meeting of “Women look to the future: “Women entrepreneurship”] 2001 
54  Zeugma: A bridge from past to present 2001 
55  Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Yönetici özeti [Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Plan: Executive summary] (Vol. 1) 2002 
56  Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Ana rapor [Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Plan: Main report] (Vol. 2) 2002 
57  
Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) bölgesinde faaliyet gösteren sanayi işletmelerinde üst düzey 
yöneticilerin profilleri [Profiles of executives in industrial enterprises in Southeastern Anatolia Project 
(GAP) region] 
2002 
58  Kentsel enformal sektörde istihdam ve iş potansiyelinin geliştirilmesi: Yönetici özeti [Enhancing employment and business potential in informal urban sector: Executive summary] 2002 
59  GAP bölgesi halk sağlığı projesi raporu [Report on public health project in GAP region]. 2003 
60  GAP biyolojik çeşitlilik araştırma projesi 2001-2003 – Sonuç raporu [GAP biological diversity research project 2001-2003 – Final report] 2004 
61  GAP bölgesi su ürünleri üretim ve tüketimini artırma etüt projesi: Yönetici özeti [Survey on increasing the production and consumption of aquaculture: Executive summary] 2004 
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62  Yeni kalkınmacılık: Bölgesel kalkınmada arayışlar [New developmentalism: Searches in regional development] 2004 
63  Avrupa Birliği uyum süreci ve yerel yönetimler: Seminer el kitabı [European Union harmonization process and local administrations: Seminar handbook] 2005 
64  Dünyada, Türkiye’de, GAP’ta tarım [Agriculture in the world, in Turkey, and in GAP] 2005 
65  Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi’nde kadınların ekonomik güçlenmelerine yönelik yol haritası [Roadmap to economically empower women in Southeastern Anatolia Region] 2006 
66  Competitiveness agenda for the GAP region: GAP entrepreneur support centers project 2007 
67  Toplumsal cinsiyet temelli toplum liderlerine yönelik eğitim programı değerlendirme raporu [Evaluation report of the training program for gender-based community leaders] 2007 
68  GAP Eylem Planı (2008-2012) [GAP Action Plan (2014-2018)] 2008 
69  Stratejik Plan 2008-2012 [Strategic Plan 2008-2012] 2008 
70  Bölgesel kalkınmanın can suyu GAP: Karşılaştırmalı sosyal ve ekonomik yapı araştırması [Water of life of regional development: GAP: A comparative study of social and economic structure] 2010 
71  GAP Eylem Planı’nın uygulanmasına yönelik insan kaynakları araştırması: Sonuç raporu [Survey on human resources in the implementation of GAP action plan: Final report] 2010 
72  Toprak tuzlulaşması [Soil salinization] 2011 
73  En eskiden en yeniye GAP Bölgesi’nde sanat [Art in GAP Region from the oldest to the newest] 2012 
74  GAP sanayi gelişim raporu [GAP industrial development report] 2012 
75  GAP ve emeğe saygı [GAP and respect for the effort] 2012 
76  GAP ve enerji [GAP and energy] 2012 
77  GAP ve mimari [GAP and architecture] 2012 
78  GAP ve spor [GAP and sports] 2012 
79  GAP ve turizm [GAP and tourism] 2012 
80  GAP’ta şehirleşme ve sosyalleşme [Urbanization and socialization in GAP] 2012 
81  
Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi’nde Yenilenebilir Enerji Kaynaklarının Kullanımı ve Enerji Veriminin 
Artırılması Eylem Planı [Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources in Southeastern Anatolia Region 
and Enhancement of Energy Efficiency Action Plan] 
2012 
82  Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi’ne genel bakış [An overview of Southeastern Anatolia Project] 2012 
83  Kültürel mirasın kalkınmaya etkisi [The impact of cultural heritage on development] 2012 
84  Sulama ve sulama yöntemlerinin projelendirilmesi [Irrigation and project design or irrigation methods] 2012 
85  Klasik GAP biterken [As the classical GAP ends] 2014 
86  GAP Eylem Planı (2014-2018) [GAP Action Plan (2014-2018)] 2014 
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C. THE LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS  
C.1. Participants from TBMM175 
Participants Political party Polling district Interview date Interview location 
P1 AKP Diyarbakır 07/05/2014 Ankara 
P2 AKP Şanlıurfa 08/05/2014 Ankara 
P3 AKP Gaziantep 08/05/2014 Ankara 
P4 AKP Şanlıurfa 08/05/2014 Ankara 
P5 AKP İstanbul 12/05/2014 Ankara 
P6 AKP Batman 12/05/2014 Ankara 
P7 AKP Diyarbakır 13/05/2014 Ankara 
P8 AKP Aksaray 13/05/2014 Ankara 
P9 AKP Şanlıurfa 13/05/2014 Ankara 
P10 AKP Gaziantep 13/05/2014 Ankara 
P11 AKP Bingöl 14/05/2014 Ankara 
P12 AKP Adıyaman 14/05/2014 Ankara 
P13 AKP Mardin 14/05/2014 Ankara 
P14 AKP Adıyaman 14/05/2014 Ankara 
P15 AKP Gaziantep 14/05/2014 Ankara 
P16 AKP Diyarbakır 20/05/2014 Ankara 
P17 AKP Şanlıurfa 21/05/2014 Ankara 
P18 BDP Şırnak 06/05/2014 Ankara 
P19 BDP Şanlıurfa 06/05/2014 Ankara 
P20 BDP Hakkâri 07/05/2014 Ankara 
P21 BDP Muş 08/05/2014 Ankara 
P22 CHP Adana 29/04/2014 Ankara 
P23 CHP Diyarbakır 06/05/2014 Ankara 
P24 CHP Mersin 13/05/2014 Ankara 
P25 CHP Gaziantep 20/05/2014 Ankara 
P26 MHP Antalya 07/05/2014 Ankara 
P27 MHP Denizli 09/05/2014 Ankara 
P28 MHP Adana 20/05/2014 Ankara 
                                                
175 Participants are sorted by the alphabetical order of their affiliated political parties.  
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C.2. Participants from Governmental and Non-Governmental Institutions176 
Participants Institution Position Date of the interview 
Location of the 
interview 
P29 Ankara University Professor 08/04/2014 Ankara 
P30 
Center for Middle 
Eastern Strategic 
Studies 
Researcher 05/05/2014 Ankara 
P31 Freelance Farmer, landowner 29/05/2014 Şanlıurfa 
P32 Freelance Farmer, landowner 30/05/2014 Şanlıurfa 
P33 GAP-BKİ Expert 21/03/2014 Ankara 
P34 GAP-BKİ Expert 24/03/2014 Ankara 
P35 GAP-BKİ Retired coordinator 24/03/2014 Ankara 
P36 GAP-BKİ Coordinator 24/03/2014 Ankara 
P37 GAP-BKİ Former coordinator 25/03/2014 Ankara 
P38 GAP-BKİ Former consultant 27/03/2014 Ankara 
P39 GAP-BKİ Retired coordinator 02/04/2014 Ankara 
P40 GAP-BKİ Retired expert 02/04/2014 Ankara 
P41 GAP-BKİ Freelance planner 03/04/2014 Ankara 
P42 GAP-BKİ Former coordinator 09/04/2014 Ankara 
P43 GAP-BKİ Former vice president 22/04/2014 Ankara 
P44 GAP-BKİ Expert 22/04/2014 Ankara 
P45 GAP-BKİ Expert 22/04/2014 Ankara 
P46 GAP-BKİ Former coordinator 25/04/2014 Ankara 
P47 GAP-BKİ Former coordinator 05/05/2014 Ankara 
P48 GAP-BKİ Former coordinator 16/05/2014 Ankara 
P49 GAP-BKİ Vice president 29/05/2014 Şanlıurfa 
P50 GAP-BKİ Former head of regional unit 30/05/2014 Şanlıurfa 
P51 DSİ Head of division 01/04/2014 Ankara 
P52 DSİ Former employee, freelance engineer 20/05/2014 Ankara 
P53 DSİ Former head of GAP Regional Directorate 20/05/2014 Ankara 
P54 DSİ Expert 22/05/2014 Ankara 
                                                
176 Participants are sorted by the alphabetical order of their affiliated institutions. 
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Participants Institution Position Date of the interview 
Location of the 
interview 
P55 Harran University Professor 30/05/2014 Şanlıurfa 
P56 Hacettepe University Retired professor 24/04/2014 Ankara 
P57 METU Associate professor 10/04/2014 Ankara 
P58 DPT/Ministry of Development Deputy undersecretary 24/04/2014 Ankara 
P59 DPT/Ministry of Development Head of department 24/04/2014 Ankara 
P60 DPT/Ministry of Development 
Former project 
consultant 30/04/2014 Ankara 
P61 DPT/Ministry of Development Head of department 30/04/2014 Ankara 
P62 DPT/Ministry of Development Deputy undersecretary 02/05/2014 Ankara 
P63 DPT/Ministry of Development 
Former deputy 
undersecretary 16/05/2014 Ankara 
P64 TRT Director 23/05/2014 Ankara 
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 D. THE CODING FRAME177 
Main Category (Dimension) 1: Characteristics of GAP region 
Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker expresses any opinion about the historical 
and/or current physical, socio-political, and socio-economic characteristics of Southeastern Anatolia 
Region/GAP region. 
Label 1.1. Arid and barren178 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP region has been 
(1) a region with low rainfall and (2) arid and barren for years. 
Indicators: kuraklık, çorak, yağış [aridity, barren, rainfall] 
Example 1: Yağışları az alan bir bölge, özellikle yağmur yağışları. Bunun için kurak bir bölge. 
[It is a region that receives little rain. That’s why it is an arid region.]  
Example 2: Hala şu gün bile Urfamız’da diyelim ki yağışların düzensiz, dengesiz olması nedeniyle 
veya ufak bir iklim değişikliğiyle ciddi kuraklıklar yaşandığını biliyoruz. 
[We know that even today we face serious droughts in our Urfa due to irregular rainfall and climate 
change.] 
Label 1.2. Backward and underdeveloped 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that (1) GAP region is 
backward and underdeveloped due to its low socio-economic standards, (2) the local population therein 
are ignorant, desperate, and helpless, and (3) the region is inferior to the rest of the country.  
Indicators: geri kalmışlık, fukaralık, az gelişmişlik [backwardness, poverty, underdevelopment] 
Example 1: Ayrıca, birçok bölge insanı cahil ve mağdur durumdadır; kendilerini ifade edemiyorlar. 
[In addition, a lot of people in the region are ignorant and suffered; they cannot express themselves.] 
Example 2: Güneydoğu Anadolu, aynı zamanda bir fukaralık olayıdır, bir sosyal düzen sıkıntısıdır. 
İşsiz ve umutsuz insanlar diyarıdır Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi. 
[Southeastern Anatolia is at the same time a matter of poverty, a matter of social order. Southeastern 
Anatolia is the land of unemployed and desperate people.]  
Label 1.3. Discriminated and neglected 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that (1) GAP region has 
been intentionally or unintentionally discriminated and neglected, and (2) there has been a divide 
between western and eastern Turkey in general. 
Indicators: ihmal, unutmak, ayrım [neglecting, to forget, discrimination] 
Example 1: Şimdi, siz, Karadeniz Otoyolu’na, Bolu Tüneli’ne veya Esenboğa Havaalanı’na bir şekilde 
kaynak bulabiliyorsunuz; ama, verimliliği ve kârlılığı kendini kanıtlamış GAP Projesine dönüp 
bakmıyorsunuz bile.  
                                                
177 Unless stated otherwise, categories and subcategories appear in all three coding frames, which were 
formulated with the reviewing process of GAP-related parliamentary proceedings, interviews with the MPs, and 
interviews with bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals from various governmental and non-governmental 
organizations (see Chapter 3 for more details).  
178 This subcategory emerged only in the interviews with the MPs.  
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[Now, you can find resources to build Black Sea Highway, Bolu Tunnel or Esenboğa Airport, but you 
do not even bother taking GAP into consideration despite its proven productivity and profitability.] 
Example 2: İstanbul’daki GSMH’den kişi başına düşen pay ile Urfa’daki vatandaşın arasında dört kat 
fark var. Ortalama 11,000 dolar diyor da, İstanbul’da yaşayanın ortalama 21,000 civarındadır, GAP 
bölgesinde 4,500 civarındadır aldığı pay. Böyle bir dengesizlik var zaten. 
[The per capita income in İstanbul is four times as much as per capita income in Urfa. You know they 
say the per capita income in Turkey is around 11,000. It is 21,000 in İstanbul and around 4,500 in GAP 
region. There is already such an inequality.] 
Label 1.4. Feudal and unjust179 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP region is marked 
by (1) the remnants of feudal structure and relations even today and (2) inequalities in land, income, 
and opportunities, as a small number of people or families own vast quantity of lands in the region.  
Indicators: feodal yapı, eşitsizlikler, büyük arazi [feudal structure, inequalities, large land] 
Example 1: Çünkü toprakların büyük bölümü onların elinde, para onların elinde. Orada tarım geliştiği 
zaman da fabrika açanlar, otel açanlar, yatırım yapanlar hep onlar olduğu için daha da güçleneceklerini 
düşünüyorum.  
[Because they own the lion’s share of lands, they have the money. It is them who open a factory, open 
a hotel, or make investments; therefore, I believe they will get even stronger.] 
Example 2: Feodal yapı kırıldı mı derseniz, bence hiçbir zaman oradaki feodal yapı kırılmaz. Ancak 
toprak dağılımında bir düzenleme olursa kırılabilir.  
[If you ask me whether the feudal structure there is eliminated, well, I don’t think it will ever be 
eliminated. It happens only when lands are redistributed.] 
Label 1.5. Resourceful, diverse, and full of potential  
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP region has (1) 
abundant water and land resources to be developed, (2) rich human potential to be utilized, and (3) vast 
opportunities to be seized.   
Indicators: zengin su kaynakları, su potansiyeli, toprak potansiyeli [rich water resources, water 
potential, land potential] 
Example 1: Başta Fırat ve Dicle olmak üzere, ülkemizin en önemli su kaynakları da bu bölgededir. 
[Euphrates and Tigris being the first, the most important water resources of our country are also located 
in this region.]  
Example 2: Bölgenin yer altı ve yer üstü kaynakları son derece zengin. Pazara yakın, Ortadoğu 
ülkelerine son derece yakın. 
[The region is very rich in terms of underground and ground sources. It is close to the markets, very 
close to the Middle Eastern countries.] 
 
                                                
179 This subcategory emerged only in the interviews with bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals. 
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Main Category (Dimension) 2: Characteristics of GAP  
Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker (1) expresses any opinion about the 
characteristic features of GAP, (2) describes the project from his/her point of view, and (3) draws attention to its 
different yet interrelated aspects in terms of its size, scope, and significance. 
Label 2.1. Exploitative and assimilative180 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP is exploitative 
and assimilative because the main focus of the project is to (1) transfer the resources of GAP region to 
western Turkey, (2) empower the rich, and (3) assimilate the Kurdish population. 
Indicators: dönüşüm, Türklük, asimilasyon [transformation, Turkishness, assimilation] 
Example 1: Dolayısıyla GAP uygulama biçimi ve yöntemi itibariyle bir sömürge projesidir. Kaynak 
sömürüsü projesidir. 
[Therefore, in terms of its implementation and administration form, GAP is an exploitation project. A 
resource exploitation project.] 
Example 2: Bir zamanlar korucu projesi gibi, aslında amaç o şekilde yine siyasete şey sağlamak, onları 
asimile etmek. AKP din üzerinden asimile etmeye çalışıyor, kalkınma değil de biraz da yardımlarla 
bunu desteklemeye çalışıyor.  
[Just like in the village guard project in the past, the real goal is to assimilate them. AKP tries to 
assimilate through religion and supports this not through development, but through aids.] 
Label 2.2. Huge and vital  
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP is a large and 
comprehensive project which is of vital importance and necessity both for GAP region and Turkey. 
Indicators: kapsamlı, önemli, hayati [comprehensive, important, vital] 
Example 1: Çünkü, netice itibariyle Türkiye’nin en büyük mühendislik projesidir ve bu projenin 
yapılıp bitmesi ülkemize çok şeyler kazandıracaktır. 
[because, it is the largest engineering project in Turkey and the completion of this project will bring 
many benefits to our country.] 
Example 2: Halbuki, değerli arkadaşlar, GAP Türkiye için çok önemlidir, Türkiye için her yönüyle 
hayati bir projedir. 
[However, dear friends, GAP is very important for Turkey, it is vital for Turkey in every sense.] 
Label 2.3. Long-established181  
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP is an old, long-
established project that has been going on for many years. 
Indicators: eski, en eski, devam eden [old, the oldest, ongoing] 
Example 1: aynı zamanda da en uzun zamandır devam eden projesidir. 
[it is at the same time the longest running project] 
Example 2: Açıkçası GAP çok eski bir proje. 
[Honestly speaking, GAP is a very old project.] 
Label 2.4. Multi-sectoral and integrated  
                                                
180 This subcategory emerged both in the interviews with the MPs and bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals. 
181 This subcategory emerged only in the interviews with the MPs.  
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Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP is not merely an 
energy production and irrigation project, but rather a multi-sectoral and integrated project that covers a 
wide range of sectors under its banner.  
Indicators: çok sektörlü, entegre, topyekûn [multi-sectoral, integrated, total] 
Example 1: Tabii ki, değerli arkadaşlar, GAP projesi dediğimiz zaman, sadece bir elektrik ve 
sulamadan bahsetmiyoruz; bunun içinde sanayi var, bunun içinde eğitim var, bunun içinde sağlık var, 
bunun içinde ulaşım var, bunun içinde tarımın modernizasyonu var; çok sektörlü bir projeden 
bahsediyoruz. 
[Indeed, dear friends, when we talk about GAP, we do not merely talk about electricity and irrigation; 
it contains industries, education, health, transportation, agricultural modernization; we talk about a 
multi-sectoral project.] 
Example 2: Proje birçok şeyi kapsıyor, barajlar var, sulamalar var, havaalanları var, yollar var, 
köprüler var, OSB’ler var, sanayi siteleri var, çok entegre. 
[The project covers many things. There are dams, irrigation schemes, airports, roads, bridges, 
organized industrial zones, it is very integrated.] 
Label 2.5. National and supra-political  
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that (1) GAP embodies the 
greatness and power of the Turkish nation, (2) GAP does not belong to a specific political party or 
person but rather to the whole nation, and (3) GAP is a supra-political project. 
Indicators: millî, milletin projesi, Türk ulusunun büyüklüğü [national, nation’s project, greatness of 
the Turkish nation] 
Example 1: Biz Türkiye’yiz, biz yaparız. Bizim mühendisimiz dünyada nam salmış mühendislerdir. 
Biz hiçbir ülkenin mühendisinden geri kalmıyoruz.  
[We are Turkey, we just do. Our engineers are worldly renowned. We are not behind any country’s 
engineers.] 
Example 2: Atatürk Barajını Türk müteahhitleri yapıyor; bu, Türkiye'nin ulaştığı teknoloji seviyesini 
gösterir; ondan da iftihar duyun. 
[It is Turkish contractors who build Atatürk Dam; this shows Turkey’s level of technological 
advancement. Be proud of that.] 
Label 2.6. National security and peace 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP (1) promotes 
national security, (2) plays, or can play, a role in establishing peace both within Turkey and in the 
Middle East, and (3) allows Turkey to use the project strategically as leverage against other states.  
Indicators: barış, millî güvenlik, stratejik [peace, national security, strategic] 
Example 1: GAP sadece enerji, GAP sadece sulama değil, GAP bir barış projesi. 
[GAP is not merely an energy and irrigation project; it is a peace project.] 
Example 2: Onun için, projeye yalnız, insanların karnını doyurmak açısından değil, millî güvenlik 
açımızdan da, millî güvenlik meselesi açısından da bakmakta fayda vardır. 
[Therefore, it is better to view the project not solely from the perspective of feeding people, but also 
from our angle of national security, the angle of national security.] 
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Label 2.7. Non-political182 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP is a non-political 
project that was initiated only with technical, not political and security calculations and necessities. 
Indicators: Kürt sorunu, tamamıyla kalkınma, siyasi olmayan [Kurdish problem, purely development, 
non-political] 
Example 1: İçeride teknisyen olarak da çalıştığım için söyleyebilirim, bunlar siyasi değil. Biz bir GAP 
uygulayalım, biz bu Güneydoğu’yu kuşatalım oradaki terör vesaire falan bitsin gibi bir anlayışla bu işe 
başlandığına inanmıyorum.  
[Since I worked as a technician inside the project as well, I can say that these are not political. I don’t 
believe the project was initiated with the idea of surrounding the Southeastern Anatolia, initiating GAP, 
and thus eliminating terrorism.]  
Example 2: Ben bunu Kürtleri asimile etmek için yapılmış bir proje olarak görmüyorum. 
Güneydoğu’da sadece Kürtler yok. Her baraj projesinde herkes taşınıyor.  
[I don’t see it as a project to assimilate the Kurds. The Kurds are not the only entity in the Southeastern 
Anatolia. Everybody migrates in every dam project.] 
Label 2.8. Political183 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP is a political 
project that was initiated with political calculations, specifically to (1) to garner votes from GAP region 
and (2) exert political influence on people and institutions.  
 Indicators: siyasi, hükümet, oy [political, government, vote] 
Example 1: Teknik boyutunu yitirip çok siyasi bir hâl almış bir projeydi. O iş beni rahatsız ediyor bu 
işlerle uğraşan biri olarak. 
[It was a project that lost its technical aspect and became a political project. That disturbs me as a 
person who is dealing with these issues.] 
Example 2: Yine de geçmişte, özellikle Demirel ve Özal tarafından proje sık sık siyasete alet edildi ve 
propaganda amacı ile kullanıldı. 
[Again in the past, the project was abused in politics and used as a propaganda tool specifically by 
Demirel and Özal.] 
Label 2.9. Sustainable, participatory, and human-focused184 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP prioritizes (1) 
sustainable development and environmental sensitivity in particular, (2) participation of various 
disadvantaged groups and different private and public sector institutions into the development process, 
and (3) human development. 
Indicators: sürdürülebilirlik, katılımcı süreçler, insan odaklı [sustainability, participatory processes, 
human-focused] 
                                                
182 This subcategory emerged both in the interviews with the MPs and bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals.  
183 This subcategory emerged only in the interviews with bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals. 
184 This subcategory emerged both in the parliamentary proceedings and interviews with bureaucrats, experts, 
and intellectuals.  
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Example 1: Şu anda gelinen noktada ekonomik ve bölgesel kalkınmanın büyük bölümü tamamlandığı 
için, artık daha çok insani odaklı projelere ağırlık vermeye başladık. 
[Because a high degree of economic and regional development is achieved, we started to give more 
importance to human-focused projects.] 
Example 2: Bu çerçevede, GAP, kalkınmadan olumsuz etkilenebilecek dezavantajlı kesimlerin 
kalkınmaya entegrasyonu, kamu sektörünün yanı sıra özel sektör ve halk katılımının projeye 
entegrasyonu gibi kavramları da dikkate almaktadır. 
[Within this framework, GAP also takes into consideration the concepts such as the integration of 
disadvantaged groups who can be negatively affected by development and integration of private sector 
and public participation into the project.]  
Label 2.10. Transformative185 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that GAP is a 
transformative project that enables and accelerates the change and transformation of both GAP region 
and Turkey.  
Indicators: değişim, dönüşüm, farklılık [change, transformation, difference] 
Example 1: Sosyo-ekonomik olarak bir yapının değişmesinde katkısı olmuştur. Yapı tamamen 
değişmek üzeredir. Olumlu olumsuz fark etmez, değişme değişmedir. 
[It contributed to the socio-economic change of the structure. The structure is about to change 
completely. It does not matter whether it is positive or negative; change is change.] 
Example 2: GAP’ın başlangıcı ve öncesi ayrı bir Türkiye’den söz edebiliriz, bugün ayrı bir 
Türkiye’den söz edebiliriz. GAP’ın bölge üzerindeki genel etkisini çok büyük olarak 
değerlendiriyorum. 
[We can talk about a different Turkey before GAP and we can talk about another Turkey after GAP. I 
believe the impact of GAP on the region is huge.] 
                                                
185 This subcategory emerged both in the interviews with the MPs and bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals. 
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Main Category (Dimension) 3: Objectives of GAP 
Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker expresses any opinion about (1) the 
objectives of GAP, (2) actual or potential contributions of the project, and (3) the need to fulfill these objectives 
without further delay.  
Label 3.1. Addressing the Kurdish question 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to solve the Kurdish question and helps the state (1) win the hearts and minds of the local 
population, (2) make propaganda, (3) rid the PKK of its propaganda material to attract others to join its 
ranks, (4) fight the PKK through socio-economic development, and (5) prevent the maneuver 
capabilities of the PKK through building dams on their passage ways. 
Indicators: bölge halkını kazanmak, ekonomik ve sosyal tedbirler, terörü önlemek [winning local 
population, economic and social measures, preventing terror] 
Example 1: GAP yüzde 80’e gelsin orada anarşi falan kalmaz. Adam tarlasını ekip biçtikten sonra, 
para kazandıktan sonra niye anarşist olsun? 
[If 80% of GAP is completed, there will be no anarchy there. As long as a man cultivates and makes 
money, why would he become an anarchist?] 
Example 2: İşsizlik, terörün en büyük istismar konusu ve malzemesidir. Bu bakımdan, GAP’ın ülke ve 
bölge ekonomisine sağlayacağı katkı, küçümsenmeyecek boyutlarda olacaktır. 
[Unemployment is the biggest material and source of abuse for terror. Therefore, the contribution of 
GAP to the economy of the region and the country will be immense.] 
Label 3.2. Changing the face and destiny of Turkey186  
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) initiate change in GAP region, (2) initiate change in the country, and (3) radically 
transform the socio-economic landscape of GAP region and Turkey. 
Indicators: makûs talih, memleketin kaderi, insanın kaderi [ill fate, destiny of the country, destiny of 
the people] 
Example 1: GAP ve benzeri hizmetlerle Doğu’nun makûs talihi yenilecektir. Bunda kararlıyız, hiç 
kimsenin şüphesi olmasın. 
[With GAP and similar projects, the ill fate of the East will be defeated. We are determined to do so, 
have no doubt about it.]  
Example 2: Bu projenin gerçekleşmesiyle, Güneydoğu Anadolu insanının kaderi değişecektir. 
[With the completion of this project, the destiny of the people of Southeastern Anatolia will be 
changed.] 
Label 3.3. Eliminating feudalism and land inequality187 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) eliminate or weaken the remnants of feudal structure in GAP region and (2) 
address the land ownership inequality in relation to the feudal structure.   
                                                
186 This subcategory emerged only in parliamentary proceedings. 
187 This subcategory emerged both in parliamentary proceedings and the interviews with bureaucrats, experts, 
and intellectuals.  
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Indicators: toprak reformu, feodalizm, adaletsiz toprak dağılımı [land reform, feudalism, unjust land 
distribution] 
Example 1: Yani bilinenin aksine, burada büyük toprak sahibi kalmadı ki? Nedir büyük toprak sahibi 
ölçüsü? 100 dönüm mü, 1,000 mi? 5,000 mi? Dolayısıyla bu sulama feodal ilişkileri perçinlemedi, 
aksine bozmuştur. Yok etti. Sulama yok etti. GAP’ın bu yönde etkisi var. 
[Contrary to the common belief, no large landowner was left here. Whom to call a large landowner 
anyway? The ones who owned 100 acres? 1,000? 5,000? Therefore, irrigation ruined the feudal 
relations. Eliminated. Irrigation eliminated feudal relations and GAP had a decisive effect on this.] 
Example 2: Bölgede adil ve ciddi bir toprak reformu yapmadan bu yöre halkının yoksulluğuna son 
vermek mümkün değildir. GAP bölgesinde toprak reformu yapılacak mıdır? Büyük çoğunluğu 
topraksız olan bölge halkının, GAP tamamlandıktan sonra, büyük arazi sahiplerine ırgatlık yaparak, 
kalkınabileceklerine inanıyor musunuz? 
[It is impossible to eliminate poverty in the region without carrying out a just and serious land reform. 
Is there going to be a land reform in GAP region? Do you really believe that local population, the 
majority of whom are landless, can develop just by working for the large landowners?] 
Label 3.4. Eliminating regional disparities 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) ensure regional development and (2) eliminate or minimize regional disparities 
between GAP region and the rest of the country in terms of socio-economic indicators.  
Indicators: bölgesel farklılıklar, gelişmişlik farkları, bölgeler arası dengesizlik [regional differences, 
development differences, inter-regional disparities] 
Example 1: Bugün Ankara ile Urfa arasında binalar ve lüks arasında bir fark yok. Konya öyle, 
Diyarbakır öyle. Bizim istediğimiz de o, Doğu-Batı, Kuzey-Güney arasındaki farklılıkların azalması. 
[Today, there is no difference in terms of luxury between Ankara and Urfa. Same applies for Konya 
and Diyarbakır. That’s what we want, to minimize the differences between east and west, north and the 
south.] 
Example 2: Bakın, biz göreve geldiğimizden beri GAP projesinin öneminin farkındayız. Bütün 
cumhuriyet hükümetleri GAP projesinin öneminin farkındadır çünkü bu bir devlet projesidir, doğru 
olan bir iştir, bölgeler arası dengesizliği ortadan kaldıracak. 
[Since we took office, we are aware of the importance of GAP. All of the governments are aware of 
this because it is a national project, it is the right project that will eliminate regional disparities.] 
Label 3.5. Generating national income and providing added value 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) generate national income and (2) provide added value in some way.   
Indicators: ekonomiye katkı, gelir elde etmek, katma değer [contribution to the economy, generate 
income, added value] 
Example 1: Sayın milletvekilleri, neden yapıyoruz biz bunları? Çünkü biliyoruz ki bir GAP, bir buçuk 
yılda ülke ekonomisine, 72 milyon insanın cebine 32 milyar dolar para koyuyor. 
[Honorable deputies, why do we do that? Because, we know that GAP puts 32 billion dollars into the 
country’s economy, into the pockets of 72 million in one and a half years.] 
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Example 2: parasal olarak, parasal olarak tekrar söylüyorum, kazancımız korkunç. Barajın ötesinde, 
onun su sathından faydalanmak suretiyle korkunç maddi kazançlar elde etti o ülke. 
[in monetary terms, I repeat, in monetary terms, our gains are terrific. The country has generated 
terrific economic gains through utilizing its water resources.] 
Label 3.6. Improving agricultural and industrial production and efficiency 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) increase agricultural production and efficiency in GAP region, (2) improve 
agriculture-based industries, (3) turn the region into the food base of the Middle East, and (4) turn the 
region into a trade base.  
Indicators: üretim artışı, tarıma dayalı sanayi, tahıl merkezi [increase in production, agriculture-based 
industries, grain base] 
Example 1: 3 yılda 1 mahsul yerine, 1 yılda 3 mahsul alabilmenin adıdır Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi. 
[Southeastern Anatolia Project is the name of harvesting three crops in one year instead of one crop in 
three years.] 
Example 2: GAP’ta Harran Ovası’nda susuz bir dönüm tarlayı ektiğinizde 200 kilo buğday alırsınız. 
Bunu bir sefer suladığınız zaman 1,200 kilo buğday alıyorsunuz, bu kadar basit bir hesap. 
[When you cultivate one acre of land without water in Harran Plain in GAP, you produce 200 
kilograms of wheat. When you irrigate this land once, you produce 1,200 kilograms of wheat. It is 
simple as that.] 
Label 3.7. Irrigating agricultural lands 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) bring water to dry lands of GAP region and (2) irrigate its agricultural lands. 
Indicators: tarımsal sulama, su ihtiyacı, arazi [agricultural irrigation, water need, land] 
Example 1: Değerli arkadaşlar, GAP Projesinin temeli, tarımsal sulamadır. Sulama projeleri 
tamamlanmadan, GAP’ın tamamlanmasından kimse bahsedemez. 
[Dear friends, the crux of GAP is agricultural irrigation. Unless the irrigation projects are completed, 
no one can claim that GAP is completed.] 
Example 2: GAP’ın anlamı bu. 2000 yıldır su görmeyen bir arazinin suya kavuşması demek 
yorulmamış, bakir toprakların işletmeye açılması demektir. 
[That’s what GAP is all about. It is irrigating the untouched, waterless lands for the past 2000 years and 
opening them to operation and management.] 
Label 3.8. Preventing migration and containing the local population  
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) provide employment opportunities for the local population, (2) curb migration 
from GAP region to larger cities, (3) contain the local population, and (4) reverse the migration trends.  
Indicators: istihdam, iş olanakları, göç [employment, job opportunities, migration] 
Example 1: Sulu tarıma bağlı sektörler güçlenecek, çalışacak ve istihdam gerçekleştirecektir. Yapılan 
tahminlere göre yaklaşık olarak 3.5-4 milyon insanımız ekmek sahibi olacaktır. 
[Sectors that depend on irrigation will grow stronger and provide employment opportunities. 
According to the estimates, 3.5-4 million people will be employed.] 
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Example 2: Yıllardır, Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi’nden büyük kentlerimize göç vardır. GAP’ın 
bitirilmesiyle bu göç sona erecek, üstelik tersine dönerek yıllardır büyük kentlere göç eden insanlar 
yine kendi topraklarına döneceklerdir. 
[For years, there has been migration from Southeastern Anatolia Region to our large cities. With the 
completion of GAP, this trend will end and, furthermore, be reversed. People who migrated to large 
cities will return to their lands.]  
Label 3.9. Producing energy 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to produce hydroelectric energy to meet Turkey’s growing energy demands. 
Indicators: enerji üretimi, hidroelektrik enerji, elektrik [energy production, hydroelectric energy, 
electricity] 
Example 1: Devletin buraya yaklaşımı ve stratejisi tamamıyla enerji üretimi üzerine olmuş.  
[The approach and strategy of the state have been entirely on energy production.] 
Example 2: Proje tamamlandığında, GAP ile Türkiye’nin toplam hidroelektrik enerjisinin üçte biri 
üretilecektir. 
[When the project is completed, GAP will have produced one-third of Turkey’s hydroelectric energy.] 
Label 3.10. Raising the infrastructural standards of GAP region 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) improve the transportation and infrastructural standards of the region and (2) 
facilitate the integration of GAP region to the rest of Turkey. 
Indicators: altyapı, teknik altyapı, ulaşım [infrastructure, technical infrastructure, transportation] 
Example 1: Öncelikli olarak ele alınıp altyapı kısımlarının bir an önce tamamlanması lazım. 
[Sections related to infrastructure must be handled with priority and completed at once.] 
Example 2: Ulaşım olanaklarının iyileştirilmesi temelde GAP nedeniyledir. Türkiye’nin bir sürü 
yerinde bugün bölünmüş yol yapılıyor ama GAP bunu biraz daha hızlandırmıştır. 
[The improvement of transportation opportunities is essentially linked to GAP. Highways are built 
everywhere in Turkey but GAP accelerated this a little bit more.] 
Label 3.11. Raising the socio-economic standards of the local population  
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) raise the income and welfare level of the local population and (2) focus on the 
social and cultural development of disadvantaged groups such as women, children, and youth.  
Indicators: sosyal kalkınma, sosyo-ekonomik, yaşam kalitesi [social development, socio-economic, 
quality of life] 
Example 1: Projenin gerçekleşmesi durumunda, bölge ekonomik ve sosyal yönden kalkınacak, fakirlik 
ve sefalet, bir daha dirilmemek üzere, tarihe gömülecektir. 
[With the realization of the project, the region will develop economically and socially. Poverty and 
misery will irreversibly be history.] 
Example 2: yeni şehirler yeni köyler kurulacak, yepyeni bir vatan köşesi imar görecek, bugün kuşun 
dahi içecek suyu bulunmayan - bir süre önce, 10 sene, 15 sene önce - bu ovalarda yarın dış ülkelere yaş 
meyve ve sebze ihraç edecek hava meydanları yapılacak.  
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[new cities, new villages will be established, a new country will be constructed, new airports that will 
be used to export fruits and vegetables to foreign countries will be constructed in these plains, where 
even birds were unable to find water to drink 10, 15 years ago.] 
Label 3.12. Rationally utilizing and efficiently developing natural resources188 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that GAP contributes to the 
state’s efforts to (1) have control over the flow of Euphrates and Tigris and (2) rationally and 
efficiently develop and utilize the natural resources of the region.  
Indicators: kaynakların değerlendirilmesi, kaynakların rasyonel kullanımı, kaynakların geliştirilmesi 
[utilizing resources, rational use of resources, developing resources] 
Example 1: Kaynağı ülkemizde bulunan akarsuları tamamen kontrol edebilmek için bu proje süratle 
bitirilmelidir. 
[This project should be completed quickly to be able to control the rivers originating from our country.] 
Example 2: Şimdi biliyorsunuz Fırat tamamen göl haline döndü. Su devletin kontrolünde. Dicle’de 
Ilısu yapılıyor, sonra Cizre yapılacak. 
[You know that Euphrates has become a lake. The water is under the control. Now Ilısu Dam is being 
built on Tigris, and later on Cizre Dam will be built.] 
 
 
 
 
                                                
188 This subcategory emerged both in parliamentary proceedings and the interviews with bureaucrats, experts, 
and intellectuals. 
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Main Category (Dimension) 4: Drawbacks of GAP 
Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker expresses any opinion about (1) a 
drawback of GAP, (2) its actual and potential harmful effects, (3) its unintended or unforeseen consequences, 
and (4) implications of these consequences on GAP region.   
Label 4.1. Delays and incompleteness 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that one of the drawbacks 
of GAP is (1) the deviation from the project schedule and (2) lingering of the project, which was 
supposed to be completed in 2005 according to GAP Master Plan.  
Indicators: uzamıştır, gecikmiştir, sapma [lingered, delayed, deviation] 
Example 1: Ama maalesef 90’lı yılların başında, 80’li yılların sonunda bitmesi gereken proje 25 yıllık 
zaman geçtiği halde bitmedi. 
[But unfortunately the project that was supposed to be completed at the beginning of the 90s, at the end 
of the 80s is still incomplete after 25 years have passed.] 
Example 2: Bu hızla giderse -AKP ne kadar daha iktidarda kalacak bilemiyoruz- eğer AKP devam 
ederse iktidara, bu yatırımların bitmesi için Türkiye’nin yüz on beş yıla ihtiyacı var. 
[We don’t know for how long AKP will govern but if AKP continues to govern, with that pace Turkey 
needs 115 years to complete these investments.] 
Label 4.2. Detachment from the local population 
Definition: A unit of coding falls under this category if a speaker expresses that one of the drawbacks 
of GAP is its failure to (1) bring the expected benefits to the local population, (2) be sensitive to the 
needs of the local population, and (3) shift from an “elitist” project to a popular/societal project.  
Indicators: bölge ihtiyaçlarından uzak, topluma yansıması yok, rant [far from the needs of the region, 
effects not felt within society, rent] 
Example 1: yani çalışıyorsun da sonunda bir şey çıkmıyor. Kendi kendimizi tatmin ettik. Bölgeyi 
kalkındıracağız, bölge ekonomisine büyük şeyler yapacağız diye projeler yaptık, şevkle çalıştık.  
[I mean, you work, but at the end nothing happens. We worked hard and made projects to develop the 
region and contribute to the region’s economy, but we only satisfied ourselves.] 
Example 2: “Yüzyılın projesi” olarak lanse edilen bu projenin odağında iyi niyet yok, çözüm yok, 
doğa yok, insanlık yok ve en önemlisi de o coğrafyada yaşayan Kürtler yok. 
[There is no good will, no solution, no environment, no humanity, and more importantly, no Kurds 
living in that geography within the focus of this project, introduced as the “project of the century.”] 
Label 4.3. Deviation from the integrated approach189 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the drawbacks of 
GAP is the failure to (1) handle the project in an integrated and harmonious manner and (2) implement 
sectoral projects in a synchronized manner. 
Indicators: entegre, dengesizlik, uyumsuzluk [integrated, disparity, lack of harmony] 
                                                
189 This subcategory emerged only in parliamentary proceedings. 
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Example 1: 1989 yılında GAP Master Planı hazırlanırken, tarım, sanayi, ulaştırma, eğitim, sağlık, 
kırsal kesim altyapı yaptırımlarını da içeren bir GAP entegre planıydı ancak görüyoruz ki son 
zamanlarda farklı bir uygulama var. 
[When GAP Master Plan was prepared in 1989, it was a plan containing agriculture, industry, 
transportation, education, health, and infrastructure investments, too. Yet, we see that this has changed 
lately.] 
Example 2: Ortada, entegre proje yok veya duruma entegre proje gibi bakıldığı yok. 
[As far as I can see, there is no integrated project, or nobody thinks it is an integrated project.]  
Label 4.4. Harming the environment and cultural and historical heritages 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the drawbacks of 
GAP is the harm the project does, or can do, to (1) the environment and (2) the historical and cultural 
heritages of GAP region specifically through flooding historical sites such as Samsat, Hasankeyf, 
Zeugma, and Halfeti. 
Indicators: tuzlanma, çoraklaşma, ekolojik tahribat [salinization, desertification, ecological 
destruction] 
Example 1: Geçen yılki bütçe konuşmalarında da değinmiştim. GAP projesi bir yanda sulamaya 
geçilen, özellikle Harran Ovası’nda çoraklaşma geçen yıla göre yüzde 30 oranındayken bu yıl yüzde 
35’lere doğru gitmektedir. 
[I mentioned it last year, too. While the desertification rate in Harran Plain was 30% last year, it is 
increasing to 35% this year.]  
Example 2: Bakın, Hasankeyf’i sular altında bırakıyorsunuz elektrik enerjisi uğruna. Cizre Barajı’yla 
tarihî yerleri sular altında bırakacaksınız.  
[Look, you are flooding Hasankeyf for the sake of energy production. With Cizre Dam, you are going 
to flood historical locations.] 
Label 4.5. Insufficient scientific research190 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the drawbacks of 
GAP is (1) the failure of the establishment of a partnership between the academia and public 
institutions and (2) the lack of high-quality scientific research that focuses on GAP-related topics.  
Indicators: çalışma, araştırma, araşırma-geliştirme [study, research, research and development] 
Example 1: Şimdi, Allah aşkına… Ilısu Barajı yapılıyor. Münih Üniversitesi bundan yedi sene önce 
geldi Ilısu Barajı’yla ilgili gövde barajından Hasankeyf’in batısına kadar bütün ekolojik yapıyı, bütün 
hayvan türlerini, canlı türlerini, hepsinin fizibilitesini, çalışmasını yaptı, 500 tane kitap bastı ve bu 
kitapları piyasaya vermedi. Türkiye’nin elinde var mı öyle bir çalışma? 
[Now, for God’s sake… Ilısu Dam is being constructed. Seven years ago, University of Munich came 
here and conducted a research on the ecology, animal species, species, and feasibility from Ilısu Dam 
to Hasankeyf. They published 500 books and did not release them. Does Turkey have such a study?] 
                                                
190 This subcategory emerged both in parliamentary proceedings and the interviews with bureaucrats, experts, 
and intellectuals. 
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Example 2: değişimleri ölçmek için çok geniş kapsamlı, topyekûn bir sosyal etki değerlendirmesinin 
yapılması lazım. İyileşme ancak bu şekilde ölçülebilir, böyle bir çalışmanın yapılması gerektiğine 
inanıyorum. 
[A very comprehensive social impact assessment should be made. Development can only be measured 
as such, I believe such a study should be conducted.] 
Label 4.6. Negligence of irrigation projects 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the drawbacks of 
GAP is (1) the prioritization of energy projects at the expense of neglecting irrigation projects, (2) the 
low realization level of the irrigation projects, and (3) the failure to implement irrigation projects in a 
synchronized manner.    
Indicators: sulama, enerji, gecikmeler [irrigation, energy, delays] 
Example 1: GAP’a sadece enerji projesi bakışından vazgeçilmelidir. Sulama gibi çok önemli 
ekonomik ayakların unutulmaması lazım olduğunu söylemek istiyorum. 
[It is time to stop conceiving GAP merely as an energy project. Its other stages, such as irrigation, 
should also be remembered.] 
Example 2: Biz sürekli savunduk tarımsal payın artırılmasını, sulamanın bitirilmesini. İşin en kötü 
tarafı da, Atatürk Barajı’nda 15-20 yıldır su tutuluyor, o su isale edilemedi, tarlaya aktarılamadı. Bu atıl 
kapasitedir. Biz suyunu kullanamadık. 
[We have always stood for increasing the share of agriculture and completing the irrigation projects. 
The worst is that the water is kept in Atatürk Dam for the past 15-20 years. That water could not be 
allocated to the lands. This is unutilized capacity. We could not use that water.] 
Label 4.7. Source of forced migration, income inequality, and social degeneration 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the drawbacks of 
GAP is (1) forced migration of inhabitants due to dam construction, (2) worsening of the income 
distribution and inequality, and (3) the emergence of various social problems.  
Indicators: küçük toprak sahibi, su altında kalmak, sosyal sorunlar [small landowner, submerging, 
social problems] 
Example 1: bu kentlerde yoksul ile zengin arasındaki yaşam standardı açısından bir uçurum yaratıldı.  
[In these cities, there emerged a huge difference between the poor and the rich in terms of living 
standards.] 
Example 2: Urfa’yı ayrı bir incelemek lazım. OSB’ler yapılıyor. Bir para oldu Araplarda. İlk önce 
onlar da bir zenginlik bunalımı yaşadılar. Ne oldu, ikinci, üçüncü hanımları aldılar, Antep’te 
pavyonlara gittiler, bir de araba aldılar. 
[Urfa needs to be examined separately. Organized industrial sites are being built. Arabs made huge 
amounts of money. First, they experienced a richness crisis. They married to their second, third wives. 
They went to nightclubs in Antep, and bought cars.] 
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Main Category (Dimension) 5: Factors behind GAP’s delay  
Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker expresses any opinion regarding (1) the 
direct and indirect factors behind the delay and incompletion of GAP and (2) the immediate need to address 
these factors to fully implement and successfully complete the project.  
Label 5.1. Administrative structure of GAP-BKİ  
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay of GAP is administrative problems within GAP-BKİ in the forms of (1) its ambiguous tenure, 
(2) its location and relocation between Ankara and Şanlıurfa, (3) its insufficient capacity, and (4) its 
lack of authority and sanction power.  
Indicators: yetkisizlik, yaptırım gücü olmayışı, taşınma [lack of authority, lack of sanction power, 
relocation] 
Example 1: GAP İdaresi çözülmüş bir idaredir. Çok kötüdür. Zamanla GAP İdaresi bir nevi turizm 
merkezine döndü. Ankara’da yeni bir binaya taşındılar, ondan sonra da orada çalışanlar bir bakarsınız 
pazartesi burada, salı Urfa’da, çarşamba burada, cuma yine Urfa’da. Ya yapmayın, bunu pekâlâ 
planlayabilirsiniz. Turizm şirketi gibi çalıştılar, bu olmaz.  
[GAP Administration is a dissolved administration. It’s terrible. In time, GAP Administration has 
turned into a tourism agency. They moved to a new building in Ankara, you see the employees in 
Ankara on Monday, in Urfa on Tuesday, here in Ankara on Wednesday, in Urfa again on Friday. Come 
on, you can plan it in advance. That’s unacceptable; they operated like a tourism agency.] 
Example 2: Değerli arkadaşlarım, GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi’nin istenen etkiyi gösteremediğini de 
biliyoruz. Bu idarenin istenen etkiyi gösteremeyişinin birincil nedeni yetkisiz oluşudur, 
koordinasyonda yaptırım gücünün olmayışıdır ve ödenek tahsis etme yetkisinin bulunmayışıdır. 
[Dear friends, we know that GAP-BKİ has not shown the desired effect. The primary reasons for that 
are its lack of authorization, sanction power in coordination, and authority in financial allocation.] 
Label 5.2. Foreign powers 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay of GAP is foreign powers, as they supposedly (1) consider GAP as a threat to themselves and 
(2) engage in activities to hinder Turkey to implement the project.  
Indicators: dış güçler, engellemek, terör [foreign powers, hinder, terror] 
Example 1: Ben komplolara inanan birisi değilim ama bu su meselesini dışarıdan kaşıyanlar olabilir. 
Mesela Almanya. Bu bölgeyle çok yakından ilgililer. Belki sizin araştırmanız da onun bir parçası 
olabilir. 
[Anyway, I don’t normally give credit to conspiracy theories but some actors may stir this water 
problem in the future. For instance Germany… Germany is so interested in this region, your research 
may be part of this, too.] 
Example 2: Bu nedenle, GAP Projesini istemeyenler, Türkiye’nin o bölgesinin kalkınmasını 
istemeyenler, o bölgedeki doğal potansiyelin değerlendirilmesini istemeyenler, direkt ve endirekt 
şekilde PKK terörüne destek vermişlerdir. 
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[For this reason, countries that do not want GAP project, that do not want Turkey’s that region to 
develop, that do not want Turkey to use the region’s natural potential have directly or indirectly 
supported PKK terrorism.] 
Label 5.3. Strong centralized governance structure 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay of GAP is (1) strong centralist orientation of Turkey and (2) insistence on governing the 
country in a centralized manner from the capital.  
Indicators: merkeziyetçilik, yerel yönetim, yerel kalkınma konsepti [centralism, local administration, 
local development concept] 
Example 1: Türkiye’nin idari ve siyasi dokusunun tümden değişmesi gerekiyor. Yeniden bir dizayn 
gerekiyor. Kaynakların yönetimi yerelin inisiyatifine bırakılmalı. GAP da bunun bir parçasıdır. 
[The administrative and political structure of Turkey should be changed completely. A new design is 
required. Administration of the resources should be left to the initiative of the local. This applies to 
GAP, too.] 
Example 2: Bölge kalkınma idareleri de merkezi otoritenin uzantıları, ajanslar da öyle. Bunun 
ademimerkeziyetçilikle hiçbir alakası yok. Kararlar Ankara’da veriliyor. 
[Both regional development administrations and development agencies are the extensions of the central 
authority. This has nothing to do with decentralization. Decisions are still given in Ankara.] 
Label 5.4. Poor and insufficient planning191 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay of GAP is (1) the lack of good and detailed planning and (2) mistakes in planning and 
engineering projects.  
Indicators: plansızlık, projesizlik, teknik problemler [the lack of plans, the lack of projects, technical 
problems] 
Example 1: Türkiye’nin iş yapış biçiminden de kaynaklanıyor. Aslında GAP başı sonu belli, adı sanı 
konmuş, iyi tanımlanmış bir proje değil. 77 yılındaki GAP ile 87 yılındaki GAP, 87 ile 97 arasındaki 
GAP farklı. 
[This is because of how Turks do business. GAP is not a well-defined project. GAP in year 1977 is 
different than the one in 1987, the one in 1987 is different than the one in 1997.] 
Example 2: Şimdi, normal olarak bakarsanız proje biter. Bir başlama yılı vardır, bitiş yılı vardır. 
Bitmesi gerekir. Yılan hikâyesine dönüyorsa, bitmiyorsa, ortada proje mroje yoktur. 
[Actually any project ends. There is a beginning year and an end year. It must end. If it becomes an 
endless story, this means there is no project at all.] 
Label 5.5. Cumbersome bureaucracy and the lack of coordination  
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay of GAP is (1) cumbersome bureaucratic state structure that slows down the implementation 
of the project and (2) the lack of coordination among various state agencies. 
                                                
191 This subcategory emerged only in interviews with bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals. 
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Indicators: koordinasyonsuzluk, bürokrasi, yaptırım gücü [lack of coordination, bureaucracy, sanction 
power] 
Example 1: Bürokraside ne oldu bilmiyorum. Bir devlet kültürü problemimiz var. Kapasite 
yönetimimiz yok. Bana bir arkadaşım öyle tanımladı. Yabancı kendisi, “sizde capacity building yok” 
dedi. Mevcut kapasiteyi yönetemiyoruz ve kullanamıyoruz.  
[I don’t know what happened in bureaucracy. We have a problem of state culture. We do not have 
capacity management skills. One of my foreigner friends told me that we did not have capacity 
building. We cannot manage and use the existing capacity.] 
Example 2: Tuzlanma mesela. DSİ’ye soruyorsun, tuzlanma sosyal bir problemdir diyor. Ben suladım, 
gerisine GAP İdaresi baksın. GAP İdaresi diyor, bu DSİ’nin işidir falan filan. Tuzlanıp gidiyor sonuç 
olarak. Bu tür koordinasyon sorunlarımız var. 
[For instance, salinization. When you ask DSİ, they say it is a social problem. They say they irrigated, 
the rest concerns the GAP Administration. GAP Administration says it is DSİ’s job… Meanwhile, 
salinization spreads. We have such coordination problems.] 
Label 5.6. The lack of financial resources 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay of GAP is (1) insufficient financial resources of the country and (2) insufficient amount of 
public funds allocated to GAP.  
Indicators: ödenek, yetersiz finans kaynakları, kıt kaynaklar [allocation, insufficient financial sources, 
scarce resources] 
Example 1: Gecikmeler teknik ve mühendislik gecikmeleri değil, kaynak gecikmesi. Yani yeterince 
kaynak bulunamadı Türkiye’nin ilk yıllarında. Türkiye’nin genel ekonomik durumuna bağlı olarak 
bulunamadı. 
[Delays are not about technical or engineering problems. They are about the lack of resources. Due to 
the situation of Turkey’s economy, sufficient funds could not be found during the first years.]  
Example 2: Bence en önemli mesele yeterli kaynağın tahsis edilmemesi. Paranız varsa bugünkü 
teknolojiyle, bugünkü Türkiye’nin kurumsal yapısında her şeyi yapıyorsunuz. Paranız yoksa olmuyor. 
[I think the most important problem is the lack of allocated resources. If you have the funds, you can 
do anything with today’s technology and Turkey’s institutional structure. If you don’t have the funds, it 
just does not happen.] 
Label 5.7. The lack of investments  
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay and incompletion of GAP is (1) the lack or absence of private sector investments in GAP 
region, (2) the lack of public-private partnership in investments, and (3) insufficient role the state has 
played in making investments in the region and attracting investors to the region.  
Indicators: özel sektör, kamu yatırımı, kamu-özel sektör ortaklığı [private sector, public investment, 
public-private partnership] 
Example 1: Şimdi serbest piyasa, neoliberalizm, her şeyi piyasaya bırakalım tarzında bir şey var. Tabii 
serbest piyasaya bırakırsanız GAP gibi bir projeyi olmaz. 
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[Now there is a tendency to embrace neoliberalism and leave everything to the markets. If you leave a 
project like GAP to free market, of course it does not work.] 
Example 2: “E, canım, zarar ediyor devlet teşkilatı, kurarsak, devlet ekonomik işletmesi kurarsak.” 
Zarar ederse, zarar etsin. Bu, ekonomik hesap işi değil, finansman, hesap işi değil, bunun gereğini 
yapacaksınız, bu bir barış projesi, mutlaka uygulayacaksınız. 
[“But the state is making a loss if we establish an economic enterprise run by the state,” they say. I 
don’t mind about the loss. This is not a matter of economic calculation, not a matter of finance. This is 
a peace project; you must do whatever is necessary.] 
Label 5.8. The lack of political will, stability, and competence 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay of GAP is (1) the lack of political will of the governments, (2) the lack of competence and 
skills of the politicians, (3) the lack of interest of the politicians, and (4) the lack of political stability 
and strong one-party governments.  
Indicators: siyasi irade, ilgisizlik, sahipsizlik [political will, indifference, lack of ownership] 
Example 1: Değerli arkadaşlarım, sorun, 1990’lardan itibaren GAP projesinin siyasi irade tarafından 
yeterince desteklenmemesindedir. GAP, 1930’lu yıllardan beri, yıllar boyunca sahipsiz kalmıştır. 
[Dear friends, the problem is the lack of political support given to GAP since the 1990s. GAP has been 
abandoned for years since the 1930s.]  
Example 2: Sürdürülebilir olması lazım, siyasi değişim olmaması lazım. Millî bir politika olması 
lazım. Diğer hükümetlerin de aynı şekilde devam ettirmesi lazım ki hedefe ulaşabilesiniz. 
[It must be sustainable. There must not be political change. There must be a national policy. Other 
governments should also pursue the same policies so that you can reach your goal.] 
Label 5.9. The lack of qualified personnel192  
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay of GAP is the lack of qualified personnel who are (1) knowledgeable in their fields and of 
GAP region and (2) tailored to the needs of the project.  
Indicators: kabiliyet, tecrübesiz, bilgisiz [ability, inexperienced, clueless] 
Example 1: Buradan bölgeye gidince ne yaşadık? Bir defa burada bölgesel kalkınma alanında 
uzmanlaşmış en az 70 yetişmiş personelimizi kaybettik. Oraya gittik, orada aldığımız personel yeni 
mezun personel, bölgesel gelişme alanında deneyimi yok. Kendi lisans eğitimini aldığı alanda bile bir 
deneyimi yok. Siz bunlarla orada GAP gibi bir projeyi izleyip, değerlendirip, yönetip yeni projeler 
ortaya koymaya çalışıyorsunuz. 
[What happened when we were relocated to the region? First of all, we lost at least 70 regional 
development experts. The ones we employed there were newly graduates without any experience. They 
did not even have any experience in their own fields. You are trying to measure, evaluate, and 
administer a project such as GAP with these people.] 
Example 2: Ama benim en büyük sıkıntım iyi sosyolog bulamamaktı. İşin ta başından beri iyi bir 
sosyoloğun olmasını istedim. Sosyologlar sosyal araştırmacı gibi çalıştılar GAP’ta. Efendim insanın 
                                                
192 This subcategory emerged only in interviews with bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals. 
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grubuna bakıp sonuçlar çıkarmaya çalıştılar. Bana kitle sosyolojisi lazım, onu kimse çıkartamadı. 
Bugün bile yok. 
[The gravest challenge I had was to find a sociologist. From day one, I wanted to have a qualified 
sociologist. Sociologists worked as if they were social researchers and tried to reach conclusions upon 
focusing on a specific group. I needed a mass sociologist, not social researchers. Even today, I don’t 
see any.] 
Label 5.10. The PKK 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
the delay of GAP is terrorism and the PKK, as the organization has (1) sabotaged the construction of 
dams in the past and (2) prevented the private sector investments to flow to the region.   
Indicators: terör örgütü, PKK, sabotaj [terrorist organization, PKK, sabotage] 
Example 1: Bölgede on yıl boyunca yaşanan terör, GAP’ın yarım kalmasının en önemli nedenidir; 
terör, önce bu projeyi vurmuştur. 
[Terrorism that has been going on for the past ten years is the most important reason why GAP is half-
completed. Terrorism primarily hit the project.] 
Example 2: Türkiye’ye çok bedeller ödetti. 300-400 milyar dolar gibi bir para harcandı terörle 
mücadeleye. GAP’a baktığınız zaman onun yanında esamesi bile okunmayan bir para. Bu terörle 
yapılan mücadele parası bölgeyi geliştirmek için kullanılsaydı zaten iş bu duruma kadar gelmezdi. 
[It cost Turkey a lot. Around 300-400 billion dollars were spent to fight against terrorism. When you 
compare it to money spent on GAP, it is huge. Had that money was spent on developing the region, 
these incidents would not have been experienced.] 
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Main Category (Dimension) 6: Factors behind GAP’s loss of popularity193 
Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker expresses any opinion regarding the direct 
and indirect factors behind GAP’s loss of popularity.  
Label 6.1. Changing development paradigms and practices  
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
GAP’s loss of popularity is (1) the shift in Turkey’s development paradigms and (2) implementation of 
new and ambitious megaprojects in the light of recently formulated development policies and practices. 
Indicators: yeni projeler, büyük projeler, popülarite [new projects, large projects, popularity] 
Example 1: Birincisi, özellikle son hükümet döneminde, AKP yönetiminde hep şu verildi: Bir tek 
Güneydoğu değil. Doğu, Karadeniz, Doğu Karadeniz, İç Anadolu, biz hepsine aynı yatırımı yapıyoruz. 
[To begin with, lately during AKP government, the underlying message was that “we don’t invest only 
in Southeastern Anatolia, we at the same time invest in the East, Black Sea, Inner Anatolia regions.”] 
Example 2: büyük projeler peşindeler. İşte İstanbul’a dünyanın en büyük havaalanı açılacak. İkinci 
Marmaray, Üçüncü Köprü yapılacak. Bunlar puan topluyor. 
[They are after huge projects. Soon the world’s largest airport will be opened in İstanbul. Second 
Marmaray, the Third Bridge… They are more alluring now.] 
Label 6.2. Completion of vote-garnering projects 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
GAP’s loss of popularity is (1) the completion of sensational development projects within GAP that 
can attract the voters and (2) relatively low importance of the remaining projects from the perspective 
of the local population.  
Indicators: propaganda, oy, vaatler [propaganda, vote, promises] 
Example 1: Barajlar bitti. Daha doğrusu büyük propagandası yapılacak şeyler bitti. 90’ların başlarında 
Atatürk Barajı bittiği zaman büyük bir ulusal şeydi.  
[Dams are completed. More precisely, things they can use as a propaganda tool are completed. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, it was sensational when Atatürk Dam was completed.] 
Example 2: Propaganda aleti olarak kullanabilecekleri, kamuoyu oluşturabilecekleri şeyler yapıldı bitti 
zaten. Bazı barajlar hâlâ yapılıyor ama o kadar önemli değil onlar. 
[Things they can use as a propaganda tool, things they can mold public opinion are already completed. 
Some dams are being constructed but they are of minor importance.] 
Label 6.3. Disappointment and loss of excitement 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
GAP’s loss of popularity is (1) disappointment and (2) the loss of excitement due to broken promises 
and unmet goals after the intiation of GAP. 
Indicators: bıkkınlık, başarısızlık, heyecan [weariness, failure, excitement] 
Example 1: Bu sefer de halkın güveni kalmıyor işte. O yapıda oluşmuyor. Hedeflediğimiz şeylere çok 
ulaşamıyoruz. O kadar para, yatırımlar, emek, insan gücü aktarıyoruz, insan birazcık sonuçlarını 
görmek istiyor. 
                                                
193 This category emerged only in interviews with bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals. 
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[Then the public loses its confidence in you. We cannot reach our goals. We allocate that much money, 
make investments, and make a great effort, but people would like to see the results.] 
Example 2: İlk yıllar çok iyiydi, başarılı işler yapıldı. O heyecan vardı. Heyecan yerini zamanla 
alışkanlığa devretti, o bıkkınlık yarattı. Yerel açısından umutsuzluk hâline geldi.  
[During the first years, everything was fine and successful. Excitement was there. In time, excitement 
was replaced by routine. That caused weariness. The project became a source of hopelessness.] 
Label 6.4. Indifference of the society 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker expresses that one of the factors behind 
GAP’s loss of popularity is the absence or lack of interest of society and the elites in the project.  
Indicators: ilgisizlik, bilgisizlik, Türk toplumu [indifference, cluelessness, Turkish society] 
Example 1: Yoksa çoğu parlamenter bile bilmiyor Güneydoğu’yu, yatırımları, kaynakları. Çoğu insan 
bilmiyor. Bunun için de ben kimseyi suçlamıyorum, çok hızlı tüketiyoruz artık… Saatle tüketiyoruz. 
[Even many parliamentarians have no idea about the Southeastern Anatolia, investments, resources. 
Many people have no idea. I don’t blame anyone for this, we consume everything very fast 
nowadays… We consume by hours.] 
Example 2: üniversiteden sınıf arkadaşım “Ben GAP’ta çalışıyorum” dediğim zaman Kâzım 
Karabekir’deki GAP Oteli’nde çalıştığımı sanıyorlardı. O zaman da GAP’tan haberdar olmayan çok 
kişi vardı. Kurumsal olarak ele alırsanız üst düzey hariç alt düzeyin de bir bilgisi yoktu. 
[When I was telling my friend from the university that I was working at GAP, she thought I was 
working at the GAP Hotel on Kâzım Karabekir Street. Even then there were a lot of people who were 
uninformed about GAP. Institutionally speaking, except high-level bureaucrats, low levels did not have 
any idea.] 
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Main Category (Dimension) 7: Miscellaneous  
Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker expresses any opinion that does not belong 
to the categories above, but is still important in terms of understanding the governance of GAP and processes 
the project has been going through.   
Label 8.1. Foundation and coordination task of GAP-BKİ194 
Definition: Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker expresses any opinion 
regarding the history of GAP-BKİ and its current functions.  
Indicators: koordinasyon, GAP İdaresi, GAP Master Plan [coordination, GAP-RDA, GAP Master 
Plan] 
Example 1: kurum ve kuruluşlar arasındaki koordinasyonu sağlamak üzere, Başbakanlığa bağlı 
Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Teşkilatı kurulmuştur. 
[GAP Regional Development Administration, working under the Prime Ministry, was founded to 
ensure coordination among institutions.] 
Example 2: İdare dünyadaki gelişmeleri sürekli izler, takip eder, gelişmeye açıktır. Ama gördüklerini 
olduğu gibi almaz, yerel gerçekleri göz önünde bulundurarak uyarlar, sonra uygular. Bu olumlu bir 
noktadır bence.  
[The Administration follows the developments in the world. But it does not adopt these developments 
as they are. It adjusts them to local realities and then applies. I think this is a positive point.] 
Label 8.2. Political debates to claim ownership of GAP195 
Definition: Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker expresses any opinion 
regarding which political party or which political leader has the right to claim ownership of GAP. 
Indicators: Demirel, Özal, Erdoğan 
Example 1: Neden Anavatan Partisi tarafından da destekleniyor? Çünkü, GAP’ın gerçek mimarı 
Anavatan Partisi kurucusu merhum Turgut Özal da ondan dolayı, değerli arkadaşlarım. 
[Why is it supported by the Motherland Party? Because, the real architect of GAP is the founder of the 
Motherland Party, Turgut Özal, dear friends.] 
Example 2: Bu vesileyle de, Sayın Süleyman Demirel’i buradan minnetle ve şükranla anmayı da bir 
vazife biliyorum. Yani, bir projeyi başlatan, Türkiye’nin ufkunu açan değerli insanları her zaman 
anmak durumundayız ve onlara minnet ve şükranlarımızı her vesileyle ifade etmek durumundayız. 
[I take this opportunity and remember Honorable Süleyman Demirel with gratitude. We always have to 
commemorate and respect those who initiated the project and expanded our horizons.]  
Label 8.3. GAP policies of AKP196 
Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a speaker expresses any opinion regarding the GAP 
policies of AKP and evaluates whether these policies were helpful (framed as supportive) or harmful (framed as 
opposing) for the implementation and the future of the project.  
Label 8.3.1. Supportive views 
                                                
194 This subcategory emerged both in parliamentary proceedings and interviews with bureaucrats, experts, and 
intellectuals. 
195 This subcategory emerged only in parliamentary proceedings. 
196 This subcategory emerged both in interviews with the MPs and bureaucrats, experts, and intellectuals.  
Appendix D: The coding frame 
 303 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker (1) expresses that GAP policies of 
AKP have been determined and straight to the point in the past 13 years, (2) takes a supportive stance 
towards these policies, (3) praises the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for his contributions 
to the project, and (4) praises GAP Action Plan (2008-2012). 
Indicators: GAP Eylem Planı, başbakan, ödenek, [GAP Action Plan, prime minister, allocation]  
Example 1: 2005’te sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Diyarbakır’da açıklamış olduğu Eylem 
Planı’ndan sonra GAP’ın kaderi değişmeye başlamıştır. 
[After honorable Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made the Action Plan public in Diyarbakır in 2005, the 
destiny of GAP began to change.] 
Example 2: Dolayısıyla en planlı ve en fazla kaynak aktaran, proje bir an önce bitsin de maksimum 
verim sağlansın diye uğraş veren hükümetlerin başında AK Parti geliyor. 
[Therefore, AK Party is the leading government that allocates resources the most in order to complete 
the project as soon as possible and attain maximum efficiency.] 
Label 8.3.2. Opposing views 
Definition: A unit of coding falls into this category if a speaker takes a critical stance and expresses 
that (1) the primary motivation of AKP is to seek political and economic rent rather than addressing the 
problems of the region and (2) AKP lacks realistic plans and motivation to complete the project.  
Indicators: siyasi rant, oy, gerçekçi olmayan [political rent, vote, low priority, unrealistic] 
Example 1: Tamamıyla bir simülasyon, bir yanılsama. 2008’de 11 bakanla Erdoğan Diyarbakır’da 
GAP’a muazzam yatırım yapacaklarına dair bir çıkış yaptı. Ancak o günden bugüne kadar verilen 
sözün yüzde 20’si dahi gerçekleşmemiş. 
[It is entirely a simulation, an illusion. Erdoğan, with 11 ministers, stated in Diyarbakır in 2008 that 
they would make huge investments to GAP. Since then, not even 20% of the promises are kept.] 
Example 2: Ben AKP’nin bu kalkınma planlarına gerektiği değeri verdiğini düşünmüyorum. AKP her 
alana siyasi gözlükle bakıyor. Ne kadar oy alırım, ne kadar kaybederim, o gözlükle bakıyor.  
[I don’t think AKP is giving enough importance to these development plans. AKP evaluates everything 
as part of politics. They evaluate everything on the basis of how many votes they would attract or lose.] 
 
